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The Political Economy of Environmental Conflict and the Investigation of Business 
Power 
it 
This thesis investigates the ability, exercise and consequences of business power in 
environmental. conflict in advanced capitalist society. Research into this subject has tended to 
fall into either of two camps; system-wide theoretical studies from within political economy or 
narrower empirical studies by neo-pluralist scholars. It is argued there is a need to reconcile 
these levels to see how the various mechanisms of influence coinCide. The critical realist 
philosophy of science is used to clear the path for the project, detailing, among other things, an 
understanding of the nature of social being and of social scientific investigation. The various 
strands of literature on business power and the environment are reconciled in a two stage 
analytical framework. The first part of that framework deals with the dilemma of theorising 
about class in environmental conflict. The solution to that problem is found in value-form. 
This approach allows structural connections to be made between socioeconomic class and 
types of substantive value relations with the natural world. The second part of the framework 
deals with the issues of power and politics. It integrates the wider political economy approach 
and the narrower mechanisms of business power studied usefully by neo-pluralists. Two in-
depth historical case studies of environmental conflict are carried out; the Black Head conflict 
over a quarry operation near Dunedin, and the much larger Wbanganui River Minimum Rows 
dispute, both throughout the 1980s. At the end of each study the principles of the analytical 
framework are investigated in turn. It is ultimately concluded that the ability of business to 
dominate within this context is not absolute, yet it is real and pervasive. Such dominance poses 
a serious impediment to the achievement of sustainable relationships with the natural world, 
and the ability of people to participate in decision-making in respect to their environments. 
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General Introduction 
Investigating Business Dominance in Environmental Conflict 
The purpose of this thesis is to better understand the phenomenon of business dominance in 
environmental conflict in advanced capitalist society. To investigate how, on the one hand, 
business values the world, and on the other hand, the way that power is derived from the 
ownership and control of commodity production. And, to investigate how these two 
elements together systematically subvert both the possibility of sustainable relationships 
with the natural world, and the ability of people to participate in decision-making in respect 
of their environments. The focus of the project is clear - it is wholly concerned with the 
ability of business} to dominate within environmental conflict, the exercise of this capacity, 
and the consequences of such dominance. 
As a methodological response to this goal the thesis is organised into three parts. 
Part One is made up of three preparatory chapters that will perform a number of crucial 
functions; to explain and defend the purpose of the study and the approach taken, to provid~ 
a methodological foundation for the thesis, and to ground the project in the literature on 
business power and environmental conflict. These threads weave through the first three 
chapters. In Chapter One there are two parts to the argument that come together to justify 
and motivate the project. On the one hand, I construct a prima facie case for the 
examination of business power and dominance in environmental conflict. That case is 
founded on the twin imperatives of the universal need to reduce environmental harm and 
ensure sustainable relationships with the natural world, and the need to ensure that all people 
are able to meaningfully participate in decision-making about their environments. I argue 
that business power is a prima facie obstacle to those ends and must therefore be thoroughly 
explained. On the other hand, I argue that while there is a substantial body of research into 
this phenomenon, there is a need to understand how the various strands of scholarship can 
be reconciled, and to see how the various mechanisms of business influence coincide, 
conflict, cause one another, and are together articulated in practice. 
1 On the whole, I use the tenns 'business' and 'capital' interchangeably throughout the thesis. In Chapter Four, 
which is the flrst part of the analytical model, I defme the capitalist as a producer of commodities (where 
production is used in the wider Marxian sense of the term). 
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In Chapter Two I return to basics and engage with the critical realist philosophy of 
science. My intention is to make explicit a range of important assumptions about the objects 
and practices of science in general and social science in particular. In the immediate context 
of this thesis I do so to help work out how the strands of scholarship into environmental 
conflict can be brought together and empirically studied. On a more general level, it is 
hoped that such an engagement will lay the foundations for a pluralistic, critical and possibly 
emancipatory resource management. In Chapter Three I first explore some wider avenues of 
scholarship on environmental conflict. I do so partly because they provide useful insights 
into the nature and dynamics of environmental conflict, and partly because this thesis 
reflects back upon those discourses. I finish that chapter by setting out the particular method 
of the study; the development of an analytical framework, the construction of two in depth 
historical case studies, and the systematic application of the framework to the investigation 
of each study. 
It is in Part Two that I develop the analytical framework that is the hub of the thesis. 
The framework consists of two main elements. Chapter Four is concerned with the issue of 
value-form. I do so first as a solution to the problem of theorising about class in 
environmental politics and conflict. I argue that a systematic causal connection can be made 
between value type (and hence social transactions with nature) and socioecolWmic fonn. I 
suggest that value-form can be used as a basis for categorising social actors in environmental 
politics - in tendential terms business is essentially motivated by commodified values, and 
environmentalists' non-commodified values (ie. the value-holdings of participants can be 
used as a basic organising principle for the study of power and politics). The second reason 
for doing this is that it enables a systematic connection to be made between socioeconomic 
form and environmental harm. For example, I assert that the abstraction and disconnection 
involved in the process of commodification for exchange is inherently problematical for the 
attainment of a healthy relationship with the natural world (ie. a sustainable one). 
Chapter Five contains the more extensive component of the framework that focuses 
upon the power and politics element. This part of the framework operates on two levels (for 
it is an attempt to reconcile some of the theories of business power in environmental 
politics). The first works at the level of broad structural relations that persist between 
business, the state and other social agents (in this case environmental actors) in advanced 
capitalist societies. It is based upon 'state theory' - in this case the work of the post-
Marxistlneo-Weberian Claus Offe - and while that theory is in a sense state centred, it 
provides an insight into how business derives power at the broad s'tructural level. In the 
second part I draw together a series of five narrower mechanisms of business power that 
have been studied by both liberal and Marxist scholars alike. I bring the two levels together 
within the framework in order to understand how they are functionally connected. 
In contrast to this initial broadly theoretical development, Part Two of the thesis is 
dedicated to the conduct of two extensive empirical case-studies of environmental conflict: 
(a) The Black Head dispute - involving a quarry operation on a coastal promontory near 
Dunedin, during the 1980s, and; (b) The Whanganui River minimum flows dispute - which 
was over the diversion of water out of the Whanganui River headwaters for the purposes of 
hydro-electricity generation - the main period of inquiry here also the 19805. These studies 
are driven by the analytical framework, with principles and concepts derived from political-
GenerallntroductWn: Investigating Business Dominance in Environmental Conflict 3 
economy being applied to the empirical examination of business dominance in 
environmental conflict. However, the investigation - identification and understanding - of 
those structures requires the transcendence of disciplinary boundaries (for example, the 
assessment of who prevailed at a particular juncture will involve judgement across a range 
of substantive disciplines). Because of this the studies will at times appear extremely broad, 
their content ostensibly removed from the immediate concerns of the framework, but this 
amplitude is ultimately justified. 
Each of the case studies is conducted over four chapters. The first three chapters in 
each study are broadly empirical (although the types of information I provide are ultimately 
shaped by the needs of the analytical framework), and I build up a full contextual 
understanding of each conflict, setting out, among other things, the historical genesis, 
substantive discourses, processes of conflicts and outcomes. It is only when I have 
developed a full picture of each that I will seek to systematically investigate if, why and how 
the various posited mechanisms were present or not and how they connected with one-
another. I do so in Chapters Nine and Thirteen respectively and they are the interpretive 
crux of the thesis. 
Before I proceed, I would like to emphasise that while the roots of the study lie in 
political economy it is a resource management thesis and is thus intended to be thoroughly 
interdisciplinary and integrative, or as I argue in Chapter Two; at once multi-disciplinary, 
inter-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary. 
1 
The Environmental Problematique, Environmental Conflict 
and Business Dominance 
1.1 Introduction 
On the environmental front, the situation could hardly be worse .... Every major indicator shows 
a deterioration in natural systems: forests are shrinking, deserts are expanding, croplands are 
losing top-soil, the stratospheric ozone layer continues to thin, greenhouse gases are 
accumulating, the number of plant and animal species is diminishing, air pollution has reached 
health-threatening levels in hundreds of cities, and damage from acid rain can be seen on every 
continentI 
The project of emancipation is with us for the duration flrstly, because it represents the moral 
dimension of globalisation, so that there must now always be a thrust to extend moral discourses 
to all humans. Secondly, in our particular contingent world, it is increasingly looking as if 
human emancipation:'" not any (impossible) final emancipation, but emancipation from some of 
the chains that currently bind enormous groups of human beings - is a precondition of human 
survival. Contra Baumann, sociology cannot liberate itself from this project, in which it plays a 
crucial role by interpreting and theorising social reality, by producing evidence and counter-
evidence, and by observing and summarising social practices in the process of change.2 
The two passages quoted above represent two foundational strands which together underpin 
this thesis. On the one hand, there are the overwhelming material and social imperatives 
inherent in the 'environmental problematique' - manifold problems varying in scale, 
imminence and complexity - and on the other hand, there is the practice of social science with 
its intrinsic emancipatory role.3 This thesis arises out of, and inhabits, this dialectic, with 
contemporary social theory being utilised to seek a better understanding of the nature of 
business power and dominance in environmental conflict within advanced capitalist societies. 
There are two tasks that are required of this first chapter. First, the issue must be set in 
context, and secondly, the core issues must be clearly identified. This section is thus structured 
1 L. Brown. et al., 1991, State oj the World: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Towards a Sustainable 
Society W.W. Earthscan, New York, p. 5. 
2 C. New, 1995, "Sociology and the Case for Realism" The Sociological Review No. 43, November, p. 825. 
3 "Emancipation" is defined here as "the transition from an unwanted, unnecessary and oppressive situation to a 
wanted and/or needed and empowering or more flourishing situation". R. Bhaskar, 1994, Plato Etc. The 
Problems oj Philosophy and their Resolution Verso, London, p. 253. See discussion below in 1.3. (ii)( d). 
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so as to progress from the general imperatives of the environmental problematique, through the 
pandemic of environmental conflict, to the specific subject of business dominance within such 
conflict. I begin with the global perspective of the environmental problematique or crisis. I 
argue that the environmental disputes that form the core of this thesis must be understood as 
both symptomatic and constitutive of the destructive tendencies that ultimately give rise to this 
crisis. I proceed to examine the broad characteristics of the environmental problematique and 
the imperatives that arise out of that context. I then move on to construct a prima facie case for 
the study of business dominance in environmental conflict within advanced capitalist society; 
specifically, New Zealand society. In doing this I will review the existing literature on 
business dominance in environmental conflict and beyond, and will argue that there are 
deficiencies in the literature that need to be addressed. 
1.2. The Environmental Problematique 
Much of this thesis focuses upon two specific episodes of conflict. Each dispute is in and of 
itself of some significance. Each dispute involves considerable material and social 
consequences - through both the effects of conflict per se, and the effects of the concrete 
questions at their core. However, it is vital that these disputes are set in context, for although 
each episode represents a unique historical conjuncture of causal forces, they are also 
considered here to be symptomatic, and indeed constitutive, of wider destructive tendencies. 
These tendencies are manifest within what has been variously referred to as the environmental 
'problematique', 'dilemma', 'challenge', 'crisis', etc. 
On one level these labels represent a simple categorisation, or a general aggregation of 
innumerable instances of existing (and potential) environmental destruction. On another level 
they connote a holism in which singular events and threats are to varying degrees connected 
within systems, which are themselves in tum connected, and so on.4 In this way the 
environmental problematique exists contemporaneously as a global, national, regional and 
local issue - in "a seamless net of causes and effects".5 
Considered in the first sense, as a general aggregation, the problematique differs little in 
qualitative terms from previous periods in history. The difference is primarily one of scale. 
Successive waves of economic expansion have without exception been associated with new 
forms of environmental threat. For example, in recent history there have been the 
unprecedented transformations of the industrial revolution which involved a myriad of 
environmental problems; from the pollution problems attendant with the newly industrialised 
cities, natural resource depletion on a global scale, the impacts of mechanised and increasingly 
large scale agriculture, to the destruction of large tracts of pristine wildemess.6 In these terms 
the problematique represents a widening in type and scale of effects. Some idea of the more 
contemporary scope of effects can be gleaned from a 1987 United Nations Environment 
4 Holistic causality "may be said to operate when a complex coheres in such a way that (a) the totality, i.e the 
form or structure of the combination, causally co-determine each other, and so causally co-determine the 
whole." R. Bhaskar, 1994, Plato Etc. p. 254. 
5 World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987, Our Common Future: Report of the Commission 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 5. 
6 Cf. R. Wilkinson, ''The English Industrial Revolution" in D. Wilkinson, (ed.), 1988, The Ends of the Earth: 
Perspectives on Modern Environmental History Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Ch. 4. 
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Programme report State of the Environment, which discusses the crisis in terms of: Air quality 
and atmospheric issues; Land, water and food production; Energy and transport; Chemicals and 
hazardous waste; Environmental health; Military activity, and; Social and economic issues.? 
Such a list is by no means exhaustive, nor are the categories exclusive. Notable omissions are 
threats to bio-diversity and destruction of natural habitat. 
It is issues such as that of bio-diversity which encapsulate the second, holistic, nature of 
the problem. Considered in isolation, the loss of individual species, although of varied 
consequence (perceived and real, immediate and long-term etc.) will very rarely have 
shattering global effects. However the cumulative effects of biotic population depletion and 
extinction are now thought to be of huge importance, both for loss of specific human uses (eg. 
pharmaceutical production or for agricultural genetic stocks) and for the implications for wider 
ecosystem function and survival (in addition to fundamental ethical considerations).8 Other 
examples of this global holism are climate change9, contamination of the oceans and depletion 
of stratospheric ozone. 
The environmental problematique is thus stratified, consists of a panoply of issues, and 
is highly integrated across space and time. Two associated factors complete the picture: risk 
and uncertainty. The historical escalation in anthropogenic environmental change has been 
paralleled by an increase in scientific understanding of bio-physical processes. 10 Indeed, the 
very formulation of the 'environmental problematique' with its systemic connotations is itself 
derivative of conceptual developments in ecology.ll This expansion in scientific knowledge 
has, however, been double edged, for its corollary has been increased appreciation of the 
complex, chaotic and opaque nature of these open systems. As a result decision-makers 
confront acute problems with verification and prediction. 12 Human beings are faced with a 
mixture of insight and uncertainty. Furthermore, this uncertainty, coupled with the massive 
scale and fundamental nature of the crisis (the possibility of global resource shortages, 
ecological collapse, etc.) entails unprecedented levels of risk. 13 It is precisely this level of risk 
that differentiates the problematique from previous states of socia-ecological being. 
? E. Hinnawi, and M. Hashimi, 1987, The State of the Environment United Nations Environment Programme, 
Butterworths, London, passim. 
8 Most notably: World Resources Institute et. al., 1992, Global Biodiversity Strategy: Guidelines for Action to 
Save, Study and Use the Earth's Biotic Wealth Sustainably and Equitably World Resources Institute, 
Washington D.C. Also see: Department of Conservation, 1996, A Bio·diversity Strategy for New Zealand 
Department of Conservation, Wellington. 
9 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recently concluded that the world must reduce its 
emissions of green house gases by some 60-80 per cent if it is to prevent a dangerous acceleration of global 
warming. E. Von Weizsiicker, 1995, "Let Prices Tell the Ecological Truth" Our Planet Vol.7, No.1, pp. 18-
19. 
10 Although not necessarily other forms of environmental understanding .. For. example the wealth of ecological 
knowledge accumulated by indigenous peoples, especially in more homeostatic cultures. 
11 A very useful review of the development of biogeochemical understanding and the attendant conceptual 
evolution is provided by Lynton Caldwell in: 1990, Between Two Worlds: Science. The Environmental 
Movement and Policy Change Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 38-54. 
12 One example of 'this is in meteorology, where early analysts were convinced that predictive long-range models 
of global climate were a matter of identifying a sufficient range of variables together with the development of 
powerful mathematical programs. Whereas today these systems are seen as open and incredibly chaotic, and 
hence subject to greater uncertainty. 
13 There has long been, and undoubtedly will continue to be, a vigorous debate about the 'real' levels of 
environmental threat/so The position here is that although global carrying capacities and ecological thresholds 
may be contested and highly uncertain, there has been over recent decades a generally recognised decline in 
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In the opening paragraph of this chapter r asserted that there are overwhelming material 
and social imperatives inherent in the environmental problematique. Put simply: given the 
existence of the problematique there is an imminent and universal need to reduce 
environmental harm. This assertoric imperative can be considered as a fact~value argument 
(within the confines of a particular understanding of a fact 14). On this basis (which is that 
advocated by critical realists 15), "claims about what human beings and the world are like, ... 
can allow us both to recommend values as (prima facie) universally applicable and to argue 
about their application". Consequently, the argument here is that "although no fonnal 
contradiction is involved, it does not make sense to draw the conclusion that moral responses to 
environmental destruction are optional, or entirely a matter of taste".16 Diagnosis involves 
nonnative, hortatory and action elements. 
It is not possible here to traverse the range of specific responses to actual and potential 
instances of environmental destruction - such imperatives are stratified and inter-connected, 
ranging in size, urgency and complexity. It is possible, however, to identify an emergent 
generic imperative beyond the simple injunction 'to reduce environmental hann'. As with the 
definition of the problematique, the fonnulation of a broad imperative has been founded upon 
developing ecological knowledge. As noted above, to come to understand the effects of 
anthropogenic disturbance in natural systems necessarily requires knowledge of the operation 
of those systems, and such knowledge is in turn seen as providing a basis for recommending 
preferred states. Thus, certain principles which originate in scientific ecology 17, most 
significantly the idea that ecosystems organise themselves to maximise their sustainability, 
have been appropriated and extended "through the social sciences and humanities to 
philosophy, to religion, and to politics"18. This extension is more than just the employment of 
environmental quality. Cf. L. Brown, C. Havin, and H. Kane, 1992, Vital Signs: The Trends that are Shaping 
Our Future W. W. Norton, New York. 
14 The notion of a fact here differs from the positivist Wlderstanding. For positivists the "properties possessed by 
facts qua social objects are transformed into qualities belonging to them as natural things. Fetishism, by 
naturalising facts, at once collapses and destratifies their generative or sustaining social context and the mode 
of their production, reproduction and transformation in time, ipso facto dehistoricising and external ising them. 
The fact form thus acts as an ideology of what Kuhn has called 'normal science', obscuring from scientists and 
non-scientists alike the historically specific structures and relations generating sense experience in science." 
Thus for critical realists "facts are not what are apprehended in sense-experience (things, events, etc.), but the 
products of the conceptual and cognitive structures in terms of which our apprehension of things is organised". 
R. Bhaskar, 1986, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation Verso, London, pp. 283-4. 
15 See Chapter Two. 
16 C. New, 1995, "Sociology and the Case for Realism" pp. 815-6, also; A. Collier, 1994, Critical Realism: An 
Introduction to Roy Bhaskar's Philosophy Verso, London, p. 182. 
17 Fritjof Capra lists eight basic ecological principles: interdependence, ecological cycles (continual), energy 
flows (driven by solar energy), partnership (involving competition and cooperation), flexibility, diversity, 
coevolution, and sustainability. For Capra sustainability is seen as the overriding goal of the system. Such a 
view may however be overly teleological, and it is sufficient here to characterise these principles in realist 
terms as transfactual tendencies. In my view a more balanced characterisation of ecosystem function is that 
provided by John Dryzek: "Human activity in the ecological realm proceeds, then, in the context of 
interpenetrated, dynamic systems which exhibit emergent properties. Dynamism is manifested in homeostasis, 
adaptiveness and succession"(my emphasis). F. Capra, and G. Pauli, (eds), 1995, Steering Business Towards 
Sustainability United Nations University Press, Tokyo, p. 6; J. Dryzek, 1987, Rational Ecology: Environment 
and Political Ecorwmy Basil Blackwell, Oxford. pp. 26-8; An excellent discussion of the meaning of 
sustainability can be found in: M. Redclift, 1987, Sustainable Development: Exploring the Contradictions 
Methuen, London, Ch. 2. Also, A. Dragun, and K. Jakobsson, (eds)' Sustainability and Gobal Environmental 
Policy: New Perspectives Edward Elgar, Lyme NH, Chapters 3 and 4. 
18 L. Caldwell, 1990, Between Two Worlds: Science, The Environmental Movement and Policy Change 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 11. Some prominent ecologists deplore the cooption of the term 
'ecosystem', which they understand in a limited sense as a scientific concept and necessary tenn of both 
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ecological metaphor and analogy, but rather a realisation that human activity is ultimately 
constrained (and enabled) by ecological structures and processes. Ecology and economy are 
totally inter-woven. l9 
The purest nonnative expression of this connection, and of the baseline ecological 
imperative, is the notion of 'environmental sustainability'. Dietz and Van der Straaten provide 
a precise definition of this: 
The (aggregate) environmental impacts shall not impair the functioning of resource regenerative 
systems and waste assimilative systems and the use of non renewable resources of which is 
compensated for by equivalent increases in supplies of renewable or reproducible substitutes.20 
Such a definition stands in full recognition of the environmental crisis and its attendant 
physical imperatives. It is necessary, however, to consider the international context and the 
political response to this idea. 
The articulation of sustainabiIity within the wider environmental debate, and its 
overarching application to the relationship between people and the environment, began in the 
late 1%Os gaining increasing importance through such fora as the 1972 United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature World Conservation Strategy in 1980,21 the 1987 World Commission 
on Environment and Development,22 and more recently the 1992 United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro.Z3 While the essential concept of 
'environmental sustainability' has influenced this debate, it has been politically subsumed 
within the broader and less distinct notion of 'sustainable development'. This has been defined 
by the Brundtland Commission as "development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability offuture generations to meet their own needs".24 This understanding 
descriptive and analytical ecology. Instead, they advocate the use of 'ecocomplex' and 'superecocompIex' to 
refer to larger agglomerations. N. Polunin, "Ecosystems" in: R. Paehlke, (ed.), 1995, Conservation and 
Environmentalism: An Encyclopedia Garland Publishing, New York, pp. 205-6. 
19 This point was made by the Russian ecologist W.[V.]1. Vernadsky in 1945: "Until recently the historians and 
the students of the humanities, and to a certain extent even the biologists, consciously failed to reckon with·the 
natural laws of the biosphere, the only terrestrial envelope where life can exist. Basically man cannot be 
separated from it; it is only now that this indissolubility begins to appear clearly and in precise terms before 
us." In: "The Biosphere and the Noonsphere" American Scientist 33 (January), p. 4. Roy Bhaskar makes a 
similar point while criticising the mind/body dichotomy in philosophy, stating that "social structure is 
embedded in, conditioned by and in tum efficacious on the rest of nature, the ecosphere". 1989, Reclaiming 
Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy Verso, London, pp. 6-7. This is not, however, to 
advocate a homology of social systems with ecosystems and "the treatment of man as just another species 
within ecosystems. Human societies possess unique devices for dealing with any disequilibrium in their 
relationships with biological ecosystems. These devices - such as social choice mechanisms - have no 
necessary direct counterparts in biological ecosystems." 1. Dryzek, 1987, Rational Ecology: Environment and 
Political Economy Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p. 42. 
20 F. Dietz, and 1. van der Straaten, 1992, "Rethinking Environmental Economics: Missing Links Between 
Economic Theory and Environmental Policy" Journal of Economic Issues Vol. 26, No.1, pp. 27-51. 
21 International Union for the Conservation of Nature, 1980, World Conservation Strategy IUCN, Gland, 
Switzerland. According to Redclift this report marked a watershed in thinking about the environment and 
development M. Redclift, 1987, Sustainable Development: Exploring the Contradictions p. 21. 
22 World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, Our Common Future: Report of the Commission 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Z3 Cf: United Nations, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development UN Document 
A/CONF.15I1Rev.l; United Nations, 1992, Report of the United Nations Conference on Ellvironment and 
Development (Agenda 21) UN Document A/CONF.151.26. 
24 World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, Our Common Future p. 8. Various govenunental 
and business interests have diluted and possibly compromised the core ecological concept, proferring more 
liberal, or growth oriented interpretations of this term. For a discussion of this see: G. Dunkley, 1992, The 
Greenillg of the Red: Sustain ability, Socialism and the Environmental Crisis Pluto Press, New South Wales, 
pp. 13-20. 
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acknowledges that the complexities and uncertainties of the bio-physical dilemma are 
compounded by the socioeconomic dimension and the concomitant array of human 
aspirations:25 First, there is the issue of appropriate end-states (not final). Questions such as: 
What are the limits upon growth? What type of growth is appropriate? Should growth per se 
be in question?26 Should we distinguish between growth and development? And are 
development and environmental protection in a trade-off relationship or are they 
complementary? Extremely critical are the issues of spatial and temporal dislocation - that is, 
the problems of unequal standards of living (ie. global, intergenerational) and the non-
correspondence of ecological and human costs and benefits. All these issues certainly 
complexify sustainability as a goal. Some observers are concerned that they dilute and confuse 
the core concept of environmental sustainability. They argue that it is a non-negotiable bottom 
line that must be tightly defined and given normative primacy - other "desiderata, such as 
poverty alleviation, freedom, democracy, gender balance, equality, equity, employment, 
feminism, peace, social security and justice", while being of incontrovertible importance; must 
be understood as subsidiary to the life-support argument.27 It is easy to see that a diluted 
understanding of sustainability may well cloud the way forward, but it is equally and most 
difficultly the case that these "desiderata" constitute the causes of the environmental 
problematique itself; This leads into the second set of issues - the difficulties associated with 
transition. The inertia of current socioeconomic structures and practices is overwhelming. The 
transformation of human mores, behaviour and social institutions (economic, religious, 
psychological and political etc.), requires understanding diverse and complex phenomena, and 
the mobilisation of appropriate action. Without doubt these are formidable tasks. 
Within this section the problem has been defined and a solution derived from an 
ecological or systems perspective. It has been argued that the contextually derived imperative 
of sustainability is a sine qua non for the avoidance of environmental catastrophe on many 
different levels. However at least two connected qualifications need to be made here: First, as 
a generic imperative and guiding rule, sustainability, although necessary, may not always be a 
sufficient guarantor of some environmental vatues. Furthermore, in most cases a strict 
interpretation of the concept would prove sufficient, but it seems likely that there would be 
exceptions, and the flip side of such an absolute approach would be to reduce flexibility in 
environmental decisions and to preclude what may seem to be reasonable uses;28 The second 
2S This is in the rust place an artificial separation, both in terms of the creation of the problem and in defining the 
problem. As Reddift and Benton note: ..... rival human cultural and political traditions are as much at work in 
constructing ... views of nature as they are in drawing congenial lessons from them". M. Redclift, and T. 
Benton, (eds), 1994, Social Theory and the Global Environment Routledge, London, p. 44. 
26 An interesting synthesis of the growth and sustainability arguments is provided by D. Korten. 1991, 
"Sustainable Development" World Policy Journal Winter, pp. 156-90. 
27 R Goodland, 1997, "Biophysical and Objective Environmental Sustainability" in: A. Dragun, and K. 
Jakobsson, Sustainability and Global Environmental Policy pp. 634. 
28 This is the argument about the appropriate or necessary degree of environmental sustainability. A debate 
which centres upon the issue of how much substitution is possible (or right) between different types of capital 
(or things). Goodland, following Daly and Cobb,lists; human-made capital, natural capital, human capital and 
social capital. He then goes on to list three form of environmental sustainability; weak, strong, and absurdly 
strong. The middle option - strong sustainability - is described as follows: 
This requires maintaining different kinds of capital intact separately. Thus, for natural capital, 
receipts from depleting oil should be invested in ensuring that energy will be available to 
future generations at least as plentifully as enjoyed by the beneficiaries of today's oil 
consumption. This assumes that natural and human-made capital are not perfect substitutes. 
On the contrary, they are complements to some extent in most production functions. A 
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issue is that in addition to an ecological foundation there are of course other bases for 
advocating the protection of environmental values, indeed sustainability will not always be an 
appropriate starting point for such arguments (many are discussed over the course of the two 
case studies - for example, the aesthetic arguments for the protection of Black Head). 
Furthennore, where particular philosophical starting points are not discussed they are still in a 
sense accommodated through the parallel social imperatives that drive this thesis - ie. through 
meaningful democratic consideration of peoples' diverse values and beliefs (see 1.3).29 
1.3 Environmental Conflict 
The meaning of the tenn 'environmental conflict' will undoubtedly be pivotal in detennining 
the focus and parameters of inquiry - including the methods appropriate to its investigation. 
Hence it is important that a working (at least provisional) definition be established at the outset. 
Considered first, and in isolation, the concept of 'environment' is wide in its meaning. In 
concrete fonn it is commonly understood as: "That which environs; the objects or region 
surrounding anything" or alternatively; "The conditions under which any person or thing lives 
or is developed".30 Yet such a definition - as 'things exogenous' - fails to capture the essence 
of the concept, which is relational. As Caldwell notes: "The fundamental meaning of 
environment is relativistic; it denotes a relationship between a particular object and ail that 
surrounds and directly or indirectly affects it".31 These are however very broad tenns. They 
are inclusive of the understanding of 'environment' as studied herein, but do not capture the 
political meaning of this tenn, which is itself ambiguous. Indeed, the divergent usage of the 
tenn (even within the bounds of this thesis) suggests that the search for a satisfactory 
comprehensive definition may be a futile exercise.32 It is possible, however, to provide a broad 
ascriptive typology of 'environmental' issues as understood here. A common classification is 
that adopted by Btihrs and Bartlett, which identifies three dimensions: (i) Ecosystems -
concerning the functioning of ecological processes and protection of bio-diversity; (ii) NatUral 
resources - regarding those elements found in nature which may serve human needs; And (iii) 
quality of life issues - involving the material conditions of human existence, but also 
sawmill (human made capital) is worthless without the complementary natural capital of a 
forest ... Of the three degrees of sustainability, strong sustainability seems greatly preferable 
mainly because of lack of substitutability for much natural capital, the fact that it and not 
human-made capital is now limiting and for prudence in the face of many irreversibilities and 
uncertainties. 
R. Goodland, 1997, "Biophysical and Objective Environmental Sustainability" in: A. Dragun. and K. 
Jakobsson, (eds), Sustainability and Gobal Environmental Policy pp. 82-3; Daly, H. and Cobb, 1. 1990, For 
the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Towards Community, the Environment and a Sustainable Future 
Greenprint, London. 
29 My position is similar to that of John Dryzek when he writes: "An anthropocentric life-support approach is 
taken here for two reasons. First, a life-support approach is a 'minimal' one. Introducing other reasons for 
attaching positive value to natural systems can only make the arguments that follow apply a Jorteriori. 
Secondly, in restricting oneself to some basic human interests, one can meet competing forms of functional 
rationality (whether economic, social, legal or political) on their own ground: the ground of specifically human 
interests." J. Dryzek, 1987, Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
p.35. 
30 Oxford Dictionary (second edition) 1989, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
31 L. Caldwell, 1990, Between Two Worlds: Science, The Environmental Movement and Policy Change 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 6-7. 
32 Indeed, David Harvey has asserted its fundamental incoherence as a unitary concept; 1993, "The Nature of 
Environment: The Dialectics of Social and Environmental Change" The Socialist Register 1993 p.2. 
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enveloping the almost infinite human responses (subjective and intersubjective) to their 
surroundings.33 This is of course a synthetic division and the categories are often intertwined. 
All of these aspects are present in the two case studies contained in this thesis. 
Throughout this thesis the term 'conflict' is given a wide interpretation. This breadth of 
meaning is extended in two senses. First, as a verb it is understood here in a figurative sense -
"to contend, strive, struggle with" - it represents a broad tenor of opposition.34 However, it is 
in its second sense, the substantive, as an object of inquiry, that it is a more complex concept. 
'Conflict' is understood here primarily as a social phenomenon35 (although it is recognised that 
'environmental conflict', by virtue of its 'environmental' dimension, will necessarily involve 
aspects of material causality and certainly have material implications). This means that any 
understanding of this phenomenon will in the first instance rest upon a particular understanding 
of social being (social ontology). A comprehensive account of transcendental realism - the 
social ontology of an increasingly influential philosophical position broadly labelled critical 
naturalism, which underpins this thesis - will feature in Chapter Three, but it is desirable to 
preface that discussion by highlighting three elements required of a definition of conflict if it is 
to be consistent with such an ontology. First, critical realism postulates a general stratification 
of reality into three domains: (i) the empirical (made up of experiences), (ii) the actual (made 
up of events) and, (iii) the real (namely, transfactually efficacious structures and mechanisms 
generative of events).36 It follows that 'conflict' can be usefully understood in these terms as it 
persists not only in the limited 'empirical' dimension as, for example, maintained by 
behaviourists, but also at deeper levels less accessible to the observer. Secondly, for critical 
realists, considered as a social activity 'conflict' involves the duality of social structure and 
human agency or praxis - it must be understood as penetrating both aspects, irreducible (in an 
absolute sense) to neither.37 And thirdly, as with 'environment', 'conflict' is a relational 
concept - it involves relationships between individuals (and groups), and between individuals 
(and groups) and nature, and the products of such relations. Conflict is thus understood here as 
a struggle between people, and between people and things; as multi-levelled (ontologic3.Ily 
vertical); and comprising of mutually defining structural and individual elements. 
Finally, 'conflict' is also used here as a noun, to describe historic episodes (viz. the two 
case studies). In this capacity it implies the application of temporal and spatial boundaries to 
the process of conflict as just described (these may be purely for convenience). It should be 
noted here that in this sense the term 'conflict' is used interchangeably with 'dispute' or 
'controversy' . 
In justifying environmental conflict as a worthy area of inquiry I will not catalogue 
manifest examples or seek to quantify at the macro level the prevalence of conflict. To do so 
would be to exclude (given the above definition) those instances opaque or invisible to the 
33 T. Btihrs, and R. Bartlett, 1993, Environmental Policy in New Zealand: The Politics of Clean and Green? 
Oxford University Press, Auckland, pp.38-9. Also, the definition of 'environment' in the Resource 
Management Act 1991 roughly approximates this typology. 
34 Oxford Dictionary (second edition) 1984, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
35 This is not to say that other forms of conflict (intemal- subjective, non-human, etc.) do not exist 
36 W. Outhwaite, 1987, New Philosophies of Social Science Macmillan, London. p.45. Also; C. Lawson, M. 
Peacock, and S. ?ratten, 1996, "Realism, Underlabouring and Institutions" Cambridge Journal of Economics 
Vol. 20, p. 142. 
37 R. Bhaskar, 1991, Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p.147. 
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observer. The assertion that environmental conflict is pandemic can be adduced from a general 
association between environmental problems and conflict. Although environmental problems 
do not always entail conflict it is not unreasonable to suggest that in a high proportion of 
instances some form of conflict will be involved. The causal relationship is two-way, with 
social conflict producing environmental problems and vice versa. Certainly, in addition to its 
role in the genesis of environmental problems, conflict is often manifest in diagnosis and 
consequent responses (both means and ends arguments). 
As a broad and complex phenomenon environmental conflict will be considered 
significant for many different reasons. In the context of this study I would like to highlight two 
general motivations. The first and foremost is a desire to examine the functionality of 
environmental conflict vis-a.-vis the environmental problematique and its imperatives -
principally, the need to attain sustainable relationships with the natural world; to what extent 
will those elements of environmental conflict studied herein enable or inhibit the attainment of 
sustainable states? Given the overwhelming need to transform our societies in this direction 
any such knowledge will be invaluable. 
The second group of motivations are based upon two interdependent social goods; 
participatory democracy and social eqUality. These ends are at once subsidiary to the first, 
insofar as a sustainable relationship with the natural world is in the long term a sine qua non 
for any mode of social organisation. They are also valid and desirable ends in themselves, and, 
it can be argued that they provide a basis for the attainment of sustainable states.38 These are 
grand themes in political philosophy. As Barber notes: "the democratic ideal remains one of 
the most cherished and at the same moment most contested of political ideals".39 The concept 
of social equality is no less polemical. While it is impossible here to adequately traverse these 
subjects it is important that I situate myself within a general historical stream of social thought. 
Much of the model of structural dominance formulated in Chapters Four and Five is 
derived from ideas and theoretical developments in Marxist, neo-Marxist, and post-Marxist 
political economy. Such theories of dominance, which are critical analyses of structUral 
inequality - most notably the unequal ability of various individuals and groups to exercise 
influence - necessarily entail some essential understanding and positive valuation of both 
equality and the democratic imperative. Considering democracy first, Marx himself saw a 
central tension or contradiction between "the principle of democracy - the full participation of 
all members of society in regulating their communal life - and the limited, even distorted form 
which democracy assumes in a class society in which the bourgeoisie is dominant".40 In 
addition to this, for Marx: 
Democracy was seen as a necessary, but not a sufficient. condition for freedom. Marx and 
Engels denounced what they called the confusion of 'political emancipation with human 
emancipation'.41 Freedom for them meant not merely the theoretical right to do something, but 
38 For an excellent inquiry into the linkages between various social choice mechanisms and 'ecological 
rationality' see John Dryzek's 1987, Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford 
39 B. Barber, "Democracy" in: D. Miller, et al., (eds), 1987, The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought 
Blackwell Reference, Oxford, p. 119. 
4OT. Bottomore, 1979, Political Sociology Hutchinson, London, pp. 22-3. 
41 K. Marx, and F. Engels, 1956, The Holy Family Foreign Languages Publishing House, pp. 118, 128. 
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with it also the actual means.42 Thus real freedom requires 'quite palpable material 
conditions'.43 This democracy alone does not provide.44 
In this fonnulation there are two elements; the espousal of an expansive notion of participatory 
democracy contra to preponderant minimalist conceptions - "that is to instrumental, 
representative, liberal democracy",45 and a contextual understanding of democratic praxis 
extending beyond the liberal preoccupation with formal rights. The issue of equality is central 
to this understanding of democracy, both in the extension of fonnal rights - absolute equality 
articulated through convention and statute - and in the structural and consequent praxiological 
sense of the relative capacity to act and to influence. Democracy itself comes to mean "a 
society where equality exists".46 But, heeding Marx and Engels' warning noted above, 
political emancipation is intrinsic to, but not the equivalent of, human emancipation. In the 
following studies my concern with equality extends further than the issue of equality of 
opportunity (even in a broad sense), it is also with the problem of equality of outcome 
(recognising that the two are connected). In this second respect it is not absolute. It is the 
advocacy of "greater equality of material conditions rather than complete equaJity".47 This 
concern stems from two sources: 
On the one band, it arises from a concern with justice and the avoidance of exploitation: 
socialists would claim that unrefonned capitalism throws up a set of inequalities that cannot be 
justified in terms of people's differing efforts and abilities. On the other hand, it arises from a 
concern with community or fraternity: a society marked by large disparities in standards of 
living is inevitably also a society in which people are divided from one another by barriers of 
class and prevented from wxIerstanding and sympathising with each other's predicament 48 
Environmental conflict thus persists within a broad context - the environmental 
problematique. Out of this problematique arises a cardinal imperative; that of sustainability. 
Furthermore, into this equation enters another strand of emancipatory imperatives founded 
upon humanist49 principles; strong democracy and soc!al equality.50 Together these 
motivations underpin this thesis. These factors are not, however, dealt with directly. The 
42 Ibid, p. 176. 
43 Ibid, p. 127. 
44 T. Sowell, 1986, Marxism: Philosophy and Economics Unwin Paperbacks, London, p. 142. 
45 B. Barber, 1984, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age University of California Press, 
Berkeley, p. 117. 
46 B. Holden, "Democracy" in: W. Outhwaite, and T. Bottomore, 1993, The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-
Century Social Thought Blackwell Reference, Oxford, p. 142. Although I would like to stress my agreement 
with the geographer David Harvey when he writes: "Socialism is not necessarily about the construction of 
homogeneity. The exploration of our species potential can presumably also be about the creative search for 
and exploration of diversity and heterogeneity". 1993, "The Nature of Environment The Dialectics of Social 
and Environmental Change" The Socialist Register 1993 pp. 44-5. 
47 D. Miller, "Equality and Inequality" in: W. Outhwaite, and T. Bottomore, 1993, The Blackwell Dictionary 
Blackwell Reference, Oxford, p. 201. The issues of the nature of egalitarian justice, and democracy and 
emancipation have been of central concern within a new wave of Marxist scholarship (dubbed the 'second 
wave of analytical Marxism') through the 1990's. For an overview of this body of work see: L. Jacobs, 1996, 
''The Second Wave of Analytical Marxism" Philosophy of the Social Sciences Vol. 26, No.2, pp. 279-92. 
More extensive works include: T. Carver, (ed), 1991, The Cambridge Companion to Marx Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge; B. OIlman, 1993, Dialectical Investigations Routledge, New York; J. Roemer, 
1994, A Future For Socialism Verso, London; P. Van Parijs, 1993, Marxism Recycled Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge; E. O. Wright, A. Levine, and E. Sober, 1992, Reconstructing Marxism: Essays on 
Explanation and the Theory of History Verso, London. 
48 D. Miller, "Equality and Inequality" in: W. Outhwaite, and T. Bottomore, 1993, The Blackwell Dictionary 
Blackwell Reference, Oxford, p. 201. 
49 This is not to say that the sustainable imperative is not based upon humanist principles - only that it is not 
exclusively so. 
50 These are the particular motivations here, which is not to deny other concerns, or even to rank these 
motivations above others. 
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primary purpose of this thesis is not to theorise further about these ends in themselves but 
rather to understand how things are, thus contributing to the transformation of society and the 
realisation of such ends. 
Finally, it is appropriate to touch upon the question of the status of environmental 
conflict. Conflict has been defined in wide terms. On this basis it is to be seen as an inevitable 
and ever-present feature of social life rather than as a pathological phenomena necessarily 
symptomatic of social disintegration (although in particular instances it may be so).51 Hence, 
as outlined at the beginning of this chapter, this thesis is not concerned with the eradication of 
conflict per se, instead what matters are the various forms of direct and indirect harm which are 
manifest within specific conflicts, or types of conflicts (where it is possible to generalise). 
1.4. Business Dominance in Environmental Conflict 
At the beginning of the thesis, I declared the focus of this project to be; the ability of business 
to dominate within environmental conflict, the exercise of this capacity, and the consequence 
of such power. The purpose of this sub-section is to construct a prima facie case for inquiry 
into this type of business influence. To begin, I have argued that the motivating factors or 
underlying imperatives identified above mandate the examination of certain types of things, 
specifically socio-economic inequality and environmental harm. The intention here is to study 
these problems within a certain sphere. That environmental conflict in general is a worthy 
realm of inquiry has already been established, but the sphere of inquiry is further qualified, it is 
environmental conflict within advanced capitalist liberal democracies. There are two main 
reasons for this; first, because New Zealand falls into this political-economic category, and 
secondly, because this category includes a significant number of nations which, although not 
necessarily dominant in terms of aggregate population, are certainly responsible for a vast and 
disproportionate segment of the planet's resource consumption, and are directly or indirectly 
responsible for much environmental degradation. This is not to discount the importance of 
environmental conflict within other social forms, but its specificity will inevitably limit the 
applicability of the findings of the project to this category. For much of the thesis the focus is 
even narrower than this, and despite it being generally theorised at the category level, the 
model is ultimately tailored to New Zealand's geo-historical context, and both of the 
subsequent case studies are New Zealand examples. 
The assumption here that (i) business dominance potentially exists (in the realm of 
environmental conflict), and (ii) that it is a probable source of various significant forms of 
harm, stems from three bases. 
The first foundation is that of the crudely empirical - which I take here to be the level 
of readily available and unprocessed52 data. It is certainly the case that recent New Zealand 
history is riddled with examples of conflicts between developmental and environmental 
5l As Alex Callinacos notes: "Now while social change is very frequently associated with conflict. the reverse 
does not necessarily hold Conflict may be endemic and intense in a social system without causing any basic 
structural change. " 1987. Making History: Agency. Structure and Change ill Social Theory Polity Press. 
Cambridge. p. 40. 
52 By which I mean data that has not been collected or analysed for the particular purpose of studying business 
dominance in this realm. 
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interests. Until the early 1980s the state was itself the major developmental protagonist 
through its extensive involvement in the construction and operation of major infra-structural 
projects and various wealth generating ventures. Since this period the state's direct 
participation in such projects has rapidly declined (this transition is discussed in depth 
throughout the case studies) with private enterprise now being the dominant developmental 
force.53 One prominent example in this latter period was the 'Fast Ferries Case' of 1994-5. 
This case arose in response to the commencement of a fast (37-38 knots) catamaran service for 
cars and passengers between Wellington and Picton via the Tory Channel and inner Queen 
Charlotte Sound. The service was operated by NZ Rail (later Tranz Rail) the monopoly owner 
and operator of New Zealand's rail network, with an effective monopoly on the inter-island 
ferry service. The basic issue was the impact of the wash from the fast ferries which was 
substantially greater than that generated by conventional ferries. Two legal actions were taken 
by those opposed to the service. The first was to seek an interim enforcement order to stop the 
ferries operating. This was sought by a coalition of residents (Save the Sounds - Stop the 
Wash) in conjunction with local Iwi (Te Atiawa). This effort failed, ~n great part, because 
Judge Treadwell of the Planning Tribunal decided that these groups would be unable to 
compensate NZ Rail for any losses incurred if the order was not confirmed at a full hearing 
(through damages being awarded). The second action was an application for a permanent 
enforcement order taken by the same groups plus the Minister of Conservation. Following a 
lengthy hearing at which a great range of evidence, technical and otherwise, was submitted, 
Judge Treadwell decided not to make an enforcement order constraining the operation of the 
ferries. Costs in the region of forty thousand dollars were awarded against the CoalitionlTe 
Atiawa and the Minister, to be split equally. The wording of the decision and the potential 
costs of further legal action effectively ruled out the possibility of an appeal to the High 
Court.54 
A number of features stood out which raised questions about the ability of business to 
dominate in such disputes. I will only mention a couple here: First, the ferries were allowed to 
run in the interim almost solely because of the Maori and environmental interests' inability to 
pay any potential damages - a resource issue; Secondly, the Judge made reference in his ruling 
to a remarkable and indeed highly questionable ecological assumption - which was that as the 
ferries had already been running for some time (note that this would not have been the case if 
the interim enforcement order had been granted) a new eqUilibrium had been established, and 
this was itself desirable or at least consistent with the principle of sustainability. However, not 
only was it highly contentious as to whether a new equilibrium had· indeed been established, 
the judge's point also displayed little regard to the environmental costs incurred in this 
53 This transition was part of a major transformation of the structures of government in New Zealand. A 
significant body of literature deals with this process - much of which is touched upon at one point or another 
over the course of this thesis. For particular reference to the state's changing role from major developer to a 
more hands off function see: T. Bilhrs, and R. Bartlett, 1993, Environmental Policy in New Zealand: The 
Politics of Clean and Green? Oxford University Press, Auckland, Ch. 4; P. Ali. Memon, 1993, Keeping New 
Zealand Green: Recent Environmental Reforms University of Otago Press, Dunedin, passim; S. Rainbow, 
1993, Green Polites Oxford University Press, Auckland, Ch. 1. 
54 See: Marlborough District Council v NZ Rail; Save the Sounds - SlOP the Wash v NZ Rail Planning Tribunal 
Decision W40/95. See also: B. Pardy, 1995, "Fast Ferries: New Equilibrium Versus Ecological 
Sustainability" New Zealand lAw Journal June, pp. 202-4; S. Kos, and S. Bielby, 1995, "Fast Ferries 
Decision: Seeing Sense in its Wake" New Zealand lAw Journal November, pp. 363-8. 
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transition - his interpretation of the principle of sustainability was clearly out of line with its 
wider use; Thirdly, greater force was applied by the judge to his decision through his assertion 
that the fast ferry service was of such importance for the 'sustainable' management of New 
Zealand as a whole, as to weigh against basic environmental principles enshrined in Part II of 
the Resource Management Act 1991. This strongly pro-development argument was out of step 
with the received understanding of the intent and operation of the Act; Lastly, the awarding of 
costs against those seeking an enforcement order established a precedent (real or not - for 
whether other Planning Tribunal judges would follow this trend was unclear) which was a 
strong disincentive for other community groups to pursue environmental matters in the Courts. 
This is only a single straight-forward example55, it mayor may not be representative of 
a wider societal tendency, and undoubtedly there will be examples where other causal 
mechanisms lead to contrary results. But the issue here is that it suggests ipso facto the 
potential operation of business dominance and that such influence may at times result in 
significant environmental harm. 
The second foundation for research into this subject is the existing body of research into 
business dominance in environmental conflict (NB. the wide interpretation of conflict adopted 
above allows the inclusion of studies which deal with policy, regulatory, planning, ex ante 
disputes over existing uses, and general political struggles). Most of the following work is 
alluded to in some form within Chapters Four and Five. Also, this is a representative rather 
than comprehensive survey, its purpose is to add force to the prima facie justification of this 
project. 
Of those who have studied the role of business in environmental conflict the greatest 
number can be said to be nea-pluralists.56 This is because pluralism, generally, is predisposed 
to the study of inter~t group politics, and especially instances of observable group conflict. 
Nea-pluralists - such as the later Dahl, Schattschneider, Polsby, Lindblom and Nadel57, among 
others - whilst acknowledging the importance of political interaction between diverse interests, 
also acknowledge (to differing degrees) the exercise of non-observable power and the existence 
of pervasive inequalities, particularly the privileged position of business (that is 
disproportionate with, and subversive of, the basic liberal democratic principle of fonnal 
democratic equality).58 Hence the focus upon the role of business within environmental 
55 Although it is not difficult to think of other New Zealand cases; such as the series of disputes over large scale 
gold mining on the Coromandel Peninsula In one case, that of Cyprus Gold NZ Ltd's Golden Cross mine in 
the Waitekauri valley, the environmental and Maori advocates - the Coromandel Peninsula Watchdog group-
were unable to pursue their case in the High Court due to the costs of litigation. The vast tailings dam at the 
mine, which was a major concern of opponents, subsequently began to subside necessitating a huge reinforcing 
project itself of questionable viability. J. Dixon, 1991, "Coromandel Gold: Conquest and Conservation" in; J. 
Connell, and R. Howitt, (eds), 1991, Mining and Indigenous Peoples in Australasia Sydney University 
Press/Oxford University Press, Melbourne. Also, F. Macdonald, 1989, "The Battle for Paradise: Mining on 
the Coromandel" New Zealand Listener Vol. 124, No. 2750, 10-16 June, pp. 14-17,30. 
56 Although many of these studies are somewhat eclectic, also drawing upon anti-pluralist (eg. Lowi), corporatist 
and even Marxist and Weberian structural theories. 
57 Cf. R. Dahl, 1982 Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy - Autonomy vs Control Yale University Press, New Haven 
and London; E. Schattschneider, 1975, The Semisovereign People Dryden Press, Hinsdale III.; N. Polsby, 
1963, Community Power and Political Theory Yale University Press, New Haven; C. Lindblom, 1977, Politics 
and Markets Basic Books, New York; 1980, The Policy Making Process (second edition), Prentice-Hall, New 
Jersey; M. Nadel, 1976, Corporations and Political Accountability D.C. Heath, Lexington Ma. 
58 P. Dunleavy, and D. O'leary, 1987. Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, p. 275; W. Kelso, 1978, American Democratic Theory: Pluralism and its Critics Greenwood 
Press, Connecticut, pp. 19-29; C. Stone, 1980, "Systemic Power in Community Decision Malting" American 
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conflict. A seminal study of business dominance in environmental politics was Crenson's 
comparative analysis of corporate decision making within the U.S. steel industry with regard to 
air-pollution effects. Crenson highlighted the importance of non-decision making and agenda 
control as instruments of corporate power. 59 Much more recently, Schrecker has analysed 
struggles over the regulation of industry's environmental impacts. His position is roughly 
comparable to that of Lindblom, retaining a focus upon interest group politics whilst arguing 
with some force that business is privileged within environmental disputes, and pointing to the 
existence of a variety of causal mechanisms which give rise to this dominance (such as 
disparate financial and organisational resources, the role of private property rights, the ability 
to inflict significant sanctions upon such society, the power to 'define reality', and problems of 
collective action - all of which are incorporated in my analytical framework60).61 In addition 
to these 'pluralist' studies, there are 'cross-over' analyses which draw upon both pluralist and 
'political economy' (which I use here to refer to structural theories such as Marxist and 
Weberian interpretations) approaches. One such historical study (Blowers62) examines the 
strategy of a large-scale polluter (a brick works) in countering environmental opposition over 
an extended period of time. Blowers, following Crenson, notes that the business was able to 
exert a high degree of control over the political process due to the operation of such 
mechanisms as agenda control and non-decision making. But he also incorporates a wider 
structural element in his analysis. Most notably, he suggests that the strategic power of the 
business fluctuated over time due to the relative strength of the economy - when the wider 
economy was strong the company was less powerful and vice versa.63 A more theoretically 
Political Science Review Vo1.74, No.4, pp. 987-90. A discussion concerning the general characteristics of the 
classical and neopluralist positions is to be found in Chapter Two. 
59 M. Crenson, 1971, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decision Making in the Cities John 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore. Crenson's study proceeded from the principles of classical pluralism - including 
the flawed positivist notion that it was possible to divest the research exercise of bias - but in terms of 
analysing power he was concordant with the revised pluralism of P. Bachrach, and M. Baratz. Cf.: 1962, 
"Two Faces of Power" American Political Science Review Vol. 66, No.4, pp.947-52; 1963, "Decisions ·and 
Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework" American Political Science Review Vol. 67, No.3. Also, R 
Wolfinger, 1972, "Non-decisions and the Study of Local Politics" American Polilical Science Review Vol. 65, 
pp. 1063-80. 
60 The collective action issue, a central focus of rational choice theory, is another strand of analysis which is 
drawn upon here. That is, following: M. Olson, 1965, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the 
Theory of Groups Harvard University Press, Cambridge Ma; A. Downs, 1957, An Economic Theory of 
Democracy Harper and Row, New York; But more recently, and of most relevance here, in the form adapted 
by critical theorists - C. Offe, 1985, Disorganized Capitalism Basil Blackwell, Oxford, passim; B. Hindess, 
1989, Political Choice and Social Structure: an Analysis of Actors, Interests, and Rationality Elgar, England, 
passim. 
61 T. Schrecker, 1984, Political Economy of Environmental Hazards Law Reform Commission of Canada, 
Ottawa; 1985, ''The Mobilisation of Bias in Closed Systems: Environmental Regulation in Canada" Journal of 
Business Administration Vol. IS, pp. 45-63; 1985, "Resisting Regulation: Environmental Policy and Corporate 
Power" Alternatives Vol. 13, No. I, pp. 9-21. Another excellent discussion of inequalities of power in 
environmental conflict, and the issue of corporate power is; D. Amy, 1987, The Politics of Environmental 
Mediation Columbia University Press, New York pp. 199-212, and passim. 
62 A. Blowers, 1983, "Master of Fate or Victim of Circumstance - The E;tercise of Corporate Power in 
Environmental Policy-Making" Policy and Politics Vol. 11, No.4, pp. 393-415; 1984, Something in the Air: 
Corporate Powers and the Environment Harper and Row, London; A. Blowers, and D. Pepper, (eds), 1987, 
Nuclear Power in Crisis: Politics and Planning for the Nuclear State Nichols Publishing Co., New York, pp. 
1-35. An extensive empirical study with similar conclusions is; M. Hill, S. Aaronovitch, and D. Baldock, 
1989, "Non-decision Making in Pollution Control in Britain: Nitrate Pollution, the EEC Drinking Water 
Directive and Agriculture" Policy and Politics Vol. 17, No.3. 
63 Due to the relative significance of the threats of investment withdrawal and job losses associated with the 
increased costs of pollution control. See here; R. Kazis, and R. Grossman, 1982, Fear at Work: Job 
Blackmail, Labor and the Environment Pilgrim Press, New York. Schrecker makes this same observation 
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sophisticated crossover study is Lake and Disch's analysis of hazardous waste conflicts.64 This 
analysis identifies the operation of pluralist interest group conflict over the siting of hazardous 
waste facilities. In the conflicts studied the state sought to remain as neutral as possible, 
avoiding partisan engagement, and restricting its role to that of providing an arena for conflict. 
However, while classical pluralism has traditionally conjectured the state's role in interest 
group politics to be just so, Lake and Disch suggest that the state withdrew from direct 
involvement because of the strategic necessity that it sustain the conditions of profitable capital 
accumulation. It did so in these instances by defining hazardous waste as a locational issue 
rather than as an issue about the production process itself (viz. the intemalisation, mitigation or 
eradication of environmental costs at the point source). Meaning the state conveniently 
avoided making any threats to the process of accumulation whilst enabling a process of 
political legitimation to occur. They assert that the pluralistic form of the politics was a 
function of, and served to obfuscate, deeper structural mechanisms. The Lake and Disch study 
is a very good analysis, and it is my intention to pursue this type of investigation - although it 
will be more firmly grounded in the political-economy standpoint. 65 
The political economy approach to environmental politics is strongest outside of 
political science. Disciplines such as geography, planning and political-ecology have been 
more profoundly influenced by European sociological traditions. More accurately, each of 
these disciplines is home to groups of scholars who utilise sophisticated theories of structural 
dominance to comprehend relationships between various socioeconomic groups, between those 
groups and nature, and with the products of those relations. The literature is abundant, so 
rather than compile even a 'representative' sample, I will highlight a few of the main 
influences upon this project. First, the geographer David Harvey (who proceeds from a 
geographical-historical materialism) has written extensively, and with great erudition and 
breadth, in the areas of Marxist economic and political theory, urban geography, environmental 
and social justice, and on the dialectics of social and environmental transformation. There are 
many elements of his work which are integrated into the following studies, but probably of 
greatest value here are his efforts to reconcile Marxist economic theory with the 'ecological' 
sensibilities of those such as Aldo Leopold, and hence to develop an ecological-Marxist 
critique of capitalism.66 However, while the pluralist/political-science studies tend to be overly 
elsewhere; 1990, "Resisting Environmental Regulation: The Cryptic Pattern of Business-Government 
Relations" in R. Paehlke and D. Torgerson (eds), Managing Leviathan Broadview Press, Ontario, p. 187. 
64 R. Lake, and R. Disch, 1992, "Structural Constraints and Pluralist Contradictions in Hazardous Waste 
Regulation" Environment and Pwnning A Vol. 24, pp. 663-81. See also; R. Lake, and R Johns, 1990, 
"Legitimation Conflicts: The Politics of Hazardous Waste Siting Law" Urban Geography Vol. II, No.5, pp. 
488-508. 
65 Sandbach provides a useful review of both pluralist and Marxist analyses of environmental politics prior to 
1980; F. Sandbach, 1980, Environment, ldeology and Policy Basil Blackwell, Oxford, Ch. 4. 
66 Cf: 1982, The Limits to Capital Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Which sets out a sophisticated reading of Marx's 
economic theory - note especially the work on value; 1989, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into 
the Origins of Cultural Change Basil Blackwell, Oxford An expansive study of the global development and 
transformatiQn of the forms of capitalist accumulation, and of certain general effects that these transformations 
have wrought upon cultural conceptions such as space and time; 1993, "The Nature of Environment The 
Dialectics of Social and Environmental Change" The Socialist Register 1993 pp. 1-51. For a discussion about 
the possibility of an ecological socialism; 1996, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference Blackwell, 
Cambridge Ma. Of particular significance here is the work of Redclift, Benton, Gnmdmann, Enzensberger and 
Martinez-Alier. Cf. M. Redclift, 1987, Sustainable Development: Exploring the Contradictions Methuen, 
London; M. Redclift, and T. Benton, (eds), 1994, Social Theory and the Global Environment Routledge, 
London; R. Grundmann, 1991, Marxism and Ecology Clarendon Press, Oxford; 1991, "The Ecological 
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empirical at the cost of theoretical sophistication, these Marxist works tend to be abstract 
Their concerns are with the explication of wider structural tendencies and mechanisms which 
sustain relations of domination - how causal structures manifest themselves at specific goo-
historical conjunctures is of less immediate significance. In the planning literature, which is 
interesting from a resource management perspective because of its directly applied nature, 
there is the work of John Forester whose sympathies ultimately lie with Habennasian Critical 
Theory; that is, with an express interest in impediments to 'rational' communication. His 
Planning in the Face of Power provides a useful review of theories of structural dominance 
and the practical imperatives and roles each perspective establishes for plannersP Again, 
Forester's work here is on a general level. So with regard to the question of business 
dominance the political economy and environment literature tends to operate at the category 
level. This does not mean that empirical work is absent from their analyses, but that where 
such observation occurs it is often focussed upon macro-analyses. Nevertheless, the tendencies 
theorised by Harvey, Benton, Redclift, Grundmann and Forester, add to the prima facie case 
for the in-depth investigation of business dominance in environmental conflict 
This leads on to the third predicate, which is hypothesised directly from within political 
economy. The argument is based upon predominantly, but not exclusively; Marxist, nec-
Marxist and post-Marxist analyses of advanced capitalist society. On this basis (and here 
deliberately without reference to extant analyses, from within this tradition, of environmental 
problems) it is possible to speculate about features - enduring socio-economic structures, 
forces and mechanisms - which are likely to effect environmental conflict Given that 
environmental conflict will often involve business interests, the state, and actors from within 
civil society, it will undoubtedly be both feasible and appropriate to derive potential facets, 
including avenues of concern, from this body of general theory.68 More specifically, and 
concretely, it is possible through a sideways movement - that is, through a homology - to elicit 
potential characteristics from other types of domination already rigorously theorised. The most 
obvious example here being business dominance as operative in the capital-labour relation. 
Now the capital-labour relation ultimately differs markedly from the capital-environment 
relation, however, deconstruction69 and reconstruction in tum, with reference to emergent and 
specific characteristics of environmental conflict, can provide some enlightenment about this 
phenomenon. Another example of this is the relevance of the Marxian theory of value when 
considered in conjunction with work in systems/ecological/energy theory.70 
Each of these strands is at once a partial argument for investigation into business 
dominance in environmental conflict as well as a partial theoretical and methodological basis 
for such investigation. This fragmentation poses a challenge, which is the appropriation and 
Cballenge to Marxism" New Left Review No. 187, May/June. pp. 103-20; H. Enzensberger. 1974. "A Critique 
of Political Ecology" New Left Review Vol. 84. pp. 3-31; J. Martinez-Alier. 1995. "Political Ecology. 
Distributional Conflicts. and Economic Incommensurability" New Left Review No. 211. May/June. pp. 70-88. 
67 J. Forester. 1989, Planning in the Face of Power University of California Press. Berkeley. See also: M. Dear. 
and A. Scott, (eds). 1981. Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society Methuen. London 
(especially the chapters by Hirsch, Harvey. Edel. Mollenkopf. Szelenyi and Boddy); N. Low. 1991. Planning, 
Politics and the state: Political Foundations of Planning Thought Unwin-Hyman. London. 
68 See later discussion on the analogical-retroductive movement in science - see 2.3.(iii). 
69 I do not use this term in any specific post-modernist or post-structuralist sense. Instead. it simply represents an 
analytical process of decomposition and abstraction. 
70 This is the avenue by which the work of those such as Wilden is incoporated into the theoretical framework. 
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synthesis of the strengths and insights of each level of analysis into a mature and 
comprehensive, vertically integrated approach.71 While I acknowledge that the internal 
reasoning and philosophical foundation of each of these approaches is in some way 
contradictory or exclusive, and that a crude amalgamation is a thing to be avoided, there is still 
a need to see how these levels (in some fonn) can speak to each other. To do this requires the 
examination of the philosophical foundations of scientific discovery in general and social 
scientific discovery in particular. This project thus possesses a multi-levelled character. 
1.5. Conclusion 
In discussion thus far, I have argued that business power and dominance in environmental 
conflict is a prima facie obstacle to the achievement of, on the one hand, crucial sustainable 
relationships with the natural world (given the conception of the environmental problematique 
outlined), and on the other hand the ability of people to meaningfully participate in decision-
making about their environments. Business power in the context of environmental conflict is 
thus a very worthy subject of inquiry. I then looked at some of the ways that people have set 
out to examine this phenomenon. My conclusion was that business power has been explored in 
diverse and often fruitful ways, but that they tend to be either system-wide analyses that are 
largely theoretical and are not thoroughly or deeply grounded in empirical work, or they have 
been relatively weak on the theory, and they focus narrowly upon specific mechanisms of 
business dominance. I then asserted that the goal of this project was to try and bring these 
strands of analysis together: First, by vertically integrating theory about wider structural 
tendencies in political economy with the work on specific mechanisms of business dominance 
(such as disparate resources or property rights); And secondly, by horizontally integrating work 
that had been done on those various mechanisms. This of course raises difficulties on meta-
theoreti·cal, theoretical and empirical grounds, and this thesis can be understood as an effort to 
work out this problem. I begin by devoting the next chapter to the meta-theoretica1level. I do 
so to clarify some basic questions about first, the structure of the natural and social worlds that 
are the object of this study, and secondly the practices (possibilities and limitations upon) of 
scientific and social scientific investigation. I frame my discussion around a basic question of 
what a realist philosophy of science can do for resource management in general (this is a thesis 
in resource management), and my study in particular. 
71 Mollenkopf (a geographer) expresses such a need in; M. Dear, and A. Scott, (eds), 1981, Urbanization and 
Urban Planning in Capitalist Society Methuen, London, p. 334. 
2 
Critical Realism 
Clearing the Path for a Critical Resource Management 
2.1 Introduction 
Resource managementl , be it as abstract inquiry or as an applied activity, is an inherently 
indeterminate field. To attempt to pin it down in some rigid form is neither necessary nor 
desirable, but it is possible (and useful) to identify some of its defining characteristics without 
substantially constraining its possibilities. First of all, like the understanding of conflict 
described earlier, resource management is concerned with relationships between people, and/or 
between people and nature, and the products (artefacts) of such relations. Obviously this 
covers the whole of social life, and must be further narrowed to a central concern with the 
human-environment nexus (mutuality) which is the absolute core of the notion. This can of 
course be said of many specific disciplines, which leads on to the second characteristic in 
which resource management can be considered either in an oxymoronic sense as a n~n­
disciplinary discipline, or alternatively as a mega-discipline. My preference is for the former. 
On this understanding resource management is at once multi-disciplinary, inter-disciplinary 
and trans-disciplinary.2 Thirdly, resource management necessarily involves an applied 
element. That is, even at its most abstract, inquiry in this field must have some intentional 
implication for work-in-the-world. Associated with this applied element is a fourth feature 
which is a belief (acknowledged or not) in the possibility of positive interventions in the 
environment. Such interventions may involve not only the transformation of material relations, 
but also efforts to reproduce or protect (an intervention to prevent other types of interventions 
or consequences thereot) existing states. This qualitative assertion is inevitably contentious -
1 The understanding of resource management adopted here conflates the historical distinction described by Bryan 
Norton, between resource management and environmental management He characterises resource 
management as reductionist and production oriented - the wise use approach to resource producing sub-
systems. In contrast, environmental management focuses upon the larger autonomously functioning 
environmental context B. Norton, 1991, Toward Unity Among Environmentalists Oxford University Press, 
New York. 
2 In a sense, but not fully, this is a repudiation of the historical fragmentation and institutionalisation of knowledge 
and its production, within disciplines (see P. Manicas, 1987, A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 193-212.). It is not, however, a rejection of the advances which such 
specialisation can bring but rather the affirmation of the need to see boundaries as blurred and interconnected, 
and ultimately the need to take a global view. 
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for critiques of the enlightenment tradition have, inter alia, focussed upon such ideas. 
However, the position taken here is that this essential standpoint must be qualified by a 
cautionary understanding of human knowledge and action as contingent, unavoidably historical 
and thus relatively transitory, as fallible, and as subject to a proliferation of motivations. This 
does not mean, however, that the possibility of positive intervention should be abandoned - a 
position which shall be developed over the course of this chapter. 
In the following discussion this initial open-ended depiction is set to one side. The 
intention here is to move backwards or downwards3 into the realm of the philosophy of science 
- to introduce, review and advocate a realist philosophy of science - specifically, a 
sophisticated variant that has come to be termed critical realism. This is to make explicit a 
range of important assumptions about the objects and practices of science in general and social 
science in particular. In doing this I hope to describe how a pluralistic, critical and sometimes 
necessarily emancipatory scientific resource management is possible.4 
2.2. Critical Realism and the Philosophy of Science 
The development and advocacy of realism as a coherent and credible philosophy of 
science has been due to the efforts of many individuals. Since 1975 the most influential 
contribution to this discourse has been that of British philosopher Roy Bhaskar.s Bhaskar's 
specific formulation has come to be labelled critical realism - itself an elision of his philosophy 
of science, transcendental realism, and special philosophy of the human sciences, critical 
naturalism.6 My intention is to engage with Bhaskar's philosophy (and with that of others who 
have contributed to this development - supporters and detractors alike) by discussing in tum 
his transcendental realist arguments, his critical naturalist extensi?n, and by reviewing some 
miscellaneous elements within his schema which cast some light upon scientific and historical 
practices, and the implications of such. 
In its broadest sense philosophical 'realism' involves the elemental claim that some 
entity (universals, material objects, causal laws, numbers, probabilities, propositions, etc.) 
exists.7 For critical realism as a philosophy of science - and as Bhaskar asserts - as a 
philosophy for science, its claims are in the first instance those of scientific realism: that the 
objects of scientific enquiry exist and act "absolutely (for the most part in natural science) or 
relatively (for the most part in social science) independently of the enquiry, or more generally 
of human activity".8 This scientific realism takes on a particular form. Instead of examining 
3 Metaphorically speaking, as what is involved is the distillation, clarification and consequent development of an 
implicit philosophy. 
4 This is not, however, to articulate a foundationalism, for the following argument is grounded in action. Indeed, 
as Wittgenstein highlighted; "Giving grounds [must] come to an end sometime. But the end is not an 
ungrounded presupposition: It is an ungrounded way of acting". L. Wittgenstein, (G. Anscombe, and G. von 
Wright eds) 1969, On Certainly Harper and Row, New York, Sec. 110. 
S P. Baehr, 1990, "Critical Realism, Cautionary Realism" Sociological Review Vol. 38, No.4, p. 765. 
6 D. Corson, 1991, "Bhaskar's Critical Realism and Educational Knowledge" British Journal of Sociology of 
Education Vol. 12, No.2, p. 223. 
7 C. Lawson, et aI., 1996, "Realism, Underlabouring and Institutions" Cambridge Journal of Economics Vol. 20, 
p. 140; R. Bhaskar, 1986, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation Verso, London, p. 5. 
8 R. Bhaskar, "Realism" in: Outhwaite, W. and Bottomore, T. 1993, The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-
Century Social Thought Blackwell Reference, Oxford, p. 547; R. Bhaskar, 1986, Scientific Realism and 
Human Emancipation Verso, London, p. 5. It is necessary that discourse be about something other than itself 
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specific sciences and their assumptions about the particular objects of their enquiry (a first-
order or internal realism) Bhaskar posits a metaphysical or transcendental realism: 
..... consisting in an elaboration of what the world must [my emphasis] be like prior to any 
empirical investigation of it and for any scientific attitudes or activities to be possible".9 
Lawson et ai. point out that in this procedure must "does not signify some ahistorical, infallible 
conception of the acquisition of knowledge; the premises accepted in a transcendental 
argument are always likely to be replaced, recast or become unacceptable". 
In pursuing the transcendental form, Bhaskar comprehends a particular relationship 
between philosophy and science. Like Kant (whose transcendental idealism is an antecedent of 
Bhaskar's theoryl0) Bhaskar perceives philosophy and science as two different things, neither 
reducible to the other. Philosophy distinguishes itself by the types of considerations and 
arguments it employs - a distinction principally founded upon its use of pure reason. 11 
However, while remaining distinct, philosophy and science are necessarily connected. On the 
one hand, the deployment of pure reason is itself impossible without reference to something (a 
practice or object) other than itself. For the philosophy of science "analyses notions that 
denote only on the condition that they are used syncategorematically, that is under some 
particular description, in science".12 An important consequence of this connection is that the 
historical and 'unfinished' state of science must be mirrored in any philosophy of science;13 
hence critical realism is inevitably historically contingent and open ended. 14 On the other 
hand, science cannot separate itself from philosophy, for: "underpinning all substantive 
inquiries there are always particular philosophical and methodological assumptions ... a 
sometimes tacit, sometimes explicit, level of general concepts and broad perspectives on the 
nature of the subject to be investigated and the form of explanation appropriate to it". 15 
So what function can a critical realist philosophy perform? Bhaskar appropriates the 
Lockean idea of the philosopher as an 'underlabourer' for science. Under this description the 
purpose of philosophy is to remove ideological and other obstacles to intellectual coherence16 -
it can clear the path for the sciences (and indeed other social practices). On one level it carties 
clarificatory, defensive and critical implications for first-order inquiry. On another level, or in 
"or else it even cannot be about itself' (the self referential paradox). R. Bhaskar. 1994. Plato Etc. The 
Problems of Philosophy and their Resolution Verso. London. pp. 163-4; Also Cf. Ch. 2.1. 
9 R. Bhaskar. 1986. Scientific Realism p. 6. 
10 However. as Bhaskar notes: 
If philosophy is to be possible (and I want to contend that it is in practice indispensable) then it must 
follow the Kantian road But in doing so it must avoid any commitment to the content of specific 
theories and recognize the conditional nature of all its results. Moreover it must reject two 
presuppositions which were central to Kant's own philosophical project. viz. that in any inquiry of 
the form 'what must be the case for ~ to be possible?' the conclusion. X. would be a fact about us 
and that ~ must invariably stand for some universal operation of the mind. That is to say. it must 
reject the idealist and individualist cast into which Kant pressed his own inquiries. 
R. Bhaskar. 1979, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human 
Sciences (first edition) Humanities Press. New Jersey, p. 6. 
11 R. Bhaskar. 1979. The Possibility of Naturalism p. 8. 
12 Ibid; Scientific Realism pp. 12-13. 
13 C. Lawson, et al .• 1996, "Realism. Underlabouring and Institutions" p. 141. 
14 ..... activity. conceptualisation and analysis may each be normatively corrigible, socially contested, spatially 
localised and temporaUy transient" R. Bhaskar. 1986. Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation Verso, 
London. pp. 11-12. 
15 C. Lawson, et al., 1996. "Realism. Underlabouring and Institutions" p. 141. 
16 P. Baehr, 1990. "Critical Realism, Cautionary Realism" Sociological Review Vol. 38, No.4, p. 766. 
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a less immediate sense, such reflection can shed light upon the cognitive schemes, conceptual 
tools, etc., at work behind scientific practices. l7 
But critical realism cannot act as an overseer or judge of science. The transcendental 
approach (ie what must be the case for the ensemble of scientific activities to be possible?) 
rules out the possibility of a substantive apriorism where philosophy legislates in advance for 
the use of specific scientific procedures, or indeed, predicts the substantive findings of 
science. l8 This is a fundamental constraint that differentiates the realist project from such 
historical enterprises as absolute idealism and post-Cartesian, pre-critical rationalism 
(including empiricism). 19 On this understanding philosophy can produce knowledge, but only 
a sort of second-order knowledge; of the conditions necessary for the production of 
knowledge.20 One implication of this is that philosophy does not "produce any radically new 
knowledge in the way that science can but makes explicit that knowledge which was already 
implicit in some other practice".21 It is my view that despite these very real constraints, such a 
philosophical clearing is indispensable for resource management. 
Finally, it is essential that I situate the realist position within the spectrum of 
philosophy of science/social science. Realism spans or inhabits a broad philosophical divide, 
and as a consequence is often perceived, for better or worse, as a compromise position. This 
position can be seen as an attempt to avoid two sets of mistakes: First, to circumvent the 
diametric and fundamental errors of, in the first instance, the reduction of being to knowledge -
for this results in the privileging of mind as a source of meaning as is the case with idealism, 
most recently in the form of constructivism (this is what Bhaskar has labelled the epistemic 
fallacy, and which necessarily involves, among other things, an anthropomorphism which is 
problematic in environmental terms22). And in the second instance, and conversely, the 
reduction of knowledge to being, as evidenced in more extreme empiricist ontologies (the ontic 
fallacy); Secondly, to avoid the already noted mistake of reducing either science to philosophy 
or philosophy to science (the speCUlative and positivistic illusions respectively).23 
Christopher Gosden, an anthropologist who is a realist, provides a succinct descriptiori of 
this perspective: 
Realism has elements of both positivism and constructivism. For realists (eg Bhaskar) the world 
exists independently of us and we can only attempt to understand the nature of the world's 
existence. However, we never apprehend the world as objective observers, as positivists claim 
we can, but as beings involved both in the world and in social relations.24 
, Later in his discussion he adds to this. 
-
17 C. Lawson, et al., 1996, "Realism, Underlabouring and Institutions" pp. 140-1. 
18 R. Bhaskar, 1986, ScienJijic Realism p. 6; R. Bhaskar, 1989, Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to 
Contemporary Philosophy Verso, London, p. 3. 
19 R. Bhaskar, 1979, The Possibility of Naturalism pp. 8-9. 
20 Ibid, p. 10. 
21 C. Lawson, et al., 1996, "Realism, Underlabouring and Institutions" p. 141. 
22 Due to its failure to adequately account for, inter alia, material causality. C. New, 1995, "Sociology and the 
Case for Realism" The Sociological Review p. 814, and passim. 
23 R. Bhaskar, 1986, Scientijic Realism pp. 22-3. There are some excellent discussions of the historical context 
and development of realism in the philosophy of science. Cf. W. Outhwaite, 1987, New Philosophies of 
Social Science Macmillan, London; P. Manicas, 1987, A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford. 
24 C. Gosden, 1994, Social Being and Time Blackwell, Oxford, p. 10. 
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For realists. the structure of the world limits what we can say. but these limits are determined not 
just by reality itself but also by our forms of knowing and telling. Knowledge through 
involvement in a material reality is the key to realism .... 25 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a fuller explication of this position. 
2.3. Transcendental Realism: A Realist Theory of Science 
25 
So far I have been concerned with the issues of what the philosophy of science can do for 
science. I now tum to the results of the transcendental analysis of science - specifically, in this 
subsection, the transcendental consideration of activity in the natural sciences. Out of 
necessity, discussion is restricted to a general review focussing upon the conclusions of 
Bhaskar's analysis, rather than upon their derivation. There are three main elements of 
transcendental realism that are of immediate relevance in this context; the split between the 
transitive and intransitive dimensions; the understanding of the world as structured, 
differentiated and changing; and the depiction of scientific discovery and development 
2.3.(i) The Distinction Between the Transitive and Intransitive Dimensions 
The phenomenon of scientific discontinuity and change poses an immanent challenge to the 
privileged relationship between subject and object - between thought and things - found in 
classical philosophy (both in the idealist and empiricist polarities).26 To avoid such errors (the 
ontic and epistemic fallacies), and in order to provide an adequate account of scientific activity 
it is necessary to make a rigorous distinction between two domains; the intransitive and the 
transitive. The first is born of the principle of the existential intransitivity of objects - that is, 
that "things in general exist and act independently of their descriptions".27 This is the domain 
of the objects of scientific knowledge - "real material things and structures possessed of their 
own tendential causal powers: for instance the existence of planets in motion or the existence 
of market economies prone to crises of accumulation and profit".28 The second, concomitant. 
domain is underpinned by the principle of the historical transitivity of knowledge - "that 'we 
can only know things under particular and potentially transformable descriptions".29 This is 
the realm of changing cognitive objects - historically and culturally situated - thus the above 
noted planetary and economic structures have been variously described and redescribed in 
"Ptolemaic, Copernican and Newtonian astronomy" and in "Keynesian and Marxist accounts 
of capitalism" respectively.30 Clearly there can be no unhypothetical beginning in science.31 
2S Ibid. p. 11. 
26 Either through thought being considered to be a mechanical filllction of things (as in empiricism). or 
conversely. through the "activity of creative subjects [being] regarded as endowing the world with things (as in 
idealism)". R. Bhaskar, 1975. "Feyerabend and Bachelard: Two Philosophies of Science" New Left Review 
No. 94, p. 32. 
27 R. Bhaskar, 1991, Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom Basil Blackwell, O:uord, p. 24; 1993. Dialectic: The 
Pulse of Freedom Verso. London. p. 399. 
28 P. Baehr. 1990. "Critical Realism. Cautionary Realism" p. 767. 
29 R. Bhaskar. 1991. Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom Basil Blackwell. O:uord, p. 24. 
30 P. Baehr. 1990. "Critical Realism. Cautionary Realism" p. 767. Science must be understood as a social 
enterprise. 
31 R. Bhaskar. 1994. Plato Etc. The Problems of Philosophy and their Resolution Verso, London. p. 164. 
Another consequence of this is highlighted by Manicas: ..... any division of labour as regards the attempt to 
theorize structures and their relations can. ultimately. be defended as no more than a convenience." P. 
Manicas. 1987. A Histo? (lnd Philosophy of the Social Science p. 281. 
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In making this distinction Bhaskar rejects any sort of foundationalism, whether in mental 
categories or in the world-out-there. By acknowledging the hiatus between the intransitive and 
transitive dimensions, and their dialectical relationship, Bhaskar accounts for the inexorably 
changing scientific understanding of a real world. 
2.3.(ii) A Structured, Differentiated and Changing World 
The intransitive dimension is characterised as: (i) Stratified into three domains. 
1. The empirical - made up of experiences 
2. The actual - made up of events 
3. The real- made up of entities, underlying structures, mechanisms etc. 
These strata are distinct, with movements from (3) to (2), and from (2) to (1), being 
contingent.32 For example, between (2) and (1), it is possible for events to occur without being 
experienced, and moreover, that those events which are experienced may be so in different 
ways by different observers.33 The differentiation between levels (2) and (3) is a critical one. 
At level (3) the structure of a thing is "constituted by its causal powers which, when exercised, 
manifest themselves as tendencies"34, that is, a propensity or capacity to act in certain ways. 
But such underlying structures must be distinguished from events. For tendencies may exist 
unexercised, they may also neutralise one another so that no event (level 2) takes place - with 
no potentially observable change in rea1ity35 - and they may act conjointly and complexly 
producing seemingly random events. It is not always the case that they will be manifest as 
observable constant conjunctions. Furthermore, the "non-identity of underlying structures and 
events implies that the operation of such structures will typically not be directly manifest in 
(but will be out of phase with) events, ie. they will be transfactuallj36 operative".37 Bhaskar 
sums this up: 
The logical fonn of a law of nature is given by the concept of a transfactually efficacious 
tendency, which may be possessed without being exercised, exercised without being actualised, 
and actualised without being empirically identified by human beings.38 
(ii) The interaction between causal mechanisms points to the differentiation of reality. 
The possibility or efficacy of the experimental procedure - the engineering of constant 
conjunctions within artificially closed systems - suggests, transcendentally, that the world is 
differentiated (that single (or sets of) causal mechanism(s) and tendencies exist). 
(iii) A changing world. The intransitive dimension must itself be understood as 
dynamic, and its innumerable elements - including fundamental natural laws - as variously and 
relatively enduring. Obviously, the reonic nature of the planets in motion seems timeless in 
32 W. Outhwaite, 1987, New Philosophies p. 22. 
33 C. Lawson, et al., 1996, "Realism, Underlabouring and Institutions" p. 142. 
34 R. Bhaskar, 1994, Plato Etc. p. 258. 
35 W. Outhwaite, 1987, New Philosophies p. 22. 
36 The exercise of the causal powers of structure, that is, the working of a generative mechanism, e.g. 
as manifest in the operation of all the natural laws known to science, must be interpreted as applying 
transfactually, that is to say in closed and open systems alike ... The result of not interpreting laws 
transfactually is that the nonnic statements with which they are expressed are immediately falsified 
in open systems, and practical science is left without any epistemic credentials. 
R. Bhaskar, 1993, Dialectic p. 405. Collier similarly notes that "Positivism has problems accounting for 
applied science at all, since the rare conditions under which positivist assumptions seem to obtain (that is, in 
closed systems) are not the conditions in which the applied scientist is working. A. Collier, 1994. Critical 
Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskm's Philosophy Verso, London, p. 220. 
37 C. Lawson. et al., 1996, "Realism, Underlabouring and Institutions" p. 142. 
38 R. Bhaskar, 1994, Plato Etc. p. 23. 
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comparison with, say, the specific properties of a rapidly mutating virus, nevertheless each is 
temporally contingent. 
The understanding of the world as structured, differentiated and changing stands in 
stark contrast with the flat, unstructured, undifferentiated and uniform world of Hume and the 
empiricists - an implicit ontology comprised of atomistic events or states, constantly conjoined 
within apparently closed systems.39 Critical realism posits a rich ontology that necessitates a 
complex comprehension of causal relations: "a multi-determined, multi-levelled, multi-linear, 
multi-relational, multi-angular, multi-perspectival, multi-detennined and open pluriverse":.\O 
2.3.(ili) Depth Explanation: Scientific Discovery and Development. 
This transcendentally derived ontology reflects back upon scientific activity - the clarificatory, 
defensive and critical moments alluded to above. Most significantly, it provides the basis for a 
rational account of scientific discovery and development. 
Scientific investigation typically follows a four-phase pattern of development. 41 The 
first phase involves the identification and description of some epistemically significant 
phenomenon. In phase two an explanatory model is constructed. Such a model will conjecture 
some transfactual mechanism or mechanisms, which, if real and act as hypothesised, would 
explain the phenomenon in question. This essential movement of thought has been termed 
'analogical-retroductive', and involves the employment of existing cognitive/transitive 
resources,42 advancing by the use of such devices as analogical and metaphorical connections 
with already familiar mechanisms. Retroduction43 inevitably raises existential questions, for 
"whether or not the postulated mechanism acts in the postulated way cannot of course be 
decided by theory alone, since in general a plurality of possible explanations will be consistent 
with the phenomenon".44 Hence the third phase consists of both the empirical scrutiny of the 
posited mechanism/s,45 and the consideration and elimination of alternative explanations. 
39 W. Outhwaite, 1987, New Philosophies pp. 19-21; R. Bhaskar, 1989, Reclaiming Reality: A Critical 
Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy Verso, London. pp. &-9. This is also a criticism of Cartesian 
reductionism - not the splitting up of the world into bits for the purposes of investigation (this is of course an 
.indispensible, albeit not exclusive, way of learning about the world) but rather the ontological assumption that 
the world is simply an agglomeration of bits. Although as Levins and Lewontin note, "reduction as a method 
and reductionism as a world view feed on and recreate each other". R. Levins and R. Lewontin, 1985, The 
Dialectical Biologist Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. 
40 R. Bhaskar, 1993, Dialectic p. 53. 
41 R. Bhaskar, 1986, Scientific Realism pp. 61-2. 
42 And so science must be recognized as a thoroughly social endeavour. 
43 Patrick Baert explains: 
Critical Realism draws on neither inductivism or deductivism. Instead it relies on retroduction (or 
sometimes called abduction). In the case of retroduction one tries to make sense of newly observed 
phenomena by drawing upon metaphors or analogies with mechanisms that are familiar. One 
identifies the deeper structures which account for the observations. Through retroduction critical 
realists attempt to comprehend the creative process of scientific activity. Relying upon retroduction. 
the laws uncovered within a realist programme do not refer to some logical necessity with ceteris 
paribus restrictions. but to unconditional natural necessity. The laws revealed are not counterfactual 
statements about what would occur at the empirical level if X, Y, Z, ... - they are statements about 
which underlying structures are at work. 
It should be noted that while recognising certain merits of the critical realist project, Baert is not himself a critical 
realist. P. Baert, 1996, "Realist Philosophy of the Social Science and Economics: A Critique" p. 516. 
44 R. Bhaskar, 1986, Scientific Realism p. 61. 
45 The problems of empirical analysis are, for the greater part, issues pertaining to the specific sciences. 
However, it is important to highlight that in open systems the possibility of closure - and hence isolation of a 
single mechanism - will be limited. Critical realists normally limit the availability of experimental closure to 
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Finally, when the mechanism has been adequately identified and described,46 it then becomes 
the phenomenon to be explained, and so begins the next cycle of investigation.47 Hence the 
tenn depth explanation. 
While this depiction of scientific development allows for the provision of "fuller, 
deeper and more comprehensive accounts of reality"48, it does not in any way necessitate a 
monistic understanding of scientific progress. It is important to emphasise the fallibility of 
scientific theories and research programs. One crucial aspect here is that as successively 
deeper levels of reality are uncovered and explained, "knowledge at more superficial levels is 
typically revised, corrected or more or less drastically recast, issuing in a characteristic pattern 
of description, explanation and redescription for the phenomenon understood at anyone level 
of reality".49 The transcendental realist account can thus rationally accommodate the epistemic 
breaks and 'paradigmatic' (indeed, any) changes, characteristic of the history and sociology of 
science. 
Finally, this account carries critical implications, as Lawson et. ai. explain: 
The possibility of critique, and the role of philosophy, on this account is crucially bound up with 
a concern for ontology. Thus, in transcendentally deducing an ontology which renders 
intelligible certain widely acknowledged features of the world, critical realism is not restricted to 
the clarificatory/descriptive moment. Instead the possibility is opened up for criticising positions 
which, in virtue of their ontological presuppositions, fail to render such phenomena, or others, 
which the standpoint purports to uphold, intelligible. 
One such critical aspect is found in the transcendental realist emphasis upon explanation in 
science, as opposed to the positivistic preoccupation with prediction. This argument rests, in 
some part, upon the difficulties of obtaining decisive test situations (isolation and closure) 
because generative mechanisms are held to operate transfactually within complex open systems 
where constant conjunctions may be absent.so As I made clear above, complex open systems 
make up most of reality, and hence, positivism begins to look like an approach with very 
the natural sciences, and even then it is necessary to be circumspect (see 1.3.(iii». On retroduction in a 
similar context to that studied in this thesis, see P. Saunders, 1981, Social Theory and the Urban Question 
Hutchinson, London, pp. 17-18. . 
46 Recognising here that scientists' judgements are always fallible and their conclusions necessarily provisional. 
47 What I have described here is a straightforward treatment of discovery. It is useful to consider Bhaskar's more 
complex RRREI(C) model of applied scientific explanation. Such explanation is generally a: 
much messier, less unilinear and more context specific affair ... . But in so far as the explanation is 
of a phenomenon such as a typical open-systemic event, co-determined by a multiplicity of 
mechanisms, which has the character of a conjuncture, the explanation will depend upon the 
following steps; 
(a) Resolution of the events into components. 
(b) Redescription of these components in a theoretically significant way so that theoretically 
established laws can be brought to bear on them 
(c) Retroduction via such laws to possible antecedent causes. 
As there will be in general a disjunctive plurality as well as a conjunctive multiplicity of (possible) 
causes in open systems, the next step will consist in the; 
(d) Elimination of alternatives. 
This process will continue until; 
(e) Positive Identification of the generative causes at work in the production of the conjuncture is 
forthcoming (if it is) .... 
(t) Secondary recessive Corrective work in the description of the explanandum conjuncture. 
The model of theoretical development has been labelled DREIC where the Resolution and 
Redescription stages are replaced by a straightforward Description stage. R. Bhaskar, 1994, 
Plato Etc. p. 27. 
48 R. Bhaskar, 1986, Scientific Realism p. 60. 
49 Ibid, p. 63. 
SO For a discussion of this problem in the fields of ecology and evolutionary biology - particularly, the 
applicability of predictive or 'stochastic' models - see R. Levins and R. Lewontin, 1985, The Dialectical 
Biologist Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 152-60. 
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limited applications. The argument against the positivistic preoccupation with prediction also 
rests upon criticism of the empiricist belief that we can know no more than the constant 
sequences that unite phenomena.51 It should be emphasised here that this perspective does not 
rule out the possibility or even the importance of prediction, just that explanation is not 
identified with prediction, and that "statements about past conjunctions are not in themselves 
explanations".52 Indeed, the idea that such statements could be considered explanations seems 
highly counter intuitive, William Michael argues the following in this context: 
Imagine someone had correctly predicted the results of five horse races in a row, but was unable 
to say anything illuminating about how he did il We wouldn't intuitively say he had an 
explanation for why the horses that won did win. Explanations aim to satisfy why questions. 
Predictions just don't do that. But I find why questions meaningful, and their denial I am not 
prepared to go along with.53 
It is in this context that this thesis focuses upon the explanation of business power and 
dominance in environmental conflict. 
2.4. Critical Naturalism: the Social Ontology of Critical Realism 
The question about which this section pivots is the naturalistic one of the susceptibility of both 
the social and natural worlds to synonymous modes of explanation, ie. scientifically. A 
particular understanding of scientific explanation has been espoused above - the transcendental 
realist view - in which the essential moment in science is the retroductive "movement at any 
one level from knowledge of manifest phenomena to knowledge of the structures that generate 
them". On this basis the question of naturalism can be put as follows; "to what extent is it 
possible to suppose that a comparable move can be made in the domain of the human 
sciences?"54 In pursuing this question Bhaskar does not, however, set out to establish, assert or 
defend, either a scientistic unity of method across the social and natural sciences, nor a 
reductionist identification of the subject matters of both. 55 The issue is, rather, what relevance 
a realist theory of science has for the study of the social world. Bhaskar argues that a 
naturalism is possible but only in a conditional or qualified fonn. 
Once again, the nature of the (social) world is apprehended through transcendental 
inquiry. Because of his preoccupation with freedom, Bhaskar's point of departure in his social 
philosophy is the generic possibility of human agency.56 As with the above treatment of 
transcendental realism, discussion is limited here to a review of the main aspects of Bhaskar's 
naturalistic extension. In this section I deal with four central arguments within Bhaskar's 
social philosophy; his transfonnational model of social activity, the limits to naturalism, 
complex causality and material relations, and his broad understanding of social analysis. 
51 W. Outhwaite, 1987, New Philosophies p. 20. 
52 A. Collier, 1994, Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaslwr's Philosophy Verso. London, p. 2Z7. 
53 William Michael, December 1998, Personal correspondence. 
54 R. Bhaskar, 1979, The Possibility of Naturalism p. 17. 
55 R. Bhaskar, "Naturalism" in: Outhwaite. W. and Bottomore. T. 1993, The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-
Century Social Thought Blackwell Reference, Oxford, p. 412. 
56 C. Lawson et. al.. note that this "is taken as a starting point because those antagonistic to any possible 
application of science to the social realm have stressed this feature above all others". 19%, "Realism, 
Underlabouring and Institutions" Cambridge Journal of Economics Vol. 20, p. 147. 
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2.4.(i) The Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) 
Two polarised social ontologies, have penneated social science. On the one hand there has 
been the tradition, epitomised by Max Weber (Figure 2.1.),57 in which social objects are 
understood as the results of, or constituted by, intentional human behaviour. Such a 
perspective tends towards voluntarism, it is associated with social atomism and hence 
methodological individualism, and also underpins the action-oriented and interpretive 
(Verstehen) sociologies. On the other hand there is the Durkheimian tradition (Figure 2.2.), 
where social objects possess a life of their own, "external to and coercing the individual".58 
This perspective tends to reification, is associated with collectivism and social detenninism, 
and underpins the substantive approaches of structuralism and functionalism. Both standpoints 
shed light upon the nature of the social world, however, each is a flawed and at best, partial, 
explanation. I SOC;", 
Individual 
Figure 2.1. The Weberian 
Stereotype 
Society 
1 
Individual 
Figure 2.2. The Durkheimian 
Stereotype 
Over the past three decades there have been a number of parallel programs seeking to 
resolve this perceived antinomy by means of synthesis. For example, Anthony Giddens' 
'theory of structuration'59 and Pierre Bourdieu's 'generative structuralist method' -
specifically, his model of reproduction and change.60 The most fully worked out account, 
however, is Bhaskar's transformational model of social activity, which is set out below. in 
Figure 2.3. On this fonnulation, society61 is conceived not only as a pre-existing and necessary 
57 But also of Hobbes, Locke. Adam Smith. J.S. Mill, Spencer and Pareto etc. See: P. Manicas, 1987. A History 
and Philosophy of the Social Sciences p. 269. 
58 R. Bhaskar, "Naturalism" in: Outhwaite. W. and Bottomore. T. 1993. The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-
Century Social Thought Blackwell Reference, Oxford, p. 413. This perspective also includes Comte, and the 
Hegelian tradition exemplified in versions of Marxist historical materialism. On such accounts people are seen 
as the bearers of autonomous structures - "One fonn of this. that found in Levi-Strauss, involves an escape 
from history via a form of Platonism in which 'ethnographic analysis tries to arrive at invariants beyond the 
empirical diversity of human societies'. and where 'the ultimate goal of the human sciences is not to constitute 
[persons] but to dissolve them .. •. P. Manicas. 1987. A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences p. 269 
59 cr. A. Giddens. 1984. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration Polity Press. 
Cambridge. 
60 For a useful summary see: R. Harker. C. Mahar. and C. Wilkes. (eds), 1990. An Introduction to the Work of 
Pierre Bourdieu: The Practice of Theory Macmillan. London, pp. 100-2. 
61 "Society ... the ensemble of positioned practices and networked interrelationships which individuals never 
create but in their practical activity always presuppose, and in so doing everywhere reproduce or transform." 
R. Bhaskar, 1989, Reclaiming Reality p. 4. 
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condition for, intentional agency,62 but also as existing and consisting only in virtue of such 
agency,63 
Socialization 
TT 
Society 
Individuals 
Reproduction! 
Transformation 
Figure 2.3. The Transformational model of the society/person connection64 
To explain: Agency (transcendentally) presupposes the existence of social structures that are 
both real and transfactually active.6S Bhaskar puts this clearly: 
For all activity presupposes the prior existence of social forms. Thus consider saying, making 
and doing as characteristic modalities of human agency. People cannot communicate except by 
utilising existing media, produce except by applying themselves to materials which are already 
formed, or act save in some or other context Speech requires language; making materials; 
action conditions; agency resources; activity rules. Even spontaneity has as its necessary 
condition the pre-existence of a social form with (or by means 00 which the spontaneous act is 
performed 66 
Like natural structures, social structures are causally efficacious; they both enable and 
constrain human activity.67 In their absence particular outcomes will either not happen, or not 
happen the same way, Yet this is not to advocate a structural determinism - "rules of grammar 
facilitate speech but do not determine what is said",68 The model acknowledges the "space of 
indeterminacy" between "institutionalised expectations of any kind and any particular act".69 
Hence it does not vitiat~ the notion of agency and it is only through the actions of agents that 
social structures persist and are transformed,7o Society is only present in human action, This 
model avoids the reductionist errors of both reification and voluntarism, and enables us, to 
sustain the twinned dualities of structure and praxis,71 In summary: 
62 "Agency Intentional transformative praxis caused by real, even if routinised, unconscious, multiple, anterior 
(including long prior) andlor contradictory reasons; which issue in a state of affairs that, unless it was 
overdetermined (as in a fuing squad), would not have occurred otherwise." R. Bhaskar, 1993, Dialectic pp. 
393-4. 
63 R. Bhaskar, "Naturalism" in: Outhwaite, W. and Bottomore, T. 1993, The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-
Century Social Thought Blackwell Reference, Oxford, p. 413. 
64 R. Bhaskar, 1989, The Possibility of Naturalism p.36. 
6S C. Lawson, et al., 1996, "Realism, Underlabouring and Institutions" p. 147. 
66 R. Bhaskar, 1989, The Possibility of Naturalism p.34. 
67 A. Giddens, 1984, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration Polity Press, Cambridge, 
p.297; 1979, Central Problems p. 91. 
68 C. Lawson, et al., 1996, "Realism, Underlabouring and Institutions" p. 147. 
69 J. Alexander, 1995, Fin de Siecle Social Theory: Relativism, Reduction, and the Problem of Reason Verso, 
London, p. 139. 
70 ''The transformative capacity of the agent depends upon competences and facilities (access to resources), while 
the acts performed in or by her actions will depend upon the extent and manner in which she is able to 
mobilise these resources (including 'inner' ones - curiosity. hope, imagination, drive, bodily gesture, self-
esteem) and the circumstances of her actiolL" R, Bhaskar, 1994. Plato Etc. The Problems of Philosophy and 
their Resolution Verso, London, pp. 99-100. 
71 R. Bhaskar, 1989, Reclaiming Reality p. 184. Bhaskar describes these dualities in Plato Etc.: "Society is thus 
both the condition and outcome of human agency (the duality of structure to use Anthony Giddens' 
terminology) and human agency both the production and reproduction (or transformation) of society (the 
duality of agency) ... ". pp. 91-2. 
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Society is not the unconditioned creation of hwnan agency (voluntarism), but neither does it 
exist independently of it (reification). And individual action neither completely detennines 
(individualism) nor is completely determined by (determinism) social forms. In [this 
formulation}, unintended consequences, unacknowledged conditions and tacit skills ... limit the 
actor's understanding of the social world, while unacknowledged (unconscious) motivation 
limits one's understanding of oneself.72 
32 
As will be discussed later, these various disjunctions - between the intended and unintended73 , 
the acknowledged and the unacknowledged, the explicit and the tacit, and the conscious and 
the unconscious - suggest an explanatory, and indeed emancipatory, role for the social 
sciences. 
Contained within this schema is a subtle understanding of, on the one hand, the 
ontological hiatus which exists between society and people - they are thoroughly different 
kinds of thing and do not constitute two dialectical moments of the same process (as, for 
example, appears to be the case in Giddens' earlier circular model of structuration)74 - and on 
the other hand, it situates the connection between the two in the process of transformation. As 
a consequence, the model is able to uphold a robust concept of change, and hence of history. 75 
In addition to their advocacy of this transformational conception of social activity, 
critical realists also advance related argument for the relation-dependent character of the social 
world.76 Marx articulated a similar perspective in Grundrisse: "Society does not consist of 
individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these relations 
stand".77 Such an understanding is, once again, contra to the extremes of both atomistic 
individualism and undifferentiated collectivism that have underpinned much of social science. 
It can also be perceived, mistakenly, as an extreme position - particularly, as a denial of the 
ontological status of the individual.78 This is to ignore the specific focus of these realist 
claims, which is society. To study society per se, the object of sociology, is to be concerned 
"at least paradigmatically, with the persistent relations between individuals (and groups), and 
with the relations between these relations (and between such relations and nature and the 
products of such relations) ... ".79 Importantly, this approach does not rule out individualist 
methodologies per se, rather, it highlights their limitations and warns against their dominance. 
A corollary of both the TMSA and the relational conception of society, and one which 
has important methodological consequences or potentialities for the study of social phenomena, 
is what Bhaskar has called the 'position-practice' system: 
72 R. Bhaskar, 1982, "Emergence, Explanation and Emancipation" In: P. Secord, (ed.) , Explaining Human 
Behaviour Sage, Beverly Hills C.A., p. 286. 
73 "As regards unintended consequences, Marx was one of the first social scientists who systematically treated 
this mechanism. He employed this kind of analysis himself when he demonstrated both on the political and 
economic level how individual rationality can bring about collectively undesirable outcomes" R. Grundmann, 
1991, Marxism and EcoLogy Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 71. See also J. Elster, 1985, Making Sense of Marx 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
74 R. Bhaskar, 1989, The Possibility of Naturalism p. 33. 
75 Ibid, pp. 36-7. 
76 R. Bhaskar, 1994, PLalo Etc. p. 93. 
77 K. Marx, 1973, Grundrisse Penguin, Harmondsworth, p. 265. 
78 This is clearly wrong - the significance of individual agency within the TMSA has already been underlined. 
William Outhwaite sums up the realist position here: "At the centre of our social ontology there must be then, 
the commonsense picture of physically distinct persons capable of independent action: what Harre and Secord 
ironically called the 'anthropomorphic model of man'. "W. Outhwaite, 1987, New Philosophies of SociaL 
Science Macmillan, London, p. 108. 
79 R. Bhaskar, 1989, The Possibility of Naturalism p. 29. 
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... it is evident that we need a system of mediating concepts encompassing both aspects of the 
duality of praxis, designating the . slots' as it were, in the social structure into which active 
subjects must slip in order to reproduce it; that is, a system of concepts designating the point of 
contact between human agency and social structures. Such a point, linking action to structure, 
must both endure and be immediately occupied by individuals. It is clear that the mediating 
system that we need is that of positions (places, functions, rules, tasks, duties, rights, etc.) 
occupied (filled, assumed, enacted, etc.) by individuals, and of the practices (activities, etc.) in 
which, in virtue of their occupancy of these positions (and vice versa), they engage .... Now such 
positions and practices, if they are to be individuated at all, can only be done so reiationally.80 
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This system thus avoids the pervasive reductionist errors identified earlier, allowing for a non-
trivial treatment of agency whilst avoiding the reduction of social structure to "the inadequate 
notion of context".81 Many aspects of the analytical framework developed in Chapter Two 
can be understood as position-practice nodes and articulations. 
2.4.(ii) Limits to Naturalism 
The social world has been described here as a complex real object. But although real, society 
possesses crucial divergent ontological characteristics, which establish limits upon naturalism, 
Of these, relation-dependence has already been discussed - substantive social explanation must 
always have regard to some or other social relation. There are three other important 
conditions; activity-dependence, concept-dependence and greater space-time specificity, 
In Dialectic Bhaskar notes that the latter three limits can be derived from the premise of 
intentional embodied human agency.S2 So consider once more Bhaskar's definition: 
"Intentional, ·transfonnative praxis caused by real, even if routinized, unconscious, multiple, 
anterior (including long prior) and/or contradicting reasons."83 
The first condition is the activity-dependent, or the auto-poietic character84 of social 
structures; "Social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the 
activities they govern".85 This is in the main straightforward, however William Outhwaite and 
Ted Benton propose two further qualifications or additions: That it be counterfactualised to 
include possible actions governed (enabled or constrained) by a structure. This crucial 
observation embraces such political phenomena as agenda-control, non-decision making and 
some types of structural dominance; And that the issue of non-correspondence be taken into 
account - the activities which sustain a structure are not always the same as those which it 
governs in its functioning - "[a] structure of gift exchange does not exist independently of the 
giving of gifts, but it also presupposes the possession or acquisition of potential gifts (whether 
or not these are possessed or acquired under that description)"·86 
The second condition, that of concept-dependence is supervenient to, if not inseparable 
from, activity-dependence; "social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist 
independently of the agent's conceptions of what they are doing in their activity"87 (a 
80 Ibid, pp. 40-1. See also; Reclaiming Reality p. 184. 
SI C. Lawson, et aI., 1996, "Realism, Underlabouring and Institutions" p. 148. 
82 R. Bhaskar. 1993. Dialectic p. 157. 
83 Ibid. pp. 393-4. 
84 'ihe acti'vity-dependence of social structures entails its auto-poietic character. viz. that it is itself a social 
product, that is to say. that in our substantive motivated productions. we not only produce. but we also 
reproduce or transform the very conditions of our production". R. Bhaskar. 1993. Dialectic pp. 156-7. 
85 R. Bhaskar. 1989. The Possibility of Naturalism p. 38. 
86 W. Outhwaite. 1987. New Philosophies of Social Science pp. 53-4; T. Benton. 1981. "Realism and Social 
Science" Radical Philosophy No. 27. 
87R. Bhaskar. 1989. The Possibility of Naturalism p. 38. 
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phenomenon such as sleepwalking can only be considered a marginal case of action). It is very 
important to emphasise that the agent's conception of what they are doing in their activity need 
not be correct; indeed, in certain instances a correct understanding of one's actions may render 
such action unlikely or impossible (for example, I cannot be deliberately misled if I am in full 
knowledge of the deceit).88 On a wider scale, the above definition allows for our both 
conscious and unconscious involvement (reproduction and transformation) within manifold 
structures (the nuclear family, capitalist economy, language, etc.). It can therefore account for 
such phenomena as ideology and false consciousness. Also of crucial importance here, is that 
this definition of agency talks of " ... praxis caused by real ... reasons". Bhaskar has noted 
elsewhere that "reasons (that are acted on) just are causes".89 Ideas playa causal role in any 
social transformation. 
The third constraint is that of geo-historical specificity or space-time dependence. On 
the TMSA social structures are possible objects of transformation and will therefore be only 
relatively enduring. Unlike the other constraints this is a relative rather than absolute 
difference (for as noted earlier the natural world is itself transforming). It is a warning that the 
social world is on the whole more historically determinate. Partly as a result of this, but also 
due to the differentiation and development of social activities, and hence their interdependence, 
social structures must be perceived not only as relatively transient but also as loca1ised.90 
In addition to these directly ontological constraints there are three other limits to a 
naturalistic treatment of the social world: First, there is the epistemic problem arising from the 
intrinsic openness and causal complexity (implied by the very notion of human agency) of 
social systems. It has already been noted in discussion that contra to the Humean ontology the 
natural world should be understood as complex and open, and that causal mechanisms will not 
as a matter of course reveal themselves through constant conjunctions. This was not to deny 
the possibility, and fundamental epistemological efficacy, of artificial isolation and closure for 
scientific inquiry. It was, rather, a cautionary note. However the social world is even more 
contingent and is characterised by a "complete absence of universal generalisations of any 
cognitive import".91 Secondly, there is a relational limit (distinct from relation-dependence) 
inferred by the causal interdependence between social science and its subject matter: 
This is not to say that the social theorist 'constructs' social reality. But it is to say that social 
theory is practically conditioned by, and potentially has practical consequences in society. 
88 W. Outhwaite, 1987, New Philosophies o/Social Science Macmillan, London, pp. 54. 
89 It is interesting to consider this statement in its context 
To comprehend human agency as a causally and taxanomically irreducible mode of matter is not to 
posit a distinct substance 'mind' endowed with reasons for acting apart from the causal network, but 
to credit intentional embodied agency with distinct (emergent) causal powers from the biological 
matter out of which agents were formed, on which they are capable of reacting back (and must, 
precisely as materially embodied causally efficacious agents, do so, if they are to act at all), but from 
which, in an open-systemic totality in which events are not determined before they are caused, 
neither such beings nor the transformations and havoc they would wreak on the rest of nature could 
have been predicted ex ante. On such a synchronic emergent causal powers materialism, reasons 
(that are acted on)just are causes. 
It is the notion of emergence which enables reasons to be considered in causal terms (emergence is understood 
here as, typically, tbe generation of new beings (entities, structures, totalities, concepts) out of pre-existing 
material from whicli they could have been neither deduced or induced - in a sense a quantum leap). R. 
Bhaskar, 1993, Dialectic pp. 49-51; Outhwaite has also stated that ..... 'the real reason' for an action is best 
understood as the reason which was causally efficacious in producing that action." New Philosophies p. SO. 
90 R. Bhaskar, 1989~ The Possibility 0/ Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human 
Sciences (second edition) Harvester Wheatsheaf, London. p.38. 
9l R. Bhaskar, 1994, Plato Etc. pp. 93-4. 
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Indeed critical realism suggests Utal sociallheory is non-neutral in lWO ways. It always consists 
in a practical inlervention in social life and sometimes (oUter things being equal) it logically 
entails values and actions. In Utese circumstances, the standard factJvalue and theory/practice 
distinctions break down.92 
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Another way of considering this is to picture the causal efficacy of ideas throughout the various 
pathways of the TMSA (ie. socialisation and reproduction/transfonnation). Again there is 
avoidance of positivistic and constructivist extremes and instead social science takes on "the 
character of a relational dialectic between subject and object of inquiry". 93 Yet this does not 
break down the distinction between the transitive and the intransitive dimensions (as in 
henneneutic theories). Existential intransitivity is an "a priori condition of investigation and 
applies in the same way in the social, as the natural sphere".94 Both causal interdependence 
and existential intransitivity are necessary for a realist social science;95 Finally, in the earlier 
description of the TMSA it was observed that society consists not only of social objects but 
also beliefs about such objects. This differentiation has radical implications for social science 
as it "makes possible an explanatory critique of consciousness (and being), entailing 
judgements of value and action, without parallel in the domain of the natural sciences ... ".96 
For critical realists all social forms will be liable to critique. 
2.4.(iii) Complex Causality and Material Relations: The Social Cube 
In discussion thus far a conceptual distinction has been made between the natural and the social 
worlds. But ~t is of course the case that human beings transact with nature ("social structure is 
embedded in, conditioned by and in tum efficacious on the rest of nature, the ecosphere"97) and 
hence a comprehensive ontology should reflect this. While the above social ontology provides 
for the spatia-temporality of social life, it does not capture the full implications of this relation. 
It is therefore essential that this schema be extended in order to embrace "both material culture 
and human beings as active forces in the creation of social life, although each has its own 
special fonns of cause".98 Bhaskar has done this through a model variously labelled the 'four-
planar model of social being', 'human-nature simpliciter' or simply the 'social cube' . 
92 R. Bhaskar, 1989, Reclaiming Reality p.5. 
93 R. Bhaskar, 1994, Plato Etc. p. 94. 
94 R. Bhaskar, 1989, The Possibility of Naturalism p. 60. 
95 W. Outhwaite, 1987, New Philosophies of Social Science pp. 54. 
96 Which vindicates a kind of 'substantive ethical naturalism'. That is a form of naturalism which recognises the 
cognate nature of statements of fact and value. R. Bhaskar, "Naturalism" in: Outhwaite, W. and Bottomore, T. 
1993, The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought Blackwell Reference, Oxford, pp. 4124. 
97 R. Bhaskar, 1989, Reclaiming Reality pp. 6-7. 
98 C. Gosden, 1994, Social Being and Time p. 72. Gosden in a discussion about Hegel and Marxs' treatment of 
the subject/object relation writes: 
[In Marx] the full implications of the dialectic between people and nature was never followed Utrougb. 
In Marx, as in Hegel, there is a unity between the dialectical fonn of analysis and the dialectical 
movements of Ute social world. In both schemes Utere is an attempt to break down the divide between 
subject and object While people may be considered separate from external reality for certain 
purposes of Utought. ultimately they are locked togeUter in a structure of mutual causatiOlL 
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Figure 2.4. Four·Planar Social Being Encompassing the Social CulJe99 
Structures 
[c] 
\1' Enable~en!J \J Constramt 
Institutions 
Socialization 
Elaboration 
The intentionality 
ofpraxiis L ------------------ ----
/ [b] I ~s Agents 
r------,...-----.lC---~ Human agency <I> 
[d] _______________ .. _ .. _ [a] I 
Biosphere 
In this schema the four inter-dependent planes that constitute social life are: 
[a] The plane of material transactions with nature; 
[b] The plane of inter-/intra-subjective (personal) actions; 
[c] The plane of social relations; 
[d] The plane of the subjectiv ity of the agent 
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Where planes [b] and [c] constitute the social cube. 1OO It is not possible or appropriate at this 
point to conduct an extended excursus into the implications of this model. It is placed here 
simply as a graphic representation of the interconnection between people and nature. In the 
context of this thesis, there is one point that must be made - that the social world; 
is both inscribed within and in constant dynamic causal interaction with (the rest of) nature. To 
fail to see this. and in particular that there are aphysical (natural) constraints on human social life 
... is a charterfor ecological disaster ... .101 
Finally, it is intended that the model will later function as a heuristic in the development of the 
theoretical framework in Chapter Two. 
2.4.(iv) Social Analysis: Depth Explanation and ElTUlncipatory Critique 
I will start here by returning to the issue of naturalism, and ask; What relevance does a realist 
theory of science have for the study of the social world? There are tWo elements here; is such 
an extension possible, and, further, is it appropriate? Underpinning all of this is the historical 
record of science in furnishing us with often sensational insights into the operation of the 
natural world. 
The transcendental realist account of scientific discovery in the natural world was 
predicated upon the exposition of a specific ontology which was characterised by; (a) a split 
between the intransitive and the transitive domains, and (b) the depiction of the intransitive 
realm as structured, differentiated and changing, necessitating a complex comprehension of 
99 R. Bhaskar. 1994. Plato Etc pp. 96-7. 
100 Ibid. 
101 R. Bhaskar. 1991. Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom p. 73. 
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real causal relations. Scientific investigation of this world was seen to consist in a typically 
four-phase procedure of identification/description, retroduction, empirical scrutiny and 
resultant redescription (the DREIC and RRREI(C) models of theoretical and applied analysis 
being specific variants of this fundamental progression). Moreover, while the essence of 
scientific development lies in the retroductive movement of systematic depth explanation, this 
is not in any way to subscribe to monism, rather, science must be seen as fallible and inherently 
contingent, involving the ongoing redescription of phenomena at anyone level. 
On the critical naturalist extension the social world, while constituted of very different 
things, also possesses these core characteristics. Even though the object of social science is 
itself conceptualised, and there exists a relational dialectic between the subject and object of 
inquiry, the transitive/intransitive split still holds. Further, society is a complex real object: 
We can be sure that society exists and confident that it has certain general features (such as 
emergence, praxis-dependence, conceptuality, structural plurality, nomic transfactuality, spatio-
temporality, totality 102). Its existence (and some of these features, such as the stability of word 
meaning across uses, combined with simile and metaphor) is a necessary condition for any 
knowledge including knowledge in the natural sciences or everyday life. 103 
Like the natural world, society is stratified, differentiated and changing, and the causal account 
of being contained within transcendental realism (the structure of a thing constituted by its 
causal powers) applies to the social world as it does to the natural (although the nature of 
specific causes differ, ie. reasons may be causes in the social world). Hence the critical 
naturalist position is that the DREIC and RREIC models are prima facie applicable to social 
science - the systematic depth investigation of social phenomena is presumed to be possible. 
On this basis the task of social science is "to describe what social processes (for example, the 
buying and selling of labour power, the extraction of surplus value) must be going on for a 
Stock Exchange crash or some other manifest phenomena to be possible".I04 
However, the limits to naturalism detailed above do imbue social science with certain 
divergent characteristics. Some of these have already been touched upon, and it is my 
intention here not to systematically deal with the implications of those constraints, but instead, 
to highlight some key characteristics of a realist strategy in social science, and to provide some 
brief examples. 
First, it was mentioned earlier that the concept-dependent character of human activity 
implies the necessity for a hermeneutical moment in social inquiry. In fact this understates the 
case for, and role of, hermeneutics in such activity. Outhwaite distinguishes between two 
historical strands of hermeneutics; The first, termed the 'general' or 'universal' thesis, stresses 
the "hermeneutic starting point which precedes and underlies any scientific inquiry" .105 It 
appears that this aspect relates to the transitive realm of both natural and social inquiry, it 
reflects the inherently conceptual, motivated and gee-historical nature of any science, and 
subsequently necessitates reflexive moments (incorporating the contemplation of those very 
102 Totality: "Totalities are systems of internal relations (q.v.), which may assume various forms of intra-activity 
(q.v.) and opemte via holistic causality .... most totalities of concern to science, at least macroscopically, are 
partial as well, displaying external in addition to internal and contingent besides necessary connections." R. 
Bhaskar, 1993, Dialectic p. 405. 
103 R. Bhaskar, 1989, Reclaiming Reality p. 186. 
104 Ibid., p. 4. 
105 W. Outhwaite, 1987, New Philosophies p.62. 
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motivations, contexts etc.) within the process of discovery. 106 It is unlikely that any realist 
would challenge this thesis. The second, 'special', thesis, "argues (instead or as well) for a 
specific henneneutic dimension in some of the sciences, implying for example a commitment 
to a Verstehende sociology",l07 Now while realists would point to the basic flaws of such a 
sociology (viz. the ontological deficiencies of the 'Weberian Stereotype' illustrated in Figure 
2.1. 108) they would acknowledge (principally on the basis of the concept-dependence and 
causal-interdependence arguments 109) the necessity for some henneneutical 
understanding/analysis of the intransitive realm in the social sciences. For example, Andrew 
Collier (a critical realist political scientist/philosopher who is also a socialist) notes: 
Even though ideas may be causally secondary to economics (at least in the dimension of 'vertical 
explanation'), and history may be the history of class struggles, as Marx claimed, there can 
nevertheless be no understanding of the English Civil War and Commonwealth without 
understanding Puritanism, or of Modem Iran without understanding Shi' ite Islam, .... So an 
account of the ideas prevailing in a society will be an essential part of a social scientific account 
of that society. 110 
While Collier does not put this in 'hermeneutical terms', and is clearly disposed towards a 
Marxian account of history, he is acknowledging the need for social scientists to take into 
account meanings - although in this instance these are not individuated. However in the realist 
program of "elucidating the enduring structures and generative mechanisms underlying and 
producing observable phenomena and events"111 henneneuticaI insights will tend to be most 
fruitful in the early stages of the research program (the Descriptive stage): 
... common-sense descriptions of social phenomena can and must be taken as a starting-point in 
social scientific theorising. Can, because they provide the beginnings of defmitions of the 
phenomena and thus help in the otherwise bewildering activity of object-constitution ... given the 
mish-mash nature of social reality. Must, because however imperfect they may be, to the extent 
that they are the perceptions of the agents involved in that situation they will influence the very 
nature of that situation. 112 
Beyond this stage an interesting paradox arises, in that henneneutics offers social 
scientists a valuable investigative tool at the margin, indeed beyond the margin, of its powers. 
That is, where hermeneutics (as the interpretation of actors' accounts) becomes unable to deal 
with such phenomena as unintended consequences, unacknowledged conditions, tacit skflls, 
and the efficacy of wider structural mechanisms, it can become a de facto tool of structural 
106 Christopher Gosden discusses the rationale for this thesis; ..... there is no objective point from which to view 
the world: we cannot step outside the antagonisms and attractions that the world and people in it hold for us. 
There is no dispassionate point of view; no point of non-involvement" C. Gosden, 1994, Social Being and 
Time pp. 72-3; For discussion on the process and value of 'reflective distaricing' see R. Bhaskar, 1986, 
Scientific Realism p. 284. 
107 W. Outhwaite, 1987, New Philosophies p.62. 
lOS Specifically, hermeneutics failure to sustain the "intransitivity of both beliefs and meanings", and hence .. their 
susceptibility to scientific explanation". R. Bhaskar. 1989, The Possibility of Naturalism pp.21-2. 
109 Anthony Giddens puts this very well when he ta1ks of the double-hermeneutic of social analysis: 
But sociology, unlike natural science, deals with a pre-interpreted world. where the creation and 
reproduction of meaning-frames is a very condition of that which it seeks to analyse, namely human 
social conduct: this is why there is a double hermeneutic in the social sciences ... the observing social 
scientist has to be able to first grasp those lay concepts, i.e. penetrate hermeneutically the form of life 
whose features he wishes to analyse or explain. 
A. Giddens, 1976, New Rules of Sociological Method Hutchinson. London, pp. 158-9. 
110 A. Collier, 1994, Critical Realism p. 171. 
111 R. Gunn. 1989, "Marxism and Philosophy: A Critique of Critical Realism" Capital and Class No. 37, Spring, 
p.88. 
112 W. Outhwaite, 1987, New Philosophies p. 56. 
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analysis, enabling the provision of crucial dialectical explanations. 113 Once again Collier 
illustrates this: 
Now many of the most significant ideas in any society will be ideas about features of that 
society. For instance, in Britain in the 198Os, a large number of people believed that 
unemployment was the result of the fecklessness of the unemployed. Any account of social 
attitudes, political behaviour, etc. in that period would also need to mention the real causes of 
unemployment in the structure of British financial institutions, the world market, government 
policy, etc. Hence the explanations that were part of the social-scientific study, and the 
explanations which were part of the society studied would contradict. 114 
The apparent disjunction between the perceived and real outcomes of conflict, contained within 
the first of the following case studies, is an example of such a dialectical explanation. I IS 
Henneneutical analysis must therefore playa part in the reflexive contemplation of the 
transitive realm of both natural and social science, and must play some meaningful part in the 
investigation of the intransitive within the domain of the social sciences. 
Secondly, it has already been noted that the intrinsic openness and causal complexity of 
social systems - their 'mish-mash' nature - pose significant epistemic limits to naturalism. 
One crucial effect is that the multiple detennination of events in a vertically structured and 
horizontally differentiated world implies the need for their explanation in tenns of a plurality of 
mechanisms belonging to different scientific strata.116 Bhaskar provides an indication of how 
such explanation works in his discussion of the base-superstructure question (note that a 
definition of emergence is located in an earlier footnote): 
In [this complex, stratified world etc.] ... emergence situates the widespread phenomenon of 
dual, mUltiple, complex and open control. Thus typically, in our zone of being, higher order 
agencies set the boundary conditions for the operation of lower order laws. Thus in 
contemporary capitalist society it is economic considerations which explain when, where and 
how the physical principles engaged in engineering are put to use (or held in abeyance).!!7 
Among other things, this example illustrates how the realist ontology can accommodate some 
types of (qualified) vertical detennination whilst avoiding the pitfalls of explanatory 
reductionism. Such an approach is necessarily ecumenical, requiring a plurality of 
methodological approaches. U8 
But the most profound implication of the 'messiness and fluidity' of the social world 
(exacerbated by the intrinsic complexity of its meaning-laden character) is that social science is 
113 "A dialectical explanation typically explains some tendency or outcome in terms of a dialectically 
contradictory ground or condition of possibility or some complex, combination or totality of them". R. 
Bhaskar, 1994, Plato Etc. pp. 93-4. Richard Gunn observes that in Marxist terms this model conveys "a 
particular understanding of the relation between 'appearances' (which may be misleading, mystifying and so 
forth) and social 'essence' or 'reality' ... ". R Gunn, 1989, "Marxism and Philosophy: A Critique of Critical 
Realism" Capital and Class No.37, Spring, p. 88. 
114 A. Collier, 1994, Critical Realism pp. 171-2. 
115 In a move resonant (but only partially so) of the transcendental philosophical method we are able to ask what 
a particular society must be like in order for people to act within it, and conceive it, in the ways they do. This 
is the case in the following study of the Black Head conflict where theory of the state is used to explain how 
the general public there was a general perception that business had made a significant accommodation to 
conservation interests, when in fact the Company had in all likelihood profited from the agreement In a sense, 
therefore, concept-dependence makes possible certain kinds of dialectical eltplanation. W. Outhwaite, 1987, 
New Philosophies p. 56. 
116 A. Collier, 1994, Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar's Philosophy Verso, London, p. 213, also; 
1. Lovering, 1990, "Neither Fundamentalism nor 'New Realism': A Critical Realist Perspective on Current 
Divisions in Socialist Theory" Capital and Class No. 42, Winter, pp. 41-2. 
117 R. Bhaskar, 1993, Dialectic p. 53. This is precisely the relationship which is envisaged in the following case 
studies between the explanations of my model (founded in political economy) and other contributing causal 
factors (for example, the implications of juridical decision-making for the integration of a multiplicity of value 
types and rationalities). 
118 W. Outhwaite, 1987, New Philosophies p. 116. 
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inherently tentative. The penetrating power of social science is limited by all those 
qualifications listed above, and hence it cannot deliver "in the study of human social life, the 
same sort of sensational illumination and explanatory power yielded up by the sciences of 
nature".1l9 While this is indeed a rejection of the utopian aspirations of positivistic social 
science it is not to say that that social science is without surprises; "but the important ones are 
arguably not the findings which go against our expectations, but the qualitative discovery of 
new ways of conceiving social reality - ways which are however still in some sense continuous 
wi th common-sense perceptions" .120 
But does this complexity mean that social science dissolves into undifferentiated 
eclecticism, relativism or possibly irrationalism? Can we judge between competing 
explanations, and if so on what basis? With regard to the first question Bhaskar makes a 
distinction between two distinct theses (which he says are confused by both supporters and 
detractors of relativism): 
The first is the correct thesis of epistemic relativity, which asserts that all beliefs are socially 
produced, so that all knowledge is transient, and neither truth-values nor criteria of rationality 
exist out of historical time. The other is the incorrect thesis of judgemental relativism, which 
asserts that all beliefs (statements) are equally valid, in the sense that there can be no (rational) 
grounds for preferring one to another. Denying the principle of epistemic relativity inevitably 
entails embracing some type of epistemological absolutism (which, by a short route, invariably 
results in some kind of idealism), while acceptance of judgemental relativism inevitably leads to 
some or other form of irrationalism. I21 Epistemic relativity is entailed both by ontological 
realism and by the transformational conception of social activity: it respects a distinction 
between the sense and reference of propositions, while insisting that all speech acts are made in 
historical time. 122 
The rejection of judgemental relativism, and thus irrationalism, leads me to the second 
question. The critical naturalist position here is that because of the complexity of the social 
world, and the associated unavailability of decisive test situations (due to the practical 
impossibility of experimental closure), prediction cannot be the preeminent criteria for the 
evaluation of theories (NB previous discussion of the limitations upon prediction even within 
the natural sciences).123 Instead, the comparison between research programs and between rival 
theories must be on the basis of their comparative explanatory power. Conceptual schema 
being "neither a priori demonstrable nor empirically refutable ... can only be assessed indirectly 
- in terms of their developmental potential, empirical fertility, heuristic plausibility, synoptic 
power etc." 124 Similarly, Outhwaite offers general criteria in parallel with the realist model of 
discovery: 
We shall feel we ... have a good explanation if 
1. The postulated mechanism is capable of explaining the phenomena; 
119 A. Giddens, 1976, New Rules of Sociological Method Hutchinson, London, p. 16. 
120 W. Outhwaite, 1987, New Philosophies pp. 55-6. 
121 As Manicas notes elsewhere this position "is not an irrationalism because it presupposes a realism". P. 
Manicas, 1987, A History and Philosophy of Sockll Sciences Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p. 261. 
122 R. Bhaskar, 1989, The Possibility of Naturalism p. 57. 
123 This is not to rule out the possibility of prediction per se in the natural sciences (indeed prediction is often a 
decisive part of empirical invesigation) but rather due to the acceptance of nomic transfactuality etc. realists 
place the emphasis upon explanation. Nor does this rule out conditional predictions in the social sciences: u ... 
a powerful explanatory theory will be capable of situating probabilities long before the yare manifested; so 
that theory retains a prognostic function in the social domain." R. Bhaskar, 1989, Reclaiming Reality p. 186. 
Many social scientists have responded to the impossibility of closure by applying a battery of statistical 
techniques as a sWTogate. However, "this neglects the qualitative limits on measurement and the use of 
statistical methods in the human sciences, as well as the probability that the social world is stochastically 
open". Ibid., p. 185. 
124 R. Bhaskar, 1986, Scientific Realism pp. 21-2. 
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2. We have good reason to believe in its existence; 
3. We cannot think of any equally good a1tematives. l25 
Such an indetenninate, 'epistemologically cautious', approach has been vigorously 
criticised by social scientists committed to more definitive standpoints such as Popperian 
critical rationalism with its holy doctrine of falsification. 126 The realist response has been 
simply to acknowledge that it would be desirable to have strict meta-critical criteria but, 
"unfortunately we do not", and instead have to content ourselves with the general principles 
detailed above, and in any specific area with "standards of inquiry ... generated in the course of 
that inquiry" - again, contextual explanatory power. 127 
Mats Ekstrom summarises the generative view of causal explanation as thus: 
... causal explanations are not directed towards the production of empirical correlations between 
variables or towards the making of predictions on the basis of empirical laws, but towards the 
uncovering of causal properties and the processes whereby social actions arise out of the 
complex interaction of internally related mental dispositions, intentions, social contexts and 
structures. 128 
Finally, much of Bhaskar's philosophy can be understood as a move to transcend or 
dissolve the historical breach between social theory and moral philosophy. It is his contention 
that "social theory just is moral philosophy, but as science")29 Towards this end he argues 
along three lines: Firstly, by asserting that social science is not only potentially emancipatory 
but in some cases inevitably so; Secondly, by holding the traditional antinomies between fact 
and value, and theory and practice, to be false (eg. between positivism and moralism, science 
and critique); And thirdly, by stating that contra to 'Hume's Law' the movement from 'is' to 
'ought' is not only possible but logically mandatory.130 All three arguments are 
interconnected, relatively homologous and mutually reinforcing, but it is the first that is most 
relevant here. 
On the first page of this chapter emancipation was held to be "the transition from an 
unwanted, unnecessary and oppressive situation to a wanted and/or needed and empowering or 
more flourishing situation".131 The argument that social science has a potential, and 
sometimes inevitable, role to play in any such transitions rests on a number of foundations. . 
125 W. Outhwaite, 1987, New Philosophies pp. 58. 
126 For example P. Baert "The realist notion of explanatory power seems to leave the door wide open for some 
non-falsifiable (or hardly refutable) theories to enter the realm of science - a highly undesirable move indeed". 
1996, "Realist Philosophy of the Social Science and Economics: A Critique" p. 518. 
127 P. Manicas, 1987, A History and Philosophy of Social Sciences p. 261. 
128 M. Ekstrom, 1992, "Causal Explanation of Social Action: The Contribution of Max Weber and of Critical 
Realism to a Generative View of Social Science" Acta Sociologica No.35, p.l07. 
129 R Bhaskar, 1991, Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p. 145. 
130 Caroline New makes a similar point 
A critical sociology, in common with all political analysis, needs not only to be realist in the sense of 
recognising that the world has an intrinsic nature, but also to be realist in the sense of recognising that 
knowledge of the natural and social world is relevant to the assessment of moral claims, and 
necessarily gives rise to them [my emphasis]. 
C. New, 1995, "Sociology and the Case for Realism" p. 815. This !>elief is integral to the notion of stylised facts 
(see footnote onfacts in 2. 1. (i». 
131 R. Bhaskar, 1994, Plato Etc. p. 253. A fuller description is provided in p. 178 of Reclaiming Reality where 
the concept of emancipation is thought to involve: 
(1) a stronger sense of being 'free'. namely as knowing, possessing the power and the disposition to 
act towards one's real interests ... : and 
(2) a stronger sense of 'liberation', namely as consisting in the transformation of unneeded, unwanted, 
and oppressive to needed, wanted and empowering sources of determination. 
Emancipation, that is to say, depends upon the transformation of structures rather than just the 
amelioration of states of affairs. And it will, at least in the case of self emancipation, depend in 
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One particular route is via consideration of the TMSA itself. The transformational model 
clearly asserts a causal role for agents - people can change society. Furthermore, such agency 
is necessarily conceptualised and hence ideas playa causal role in any social transformation 
(cognition~onation~action). Consequently, the expectation here is that in so far as social 
science can furnish agents with some understanding of the structures in which they are 
enmeshed it can motivate, enable and/or enhance their transformative capacities (although 
there will be exceptions where greater understanding may indeed hinder agents' efforts). Thus 
as Paul Dalziel (an economist) notes "successful explanation of underlying structure is an 
essential prerequisite for effective policy making". 132 However, this particular argument is, in 
an immediate sense, morally neutral. It just as easily explains the use of social science for 
antithetical purposes - to create or maintain conditions of un-freedom, hide real interests, etc. 
But, more forcefully, Bhaskar conceives of an often-necessary relation between social 
science and emancipation - the immanent critique argument. This is well illustrated by 
continuing with Collier's discussion of the real causes of unemployment, and the provision of 
dialectical explanation: 
... the explanations that were part of the social-scientific study, and the explanations of the· 
society studied would contradict If the social science had got it right, then the people it 
described who had the opposite explanation must have got it wrong. Hence social science 
criticises (part of) its object There can be no equivalent of this in the natural sciences. Black 
holes may be unpleasant things to contemplate, but that is no criticism of them. They exist - or 
don't- and there's an end to it. 133 
He then goes on to detail how such criticism implicates the social scientist within the 
emancipatory spiral: 
... the social scientist will not be content with noticing the existence of a false belief in the 
fecklessness of the unemployed; he or she will want to explain it And whether the explanation 
is something subtle and socially pervasive, like the atomistic nature of social relations in a 
commercial society, or something crude or contingent like the lying press-lords, the criticism of 
the belief will rub off onto its cause. To say that some institution causes false beliefs is to 
criticise it Given that (other things being equal) it is better to believe what is true than what is 
false, it is also better (other things being equal) that institutions that cause false beliefs should be 
replaced by, or transformed into, those that cause true one's. Further still, particular institutions 
and false beliefs about them may be in a functional relation, such that the false beliefs serve to 
preserve the institutions that they are about. Where institutions oppress a substantial number of 
people, they will only be stable if protected by such false beliefs. In such cases, to propound the 
truth is not just to criticise, but to undermine the institution. 134 
Now this example may be considered extreme, for as Manicas rightly points out "it is a 
simplification to hold that only 'false consciousness' stands in the way of progressive social 
change, for ... people are not the dupes of society",135 It is nonetheless a legitimate illustration 
of how social science is at times non-neutral both in tenns of its practical intervention in the 
social world (causal interdependence) and in so far as such endeavours logically entail values 
and actions. 136 The upshot of this is that social science generates "practical emancipatory 
projects by showing there to be (a) a need, (b) some obstacle preventing its satisfaction, and (c) 
particular upon a conscious transformation in the transformative activity or practice of the social 
agents concerned. 
132 P. Dalziel, 1994, "Critical Realism and the Methodology of Economics" A paper presented to the Social 
Science Group seminar, lJncoln University, Canterbury, p. 5. 
133 A. Collier, 1994, Critical Realism pp. 171-2. 
134 Ibid. 
135 P. Manicas, 1987, A History and Philosophy of Social Sciences p. 277. 
136 R. Bhaskar, 1991, Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom p. 146. 
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some means of removing this obstacle .... it may ground assertoric imperatives, ie. since you 
need this, remove that obstacle thus" .137 
Lastly, to qualify a point made by Collier above; "that social science criticises part of 
its object" and that "[t]here can be no equivalent of this in the natural sciences". It should be 
noted that this does not in any way mean that human relations with the natural world are 
exempt from such immanent critiques. Indeed it is such a direct emancipatory critique which 
lies at the heart of this thesis. 
2.5. A Pluralistic,J38 Critical, and Emancipatory Resource Management 
The implications of critical realism for resource management (and hence for this thesis) are 
manifold and operate at a variety of levels. Such ramifibltions penneate much of this thesis -
throughout both the relatively theoretical and the relatively empirical stages, and I do not 
intend to catalogue these impacts here. Instead it is useful, first, to return to the description of 
resource management asserted at the beginning of this chapter, and secondly, to articulate the 
central question of business dominance within environmental conflict in realist tenns. It is 
appropriate, however, to precede this discussion by reiterating the caveat made earlier about 
the connection between first-order and second-order theorising; namely, the warning that 
philosophy cannot legislate in advance for the use of particular scientific procedures or, for that 
matter, predict the substantive findings of science. This point is a subtle one for adherence to 
the above ontology, description of the generic scientific process, and attendant epistemic limits, 
will inevitably rule out the use of certain theories and methods. This movement is, however, 
one of reflection back upon the critical realist principles - a 'check list' or c1arificatory/critical 
schema. It will also have its limitations, hence divergent approaches to the study of a singular 
phenomenon (say, for example, Marxist and neo-Keynsian analyses of the business cycle) may 
each be seen in critical realist tenns as efforts to investigate the workings of particular causal 
mechanisms, and each may progress along the lines of the RRREIC model (or some 
approximate). In such circumstances critical realism cannot preemptively mandate one 
approach over the other, nor can it arbitrate between them other than to hold up the notion of 
contextual explanatory power. 
Each of the four general characteristics of resource management set out earlier clearly 
confonns to some element of the critical realist framework. To say that resource management 
is concerned with the relationships between people, and/or between people and nature, and the 
products of such relations - particularly upon the human-environment nexus - articulates the 
concerns of resource management in tenns of the relational models of the TMSA and more 
comprehensively (given the human-enviroiunent relation) the Social Cube. This feature should 
be further extended to emphasise that these are real relations. Caroline New has asserted that 
to "the extent that sociology eschews realism, it will be unable to contribute to argument about 
ecological threat and effective action to overcome it",l39 This point is just as applicable to 
resource management. Secondly, the notion that it is a non-disciplinary discipline - at once 
137 A. Collier. 1994. Critical Realism p. 183. 
138 I use this term here in a generic sense and not in its political sense where it refers to a particular normative 
standpoint 
139 C. New. 1995. "Sociology and the Case for Realism" p. 810. 
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multi-disciplinary, inter-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary. Here it is useful to note the 
characterisation of the intransitive dimension as a "multi-determined, multi-levelled, multi-
relational, multi-angular, multi-perspectival, multi-determined and open pluriverse".l40 This 
ontological formulation itself suggests the need to transcend boundaries and make connections 
whilst at the same time recognising the sui generis character of the differentiae (particular 
mechanisms, events, phenomena). Furthennore, the characterisation of knowledge production 
in the transitive as historically and culturally situated, and as in flux (although in a non 
monistic fashion), serves to substantiate this necessarily pluralistic and strongly holistic 
description. Indeed, as Andrew Collier has suggested: 
... one of the most common and helpful of the interventions of critical realism in the everyday 
work of the human sciences is precisely this insistence that the republic of knowledge has a 
federal constitution. It is particularly valuable in concrete, practical and interdi'sciplinary studies 
- in areas such as human geography, sociobiology, ecology and feminist studies. 141 
Which leads into the third feature - that resource management necessarily involves an applied 
element. I observed that critical realism breaks down the traditional antinomy between theory 
and practice. The causal-interdependence argument, and the intrinsic value and action 
components of social science, bolster this thesis. But these are held to be generic features. In 
this respect critical realism can explain how resource management can be praxis oriented, but 
cannot determine that it be uniquely or especially so. And fourthly, the positive intervention 
element can be couched in realist terms as an emancipatory role. Earlier discussion has noted 
how social science is always potentially liberating and in certain instances necessarily so (and 
here I include resource management - for the 'management' element clearly implies an applied 
anthropic interest - although I picture it as an intersecting subset of both the natural and social 
sciences as well extending beyond the bounds of the sciences into other realms of inquiry and 
modes of discourse). 
Many other features of critical realism are of potential value in further developing a 
form for a resource management capable of dealing with the weighty imperatives of the 
environmental problematique, but I would like now to finish off this discussion by framing~ in 
realist terms, the central question of this thesis. 
Essentially, the intention here is to conduct a depth investigation into certain features 
and causes of business domination in environmental conflict. Following the general four-phase 
pattern of scientific investigation the study involves: (a) The identification of an epistemically 
significant problem - namely, the problem of business power and dominance in environmental 
conflict The prima facie case for investigation of this phenomenon preceded this chapter; (b) 
The construction of an explanatory model involving an analogical/retroductive movement. 
This development follows in Chapters Four and Five, which involves the postulation of certain 
structural relationships/generative mechanisms which may explain such dominance, and which 
point to the possibility of further environmental and social costs; (c) The empirical scrutiny of 
the posited mechanisms. This is carried out here through the case study method. It should be 
noted here that the realist characterisation of the intransitive as stratified poses significant 
difficulties here, necessi tating the use of a range of techniques to infer or reveal the operation 
of these mechanisms. The consideration of alternative explanations is partially present, in so 
140 R. Bhaskar, 1993, Dialectic p. 53. 
141 A. Collier, 1994. Critical Realism p. 214. 
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far as the historical method allows contextual observations. Assessment is on the basis of the 
criteria proffered earlier by Outhwaite - that the postulated mechanism is capable of explaining 
the phenomenon, and that we have good reason to believe in its existence. However, the 
application of different methods to the investigation of this phenomenon is considered to be 
part of the broader process if inquiry in this field and beyond the scope of this thesis; (d) The 
fourth phase of corrective work is, likewise, beyond the scope of this initial inquiry. In short, 
what is constructed here is an exploratory, explanatory and hopefully emancipatory critique 
into business power. 
3 
The Wider Literature on Environmental Conflict and the 
Research Method 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I deal with two fairly separate issues. In the first half of the chapter I engage 
with the wider literature on environmental conflict I do so to acquaint myself with the context 
within which I will study business power. Environmental conflict is an inherently 'messy' area 
where numerous discourses come together, and it is important to be aware of the types of 
issues that may prevail; this is important for both the following theoretical development, and 
for the construction of the case studies themselves. A second and important reason why I 
discuss this literature is because I believe that some of the more prominent strands of 
scholarship rest upon some questionable assumptions about the role and distributions of social 
power. It is possible that this project will have critical implications for those approaches to the 
study of environmental conflict. 
In the second half of the chapter I focus upon the broad method utilised here, including 
the development of the analytical framework, the historical case studies, and the consequent 
use of the framework to investigate those examples of conflict. 
3.2. Environmental Conflict: The Wider Literature 
The central purpose of this section is to roam beyond the boundaries of the particular approach 
adopted here - to situate this project within the wider body of scholarship on environmental 
conflict. In doing this I will identify the particular strengths and weaknesses of each broad 
perspective. The strengths of some approaches mean that those works may be of both general 
(contextual) and specific value throughout the various stages of this project - most usefully 
within the case studies which are the most interdisciplinary components of this work. The 
weaknesses of certain approaches not only serve to exclude elements (methods and substantive 
findings) of such work, but also enable the identification of gaps within the literature, some of 
which may be filled by aspects of this study. It is important to stress that the process of 
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defining and justifying the problem through the early stages of this chapter has already wedded 
this project to a particular perspective: that of a 'vertically integrated' approach which is 
centred upon theories of the distribution and exercise of power in advanced capitalist society. 
Hence, this review is only about the choice of fundamental approach in a retrospective and 
partial sense. For having decided to focus upon issues of power and dominance, and having 
already justified that choice, other features of environmental conflict either become subsidiary 
or peripheral to these central questions. Moreover, further discussion about the specific merits 
of various theories of power and dominance, and environmental politics in general, is provided 
throughout the development of the analytical framework in Chapters Four and Five. 
There are countless strands of writing on environmental conflict. This is because they 
are complex phenomena that involve multiform substantive issues and values. Each dispute 
represents an elaborate and unique conjunction of causal forces. A consequence of this is that 
such conflict attracts the interest of many disciplinary (and, as in this instance, trans-, inter- and 
multi-disciplinary) perspectives. For example, Mernitz discusses economic, legal, social 
psychological, political and geographical perspectives upon environmental mediation alone -
only one occasional feature of these conflicts. 1 Once again, many of these approaches are 
variously applied or criticised throughout this work. However, the focus is upon four rough 
groupings of study: (i) The Conflict Resolution Literature; (ii) Analysis of Competing Forms of 
Reason; (iii) The Partisan Review; and (iii) Academic Case Studies. The first two sets are 
comprehensive analytical approaches to the subject and they are discussed because they 
provide mostly theoretical insights.2 The second two are featured because diverse narratives of 
past conflicts provide a fertile reference source for problem definition, theoretical development 
and, most of all, the execution of the empirical studies themselves. 
3.2.(i) The Conflict Resolution Literature 
The nomenclature of conflict resolution is deceptive. On the broad understanding of confJict 
set out early in this chapter conflict must be seen as an ever-present social phenomenon, 
persisting throughout all strata of social life (the empirical, actual and real). Conflict is not in 
itself a problem - it must be seen as a morally neutral notion - what does matter, however, are 
the particular forms and effects of specific conflicts. It is not unreasonable to suggest that 
most, if not all, societies have throughout history experienced destructive and unwanted forms 
and effects of conflict. Most societies have developed mechanisms for dealing with this -from 
lexical structures, to violence, to discursive approaches, the respon:;;es have been many and 
varied. A great deal of social organisation is devoted to the avoidance, mitigation and 
resolution of conflict, but conversely, a great deal of human effort is at times devoted to the 
initiation and perpetuation of conflict. For here lies the rub; the negative effects of conflict 
upon one person may be positive effects upon another (the zero-sum type conflict), 
1 Each of which is fragmented. S. Mernitz, 1980. Mediation of Environmental Disputes: A Source Book Praeger. 
New York. Ch. 7. 
2 This typology is partly analogous with Buhrs and Bartlett 's classification of the environmental policy literature 
into (a) policy process [here conflict resolutionl. (b) analycentric [technocentric], and (c) meta-policy analysis 
[into which this study falls]. The partisan and historical categories fall outside this grouping. T. BUhrs, and R. 
Bartlett, 1993, Environmental Policy in New Zealand: The Politics of Clean and Green? Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, Ch. I. 
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occasionally conflict benefits all parties (win-win), but often it is to everyone's detriment (Iose-
lose). 
Returning to the issue of the 'conflict resolution' literature, despite its generic label this 
body of work has developed in a highly specific context It has evolved as a branch of learning 
within western democracies over the past twenty years or so, its direct antecedents include 
prior developments in such academic disciplines as international relations, social psychology 
and labour relations/management. More specifically, it has developed in countries with 
adversarial legal systems - most notably the United States and Britain - where dominant 
juridical dispute processes were seen to be failing in crucial respects, namely through; high 
litigation costs, the inevitable polarisation of parties and destruction of relationships, the 
production of zero-sum solutions, the marginalisation of third-party (polycentrism) interests 
and values, and (especially regarding environmental matters) the questionable proficiency of 
the courts in integrating both complex scientific/technical evidence and diverse value types.3 
The conflict resolution literature has thus come to focus upon non-juridical discourses, 
primarily, the process and principles of bargaining and negotiation,4 
collective/consensual/creative problem solving,S institutionalised and non-institutionalised 
forms of mediation, and structures or strategies for 'managing' conflict6 - subjects which segue 
3 L. Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" in; K. Winston, (ed.), 1981, The Principles of Social Order 
Duke University Press, Durham NC, pp. 87-124. 
4 See H. Raiffa, 1982, The Art and Science of NegotiaJion Harvard University Press, Cambridge Ma; S. Goldberg, 
E. Green, and F. Sander, 1985, Dispute Resolution Little, Brown and Company, Boston. The social 
psychology literature is extensive and dominant here, especially behaviourist studies. Cf.; J. Rubin, and B. 
Brown, 1975, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation Academic Press, New York; S. 
Bacharach, and E. Lawler, 1980, Power and Politics in Organisations: The Social Psychology of Conflict, 
Coalitions, and Bargaining Jossey-Bass, San Francisco; D. Pruitt, 1981, Negotiation Behaviour Academic 
Press, New York; D. Pruitt, and J. Rubin, 1986, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement 
Newbury Award, Records, New York.S. Bacharach, and E. Lawler, 1981, Bargaining: Power, Tactics and 
Outcomes Jossey-Bass, San Francisco; E. Lawler, 1992, "Power Processes in Bargaining" The Sociological 
Quarterly Vol. 33, No.1, pp. 17-34. The most abstract treatments are those from within game theory, ego A. 
Rapoport, 1966, Two-Person Game Theory University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. But much of the 
literature is at a more accessible level. For example, in the 1980's the Harvard Negotiation Project stimulated 
what seemed to be a paradigm change in negotiation, advocated a method of negotiation which rejected the 
traditional positional approach in favour of a principled or interest-based method: R. Fisher, and W. Ury, 1981, 
Getting to Yes Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston; R. Fisher, and S. Brown, 1989, Getting Together: Building a 
Relationship thet Gets to Yes Business Books, Great Britain - these last two books are 'how to' texts which 
provide a straightforward exposition of the method. Although whether this shift amounts to a paradigm shift is 
questionable - see C. Provis, 1996, "Interests vs. Positions: A Critique of the Distinction" Negotiation Journal 
Vol. 12, No.4, pp. 305-24. 
5 L. Susskind, and J. Cruickshank, 1987, Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public 
Disputes Basic Books Ltd, New York; Also, K. Mackie, (ed.). 1991, A Handbook of Dispute Resolution: ADR 
in Action Routledge, London; G. Tillett, 1991, Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach Sydney University 
Press, Sydney, Ch. 5. The 'brainstorming'/creative problem solving approaches have been influenced by an 
array of works on generic thought processes. Cf: R. Thouless, 1974, Straight and Crooked Thinking Pan, 
London; B. Heir, 1986, The Professional Decision Thinker Sidgwick and Jackson, London; J. Adams, 1987, 
Conceptual Blockbusting Penguin, Harmondsworth. 
6 Once again, much of the literature is in the form of 'how to' manuals: L. Bacow, and M. Wheeler, 1984, 
Environmental Dispute Resolution Plenum Press, New York; S. Mernitz, 1980, Mediation of Environmental 
Disputes: A Source Book Praeger, New York; L. Lake, (ed.), 1980, Environmental Mediation: The Search for 
Consensus Westview Press, Boulder Co; L. Susskind, and A. Weinstein, 1980, "Towards a Theory of 
Environmental Dispute Resolution" Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review No.9, pp. 311-57; J. 
Crowfoot, and J. Wondolleck, 1990, Environmental Disputes: Community Involvement in Dispute Resolution 
Island Press, Washington D.C. For more academic studies of environmental mediation see: A. Talbot, 1983, 
Settling Things: Six Case Studies in Environmental Mediation Conservation Foundation, Washington D.C. 
provides some useful fairly in-depth case studies; P. Adler, P. 1995, "Pig Wars: Mediating Forest Management 
Conflicts in Hawaii" Negotiation Journal Vol. 11, No.3, pp. 209-16. Is a useful study; G. Bingham, 1986, 
Resolving Environmental Disputes: A Decade of Experience Conservation Foundation, Washington D.C. For 
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into one another. The broad field has come to be labelled alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR).7 In practice these forms of decision-making have come to sit alongside, or be 
integrated within, existing modes of decision-making. 
The literature on environmental conflict resolution is, as Nakamura et. al. observe, 
animated by a "boosterism" which reveals its authors' positions as not only proponents, but 
also practitioners, of this discipline.s Indeed, the level of uncritical advocacy has led Rabe to 
describe it ironically as the "new panacea".9 On the basis of the principles of meaningful 
participatory democracy outlined earlier, and in pursuit of the goal of sound environmental 
decision-making, ADR seems intuitively attractive - it offers a framework that could 
potentially remedy serious deficiencies in preponderant forms of decision-making. However, 
as with classical pluralism, the normative-prescriptive content of the theory has functioned as 
an assumptive and interpretive model which confuses the 'ideal type' consultative process with 
the reality of disputes as complex conjunctures influenced (enabled and constrained) by very 
powerful causal mechanisms. This is not to say that there won't be instances where ADR 
techniques are highly successful. But it is necessary to study the relative empirical success or 
failure of these, and other modes of decision making (including juridical), by moving beyond 
the superficial assessment of techniques and tactics to carefully examine contextual factors. It 
is only in this way that we can come to understand what ADR has achieved, and what it can 
realistically accomplish. Hence, it is for this reason that Rabe considers (in the North 
American context) such cultural factors as the tradition of adversarial conflict and disdain for 
bargaining. He also examines factors such as the demand for exactitude (i.e. such as in 
scientifically established health standards) and a reluctance to compromise, and also the lack of 
data on whether negotiated outcomes have indeed been any better than otherwise. 10 By far the 
best analysis of ADR and environmental conflict is Douglas Amy's The Politics of 
Environmental Mediation. He argues that not only does mediation "open up a new form of 
participation in environmental politics, but also introduces new forms of cooptation and 
political control".l1 The focus of Amy's investigation is, as in this thesis, the problem of 
power. His position is that environmental mediation should only occupy a relatively minor 
role in environmental politics because it requires a relative balance of power to function well. 
He devotes some energy to arguing that a broad balance of power between environmentalists 
a quantitative analysis of mediation, which also contains an appendix with fifty micro-studies; and D. Amy, 
1987, The Politics of Environmental Mediation Columbia University Press, New York. In the New Zealand 
context see: C. Blackford, 1992, A Review of Environmental Mediation: Th~ory and Practice Centre for 
Resource Management, Information Paper No. 32, Lincoln University, Christchurch. And with respect to the 
current institutional framework for environmental mediation; C. Blackford, 1992, Guidelines for Monitoring 
Additional Dispute Resolution Processes within the Resource Management Act Centre for Resource 
Management, Information Paper No. 39, Lincoln University, Christchurch. 
7 It is a label which is dermed in operational terms more by what it is not ('alternative') than by any distinctive 
common attributes. R. Nakamura, T. Church, and P. Cooper, 1991, "Environmental Dispute Resolution and 
Hazardous Waste Cleanups: A Cautionary Tale of Policy Implementation" Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management Vol. 10, No.2, p. 206. 
8 Ibid pp. 206-7. 
9 Rabe, while supportive of the general concept of ADR, is suspicious of the claims of ADR proponents which are 
made on the basis of 'self analysis' rather than any rigorous and independent study. B. Rabe, 1988, "The 
Politics of Environmental Dispute Resolution" Policy Studies Journal Vol. 16, No.3, pp. 590-1. 
10 Ibid., pp. 590-8; Also, A. Marcus, M. Nadel, and K. Merrikin, 1984, "The Applicability of Regulatory 
Negotiation to Disputes Involving the Nuclear Regulatory Commission" Administrative Law Review No. 36 
(summer), p. 236. 
11 D. Amy, 1987, The Politics of Environmental Mediation p. 199. 
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and industry does not exist (certainly not in the U.S. during the latter half of the 1980s).12 
Amy's research is very useful, yet it can be categorised as a neo-pluralist analysis, and while 
strong in terms of observable power relations it fails to fully investigate the structural 
mechanisms at work. 
The conflict resolution literature is of assistance in understanding some of the 
mechanics of phenomenal forms of environmental conflict (eg. in the following case study it 
helps in the understanding of the conflict process), and works, such as those of Rabe and Amy, 
are of critical importance here. However, most of the research and writing in this field is 
premised upon the existence of a balance of power (apart from the negotiation literature that 
sees inequality of power as an inherent feature of social life - a realpolitique perspective that 
does not comprehend inequality in negative terms 13). To their credit, many practitioners 
recognise this point and will not recommend the use of these methods under such conditions.l4 
However, this is not always the case and today large corporate law firms and planning 
consultancies offer ADR services, such as for community consultation and conflict 
management, to development interests. At its worst ADR can function as a legitimising 
mechanism, a means of 'buying off and cleverly dividing potential opposition to projects with 
potentially destructive environmental effects. 
3.2.(ii) Competing Forms of Reason 
Another body of literature that while not investigating conflict per se is of considerable 
relevance, is the analysis of competing forms of reason in environmental political economy. I 
will only discuss the work of two contributors - Robert Bartlett and John Dryzek.15 
The starting point here is the notion of reason or rationality. Both Bartlett and Dryzek 
concern themselves, in the first instance, with broad, possibly generic, forms of reason. For the 
sake of brevity I list these: 
(a) Functional or formal rationality.l6 The rationality intrinsic to particular social forms or 
systems - ..... an organisation is functionally rational ... when it is so structured as to provide or 
increase, or preserve, some good in a consistent, dependable fashion" .17 
(b) Substantive rationality. The application of rational calculation to the furtherance of 
definite goals or values ... ".18 Or as Herbert Simon puts it - "the [substantive]rationality of an 
action involves its derivation by logical processes from valid premises" .19 
12 Ibid. 204-26. 
13 But not always. see: N. Rouhana. and S. Korper. 1996. "Dealing With Dilemmas Posed by Power Asymmetry 
in Intergroup Conflict" Negotiation Journal Vol. 12, No.4. pp. 353-66. 
14 Ibid. Ch. 5. 
15 There is an extensive body of literature on questions of reason and rationality. I only touch upon some useful 
examples that deal explicitly with environmental issues. Two valuable recent analyses are: J. Elster, 1989, 
Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations oj Rationality Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; E. 
Gellner. 1992. Reason and Culture: The Historic Role oj Rationality and Rationalism Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
16 Following K. Mannheirn, 1940, Man and Society in an Age oj Reconstruction Kegan Paul, London, pp. 52-3. 
And also Weber on formal rationality, see; H. Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, 1991 (1948), From Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology Routledge, London, pp. 138-9. 
17 P. Diesing, 1962, Reason in Society: Five Types oj Decisions and their Social Conditions University of Illinois 
Press, Urbana, p. 3. 
18 Anthony Giddens discussing Weber's use of this term. 1971, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An 
Analysis oj the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Weber Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 183-4. 
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(c) Procedural rationality. Being "an intelligent system's ability to discover appropriate 
adaptive behaviour". And consisting of "the cognitive processes and procedures used to 
choose actions" .20 
Bartlett's concern is with (b) and (c), Dryzek's (a) (although his use of the tenn is looser 
and he seems to draw in elements of (b) and (c». Each author then sets out to apply these 
overarching types to what Diesing has termed forms of practical reason. 21 In this case it is 
ecological rationality, which is, in general tenns, the rationality of living systems - "an order 
of relationships among living systems and their environments".22 
Both Bartlett and Dryzek devote considerable effort to the explication <;>f ecological 
rationality.23 Bartlett's fonnulation is useful, and his emphasis upon the need to consider both 
substantive and procedural ecological rationality has some merit.24 However it is Dryzek's 
more expansive argument which is most relevant here. Dryzek takes a broad functional 
definition of ecological rationality: 
Also 
... an ecologically mtional structure is one which consistently produces the good of life-support 
for its components. The order or low entropy which it contains represents its ability to cope 
effectively with stress or perturbation to the ecosystem.25 
Ecologically mtional behaviour on the part of an agent (such as a human being) may be defined 
as behaviour which promotes or protects the functional mtionality of ecosystems - their stability 
or homeostasis [also adaptiveness and succession]. Ecological mtionaIity as a decision rule for 
public policy specifies that low entropy of an ecosystem be the first concern in any decision with 
any implications for it 26 
The decision-rule element here points to Dryzek's central purpose, which is to utilise his 
conception of ecological rationality as a yardstick for the appraisal of dominant social choice 
mechanisms. His justification for this test is that the "preservation and enhancement of the 
material and ecological basis of society is necessary not only for the functioning of societal 
forms ... but also for the pursuit of any value in the long term". Because of this he argues for 
the lexical primacy of ecological rationality; "the preservation and promotion of the integrity of 
19 H. Simon, "Rationality" in; J. Gould, and W. Kolb, (eds), 1964, A Dictionary of the Social Sciences Free Press 
of Glencoe, New York, pp. 5734. 
20 R. Bartlett, 1986, "Ecological Rationality: Reason and Environmental Policy" Environmental Ethics Vol. 8, pp. 
224. Following Simon, "From Substantive to Procedural Rationality" in; S. Latsis, (ed.), 1976, Method and 
Appraisal in Economics Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 131. 
21 P. Diesing, 1962, Reason in Society: Five Types of Decisions and their Social Cqnditions University of Illinois 
Press, Urbana, p. 238. 
22 R. Bartlett, 1986, "Ecological Rationality: Reason and Environmental Policy" p. 229. 
23 Ibid, pp. 229-34; J. Dryzek, 1987, Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, Ch's 3 and 4. 
24 He writes: 
Ecological rationality may be an attribute of behaviour and actions, denoting the extent to 
which such actions are ecologically appropriate within the limits imposed by given 
conditions (substantive mtionality). Or, ecological mtionality may describe an intelligent 
system's ability to discover appropriate adaptive behaviour - the effectiveness, in light of 
human cognitive powers and limitations, of the processes and procedures used to make 
ecologically important choices (procedural mtionality). 
R. Bartlett, 1986, "Ecological Rationality: Reason and Environmental Policy" pp. 239. 
25 J. Dryzek, 1983, "Ecological Rationality" International Journal of Environmental Studies Vol. 21, p. 6. It is 
necessary to stress here that this is a general rule and Dryzek is certainly cognisant of the intrinsic dynamism 
of biological systems. See footnote in 1.2.(i). 
26 Ibid. 
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the material and social underpinning of society - ecological rationality - should take priority 
over competing forms".27 
Dryzek's subsequent analysis involves the application of five criteria of ecological 
rationality28 towards the evaluation of the dominant forms of social choice. His taxonomy of 
forms includes (with attendant decision-rules in brackets); markets (price signals), 
administered systems (command), polyarchy29 (partisan mutual adjustment), law (formal 
rules), moral persuasion (promulgated values), bargaining (formal negotiation), and armed 
conflict (force). These are of course ideal-types, and the list is neither collectively exhaustive 
nor mutually exclusive.3o His evaluation is extended and it is not possible to do it justice here. 
However, he concludes that none of these mechanisms "performs unequivocally well on any of 
the five criteria". And hence - "none of the more prominent social choice mechanisms in 
today's world can stake even a moderately good claim to ecological rationality".31 From this 
conclusion he proceeds to describe (design) three alternative forms of social choice; the open 
society, practical reason, and radical decentralisation. But with regard to the purpose and form 
of this thesis it is his analysis of extant forms which is of most value. 
The lexicon of social choice is problematic here. Put simply, it implies a level of free 
will or agency, and of consciousness, which is not always present. One does not have to 
embrace the strictures of structural determinism to concede the existence of powerful structural 
tendencies which routinely extinguish individuals' ability to exercise their 'choice'. Also, 
choice is a phenomenon which by definition resides at the level of consciousness - it is thus 
blind to our unconscious involvement within, and constitution of, social processes. It is also to 
down-play the struggle or conflict involved. The advocates of this approach may qualify their 
position by arguing that at least some choice is involved in any of these social mechanisms 
(including force), but it is often crucial to determine who does not get to choose as well as, or 
instead of, who does. Because of these criticisms forms of practical reason must be understood 
as involving choices, non-choices, and 'un' -choices. 
But regardless of this ontological mistake, and of the fact that these authors do not 
frame their discussion in terms of environmental conflict per se, their work is of considerable 
value here. In terms of the thesis as a whole, the baseline or life-support approach taken by 
Dryzek is useful. Hence the progress in this chapter from the imperative of environmental 
sustainability - indeed, such an approach conforms with the realist notion of 'emergence', 
where "higher order agencies set the boundaries for the operation of lower order laws".32 This 
approach is also an effort to explain the operation and implications of particular causal 
mechanisms - it is a depth explanatory approach. As a consequence, it is able to contribute 
here at a number of levels. In theoretical terms it is helpful in the construction of the argument 
about value form and relations within Chapter Four. On a more ad hoc basis, while Dryzek 
27 J. Dryzek. 1987. Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy Basil Blackwell. Oxford. pp. 58-9. It 
should be noted here that Dryzek holds that such a life-support approach does not deny the legitimacy of other 
arguments in favour of environmental values. only that they apply a/orteriori upon the base-line arguments. 
28 These are negative feedback. coordination, robustness, Ilexibility, and resilience (with robustness and 
Ilexibility being substitutable, and resilience contingent). Ibid, p. 54. 
29 This is Lindblom's term - it broadly describes the give and take of political interaction. 
301. Dryzek, 1987, Rational Ecology pp. 63-8. 
31 Ibid, p. ISO. 
32 R. Bhaskar, 1993, Dialectic p. 53. 
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deals with each form of practical reason separately he does note that in reality they converge 
and work complexly. This perspective is invaluable when considering the processes of conflict 
within the case studies, especially the integration33 or competition between, and the changing 
hierarchies of, decision-rules or wider modes of discourse. Although I would like to qualify 
this by noting that I will not explicitly deal with those ideas, and that they are considered to be 
contextual insights. 
Such an approach would benefit from a realist formulation where first, its concerns are 
not framed solely in terms of 'choices', and secondly, it is prefaced upon a more sophisticated 
understanding of the process of social transformation,34 
3.2.(iii) The Partisan Review 
The partisan review embraces a variety of non-academic works which focus upon both past and 
current episodes of manifest environmental conflict (or series oQ, and which involve a marked 
bias - usually, but not always, from the perspective of environmental advocates. I focus upon 
New Zealand examples here. 
An early piece was J.T. Salmon's Heritage Destroyed from 1960, which was a call to 
arms against the destruction of 'scenery' by state development agencies for the purposes of 
electricity generation. While it does not deal with conflict per se, it was an important 
generative essay, and, because of its depiction of the political context, is particularly relevant to 
the second case study which deals with the development of a hydro-electric scheme during this 
period. Graham Searle's 1980, Rush to Destruction is a similar production in response to the 
activities of the New Zealand Forest Service throughout the 1970's. Two books that do deal 
with the intricacies of specific conflicts are Paul Powell's Who Killed the Clutha and Neville 
Peat's more recent history Manapouri Saved! Powell's book is a detailed study of the 
extended conflict which preceded the construction of the Clyde dam on the Clutha River. His 
meticulous in-depth approach results in a useful record of the strategic process of conflict 
Peat's history of the Manapouri controversy is probably the most valuable historical study of 
environmental conflict in New Zealand. While he does proceed from a partisan stance his 
book is nevertheless a fairly balanced appraisal of the dispute, providing an excellent anatomy 
of an environmental campaign. Finally, while superficial in content Roger Wilson's From 
Manapouri to Aramoana provides a helpful overview of environmental campaigns prior to 
1982, and a description of the environmental movement at that time.35 
33 The question of integration is a hugely important one, Cf; T. Garling, and G. Evans, (eds), 1991, Environment, 
Cognition and Action: An Integrated Approach Oxford University Press, New York; P. Walther, 1987, 
"Against Idealistic Beliefs in Problem-Solving Capacities of Integrated Resource Management" 
Environmental Management Vol. II, No.4, pp. 439-446. 
34 Especially when it comes to attempts at design. 
351. Salmon, 1960, Heritage Destroyed: The Crisis in Scenery Preservation in New Zealand A.H. and A.W. 
Reed, Wellington; G. Searle, 1975, Rush to Destruction: An Appraisal of the New Zealand Beech Forest 
Controversy A H Reed, Wellington; P. Powell, 1978, Who Killed the Clutha? John McIndoe, Dunedin; N. 
Peat, 1994, Manapouri Saved! New Zealand's First Great Conservation Success Story: Integrating nature 
conservation with hydro-electric development of Lakes Manapouri and Te Anau, Fiordland National Park 
Longacre Press, Dunedin; R. Wilson, 1982, From Manapouri to Aramoana - The Battle for New Zealand's 
Environment Earthwork Press, Auckland. Another example from the second of the case studies is: K 
Chapple, 1987, The Rape of the Wanganui River: One of New Zealand's Most Misguided Engineering Projects 
C and S Publications, Taumaranui. The Australian experience is also of value here, particularly the hyrdro 
disputes in Tasmania which are the subject of a number of partisan studies. Cf: P. Thompson, 1981, Power in 
Tasmania Australian Conservation Foundation, Hawthorn Vic.; P. Thompson, 1984, Bob Brown of the 
Chapter Three;' The Wider Literature on Environmental Conflict and the Research Method 54 
The writers' predisposition towards one or another perspective is only an exaggeration 
of the bias which pervades any work, and in any event can be taken into account. Similarly, 
while such studies may not display the rigour required of serious analysis, they are a legitimate 
reference source not only within the process of object constitution but also throughout the case 
studies. 
3.2.(iv) Academic Case Studies 
Many of the works on environmental conflict discussed previously contain case studies of 
conflict. However, comprehensive case studies of environmental conflict are uncommon, and 
quality examples of the genre rarer still. I would like to identify some of the better precedents. 
A thoroughly comprehensive exemplar of case study research is a two volume study 
into a dispute over the siting of a dam on the Delaware River which was to affect four states 
(New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Delaware) in ·the United States. The first volume 
Boundaries of Analysis tends towards the overtly empirical, containing an extended historical 
narrative and detailing the substantive issues and value types involved.36 The second volume 
When Values Conflict complements the first with a range of perspectives on the controversy -
patterns of discourse, environmental ethics, problems of valuation and the integration of value 
forms within 'rational analysis' etc. A second study which is also a rigorous investigation of 
the processes of environmental conflict, is Bartlett's Reserve Mining Controversy.37 This 
study focuses in particular upon complex scientific and technical discourses, and as a 
consequence it is of special significance and utility for the second of the two case studies here, 
which is similarly complex. Also of a technical bent, and an excellent historical narrative of 
conflict, is Wynne's study of the nuclear power disputes in the United Kingdom.38 The 
emphasis here is upon an institutional balancing act between technocratic decision making and 
the demand for public/representative participation and accountability. An edited volume of 
five well constructed narratives of conflict, with no explicit theoretical content, is The Politics 
of Physical Resources, which is a useful 'raw' source.39 Swainson's Conflict over the 
Columbia centres upon a process of formal negotiations, and involves the application of 
Lindblom's policy models to explain the process.40 Finally, Wate's study of an urban land-use 
conflict has some relevance here because of its focus upon the antagonism between vested 
economic interests and community groups.41 Each of these studies is a valuable contribution to 
the literature on environmental conflict, providing a detailed historical record of these 
Franklin River George Allen and Unwin, Sydney; D. Lowe. 1984. The Price of Power: The Politics Behind the 
Tasmanian Dams Case Macmillan, Melbourne. 
36 H. Felverson. F. Sinden. and R. Socolow. (eds), 1976, Boundaries of Analysis: An Inquiry into the Tocks 
Isaland Dam Controversy Ballinger Publishing, Cambridge Ma. 
37 R. Bartlett, 1980. The Reserve Mining Controversy: Science, Technology and Environmental Quality Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington. 
38 B. Wynne, 1982, Rationality and Ritual: The Windscale Inquiry and Nuclear Decisions in Britain The British 
Society for the History of Science Monographs 3, Chalfont St Giles Bucks. 
39 P. Smith, (ed.). 1975. The Politics of Physical Resources Penguin, Hannondsworth. 
40 N. Swainson. 1979. Conflict over the Columbia: The Canadian Background to an Historic Treaty McGiII-
Queens University Press. Montreal. 
41 N. Wates. 1976. The Battlefor Tolmer's Square Routledge and Kegan Paul. London. For a review of the case 
study literature on environmental politics see P. Lowe. and W. Rildig. 1984. "Review Article: Political 
Ecology and the Social Sciences - The Slate of the Art" British Journal of Political Science Vol. 16. pp. 513-
50. 
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processes, and explaining a host of different causal features. The only common weakness here 
is that the emphasis is almost wholly upon the empirical at the expense of investigation of the 
actual and the real. 
To conclude, earlier discussion of the existing literature detailed a long list of studies 
that centred or touched upon the phenomenon of business dominance in environmental 
conflict. All of these studies possess some strength. However, few (if any) incorporate the 
kind of vertically integrated analysis which, while grappling with the messiness and complex 
causality of such conflict, is also able to contextualise it and satisfactorily investigate the 
operation of key generative mechanisms. The discussion of critical realism clarified the need 
to see the world in this vertically structured and horizontally integrated way, it explained how 
scientific investigation of both social and natural phenomena is possible, and it provided a 
basic description of such a process. This section has examined the wider literature on 
environmental conflict. Little of this is directly congruent with the central question here - the 
exercise of business dominance in environmental conflict, and not many of these studies can be 
seen in realist terms as successful examples of depth explanation. However all of this literature 
is relevant in some way to the conduct of such an investigation.42 Hence its inclusion here, and 
the integration of all of these approaches in some way within the analytical framework and the 
case studies. Moreover, some of these emphases (especially the ADR literature) serve to hide 
or distort concerns (such as structural inequality), and hence stand in a functional relationship 
with those features (note discussion on dialectical explanation). Finally, there are many studies 
of particular aspects of environmental conflict that have not been discussed, most notably 
individual disciplinary perspectives. Some of these are drawn upon as the study progresses.43 
3.3. The Project Structure and Research Method 
Many crucial aspects of method have already been addressed. The purpose of this final sectjon 
is to deal with residual considerations - mostly. issues of practical import At the end of 
Chapter Two I established that the overall structure of this project conforms to the four-phase 
process of scientific discovery. It is with the second and third phases that I am concerned with 
from this point onwards. That is, (i) the construction of an explanatory model of business 
power and dominance in environmental conflict, and (ii), the empirical scrutiny of the posited 
mechanisms - in this case by means of the in-depth historical case study. 
42 Lowe and Rildig in their 1984 review essay are critical of the tendency for environmental case studies to be 
crudely descriptive: "Environmental conflicts have not so far been regarded by researchers as expressions of a 
new political cleavage. nor has there been significant effort to elucidate the social interests they express". P. 
Lowe. and W. Rildig. 1984. "Review Article: Political Ecology and the Social Sciences - The State of the Art" 
British Journal of Political Science Vol. 16. p. 529. 
43 One of the most interesting aspects here is the way in which some disciplinary perspectives seek to colonise 
and dominate the area. For example the methodological imperialism of cost-benefit analysis as a meta-
analysis of conflict 
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3.3.(i) The Analytical Framework 
In my brief general introduction, I noted that the analytical framework is set out over the 
course of two chapters. Chapter Four is concerned with value and the human-environment 
relation, and Chapter Five focuses upon questions of politics and power. This approach 
roughly follows the development of Marx's discussion in Capital, where he opens his 
discussion in Volume I with an exposition of the notion of value, before moving on to develop 
his expansive critique of the capitalist mode of production. Marx's discussion of value was a 
starting point and crucial organising principle for his investigation of alienation and 
domination. While my study is far narrower in its approach. I similarly begin my argument 
about the exercise and consequences of businesses power in environmental conflict with a 
discussion of value-fonn. I would like to stress, however, that my argument does not proceed 
far along the path of the abstract labour theory. I use the value-fonn argument in two 
interconnected ways. First, as a solution to the conundrum of theorising about social class in 
environmental politics - capital and its interest in commodified values, is placed at the centre 
of my model and environmentalists and other actors are treated in a residual (and open-ended) 
way. Secondly, I make a tendential connection between the way capital values the world and 
environmental harm. These are both matters that will be made clearer in Chapter Four. The 
value-fonn argument thus allows me to proceed with the development of a model of business 
power in Chapter Five (again, business is at the centre). That second part of the framework has 
two major components; The first is a general model of politics in advanced capitalist society, 
more specifically four broad principles that help describe the relationships between business, 
the state and non-capitalist civil actors in advanced capitalist society. The second level 
operates in more specific tenns and I set out five generative mechanisms of business power 
that have been similarly observed by neo-pluralists and Marxists alike. In summary, while on a 
different scale, and with a focus upon the human-environment nexus, my progression from 
value fonn to issues of economic power and politics does have an authoritative preceden~ in 
Marx. 
The other major issue here is that of theory choice. The challenge is to traverse a path 
between, on the one hand, the dangers of eclecticism, and on the other hand, the myopia of not 
only detenninism but also of preemptively assigning causal primacy. Also, there is the need to 
ensure a modicum of consistency, or at least to avoid major contradictions. On account of this, 
my approach is to anchor discussion in broadly Marxist tenns (including classical, neo-, and 
post-Marxist analyses). The value-fonn argument is largely based on Marxist observations, but 
I do draw upon wider ecological observations in developing my own synthesis. The power and 
politics element is based first on a model of politics described by Claus Offe who is variously 
described as post-Marxist or neo-Weberian (my reasons for that choice are dealt with in-depth 
within that discussion). In the latter half of Chapter Five I draw heavily upon the insights of 
neo-pluralists - especially those, such as Schrecker, who have specifically analysed 
environmental politics.44 The movement between the two broad schools of thought is not 
necessarily inconsistent, for it is envisaged here that some particular mechanisms usefully 
studied by neo-pluralists (such as job blackmail or inequalities of resources) are either 
symptomatic and/or constitutive of those higher-order mechanisms and tendencies theorised by 
44 See 1.4. 
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Offe. Moreover, they are of critical analytical importance for they provide the types of 
mediating concepts - between action and structure - envisaged by Bhaskar in his position-
practice system. 
Once again, the specific merits and faults of each theory of the state and politics, and of 
specific schools of thought are best described, and theoretical choices explained, as I proceed 
within Chapters Four and Five. 
3.3.(ii) The Case Studies 
Having conjectured, in the theoretical framework, a series of expansive and interconnected 
causal structures it is necessary to proceed with the empirical scrutiny of those mechanisms. 
This inevitably raises the question; what is/are the most appropriate and optimal research 
method/s? In this instance it is detennined to be the in-depth historical case study.45 
The reasons for utilising the case study method stem from the convergence of both the 
investigative imperatives, and from the strengths of the method itself. On the one hand there 
are the postulated mechanisms which are themselves complex in operation. These are held to 
function (and are to be studied here) at the levels of the empirical, the actual and the real. 
Moreover, while potentially significant, these postulates are not considered to be exhaustive or 
exclusive causal explanations. The task of investigating these mechanisms requires a method 
which can, inter alia, explain them in the unique, open, interpenetrated, context of the complex 
conjuncture, that is able to deal with their messiness, fluidity and historical contingency, that 
leaves room for henneneutical insights, and a method which facilitates depth explanation. On 
the other hand, there is the case study method that can function in exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory capacities - all of which are called upon here. The explanatory function is 
particularly important. Yin notes that case studies, histories and experiments are the most 
likely procedures for research into 'how and 'why' questions.46 The realist dismissal of the 
experimental process in social science leaves both case studies and histories as options, and 
given the crossover between the two there seems to be little choice as to the appropriate 
method here.47 The case study method is expansive and flexible, and it is particularly useful 
because it is able to accommodate a range of specific research techniques within its boundaries 
- it can thus function in precisely the overarching or integrative sense required. 
Two episodes of conflict are studied here because this allows some comparative 
analysis without compromising the in-depth investigation of each dispute. As Kellow observes 
45 I note here that Robert Yin in his authoritative text on case study research makes a distinction between the case 
study and historical research. The position here is that due to the spatio-temporal boundedness of all social 
activity, such a distinction is an arbitrary one. Furthennore, the two studies here were each commenced within 
a few years of the end of conflict However, the duration of in-depth investigation will inevitably situate those 
events in the realm of 'recent history' rather than 'contemporary analysis'. R. Yin, 1989, Case Study 
Research: Design and Methods (second edition) Sage, Newbury Park, Ch. 1. 
46 Ibid, p. 18. 
47 This is not to rule out other methods such as the collection and analysis of quantitative data, or survey research, 
as ways of finding out about environmental conflict. Only that given the complexity of the model and its 
explanatory focus the case study method is appropriate here. For a quantitative approach see B. Steel, J. 
Pierce, and N. Lovrich, 1996, "Resources and Strategies of Interest Groups and Industry Representatives 
Involved in Federal Forest Policy" The Social Science Journal Vol. 33, No.4, pp. 401419. This position is 
reinforced by Lowe and Riidig where they acknowledge the efficacy of systematic comparative analysis (large 
n. limited variables) for say the study of trends in institutionalised forms of conflict (for example, wins and 
losses in law suits), but assert that the dynamics of conflict "are mainly accessible through the case study 
approach". 1984, "Review Article: Political Ecology and the Social Sciences" pp. 527-8. 
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in his advocacy of the comparative case study method; "if we cannot step into the same river 
twice [with respect to the sui generis character of each study], we can at least try to immerse 
ourselves in similar streams of issues and thus seek insights into points of similarity and 
difference".48 Furthermore, the approach here is to proceed from the relatively straightforward 
dynamics and substantive detail of the Black Head study to the much more complicated and 
expansive nature of the Whanganui River Minimum Flows dispute. This development enables 
a process of adjustment and fine-tuning to occur, and the efficacy of the model can be assessed 
under complex conditions. 
Next, there is the issue of case study choice. This is fairly straightforward. My focus 
here is upon medium to large-scale environmental disputes. Following the analytical 
framework, these disputes have to be New Zealand examples, and they have to involve 
business interests, the State, and environmental interests - preferably a range of these and also 
other types of interests and values often present in such conflict (eg. Maori participants). In 
terms of time frames, the cases extend backwards to the periods prior to the emergence of 
observable conflict - exploring the historical origins and contexts. of the disputes. In 
substantive terms there are no more requirements of the conflicts at this point, other than the 
above noted one of increased scale and complexity for the second study. They are merely to be 
'roughly representative' examples of conflict. The only other determining factors are practical 
ones such as availability of data - notably, the disputes had to be fairly recent and there had to 
be access to participants and records. 
While neither study is identical in structure or emphasis, they are similarly constructed. 
Both are intended to be of value in their own right as histories of those disputes. The approach 
is to begin each case by explaining the background to the disputes, the substantive issues, 
institutional contexts, and the specific arguments of the actors. This is followed in each case 
by a narrative of conflict, some examination of the substantive outcomes, and the reaction of 
the various agents to those outcomes. In each study, this is done over three chapters. A:s I 
mentioned above, while the types of information I am looking for are determined by the 
questions in the analytical framework these are largely empirical chapters, and I deliberately go 
into a great deal of factual depth (especially in the Whanganui conflict). It is in a fourth crucial 
chapter of each respective study, when I have a full historical and contextual picture of the 
particular dispute, that I analyse those studies through the systematic application of my 
framework. I take this approach for a number of important reasons: First of all, it is only by 
coming to know the conflicts themselves as a whole that it is possible to scan across them 
looking for how and why a particular mechanism mayor may not have operated; Closely 
related to this, the second reason is that the theorised mechanisms require various degrees of 
contextual interpretation and inference. They also require a strategic picture; Thirdly, there is 
the practical matter of the number of mechanisms (eleven) that are to be scrutinised - to follow 
the describe-analyse-describe-analyse approach and weave the theory through all elements of 
the studies - would be unworkable and unnecessarily complex; Fourthly, I want to be 
transparent in my application of the framework. By largely setting out the facts over the first 
three chapters and then applying the framework it is easier to avoid criticisms of bias or 
48 A. Kellow, 1996, Transforming Power: The Politics of Electricity Planning Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p. 10. Yin observes that "if two or more cases are shown to support the same theory replication 
may be claimed". R. Yin, 1989, Case Study Research: Design and Metlwd p. 38. 
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dogmatic interpretation (1 make no claim to value neutrality but 1 do strive for balance). This 
will allow open criticism of my framework and the positing of alternative explanations - this is 
consistent with the realist description of social science in Chapter Two. Because of this, the 
case studies can also act as a resource for the wider study of environmental conflict; Finally, 1 
want to be as consistent as possible in the process of interpretation across both conflicts 
(although not necessarily in the interpretation itself). There is, however, room to place greater 
or lesser emphasis on elements. 
1 do not want here to get into the intricacies of data collection and management other 
than to note that I follow the guidelines set out by Yin. 'Construct validity' is ensured by (a) 
using multiple sources of evidence 49 - specifically, documentation (correspondence and 
memoranda; agendas and minutes of meetings; administrative documents such as internal 
reports; formal reports; legal documents such as opinions, evidence, submissions and 
decisions; other studies of the 'site' in question; news clippings and other media articles), 
archival records (organisational records, maps and charts, photographs, lists of names and other 
relevant features, survey data, and personal records), interviews (both of an open-ended and 
focused natureSO), and direct observation (primarily through field trips to the areas under 
dispute); And (b) maintaining a chain of evidence - that is, to present a transparent process of 
argumentation throughout the studies, and by including extensive and accurate references.51 
'Reliability' is ensured by both utilising the analytical framework to guide analysis in a similar 
way in each study, and by the construction of a comparable database for each study. 52 Thirdly, 
'internal validity' - the accurate identification of causal relationships - is maintained within 
the critical realist confines of contextual explanatory power.53 And lastly, 'external validity' is 
to a limited extent served by the comparative value of replication over two studies. 54 
I would like to finish this discussion by pointing out that while the case studies 
function, first and fore~ost, towards the empirical investigation of the phenomenon of business 
dominance in environmental conflict, it is also my intention that they be sufficiently broad ~d 
robust so as to serve as a resource for further study of environmental conflict. 
3.3.(iii) Analysis 
Analysis at all levels and stages of the thesis is directed by the exigencies of the analytical 
model. It is not only fully 'operationalised' in a post hoc manner at the end of each empirical 
study, but as I have already mentioned it does guide data collection and the filtering of 
material. Following Bhaskar I do not completely separate 'theory' from 'practice' - discussion 
49 The rationale for this is explained by Yin. Ibid., pp. 96-98. 
SO Ibid., pp. 88-91. My approach to interviewing was to begin with open type questions, proceed with a series of 
common questions (somewhat tailored to each interviewee), and conclude by asking specific questions 
regarding gaps in my knowledge of the disputes. Interviews constituted a crucial source of evidence in the 
first conflict, where there was a paucity of documentary evidence and where access to the key participants - all 
parties except Maori - was easier. However, in the second study a host of participants were reluctant to speak 
to me - either due to legal privilege, political sensitivity, general inconvenience, issues of mana (the right to 
speak on certain value questions) etc. The dangers of getting an overly biased picture of events was very real. 
However this has not ultimately been a problem because the conflict generated a mountain of documentary 
evidence, including much personal correspondence. 
51 Ibid, pp. 102-3. 
52 Ibid, Ch's3 and 4. 
53 Ibid, Ch. 5. 
54 Ibid. 
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is only relatively concerned with one or the other at anyone time. As I noted above, while I 
will strive for consistency in my approach I place greater or lesser emphasis on aspects of the 
model in each case; hence the emphasis within the Black Head study upon the 'definition of 
reality' . This example also illustrates another aspect of analysis, which is the use of 
supplementary and subsidiary analytical forms or techniques - such as the discounting method 
in the black Head study. The adoption of ancillary procedures happens at various stages 
throughout both studies, usually as a means by which to reveal the operation of deeper 
structural mechanisms. 
The need to 'get at' the postulated mechanisms highlights probably the most apparent 
contradiction here; that having devoted considerable effort to criticising the solitary focus of 
many scholars upon phenomenal forms (empiricists) at the expense of deeper levels (the 
essence of realist depth investigation), I now propose to study observable episodes of conflict. 
There is a real danger in this (as I noted earlier tendencies may exist unexercised, may 
neutralise one another, and may act conjointly and complexly producing seemingly random 
events). However my approach is simply to utilise such observable conflict to gain entree to 
deeper causal structures. Any tendencies identified or inferred will be understood in 
transfactual terms, and be considered as (potentially) causally efficacious in instances where no 
observable conflict is present. This approach will become clearer as analysis proceeds. 
Finally, of absolute importance is that all of the mechanisms of value and of dominance 
are to be treated in realist terms as transfactual structures. They may be "possessed without 
being exercised, exercised without being actualised, and actualised without being empirically 
identified".ss Moreover, each episode of conflict is complex and open, and will be shaped by a 
multitude of causal forces, and hence the mechanisms posited here will only be partly 
determinative of events (notwithstanding this, it is hoped that they do in some meaningful part 
explain those disputes). 
3.4. Conclusion 
In the first half of this Chapter I dealt with the wider literature on environmental conflict. I 
will only reflect on the ADR and Competing Forms of Reason literature here. I believe that 
while of great interest, and indeed promise, each of those strands of scholarship can be 
considered idealist analyses. Much of the literature in each area tends to proceed from an 
inadequate account of the role of social structure. For example, the design of social-choice 
mechanisms to increase ecological rationality will always fail unless those projects are 
grounded in a more thorough understanding of existing power structures and the nature of 
social transformation. Also, environmental mediation will tend not to mitigate the problem of 
unequal distribution of resources and power in environmental conflict, indeed it may even 
perpetuate and legitimate such imbalances. It is hoped that this project will contribute to the 
development of those discourses. 
While methodological issues have been dealt with throughout this preparatory section, 
and will continue to be discussed in the context of the analytical framework, I have sought to 
55 R. Bhaskar, 1994. Plato Etc. The Problems of Philosophy and their Resolution Verso, London, p. 23. 
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clarify the concrete approach taken here. Discussion now turns to the development of the 
analytical framework. 
4 
Value-Form and the Environment 
4.1. Introduction: 
In this first chapter of the two-part framework I do two things. I argue that it is possible to 
classify actors in environmental conflict in advanced capitalist society on the basis of value-
form - the languages of value that are used by actors and that in tum motivate and shape 
their behaviour. I do so in realist terms, by making a transfactual and tendential connection 
between capital and exchange-value - and more widely, between capital and commodified 
values. Business sits at the centre of this model, and environmentalists are treated in a 
residual sense as non-capitalists. I also make a further and fundamental connection. I argue 
that commodity valuations of environmental goods are intrinsically problematic in 
environmental terms; constituting a serious obstacle to the attainment of sustainable socio-
ecological relations. Discussion is organised in two parts. In 4.2. I take as a starting point 
the problem of theorising about class in environmental politics and conflict and I offer my 
value-form argument as a solution to this. Following that in 4.3. I proceed to investigate the 
environmental deficiencies of the commodity form. 
4.2 Value-Form and the Study of Environmental Conflict 
[f]o say that a society has a structure is to say that there are limits to the extent to which it may 
vary without becoming an instance of a different kind of society. 1 
In theorising about business power in environmental conflict one is immediately faced with 
the conceptual dilemma of class; of differentiating and theorising about relatively enduring 
sectors of society. This matter needs to be resolved before it is possible to categorise actors 
within my framework. The difficulty here is that the politics of the environmental 
problematique have posed a serious challenge to traditional theories of structural dominance. 
The reasons for this are legion, however I would like, as a preamble to the following 
analytical framework, to focus briefly upon the particularly fraught issue of class relations. 
1 A. Callinicos, 1987, Making History: Agency. Structure and Change in Social Theory Polity Press, 
Cambridge. p. 39. 
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The concept of social class is central to Marx's analysis of capitalism. For Marx, the 
constitution of social classes throughout any epoch in history is primarily in tenns of 
peoples' relationship to the means of production. The fundamental class distinction within 
capitalist societies is between capitalists and workers. Capitalists being those who hold 
ownership of the means of production, and workers being those who do not and are thus 
forced to sell their labour power to the capitalists. In this way each class stands in an 
antagonistic relationship with the other, the social manifestation of the underlying economic 
contradictions of the capitalist mode of production2. 
Yet this undifferentiated dualism has subsequently come into question.3 On the one 
hand, such developments as the increasing division between ownership and control in the 
fonn of the joint-stock company, the growth of a bureaucratic/technocratic elite, and a 
profusion of affluent professional groups, mean that the character of the 'bourgeoisie' differs 
from that of traditional ascendant capitalist classes. And, on the other hand, the solidary 
fonns of working class identification present throughout the relatively prosperous decades 
following the second world war (characterised by Fordist production and Keynesian State 
managerialism) have subsequently been undennined through both State accommodation of 
workers' needs and political demands (ie. the very successes of working class politics 
leading, partially, to their own subversion), and the emergence of a flexible accumulation 
pattern following the world economic recessions of the 1970s, which has served to fragment 
the working class (involving, among other things, "relatively high levels of structural 
unemployment, rapid destruction and reconstruction of skills, modest - if any - gains in the 
real wage, and the rolling back of trade union power", and a radical restructuring of the 
labour market towards more flexible regimes4). 
But while the bi-polar opposition of Marx's schema is less apparent (on the basis of 
surface fonns) it is doubtful that these changes actually negate the core dynamic of the 
original fonnulation. In respect to capital, Tom Bottomore notes: 
[f]he element of continuity is very great, being sustained both by the considerable overlapping 
of ownership and management of productive capital and by the ideological commitment of a 
large proportion of those managers, technocrats and bureaucrats who are not substantial owners 
of capital to the bourgeois conception of a capitalist market economy, although this does not 
exclude the possibility of diverse and even contradictory interests and values within the 
dominant class, or the existence, for ex.ample, of important similarities between Western and 
Soviet societies in the functions, and to some extent in the outlook, of techno-bureaucratic 
groups.S 
2 I would like, right from the outset, to draw the distinction between the narrow conception of production used 
within orthodox social science and history, and Marx.' s use of the tenn. For Marx. "production is at the 
same time also consumption. Twofold consumption, subjective and objective. The individual who 
develops his faculties in production, is also expending them, consuming them in the act of production, just 
as procreation is in its way a consumption of vital powers". K. Marx., "Introduction to the Critique of 
Political Economy" in D. Horowitz, (ed). 1968, Marx and Modern Economics Monthly Review Press, New 
York, pp. 28-31. 
3 This transformation has been described by Anthony Giddens as being "a generalised process of 
'decomposition' of class relationships as they existed ... in nineteenth century capitalism ... The 
decomposition thesis holds the view that the ruling class has ceded place to a more amorphous and 
differentiated set of 'leadership groups'. In T. Bilton, et al., 1981, Introductory Sociology Macmillan, 
London, p. 186. Also; B. Head, 1984, "Recent Theories of the State" Politics Vol. 19, No. 20, p. 42. 
4 D. Harvey, 1989, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 147-50. 
5 In A. Heertje, (ed), 1981, Schumpeter's Vision: • Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy' after Forty Years 
Praeger, New York, pp. 27-8. 
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Similarly, the transition to a flexible accumulation strategy may have served to vitiate the 
class identification of workers, undermining "the objective basis for class struggle",6 but it 
has not altered the reality of capitalist production: 
Growth in real values rests on the exploitation of living labour in production. This is not to say 
that labour gets little, but that growth is always predicated on a gap between what labour gets and 
what it creates.7 
There is thus continuity by means of the underlying structural logic of capitalism. This does 
not, however, offer an easy solution to the problem of political activity in this highly 
differentiated world - whether in terms of analysis or activism. 
Environmental politics introduces a whole new set of difficulties for class analysis. 
There have been two broad approaches: The first is the a posteriori method of mainstream 
social science. Having identified environmental politics as a significant issue, the researcher 
may then seek to ascertain characteristics (such as social status, wealth and income, political 
orientation, and education) of support or opposition for 'environmental' values, economic 
behaviour, programs, politics, etc. Sometimes these studies may contrast support for 
'environmental' values with support for other supposedly competing values.s Such 
approaches tend to operate on the basis of the Humean ontology criticised in the previous 
chapter - classes being understood in an agglomerative sense rather than a relational one -
and as a consequence they are unable to furnish us with meaningful causal explanations. 
Their strength lies instead in the ability to make prima facie connections, the most important 
being the observation that environmental activism seems to transcend, or be dissonant with, 
traditional socioeconomic class alignments. But this observation has also been made by 
those whose approach to the subject of class stems from the alternative structural 
(predominantly Marxist) tradition. Claus Offe9 observes: 
I think there are basically two things that are new about these social movements [Offe is 
concerned here with not only the envirorunental movement but also, among others, the peace and 
civil-rights movements - under the broad heading of New Social Movements (NSM's»). First, 
their location within the social structure is by no means marginal. ... Support for the new social 
movements... is derived predominantly not from peripheral or underprivileged strata but from 
groups who themselves playa rather central role in steering and managing what Daniel Bell has 
called 'post-industrial' society. These core groups are relatively well to do and include people 
from the new middle classes and the professional and service sectors who have the highest levels 
of education and cognitive skills.lO 
Offe is discussing the European context and there are inevitable problems with the direct 
application of these conclusions to the New Zealand context. However, these observations 
seem to be consistent with the local experience.ll But while the middle-classes may have 
made the environment their own as a mainstream political concern, environmental politics 
6 D. Harvey, 1989, The Condition of Postmodernity p. 153. 
7 Ibid, p. 180. This is of course immediately consequent upon the Marxian labour theory of value, which I do 
not fully accept (see 4.2.(i)). But I do feel that it speaks some truth about exploitation. 
S For a thorough recent review of this type of literature, both in the international and New Zealand conteltts see 
T. Biihrs, and R. Bartlett, 1993, Environmental Policy in New Zealand: The Politics of Clean and Green? 
Oxford University Press, Auckland. Ch. 3. For a classic eltample of this methodology see: R. Inglehart, 
1977, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics Princeton 
University Press, Princeton NJ. 
9 Whose 'post-Marxist' theoretical stance is fairly eclectic. Broadly aligned with the Frankfurt school, he 
straddles the divide between neo-Marltist and neo-Weberian political sociology. 
10 C. Offe, 1984, Contradictions of the Welfare State Heinemann, London, p. 293; 1985, "New Social 
Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics" Social Research 52. See also: A. Gortz, 
1989, Critique of Economic Reason Verso, London, Chapters 8 and 9. 
11 T. Biihrs, and R. Bartlett, 1993, Environmental Policy in New Zealand. 
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has also been a prominent issue at the extremes of the socioeconomic spectrum. For 
example, Harvey has drawn attention to the emergence of the movement for environmental 
justice and against environmental racism as a significant political force in the United 
States. 12 A movement which arose in response to the tendency for hazardous waste to be 
dumped in the vicinity of poor or ethnic minority communities. 13 Such politics, which are 
not new, consider the plight of the urban poor in the newly industrialised cities of last 
century. At the other end of the spectrum, corporate capitalists have been at the forefront of 
environmental initiatives - such as the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth strategy. 14 My 
point here is simply that there is no privileged or exclusive relationship between 
environmental issues per se and socioeconomic location. "Environmentalists" thus "occupy 
almost every position on the traditional right-to-Ieft spectrum". 15 Indeed, in an immediate 
sense we are all environed beings standing in relation to our surroundings, hence our politics 
(and, ipso facto, our definitions of 'environment') will reflect this to some extent - although 
as Enzensberger wryly observes: "If avowed representatives of monopoly capitalism have 
recently become its [ecology's] spokesmen - as in the Club of Rome - that is because of 
reasons which have little to do with the living conditions of the ruling c1ass".16 Which 
points to the fact that the motivations for supporting environmental initiatives are complex, 
spanning the spectrum from altruism to maximising self-interest, and from direct use 
relations through to the most abstract and disconnected commercial impulses. 
So in this highly fractured and changing world, is the concept of class at all relevant 
to, or indeed possible within, the study of environmental politics? My answer to this is that 
not only is some form of class analysis still possible and relevant, but that it is indispensable 
to the investigation of such contemporary phenomena Structural analysis (of which the 
concept of class is an essential tool) remains possible in the investigation of the Capital-
Environment relation for almost the same reasons that it remains pertinent to the analysis of 
the Capital-Labour relation. And so: 
To plug the gap requires going back to basics and dealing with the underlying logic of capitalism 
in general. And it was, of course, Marx's peculiar virtue to have built a theory of capitalism in 
general through an analysis of capitalism under the broadly competitive and laissez-faire mode 
of regulation to be found in Britain in the mid-nineteenth century. Let us go back, therefore, to 
Marx's 'invariant elements and relations' of a capitalist mode of production and see to what 
degree they are omni-present beneath all the surface froth and evanescence, the fragmentations 
and disruptions, so characteristic of present political economy. Since flexible accumulation is 
still a form of capitalism we can expect a number of basic propositions to hold 17 
12 D. Harvey, 1996, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference Blackwell Pub\., Cambridge Ma, pp. 
366-73. See also: 1. Martinez-Alier, 1995, "Political Ecology, Distributional Conflicts, and Economic 
Incommensurability" New Left Review No. 211, May/June, pp. 70-88. 
13 D. Harvey, 1996, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference pp. 366-73. See 3J.so: 1. Martinez-Alier, 
1995, "Political Ecology" pp. 70-88. 
14 D. Meadows, et al., 1972, The limits to Growth Universe Books. New York. Hans Magnus Enzensberger 
provided a seminal critique of the class character of environmental politics in his 1974 article: "A Critique 
of Political Ecology" New Left Review Vol.84, pp. 3-31. 
15 R. Paehlke, 1989, Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics Yale University Press, New 
Haven, p. 194. To illustrate the diversity of environmental politics Harvey discusses; authoritarianism. 
corporate and state managerialism. pluralistic liberalism. conservatism. moral community. ecosocialism, 
ecofeminism, and decentralised communitarianism. D. Harvey, 1996, Justice, Nature and the Geography 
o/Difference pp. 177-181. 
16 H. Enzensberger. 1974, "A Critique of Political Ecology" p. 10. 
17 D. Harvey, 1989, The Condition ofPostmodernity p. 179. 
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Harvey is thus indicating a way forward. But this does not explain why these 'invariant 
elements and relations' are in any way appropriate to theorising the specific Capital-
Environment relation. 
The solution here is as follows. While 'environmentalists' cannot be easily treated as 
a monolithic grouping in terms of socio-economic class, there is the possibility that they can 
be theorised: (a) In opposition to capitalists (who can be treated as sufficiently homogenous 
on the basis of their overriding interest - vis-a-vis ownership and control - in profitable 
capital accumulation); And (b) on the basis of value-form. This is a functional conception of 
class and is thus not dependent upon solidary associations or consciousness. Both of these 
approaches are integrated within the following framework. 
In this chapter I focus upon the latter. The adoption of the classical distinction 
between use-value and exchange-value performs a dual function: First, it allows a political 
distinction to be made. The interests of capitalists are held, in the first instance, to be with 
the production of exchange-values, and the interests of environmentalists, in the first 
instance, with use, and more broadly, non-commodified forms of value. It thus acts 
analytically as a broad ordering principle for the discussion of environmental politics; 
Secondly, the commodity form - and especially its most abstract manifestations - is seen to 
pose inherent difficulties for the attainment or perpetuation of healthy human-nature 
relations. These elements together enable a systematic connection to be made between 
socio-economic function and environmental hann. It is a sophisticated conception of value 
that subsequently enables the discussion of interests, attitudes, perceptions and subjective 
valuations to be grounded in an understanding of the social relations underlying 
environmental conflict 
The framework is thus broken into two main sections. Part One deals with the 
subject of value form and the people-nature relation. Part Two is concerned with issues of 
power and politics in environmental conflict, also utilising the value-form schema. M~ 
approach is in this way initially consistent with that taken by Harvey in his return to Marx. 
However the consequences of value-form for socio-ecological being were not rigorously 
theorised by Marx - or at least they were not his central concern - and it is in this respect 
that I enter new territory.18 Before I proceed with these discussions I would first like to 
highlight the significance of the critical realist approach for this analysis. 
18 Although Marx certainly did consider the human-nature connection to be an ~ssential element of social 
being - through the process of people acting upon the world and the world in turn acting upon them - a 
process of mutual (and of course dialectical) creation. See Christopher Gosden for an excellent discussion: 
1994, Social Being and Time Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 68-73. A vigorous debate has recently focused upon 
Marx's comprehension of 'nature'. The biggest problem though is that Marx espoused a range of views on 
the subject over the course of his lifetime, from the romantic elements of early works, such as in the 1844 
Manuscripts, to more mechanistic 'Promethean' statements, such as are peppered throughout the volumes 
of Capital, which seem to deny any notion of natural limits. On Marx and nature see: R. Burgess, 1978, 
"The Concept of Nature in Geography and Marxism" Antipode Vol. 10, No.2, pp. 1-12; N. Smith, and P. 
O'Keefe, 1980, "Geography, Marx and the Concept of Nature" Antipode Vol. 12, No.2, pp. 30-9; S. 
Vogel, 1988, "Marx and Alienation from Nature" Social Theory and Practice Vol. 14, No.3, pp. 367-87. 
For an interesting debate over the way forward - the ecologising of Marx: T. Benton, 1989, "Marxism and 
Natural Limits: An Ecological Critique and Reconstruction" New Left Review No. 178. 
November/December, pp. 51-86; R. Grundmann, 1991, ''The Ecological Challenge to Marxism" New Left 
Review No. 187, May/June, pp. 103-20; T. Benton, 1992, "Ecology, Socialism and the Mastery of Nature: 
A Reply to Reiner Grundmann" New Left Review No. 194, July/August, pp. 55-74; T. Hayward, 1992, 
"Ecology and Human Emancipation" Radical Philosophy No. 62, pp. 3-13. 
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The value-form argument, its association with environmental harm, and its 
consequent utilisation for the investigation of the strategic processes of environmental 
politics, must be thoroughly comprehended in realist terms as the postulation of (potentially) 
causally efficacious structural relationships/mechanisms - manifest as transfactual 
tendencies. Hence, the association between capital and exchange-values is a tendential one. 
Instances to the contrary are by no means immediately problematic or automatically serve to 
negate the basic propositions. Capitalists will, for example, at times be essentially 
motivated by use-value or even non-instrumental criteria in environmental matters. Also, 
the transfactual element means that this tendency may actually operate without being 
observed, or for that matter without even resulting in a potentially observable event. This 
method goes some way in avoiding the criticism so often levelled at Marxian approaches, 
which is that of constructing deterministic, total ising theories or meta-narratives.19 It does 
not, however, rule out the identification of enduring and widely active generative 
mechanisms. 
My final point here, then, is the theorising of value-form as an important obstacle to 
the attainment of healthy human-environment relations, does not in any way deny the 
significance of other enduring causes of environmental harm - forms which may be 
pertinent to capitalist societies per se (such as a tendency towards over-production), or be of 
wider relevance (eg. industrial processes or forms of technology). While being a central 
precept of the "structure of natural/social articulation" in capitalist society,20 and significant 
in generative terms, value-form can be no more than a partial explanation of environmental 
problems.21 
4.3. Value Discourse, Value Form, and the HumanHEnvironment 
Relation 
Like all forms of social conflict, questions of value lie at the heart of environmental conflict. 
Such questions are manifest as conflicts between competing value discourses; "multiple 
languages" of value - "scientific, poetic, mythic, moral and ethical, economistic and 
instrumental, emotive and affective".22 These 'languages' are fundamental, because they 
are not only the means by which environmental issues and values are articulated, they are 
also frameworks/perspectives/worldviews/systems within which values are 'constructed' -
they embody processes of valuation.23 Moreover, in certain respects they are analogous to 
Dryzek's and Barlett's notions of competing social choice mechanisms. They possess their 
own internal logics or rationalities, and like those social choice mechanisms they interact 
and affect one another, and most significantly here, they become (create and perpetuate) 
19 To the extent that it is at all possible to avoid these criticisms. 
20 T. Benton, 1989, "Marxism and Natural Limits" p. 77. 
21 As Reiner Grundmann points out: "If I say that Marx's framework is still illuminating, this does not mean 
that it gives us a point of reference which is sufficient for the understanding of ecological problems." 1991, 
Marxism and Ecology Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 6. See also Lynton Caldwell in: S. Nagel, (ed), 1974, 
Environmental Politics Praeger Publishers, New York. p. 281. 
22 The very existence of multiple languages may be considered at least partially responsible for the existence 
of conflict D. Harvey, 1996, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference p. 172. 
23 This is by no means to deny the significance of material elements in shaping such values. 
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discourses of power and dominance.24 It is the process by which the value discourses of 
capitalism "dependent upon the money calculus and the market" result in the elevation and 
dominance of instrumental, utilitarian and abstract forms of value, which concerns me 
here.25 
Before I begin, there are a number of requirements that value places upon an 
explanatory schema. Environmental values, as instantiated within specific conflicts, 
represent a unique intertexture of elements - such as place, time and inter-/intra-subjectivity 
- a sui generis connection. It is therefore necessary to generalise, to characterise types or 
forms of value (thus, unavoidably, constructing a value discourse of one's own). Such a 
typology or schema of value must, however, be sufficiently flexible to be inclusive of all 
(reasonably foreseeable) sui generis manifestations encountered in the empirical research. 
For example, from monetary valuations, through direct use-values, to notions of ethical and 
moral community and the "intuitive sense of intrinsic natural value".26 Hence, while the 
central value dichotomy of classical economics - the split between use and exchange values 
- occupies a focal position in the following value analysis, both elements of this distinction 
fall within the categories 'instrumental' or 'utilitarian'. There is thus a danger here of 
establishing a value schema which systematically marginalises some very important fonns 
of value. 
Despite this danger this axial distinction remains at the core of my framework, for it 
remains the central antinomy of capitalist valorisation. However when I operationalise the 
value component of the model for the organisation of the case studies I use the broadly 
consistent categories of commodified and non-commodified values. This arrangement allows 
for the inclusion of a wider range of specific value types, without reducing the force of the 
central analytical split. 
4. 3. (i) The Use-ValueIExchange-Value Distinction and the Simple Commodity Form 
Marx defined the capitalist society as a "commodity producing society"P It is not 
surprising, then, that for Marx the analysis of the commodity is the key to the understanding 
of capitalism as a whole. The commodity is a fulcrum that facilitates the unravelling of the 
"intricate secrets of capitalism itself'.28 Like discussion in Capital I begin here with a 
dissection of the commodity form. I do not, however, follow the abstract labour theory of 
value that is central to Marx's approach. Instead, I hold to the more basic use-
value/exchange-value distinction of classical economics (followin~ Adam Smith) - my 
interest is with the tensions of value-form rather than the distillation of a social universal 
24 Indeed, as Harvey observes "there is in this eclecticism an omnipresent danger. Not only do different 
discourses lie uneasily side by side .... But the careful analysis of the way power relations get embedded in 
distinctive discourses suggests that the vast conceptual muddle and cacophony of discourses is far from 
innocent in the reproduction of capitalism." Ibid., p. 173. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 K. Marx, 1958 (1867), Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production Vol. I, Foreign Language 
Publishing House, Moscow. 
28 D. Harvey, 1982, The Limits to Capital Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p. 1. 
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value character (which for Marx, is found in the labour component of commodity production 
- manifest in his confusing analytical category; value).29 
Reuten and Williams introduce the commodity in the following way; "The necessary 
interplay of the exchange relation and the value fonn in the market thus actually constitutes 
the useful object as an entity of double fonn - use value and money [exchange-value]. This 
doubling constitutes the useful object as commodity."30 
The use-value of the commodity embodies the connection between people and the 
world through the ability of an object or 'thing' to satisfy a potential want or need; "the 
object of satisfaction of any system whatever of human needs".31 It largely represents the 
material side of the commodity, for almost all commodities possess physical qualities that 
endow them with use-values (it was understood by Marx to be the bearer of exchange-
value32). It is in this sense that Wilden aligns use-value with matter/energy.33 Although it is 
probably more accurate to say that use-relations are flows of matter/energy, whereaS use-
valuations represent such flows (that is, they are laden with infonnation about such). 
Moreover, to define use-values solely on the basis of the fundamentally important material 
substratum, is of course to ignore other rich textual or subjective elements of use. There is 
another important aspect in the use-value relationship - proximity or connection. It is in the 
use~relation that people come into contact with the material world and vice versa. The use-
value can therefore be seen as a direct and highly qualitative value representation of 
relationships between people and nature, and the products of such relations, throughout all 
social systems and epochs. 
The exchange-value of the commodity (and it is here that I diverge from Marx's 
definition34) is simply the power of the commodity "to command certain quantities of other 
29 My original intention was to proceed along the path of the abstract labour theory. Marx's value analysis is 
very sophisticated and constitutes a powerful critique of capitalist exploitation of labour. However, the 
concentration upon the labour component as the social. universal of value poses great difficulties from an.. 
ecological perspective, among others (for a recent criticism see R. Grant, 1997, "Fetishising the Unseen" 
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Vol. 40, No.4, pp. 443-6.). Certain elements of 
Marx's analysis are drawn upon here (for example the insights of commodity fetishism), but in essentially 
metaphorical terms. For Marx's mode of dialectical argument, its relational character, and hermetic 
internal coherence - as a totality of concepts - mostly precludes the ad hoc appropriation of components of 
his framework. In short, you either go fully down his road, or you proceed along a different path. Some 
academics have pursued a path to an 'ecologised marxism' which holds to the labour theory of value. In 
such schemas the labour process embodies the mutual making of people and the world - a concept which 
certainly contains much truth - however it raises 'labour' to an almost metaphysical level. Furthermore, 
these advocates seem to proceed from an extreme anthropocentrism incorporating a picture of the world as 
almost wholly shaped by human action. However, it is my view that while human beings have impacted 
extensively upon 'nature', there are many elements of material causality, and issues such as 'natural limits' , 
which must be acknowledged. As Claus Offe has observed: "The assumption about the centrality of labour 
within classical Marxism must ... be questioned ... the work role is only partly determinative of social 
existence". 1984, Contradictions of the Welfare State Heinemann, London, p. 283. On the ecologising of 
Marxism debate see footnote [18] above. On the abstract labour theory of value see especially Harvey's 
explication in The Umits to Capital Chapter 1. Also; J. Cameron, K. Cole, and C. Edwards, 1983, Why 
Economists Disagree (first edition) Longman, London, Ch. 8. 
30 G. Reuten, and M. Williams, 1989, Value Fonn and the State: The Tendency of Accumulation and the 
Detennination of Economic Policy in Capitalist Society Routledge, New Yorlc, p. 63. 
31 K. Marx, 1973, Grundrisse Penguin. Harmondsworth, p. 881. There are exceptions, as commodified 
things such as intellectual property may not have material form. 
32 K. Marx, 1972, Capital Vol. III, Lawrence and Wishart, London, p. 647. See also Alfred Schmidt, 1971, 
The Concept of Nature in Marx New Left Books, London, p. 15. 
33 Wilden makes this distinction in dialectical relation to exchange-value, which he links to information. A. 
Wilden, 1972, System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange Tavistock, London. p. 252. 
34 Which incorporated labour value as the universal component of all exchange-Values. 
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commodities in exchange" - a logic of equivalence.35 It is predicated upon exchange 
relations, predominantly manifest in capitalist societies through the workings of the market 
mechanism. It is important to make clear that the exchange-value embodied within the 
commodity fonn is of a particular type. Exchange relations, in general, take many fonns 
(for example the thoroughly analysed fonn of 'gift exchange'), and hence they perfonn 
many functions (such as the establishment and maintenance of social, and indeed socia-
ecological, relationships). Wilden, following the semiotic turn of many anthropological 
studies, thus writes of the symbolic function of exchange - the 'sign of a relation'. 36 
However it is possible to see an even more immediate pre-interpreted or material character 
in some 'reciprocal' exchange relations with the natural world, that is, at the level of 
thennodynamic or ecological necessity.37 Grouped together these types of exchange 
founded upon 'reciprocity' or 'mutuality' are closely related to use, essentially because of 
the direct and enduring relations that are established between giver and receiver, producer 
and consumer,38 But the exchange-value of the commodity must be distinguished from 
these basic fonns. In commodity exchange there is an inherent disconnection from use-
values. This is because the valorisation process is located solely in the nexus of exchange, 
with the exchange-value not being a direct or even necessarily close function of use but 
rather a mirror relation. Its value exists only relative to the other commodity/ies being 
exchanged. It is the total replacement of the 'of itself' with 'against' .39 It is also a fonn of 
value that wholly corresponds to infonnation rather than the often-material substratum of 
use.40 In brief, the exchange-value is an abstraction that emerges wholly out of social 
35 T. Bottomore, (ed), 1991, A Dictionary of Marxist Thought (second edition), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p. 
561. Also, J. Baudrillard, 1981, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign Telos Press, St Louis 
MO,p.130. 
36 A. Wilden, 1972, System and Structure p. 253. 
37 Take, for instance, Martin O'Connor's discussion of Lewis Hyde's work on North American Indian tribes of 
the Pacific coast: 
In ecological terms, each participant in the web of life lives through the 'gift' of others. 
Cessation of exchange is synonymous with death. One can understand the thermodynamic basis 
for life in the same terms. The whole biosphere is nourished by the influx of solar radiation, 
whose eventual contrepartie is the diSSipation of heat back into space. The sustenance of life 
activity within the biosphere depends on an incessant exchanging between systems in the way of 
food intake and waste disposal. In ecological perspective, 'we understand that what nature gives 
to us is influenced by what we give to nature'. What is important, suggests Hyde, is that the 
ceremonies assert, and establish at the level of social institution, 'a gift relationship with nature, 
a formal give-and-take that acknowledges our participation in, and dependence on, natural 
increase' . 
1990, Sustainahility, Commitment and Ineluctable Change Working Papers in Economics No. 75, 
Department of Economics, University of Auckland, p. 3; L. Hyde, 1983, The Gift: Imagination and the 
Erotic Ufe of Property Vintage/Random House, pp. 19,2<>-27. 
38 Christopher Gosden provides an interesting discussion on the differences between gift exchange and 
commodity exchange: 
Because commodities can be alienated from the people who produced them they set up 
transactions between individuals who remain independent of each other. By contrast, gifts 
always retain an attachment to the person who produced them and thus create a lasting and 
dependent relation between producer and receiver. Lasting attachments limit the economic uses 
to which gifts can be put in particular, they make capital accumulation impossible. 
1994, Social Being and Time Blackwell, Oxford, p. 83. 
39 This is not to deny the importance of consideration of the 'other' in any valuation process. Such processes 
are necessarily dialectical. 
40 A. Wilden, 1972, System and Structure p. 252. 
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relations - it is a mental abstraction and cannot, therefore, "be either a geometrical, a 
chemical, or any other natural property of commodities".41 
Of course, both aspects need to be present for a thing to be a commodity. For 
example, every commodity has a use-value, but not every use-value is a commodity; "for 
use-values which are either freely available or not exchanged, have no exchange-value".42 
The commodity thus consists of a particular relation between two forms of value, in 
which, most significantly, the two forms are not directly connected - no systematic 
relationship exists between the exchange-value of a commodity and the properties which 
give it its use-value.43 Similarly, Wilden observes that "any object of exchange may be 
valued in an entirely arbitrary way".44 The implications of this disconnection are the subject 
of further discussion later in this section. 
It is necessary here to make the (transfactual and tendential) connection between 
capital and value-form, between social class and type of substantive value connection with 
the world. Two separate passages of Marx' are apposite here: 
It is only in so far as the appropriation of ever more and more wealth in the abstract becomes the 
sole motive of his operations, that he functions as a capitalist, that is as capital personified and 
endowed with consciousness and a will. Use-values must, therefore, never be looked upon as the 
real aim of the capitalist ... the restless never-ending process of profit-making alone is what he 
aims at This boundless greed after riches, this passionate chase after exchange-value .... 45 
The product appropriated by the capitalist is a use-value, as yam, for example, or boots. But, 
although boots are, in one sense, the basis of all social progress, and our capitalist is a decided 
'progressist', yet he does not manufacture boots for their own sake. Use value is by no means 
the thing 'qu'on aime pour lui-meme' in the production of commodities. Use-values are only 
produced by capitalists because, and in so far as, they are the material substratum, the 
depositories of exchange-value. Our capitalist has two objects in view: in the first place, he 
wants to produce a use-value that has a value in exchange, that is an article destined to be sold, a 
commodity; and secondly, he desires to produce a commodity whose value shall be greater than 
the swn of the values of the commodities used in its production. that is of the means of 
production and the labour power, that he purchased with his good money in the open market46 
The connection between capital and exchange-value is a thus a systemic one. 
Lastly, while not part of this internal value relation, the core dynamic of capitalism -
the profitable accumulation of capital - is predicated upon both a qualitative and quantitative 
expansion, indeed universalisation, of the commodity form. That is, not only the expansion 
in the production and consumption of existing types of commodities (ie. a simple growth 
function), but also the extension of the commodity form into new arenas (incorporating both 
new and existing forms of use). This relentless process of commodification has manifold 
implications (for example, the associated establishment of exclusive property rights), but of 
greatest significance here is the extension of this particular value-form, with its inherent 
internal tensions/disconnections, into a greater and greater portion of socia-ecological 
being.47 
41 K. Marx, 1958 (1867), Capital p. 37. 
42 B. Fine, 1989, Marx's Capital (third edition), Macmillan, London, p. 8. 
43 Ibid p. 10. 
44 A. Wilden, 1 g'72, System and Structure p. 252. 
45 K. Marx, 1958 (1867), Capital pp. 152-3. 
461bid. 
47 For example, see Martin O'Connor on the capitalisation of nature: 1993, On the Misadventures oJCapitalist 
Nature Working Papers in Economics No. 110, Department of Economics, University of Aucldand, p. 2 
and passim. 
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4.3.(ii) The Money Form and Commodity Circulation 
The riddle presented by money is but the riddle presented by commodities ... but in its most 
glaring fonn.48 
In developed systems of commodity circulation exchange-values are expressed as money 
values. The money form is pivotal. Marx's analysis of the money form, like his analysis of 
capitalism in general, proceeds in historical terms. Harvey summarises here: 
Marx treats the simple commodity fonn as the' germ' of the money form. An analysis of direct 
barter shows that commodities can assume what he calls the 'equivalent' and 'relative' forms of 
value. In an initial state, each community or bargaining agent will possess commodities that 
operate as the equivalent form of value. With the proliferation of exchange, one commodity (or 
set of commodities) will likely emerge as the 'universal equivalent' - a basic money commodity 
such as gold The relative values of all other commodities can then be expressed in terms of this 
money commodity, 'Value' consequently acquires a clearly recognisable. unique and socially 
accepted measure. .., we can also see ... that a general system of commodity exchange would 
be impossible without money to facilitate it. The growth of exchange and the emergence of the 
money commodity therefore necessarily go hand in hand 49 
Indeed, the concomitant development of both commodity circulation and the money form as 
universal equivalent progresses beyond this. The commodity character of money - as an 
entity of double form - becomes even less apparent. In a fully developed capitalist system 
money no longer possesses an inherent use-value,50 rather, it takes the form of pure 
exchange-value. 
Hence in the process of developed commodity circulation 
(Commodity-Money-Commodity ... ), there is not only the internal disconnection between 
use-value and exchange-value intrinsic to the most basic commodity, but also an ongoing 
external process of both disconnection and abstraction via the commensuration of 
heterogeneous entities in the "social-universal homogeneous form of money".51 Marx 
referred to this higher level abstraction as the "double exchange-value" of the money 
commodity.52 In this way the dilemma of measuring and communicating values against one 
another is resolved but only "at the expense of internalising the duality of use-value and 
value within the exchange-value of money itself'.53 
The money-form is the sole expression of value within markets. The up-shot of this, 
coupled with the earlier noted dynamic of commodification, is for the money-form to be an 
increasingly dominant expression of value in capitalist society. It is expected that this will 
extend into environmental discourses, and more specifically the value discourses of 
environmental conflict It has been argued that the money-form of value involves a further 
abstraction from that already located within the simple commodity-form. The implications 
of both the dominance of the money-form of value, and of the logical 
disconnection/abstraction inherent within the double exchange-value is discussed next. 
48 K Marx, 1958 (1867). Capital p. 93. 
49 D. Harvey, 1982, The Limits to Capital p. 11. 
50 Other than its functions/characteristics as a measure of value, fiduciary store of value, and as a medium 
exchange - use-values which are identical in any quantity of money. 
5! G. Reuten, and M. Williams, 1989, Value Form and the State: The Tendency of Accumulation and the 
Determination of Economic Policy in Capitalist Society Routledge, New York, p. 63. 
52 K Marx, 1973, Grundrisse Penguin, Harmondsworth, pp. 145,200. 
53 D. Harvey, 1982, The Limits to Capital pp. 11-12. 
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4.3.(iii) Disconnection, Abstraction and Commodity Fetishism 
We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a 
community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respecL54 
Where money is not itself the community, it must dissolve the community ... It is the elementary 
precondition of bourgeois society that labour should directly produce exchange value, i.e. 
money; and similarly that money should directly purchase labour, and therefore the labourer, but 
only insofar as he alienates his activity in the exchange... Money thereby directly and 
simultaneously becomes the real community, since it is the general substance for the survival of 
all, and at the same time the social product of a11.55 
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Both Leopold the ecologist, and Marx the political-economist, each working in the context 
of widely differing worldviews, identify the commodity-form as a source of alienation and 
exploitation.56 For Leopold it leads to the exploitation of the biotic community, whereas for 
Marx it is implicated in the process of the exploitation of the worker through their alienation 
from the products of their labour. Their respective approaches to the dilemma of 
commodification subsequently diverge, with Leopold seeking an ethical remedy ("Land-use 
ethics are still governed wholly by self-interest, just as social ethics were a century ago"57). 
Marx, on the other hand, paints a more intractable picture, the solution to which would 
require the wholesale subversion of commodity relations rather than the development of an 
ethical adjunct. Nevertheless, the process of commodification is identified by both as being 
implicated in the causation of socio/socio-ecological harm. 
To identify how this is so it is useful to first consider some broad elements of 
ecosystem function. The realist ontology contained in Chapter Two is consistent with 
ecological perspectives. It describes a world of complex, open and consequently 
interpenetrated (hence co-dependent), and dynamic systems. Furthermore, the relational 
character of the world "implies a 'circularity' of actions, responses and reactions" - systems 
of material/energetic/information feedback. 58 In Chapter One there was some discussion 
54 A. Leopold. 1949, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There Oxford University Press, New 
York. 
55 K Marx, 1973, Grundrisse Penguin, Harmondsworth, pp. 224-6. 
56 I am indebted here to Harvey's juxtaposition of these two passages. See: 1993, "The Nature of 
Environment" p. 3; 1996, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference p. 120. 
57 A. Leopold, 1949, A Sand County Almanac p. 209. In later discussion Leopold provides further elucidation 
of his understanding of the relationship between economics and ethical constraint: 
It of course goes without saying that economic feasibility limits the tether of what can or cannot 
be done for land. It always has and it always will. The fallacy the economic determinists have 
tied around our collective neck, and which we now need to cast off, is the tJelief that economics 
determines all land use. This is simply not true. An innumerable host of actions and attitudes, 
comprising perhaps the bulk of all land relations, is determined by the land-users' tastes and 
predilections, rather than by his purse. The bulk of all land relations hinges on investments of 
time, forethought, skill, and faith rather than on investments of cash. As a land-user thinketh, so 
is he. 
Ibid, p. 225. 
58 Lynton Caldwell in: S. Nagel, (cd), 1974, Environmental Politics Praeger Publishers, New York, p. Z79. 
One has to be eruemely careful here not to assume a picture of absolute circularity, for this necessarily 
implies the operation of closed systems which, as has been made quite clear, is not the case. A more 
accurate picture of the operation of natural systems is provided by Kenneth Stokes in a chapter called "Neo-
physiocratic and Biophysical Models", in which he draws upon 'open systems-theory'. In: K. Stokes, 
1994, Man and the Biosphere: Toward a Coevolutionary Political Economy M.E. Sharpe, New York, Ch. 
3. Including a penetrating discussion on the disjunction between the assumptions of circular models of 
economic activity and the underlying physical reality characterised by linear and uni-directional matter-
energy flows - "beginning with the depletion of low-entropy resources from the environment and ending 
up with high-entropy wastes and pollution of the environment". pp. 103-1 to. 
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about the notion of sustainability as an ecological principle (which is not always present in 
nature) and as a widely accepted nonnative principle upon which human societies - their 
socio-ecological connection - can be organised. Any sustainable system will, in tenns of the 
above noted ontology, consist of sustainable relations and sustainable relations are 
necessarily relations of reciprocity and mutuality.59 They are also relations of complex 
qualities, whether in tenns of matter/energy or information. Which brings me to the 
processes of commodification and monetisation. 
There are at least four essential ecological difficulties posed by the commodity fonn: 
First, it has been argued that the use-vaIue/exchange-value split within the commodity fonn 
involves an inherent disconnection. No systematic relation exists between the two. In 
ecological terms this disconnection poses great problems because it represents a qualitative 
break in the interchange between people and nature. A consequence of the blindness of 
exchange-value to the rich and manifold qualities of things, and to the particularities of the 
production process (other than in the minimisation of the financial cost of manufacture and 
maximisation of exchange-value) is that many environmental (and other) costs are 
subsequently 'externalised' - they are not accounted for within the exchange-value. This is 
an absolutely fundamental effect; Secondly, commodity exchange is based upon a logic of 
equivalence (and for that matter equivalence in the abstract) not one of reciprocity. The 
material/energetic/qualitative elements of commodities do not pass back and forth along the 
same pathway in a dialectical relation, for this circuit is broken by the presence of the 
general equivalent form of money; Directly associated with this there is the third problem-
the exchange relation in capitalist society does not, in general, establish any enduring 
commitment between people (and places, environments, etc.), rather, it is an ephemeral 
commitment between alienable things; And fourthly, as Harvey has pointed out, capitalist 
commodity relations and money valuations are predicated upon a "Cartesian-Newtonian-
Lockean and in some respects 'anti-ecological' ontology" of how the natural world operate~ 
- the ontology which was extensively criticised in Chapter Two: 
Money prices attach to particular things and presuppose exchangeable entities with respect to 
which private property rights can be established or inferred. This means that we conceive of 
entities as if they can be taken out of any ecosystem of which they are a part. We presume to 
value the fish, for example, independently of the water in which they swim. The money value of 
a whole ecosystem can be arrived at, according to this logic, only by adding up the swn of its 
parts, which are construed in an atomistic relation to the whole. This way of pursuing monetary 
valuations tends to break down when we view the environment as being construed organically, 
ecosystemically, or dialectically.60 
Yet none of these problems, singularly or conjointly, ,negate the ultimate 
connectedness that exists in natural systems. Hence 0' Connor observes that the 
interconnection of complex open systems means that significant negative externalities will 
have to be reconciled in some way.61 There is in this way a link between the specificities 
(internal unsustainable relations) of each atomistic commodity relation, and system-wide 
59 M. O'Connor, 1990, Sustainability. Commitment and Ineluctable Change Working Papers in Economics 
No. 75, Department of Economics, University of Auckland, p. 4. Reciprocity and mutuality are essential 
characteristics which allow a system to e)(perience change whilst maintaining the integrity of that system 
(ie. maintain a state of dynamic homeostasis). For an extended discussion of this need see; A. Clayton, and 
M. Radcliffe, 1996, Sustainability: A Systems Approach Earthscan Publications, London, Ch. 3. 
60 D. Harvey, 1996, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference p. 153. 
61 M. O'Connor, 1990, Sustainability p. 4. 
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disturbances such as acid rain. 62 Of great importance here is that one of the effects of such 
cumulative disconnection is conflict - including environmental conflict - this will be of 
interest in later analysis of the two case studies.63 
The money articulation of value further exacerbates this disturbance. As noted 
previously, the commensuration of heterogeneous entities in the social-universal 
homogenous form of money is a process of abstraction. This abstraction has a number of 
very significant consequences. The first of these is clearly revealed in Marx's penetrating 
notion of commodity fetishism: 
The exchange of commodities for money is real enough. yet it conceals our social relationships 
with others behind a mere thing - the money form itself. The act of exchange tells us nothing 
about the conditions of labour of the producers, for example, and keeps us in a state of ignorance 
concerning our social relations as these are mediated by the market system.64 
Such social conditions and relations are not the only information concealed by the market 
calculus, the money form also abstracts from the specifics of time and place, and hence from 
the socia-ecological relations of commodity production. 65 Cronon, in a study of the 
development of nineteenth century Chicago illustrates this exact point: 
Also, 
Living in the city means consuming goods and services in a market place with ties to people and 
places in every comer of the planet, people and places that remain invisible. unknown and 
unimagined as we consume the products of their lives. The market fosters exchange 
relationships of almost unimaginable complexity, and then hides them from us at the very instant 
they are created, in that last moment when cash and commodity exchange hands and we fwally 
consume the things we have purchased. 
The geography of capital produced a landscape of obscured connections. The more concentrated 
the city markets became and the more extensive its hinterland. the easier it was to forget the 
ultimate origins of the things it bought and sold 66 
Now if this was the case in Chicago over a hundred years ago, then it is difficult to 
comprehend the infinitely complex and often ephemeral webs of interconnection which must 
persist in the present world of global commerce, advanced communication technologies, the 
extension of commodity relations into all realms of social life, and rampant consumerism. 
Webs that remain hidden behind the same veil of money relations. 
Another fundamental consequence of abstraction is the effect that it has upon value 
discourses. Namely, that the commensuration of heterogeneous entities within the money 
62 This is a classic ~ of unintended consequences arriving from the rational behaviour of the individual: "As 
regards unintended consequences, Marx. was one of the fIrst social scientists who systematically treated this 
mechanism. He employed this kind of analysis himself when he demonstrated both on the political and 
economic level how individual rationality can bring about collectively undesirable outcomes" R 
Grundmann, 1991, Marxism and Ecology p. 71. See also 1. Elster, 1985; Making Sense of Marx 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
63 On the relation between the capitalisation of nature and political conflict between states see: L. Timberlake, 
and J. Tinker, 1985, "The Environmental Origins of Political Conflict" Socialist Review Vol. 15, No.6. 
64 D. Harvey, 1982, The Limits to Capital p. 17. 
6S In a discussion of 'fetishism' Jean Baudrillard most interestingly notes that while commodity fetishism 
pertains to exchange-value; 
use-value - indeed, utility itself - is a fetishised social relation, just like the abstract equivalence 
of commodities. Use value is an abstraction. It is an abstraction of the system of needs cloaked 
in the false evidence of a concrete destination and purpose, an intrinsic fInality of goods and 
products. 
This does not, however, negate my overall value schema. The issue here is that of capitalist valorisation -
ultimately founded upon a system of needs, real or not. Discussion within the case studies allows for the 
inclusion of value discourses not formed on the basis of • utility' . See: 1. Baudrillard. 1981, For a Critique 
of the Political Economy of lhe Sign Telos Press, St Louis Mo, pp. 130-42. 
66 W. Cronon, 1991, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West W.W. Norton. New York, pp. 378-84. 
340; See also, D. Harvey, 1996. Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference pp. 2314. 
Chapter Four: VaJue-Fonn and the Environment 76 
form constitutes a moral failing - a failing which lies at the heart of capitalist relations. As 
Harvey observes: "Money hardly satisfies as an appropriate means to represent the strength 
or manifold complexity of human wants, desires, passions and values". And later: 
[N1]oney supplants all other foans of imagery (religion, traditional religious authority, and the 
like) and puts in its place something that either has no distinctive image because it is colourless, 
odourless, and indifferent in relation to the social labour it is supposed to represent, or, if it 
projects any image at all, connotes dirt, filth, excrement, and prostitution.67 The effect is to 
create a moral vacuum at the heart of capitalist society - a colourless self-image of value that can 
have no purchase upon collective as opposed to individual social identity. It cannot provide an 
image of social bonding or of community in the usual sense of that tean (even though it is the 
real community in the sense that Marx meant it) and it fails as a central value system to articulate 
human hopes and aspirations in collective terms. Money is what we necessarily aspire to for 
purposes of daily reproduction and the realisation of individual desires, wants, and needs. In this 
sense money does indeed become the community; but a community emptied of any moral 
passion or of humane meanings even though it engages human passions in furious and obsessive 
ways.68 
These comments bring discussion back to the comments made by Leopold and Marx and 
quoted at the beginning of this sub-section. The basic thesis here is the one noted earlier: 
that the value discourses of capitalism (viz. commodification and monetisation) result in the 
elevation and dominance of instrumental, utilitarian and abstract forms of value. Such forms 
are intrinsically problematic in ecological terms, constituting a serious obstacle to the 
attainment of sustainable socio-ecological relations. It should be noted that the dominance 
of the money form across all value discourses in capitalist society - through the 
homogenisation, concealment and suppression of other fonns - is one of the mechanisms by 
which business exerts it influence within environmental conflict (for further discussion see 
S.4.(iv». 
A final caveat is required. The above discussion has dealt with inherent problems of 
value-form. But, in 2.4.(i) it was noted that social structures (which the commodity-form 
undoubtedly is) can be both enabling as well as constraining. Money may be, as Marx held, 
aieveller and a cynic, but it remains the only universal yardstick of value. And while 
money is an alienated human power, it is the basic form of social power (although not 
exclusively so) in capitalist society, and as such it provides the common and practicable 
means by which we seek to "achieve, liberate, and even emancipate" our desires: 
Its neutral and universal qualities as a mere thing can be put to use in an infmite number of ways 
for purposes that may be judged good or bad as the case may be. The lack of any moral 
judgement inherent in the money form itself, can liberate the individual from direct repressive 
social constraints (though whether with good or bad effects may be debated). This leads to the 
powerful argument that the market is by far the best mechanism yet devised to realise human 
desires with a maximum of individual freedom and the minimum of socia-political restraints.69 
We are thus faced with an equivocal situation. But this, in itself, does not vitiate the above 
argument. Value-form does have a significant generative role in the causation of ecological 
harm whether or not money is beneficial in other ways. The ultimate purpose here is to 
increase the learning capacities of society (the emancipatory role of social science). While, 
on the one hand, the ecological problems derivative of value-fonn may ultimately outweigh 
the benefits of capitalist commodity circulation, on the other hand they may not, in which 
case it will still be necessary to find ways of mitigating the ecological inadequacies of the 
67 Harvey is here reiterating a perspective held by Simmel, Marx, Freud, and others. The moral failings of 
money have been dealt with most recently, and colourfuIly, by James Buchan, 1997, Frozen Desire: The 
Meaning of Money Farrer, Strauss and Giroux, New York, on Marx and money see chapter 8. 
68 D. Harvey, 1996, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference pp. 155-6. 
69 Ibid, p. 151. 
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market mechanism (such as, for example, through Leopold's ethical adjunct - the Land 
Ethic, or by intemalising ecological and social costs within prices by means of the 
institutional design of market frameworks, etc.). Either way, this will require a greater 
understanding of the impacts of commodity circulation and money relations. 
4.4. Conclusion 
I began discussion with the dilemma of theorising about class in the context of 
environmental politics/conflict; of differentiating and theorising about relatively enduring 
sectors of society. This question needed to be resolved before it was possible to categorise 
actors within my framework. The difficulty is that environmental activism seems to 
transcend or be dissonant with traditional socioeconomic class alignments. My solution to 
the problem is as follows. While 'environmentalists' cannot be easily treated as a 
monolithic grouping in terms of socioeconomic class, there is the possibility that they can be 
theorised; (a) in opposition to capitalists (who can be treated as sufficiently homogenous on 
the basis of their overriding interest - vis-a-vis ownership and control - in profitable capital 
accumulation), and (b) on the basis of value-form. This is a functional conception of class 
and is thus not dependent upon solidary associations or consciousness. I integrate both 
approaches into the framework, but it is the latter foundation that is central. 
The adoption of the classical distinction between use-value and exchange-value 
performs a dual function: First, it allows a political distinction to be made. The interests of 
capitalists are held, in the first instance, to be with the production of exchange-values, and 
the interests of environmentalists, in the first instance, with use-values (and, more broadly, 
non-commodified forms of value). It thus acts analytically as a broad ordering principle for 
the discussion of environmental politics; Secondly, the commodity fonn - and especially its 
most abstract manifestations - is seen to be intrinsically problematic in ecological terms, 
constituting a serious threat to the attainment of sustainable ecological relations. These, 
elements together allow a systematic connection to be made between socioeconomic 
function and environmental harm. It enables subsequent discussion of interests, attitudes, 
perceptions and subjective valuations to be grounded in an understanding of the social 
relations underlying environmental conflict, and vice versa. 
5 
Business, State and Environment 
5.1. Introduction 
Once again the starting point for my argument is commodity production. What follows is an 
argument about the derivation and exercise of social power out of the ownership and control 
of commodity production. The argument is split into two sections: The first phase operates 
at the level of the broad structural relations which persist between capital, the state, and 
other social agents (principally here, environmental actors) in advanced capitalist societies. 
This is an argument about relatively enduring functional relations and it is theorised on the 
basis of 'state theory' - structural models of power and politics. A series of broad 
functional principles are set out, each of which acts as a general causal imperative in the 
politics of environmental conflict. These principles explain how business derives political 
power at a system-wide level; In the second phase of the argument discussion turns to more 
specific generative mechanisms which serve to facilitate, and indeed, are themselves. 
evidence of, business dominance. Where the first phase is in a sense state centred, the 
second phase is more focused upon capital's dominance within competitive society. 
Moreover, this second element develops out of the more abstract structural theory with 
many aspects approximating the system of mediating concepts that Bhaskar referred to as 
the position-practice system. Again, it is necessary to emphasise that these mechanisms and 
relationships are theorised in realist tenns as transfactual relations, and they do not, 
therefore, constitute a totalising or detenninistic framework. 
Before I begin with the first phase I will clarify what is meant here by the underlying 
concepts of power and dominance. Bhaskar articulates a realist understanding of power in 
twofonns: 
Power,: The transformative capacity intrinsic to the concept of action. 
Power1: The capacity to get one's way against either the overt wishes and/or the real interests 
of others in virtue of structures of exploitation, domination, subjugation and control. 1 
The first fonn is a generic conception that acknowledges the ubiquity of power relations 
throughout all areas of sociallife.2 However the analysis of social relations tends to involve 
two further features: the identification of a particular relation between social agents 
1 R. Bhaskar, 1994, Plato Etc. The Problems 0/ Philosophy and their Resolution Verso, London, p. 256. 
2 Steven Lukes makes the same observation in; W. Outhwaite, and T. Botlomore, (eds), 1993, The Blackwell 
Dictionary o/Twentieth·Century Social Thought Blackwell Reference, Oxford, pp. 504-5. 
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(including relations within and between social structures), and the crucial differentiation 
between significant and non-significant affecting.) Bhaskar's second definition incorporates 
these requirements, firstly, by referring to the capacity to (Power t ) get one's way over others 
(the relational aspect), and secondly. the significance of any power relation is ascertained by 
regard to people's overt wishes and/or real interests.4 
Finally, the concept of dominance was introduced in the previous chapter as: a 
particular type of relationship which displays (or possesses) a systematic or tendential, 
asymmetry of power (PowerJ between individuals (and groups), and between individuals 
(and groups) and nature, and the products of such relations. This definition is consistent 
with the above definitions of power. The associated term, structures of dominance, simply 
means structures of power (Power t - including extrinsic and intrinsic factors) generative of 
dominance. It should be emphasised that a relation of dominance is understood here to be 
simultaneously and dialectically a relation of exploitation. 
5.2. Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State 
In Chapter Three I noted that I would restrict my focus to broadly Marxist theories of the 
state. However this initial restriction itself embraces a plethora of perspectives, each with 
divergent starting points and methodologies, etc. I provide a brief tour here to explain my 
choice of state theory.5 The instrumentalist approach is expressed in Marx and Engels' 
dictum that the "executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the affairs 
of the whole bourgeoisie".6 Instrumentalism is society centred, positing the state as an 
instrument of class domination. Barrow observes that such approaches tend to rely on the 
method of power structure research.7 As a result, this perspective is strongly empirical.8 
Standing in contradistinction to instrumentalism is structuralism. The structuralist 
perspective is constituted in functional terms; "the superstructural functions which pertain to. 
the domain of the state can generically be summarised as the protection and reproduction of 
the social structure (the fundamental relations of production), in so far as this is not achieved 
) This distinction between 'broad' and 'narrow' senses of power has been drawn by a number of writers, Cf: S. 
Lukes, 1974, Power: A Radical View Macmillan, London, passim; T. Benton, 1981, '''Objective' Interests 
and the Sociology of Power" Sociology Vol. 15, No.2, pp. 173-4; A. Giddens, 1977, Studies in Social and 
Political Theory Hutchinson, London, pp. 347-8. 
4 It should be noted that the use of the concept real interests (sometimes referred to as objective interests) has 
been identified as problematic because it remains 'indispensably evaluative' and thus stands as an 'essentially 
contested' foundation. T. Benton, 1981, "'Objective' Interests and the Sociology of Power" Sociology Vol. 
15, No.2, p. 176. 
5 For the basic typology used here I am indebted to Clyde Barrow, 1993, Critical Theories of the State: Marxist, 
Neo-Marxist, Post-Marxist University of Wisconsin Press, Madison Wn. An alternative overview and 
typology of state theory can be found in, B. Jessop, 1990, State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their 
Place Polity Press, Cambridge, Ch. 3. 
6 K. Marx, and F. Engels. 1967, The Communist Manifesto Penguin, New York. 
7 "Power structure research is a methodological approach which views the organised control, possession, and 
ownership of key resources as the basis for exercising power in any society. Key resources typically consist 
of wealth, status, force, and knowledge". C. Barrow, 1993, Critical Theories of the State p. 13. 
8 The most prominent example is: R. Miliband, 1969, The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the 
Western System of Power Quartet Books, London. Which stimulated a resurgence of Marxist theorising 
about the state. This approach, labelled by C. Wright Mills as "plain marxism" has been strongest in the 
United States. Cf: C. Mills, 1962, The Marxists Dell, New York; G. DomholT, 1990, The Power Elite and 
the State Aldine de Gruyter, New York; M. Zeitlin, 1989, The LArge Corporation and Contemporary 
Classes Polity Press, Oxford. 
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by the automatic processes of the economy".9 The capitalist economic system is seen to 
incorporate fundamental structural contradictions that generate accumulation crises. Hence 
the preeminent role of the state is to avoid, remedy and mitigate such crises, thereby 
maintaining the requisite conditions for profitable accumulation. The purpose of empirical 
work in this field is to investigate why and how this maintenance function operates at 
particular historical conjunctures; The instrumentalist-structuralist divide can in a sense be 
seen as a dispute over the ontological and methodological primacy of either action or 
structure, and over their respective utility in explaining what is distinctly capitalist about the 
state - a fundamental divergence which featured prominently in 2.4. Another factor is that 
while both instrumentalism and structuralism theorised the state as being capable of serving 
the needs of capitalist accumulation, the crisis tendencies of capitalism during the 1970s and 
the ascension of radical neo-liberal programs in response to those conditions, raised serious 
questions about the viability of the welfare state as a stabilising mechanism. 
These empirical questions and the above noted methodological antinomy led to the 
development of a third approach which has been variously labelled derivation ism or the 
capital-logic school. lO This approach proceeds through the logical derivation of state 
functions out of the developing needs of capital accumulation - for example, the need to 
provide a general legal framework (eg. private property and contract law) and to address 
market deficiencies (eg. infrastructural needs and to deal with negative externalities). 11 A 
central analytical insight of derivationism is that it questions the ability of the capitalist state 
to provide for the needs of capital in the long term. This assertion is essentially founded 
upon the increasing constraints placed on the state by both globalisation and political 
democracy. 12 While derivationism has resulted in extremely rigorous analytical 
developments, it has failed in its efforts to transcend the methodological divide between 
agency and structure. The historiography of political development has been secondary to 
logical derivation, and as a result derivationism has failed to generate, and indeed 00. 
informed by, such historical work. Finally, the fourth category here is the systems-analytic 
9 E. Mandel, 1975, Late Capitalism New Left Books, London, p. 474. For a general discussion on this 
perspective see: C. Barrow, 1993, Critical Theories of the State Ch.2. Structuralism was the dominant 
approach of nco-Marxism in the 1970s. It was, in great part, a response to instrumentalism, and this was 
most clearly the case in Poulantzas's rejoinder to Miliband, and the prominent debate which ensued. See: N. 
Pouiantzas, 1969, "The Problem of the Capitalist State" New Left Review No. 58, pp. 67-78; 1976, "The 
Capitalist State" New Left Review No. 95, pp. 63-83; 1978, Political Power and Social Classes Verso, 
London. For a useful discussion of the crisis tendencies of capitalism see: 1. O'Connor, 1987, The Meaning 
of Crisis: A Theoretical Introduction Basil Blackwell, New York. . 
10 An extensive and recent review of the development of, and arguments within, derivationism, can be found in: 
S. Clarke, (ed.), 1991, The State Debate Macmillan, London. See also; C. Barrow, 1993, Critical Theories 
of the State Ch. 3. Of some influence in the construction of this framework (including the value component) 
is a specific variant of derivationism which deduces the functions of the state out of the nature of value-fonn 
itself (by, for example, recognising that the capitalist mode of production does not intemalise all of its costs 
and that this results in significant contradictions throughout the social formation, contradictions which need 
to be reconciled in some way - i.e. by the state). This theorising is strongly influenced by Hegel, proceeding 
in dialectical terms. See: M. Williams, 1988, Value, Social Form and the State Macmillan, London; G. 
Reuten, and M. Williams, 1989, Value Form and the State: The Tendency of Accumulation and the 
Determination of Economic Policy in Capitalist Society Routledge, New York. 
11 C. Barrow, 1993, Critical Theories of the State p. 8. 
12 Ibid., p. 92. On the issue of the globalisation of capital and the state see: S. Picciotto, and H. Radice, 1973, 
"Capital and Slate in the World Economy" Kapitalstate No. I, pp. 56-68. And more recently; 1. Holloway, 
1994, "Global Capital and the Nation State" Capital and Class No. 52, Spring, pp. 23-49. On the dilemma of 
political democracy see especially: G. Therbom, 1977, ''The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy" 
New Left Review No. 103, pp. 3-41. 
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or 'post-Marxist' approach. I) This approach draws upon elements of both structuralism and 
derivationism in describing broad systemic imperatives which are placed upon (and in fact 
define) the state. Most particularly, there are the often conflicting state functions of 
promoting capital accumulation whilst simultaneously maintaining democratic legitimacy. 
The fundamental insight of the systems-analytic approach is that the state may fail in its 
efforts to reconcile these twin imperatives - there is no necessary or ultimate conjuncture 
between the needs of the capitalist formation and the functioning of the state. 14 
The question of theory choice is difficult. Each of these approaches can locate its 
antecedents somewhere within Marx's work, a fact that rules out, or at least problematises, 
any fundamentalist claims. IS Additionally none of these approaches has ultimately 
displaced the others. The reason for this is that each approach has a different and legitimate 
point of departure, and moreover, each approach generates certain truths about the 
functioning of the state in particular, and politics in general, in advanced capitalist societies. 
Furthermore, the idea of a grand synthesis is both elusive and, according to those such as 
Barrow, misguided. 16 Against this uncertain background, I have decided to place Claus 
Offe's systems-analytic theorising at the centre of my schema. I do so for three basic 
reasons. First of all, because the disjunctural possibility at the heart of Offe's model - that 
the state may not necessarily succeed in realising the interests of the capitalist class - is 
potentially consistent with a realist understanding of the operation of complex open systems, 
as opposed to deterministic frameworks.17 One has to be careful here because Offe's 
13 A good introductory discussion is contained in C. Pierson, 1984, "New Theories of State and Civil Society: 
Recent Developments in Post-Marxist Analysis of the State" Sociology Vol. 18, No.4, pp. 563-571. This 
approach is associated mostly with the work of Claus arre, Jurgen Habermas, and Andre Gortz. afre and 
Habermas's intellectual roots lie with the 'critical theory' of the Frankfurt school, hence their integration of 
Marxist and non-Marxist perspectives (for example, afre portrays the state in Weberian terms as a rational 
bureaucratic form of domination. However he characterises the wider social system in Marxist terms, that is, 
as a class society). cr. C. Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem or Policy Formation"1n 
L. Undberg, (ed.), 1975, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism D C Heath and Co, London, pp. 
125-44. 
14 Barrow discusses a further approach that he labels 'organisational realism'. C. Barrow, 1993, Critical 
Theories of the State Ch. 5. This approach can be considered 'state centred' in that it posits a high degree of 
state autonomy from the exigencies or capital accumulation. This approach proceeds through general 
historical work, and can thus be seen as a methodological corrective to the broadly deductive and highly 
theorised strategies or much of neo- and post-Marxism. Much of the research in this category can be 
alternatively labelled 'neo-Weberian' due to both its ontological assumptions (see 2.4), and its relative 
emphasis upon the bureaucratic rationality of state institutions. Cf: T. Skocpol, 1979, States and Social 
Revolutions Cambridge University Press, London; T. Skocpol, 1985, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies 
of Analysis in Current Research" In. P. Evans, et al., 1985, Bringing the State Back In Cambridge University 
Press, New York; F. Block, 1980, "Beyond Relative Autonomy: State Managers as Historical Subjects" 
Socialist Register No. 14, pp. 227-42. 
15 As Bob Jessop observes: Marx "did not offer a theoretical analysis of the capitalist state to match the scope 
and rigour of Das Kapital. His work on the state comprises a fragmented and unsystematic series of 
philosophical reflections, contemporary history, journalism and incidental remarks. 1977, "Recent Theories 
of the Capitalist State" Cambridge Journal of Economics Vol. I, p. 354. 
16 See C. Barrow, 1993, Critical Theories of the State Ch. 6, "The Antinomies of State Theory". 
17 Although, I am aware that affe's approach can itself be seen as 'deterministic' by virtue of its prediction that 
such disjunctures are inevitable consequences of the inherent contradictions of capitalist production. It is in 
this respect that Simon Clark refers toaffe's approach as ·structural-functionalist'. S. Clark, (ed.), 1991, The 
State Debate Macmillan, London, p. IS. My position is that it is possible to operationalise afre's generative 
principles along realist lines, although the consequence of this is that it must be recognised that; (a) the crisis 
tendencies of capitalism are just that - tendencies, and (b) the ability or inability of the state to deal with such 
crises is contingent (the state will not necessarily fail as crisis theory asserts). The downside of such an 
understanding is that it seriously limits the predictive capacity of a priori theorising about the state. This is 
totally consistent with the realist approach detailed previously. 
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'functionalist' prediction of disjuncture can be construed as equally deterministic. Yet it is 
possible to avoid these deterministic elements by comprehending his posited mechanisms in 
realist terms, and by rejecting the certainty of Offe and Habermas's crisis predictions. 
Secondly, Offe has endeavoured to account for social groupings and interests that do not 
define themselves along traditional class lines (ie. environmental advocates), and there is 
room in his model for further theorising about such phenomena. I8 And thirdly, Offe's 
model seems, at least in the first instance, to raise up a series of empirically operable 
principles (albeit at a very generallevel).19 It must be noted here that my argument is not 
closed to other strands of state theory, many elements of the systems-analytic approach are 
totally consistent with aspects of structuralism and derivationism, and I draw upon these 
resources where appropriate. 
As a caveat here, a central weakness of Offe's approach is that its functionalism 
seems to discount the importance of agency - a problem that has been central to discussion 
thus far. It is my opinion that by acknowledging the activity-dependent character of the 
social world (ie. by subscribing to critical naturalism) it is possible to avoid the error of 
reifying structures. This problem is further attenuated through the final section of the 
framework which, as well as postulating a suite of more specific generative mechanisms, 
stands as a methodological counterbalance to this functionalist approach. In fact this type of 
historical corrective is entirely consistent with Offe's broader methodological prescription, 
that is to supplement systems analysis with historical investigation.20 
Before I detail the four analytical principles at the core of Offe's model, it is 
appropriate to briefly discuss a couple of background features. The first of these is the 
concept of the state itself. The state is another 'essentially contested' concept in political 
theory. The formulation of the state concept tends to swing between the extremes of either 
structuralism or institutionalism, where the former understands the state to be a series of 
functions wholly derivative of the historical needs of capitalism ("state institutions are. 
viewed only'as arenas for the exercise of political power and exist as such only by virtue of 
their functional role in capitalist society"21), and the latter defines the state as a matrix of 
organisations and actors. Each approach is, in extremis, at best partial and usually difficult 
to sustain.22 Offe's stance is itself ambiguous for he has on the one hand defined the state 
on the basis of a series of functional principles - those set out below, and on the other hand 
he has elsewhere pointed to the need to integrate institutional elements into the concept 
18 This requirement has also been integrated in the work of Andre Goetz. N.R 1989, Critique of Economic 
ReasonVerso, London. 
19 That is, on the basis of the realist criteria for theory choice - empirical fertility, heuristic plausibility, synoptic 
power etc. 
20 For example, Offe sees systems analysis and policy history as jointly providing a critique of the capitalist 
state's regulatory capacities. It should be acknowledged, however, that Offe has not himself furnished any 
in-depth examples of this type of systematic. historically informed. work. C. Offer 1984. Contradictions of 
the Welfare State Heinemann. London. p. 35. 
21 C. Barrow, 1993. Critical Theories of the State p. 57-8. See also: B. Jessop, 1982. The Capitalist Siale: 
Marxist Theories and Methods Martin Robertson, Oxford. pp. 221, 223-4. 
22 For elGUllple. the institutional approach is beleaguered by the problem of ascertaining the boundaries of the 
state. See G. Poggi. 1990, The Siale: Its Natllre Development and Prospects Stanford University Press, 
Stanford. p. 184. 
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(although he has not provided any concrete direction as to how this is possible).23 My belief 
is that Offe's dual approach is by no means inconsistent; rather, it heralds an unavoidable 
amalgam.24 Thus, my explication of Offe's (and others') broad functional principles of state 
action contained here are complemented and supplemented later through my references to 
the state within the case studies in a manner which treats the state as an historical matrix. 
My second comment is to reiterate the centrality of the process of capital 
accumulation, and the concomitant ownership and control of such, within this model of 
politics. This is the class-analysis element articulated in functional terms. The approach of 
systems-analysis, like that of the structuralists and derivationists, is to detail what is 
distinctly capitalist about the state (which functions variously as arena, arbiter, and advocate 
within environmental conflict) by specifying the ways in which the "state is functionally 
related to and dependent upon the capital accumulation process".25 Moreover, a residual 
effect of this specification is the determination of just how autonomous the state is from the 
exigencies of accumulation (the relative autonomy argument).26 This strategic relationship, 
between capital and the state, is specified by reference to the four general 
principles/structural mechanisms that are set out below. Offe's arguments are used as a 
general guide, and I draw upon other perspectives where I consider this to be appropriate. 
Lastly, it is important to stress that Offe is proceeding at the most "abstract-general" level -
his theory of the capitalist state can be described in Weberian terms as an ideal-type.27 The 
operationalisation of his model requires supplementary historical work. This intermediate 
level analysis is provided as contextual discussion within the case studies themselves. I now 
set out Offe's four principles that I will subsequently utilise in my analysis of environmental 
conflict. 
5.3. OtTe's Strategic Model 
5.3.(i) Exclusion 
The principle of exclusion or private production describes the division of labour that 
divorces the modem capitalist state from organising commodity production, and assigns this 
crucial task to the capitalist.28 Offe states: 
Political power is prohibited from organising material production according to its own 'political' 
criteria; property, whether in labour power or capital, is private. Hence, it is not political power, 
but private decisions that determine the concrete use of the means of production.29 
The state can thus be considered an entity that has its existence outside of the accumulation 
process.30 Value-form theory advances a compelling explanation for this division: 
23 Offe's clearest exposition of the state is to be found in: "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of 
Policy Formation" In L. Lindberg, (ed.), 1975, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism D C Heath 
and Co, London, pp. 125-44. 
24 That is, in the absence of an intermediate level of language between the two polarities. 
25 C. Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation" p. 125. 
26 This is an example of Giddens' observation that social structures can either be enabling or constraining. 
27 C. Offe, 1984, Contradictions of the Welfare State Heinemann, London, p. 120. On the concept of 'ideal-
type' see; M. Weber, 1954, Law in Economy and Society Harvard University Press, Cambridge Ma, p. 9 and 
passim. 
28 H. Gulalp, 1987, "Capital Accumulation, Classes and the Relative Autonomy of the State" Science and 
Society Vol. 51, No. 20, p. 307. 
29 C. Dffe, 1984, Contradictions of the Welfare State p. 120. 
Chapter Five: Business, Stall! and Environment 
The value-form detennined capitalist-economy is, in itself, indifferent to the existence of 
particular individuals, and is characterised by dynamic tendencies which periodically undennine 
the conditions of their existence. Rights of property and existence are therefore in themselves 
contradictory. This contradiction is transcended in the doubling of competitive society into the 
state and civil society - the reappearance of the economy given the emergence of the state.31 
84 
Williams refers to this as a "separation-in-unity" which is the expression of a "contradiction 
which cannot be resolved at the level of competitive society".32 There is in this way a 
necessary split deriving out of capital accumulation. This separation is, however, constantly 
threatened by countervailing pressures on the state to secure the reproduction of capitalist 
relations, a factor that will be elaborated below.33 The result of this, at the level of events, is 
that this division of labour is not always clear cut Nevertheless, this functional separation 
acts as a powerful "selective mechanism" which tends to "screen out social policies that are 
incompatible with the private ownership of productive assets".34 
The exclusion imperative is a necessary part of Offe's model because it underpins 
the other three principles. It will, therefore, be necessary to deal with this mechanism within 
my analysis at the end of each study. I will set out to identify whether the state was 
involved in commodity production, and if so, whether there was pressure upon the state to 
divest itself of the ownership of production. Nevertheless, I do not envisage that it will be 
of direct explanatory value and will essentially function as a secondary mechanism that 
explains the presence of the following imperatives. Finally, the exclusion imperative, like 
all of the mechanisms posited here, operates tendentially and transfactually. 
S.3.(ii) Dependency 
The strength of the modem capitalist state depends in great part upon the strength of the 
economy. This fact rests upon two interconnected aspects. First, the material capacity of 
the state to make decisions, and act upon them, is predicated upon the resources it extracts 
from private accumulation: 
Those who occupy positions of power in a capitalist state are in fact powerless unless the volume 
of the accumulation process allows them to derive (through taxation) the material resources 
necessary to promote any political ends.3S 
Now the ability of the state to extract such material concessions will depend upon the 
performance of the economy itself. For when the economy slows down or declines then tax 
revenues will likewise fall. Conversely, when the economy is expanding the state is able to 
extract revenue from the private sector with less effort, and hence, with less resistance from 
30 C. Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation" p. 127. 
31 M. Williams, 1993, "The Political-Economic Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe: A Tragic 
Neglect of Civil Society" Working Paper Series 2/93 Graduate School of Business and Government 
Management, Victoria University of Wellington, p. 9. 
32 Ibid, p. 12. 
33 S. Clarke, (ed), 1991, The State Debate Macmillan, London, p. 15. 
34 C. Barrow, 1993, Critical Theories of the State p. 100. 
3S C. Ofre, 1984, Contradictions of the Welfare State Heinemann, London, p. 120. See also; H. Gulalp, 1987, 
"Capital Accumulation, Classes and the Relative Autonomy of the State" Science and Society Vol. 51, No. 
20, p. 299. 
Chapter Five: Business, State and Environment 85 
both business and the public at large.36 The second aspect here is not part of Offe's schema; 
rather, it is a structuralist observation:37 
The state necessarily serves the interests of the capitalist class, because the state's legitimacy is 
dependent upon the economy.38 
It is certainly the case that people "view the state's personnel and policies as being 
responsible for their economic prosperity or lack thereof'.39 However, from a realist 
perspective the structuralist assertion that the state necessarily serves the interests of capital 
must be seen as overly deterministic. The actions of the state being more contingent than 
this, such that, because the state derives its legitimacy in great part from the performance of 
the economy, and because (on the basis of the exclusion principle) the state is functionally 
divorced from direct involvement in commodity production, the state will depend to a 
significant degree upon the performance of capital for its legitimacy. It is important, 
however, to not confuse such economic legitimation with the principles of legal (rights 
based) legitimacy and democratic legitimation discussed below. 
5.3.(iii) Maintenance 
The state's fiscal and legitimatory dependence upon the economy motivates the state in the 
performance of a crucial function, the imperative of maintaining private accumulation.4O 
Following the exclusion principle there is pressure upon the state not to directly engage in 
accumulation. Yet the state depends upon accumulation, so the state responds to this by 
creating, sustaining and modifying the conditions in which capitalists engage in production 
for profit - "they must induce rather than command".41 The second underlying assumption 
or foundation is that "individual capitalists cannot themselves produce the general political 
or material conditions necessary for profitable business activities".42 These conditions may 
be split into two broad categories. First, there are system-wide needs - relatively enduring 
generic preconditions of commodity production, exchange and accumulation - that the state 
must satisfy. For example, Harvey notes that the state "in some form or another is a 
necessary condition for the production of values", for at the most basic level capitalist 
relations require the creation and enforcement of private property rights, a system of 
contractual exchange, and the guarantee of the quality of money in circulation.43 Further 
conditions would include, inter alia, the existence of institutional frameworks for the 
regulation of conflict (including environmental conflict), military/diplomatic apparatuses to 
guarantee nationally based capital in foreign markets, and general material conditions such 
36 F. Block, 1977, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State" Socialist 
Revolution No.7, p. 15. 
37 It is also one held by the neo-pluralist Charles Lindblom. Cf. 1982, "The Market as Prison" Journal of 
Politics Vo!' 44, pp. 324-36. 
38 A. Bridges, 1973, "Nicos Poulantzas and the Marxist Theory of the State" Politics and Society Vo!' 2, pp. 
161-90. 
39 C. Barrow, 1993, Critical Theories of the State pp. 58-60. 
40 C. Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation" p. 126. 
41 C. Lindblom, 1977, Politics and Markets Basic Books, New York, p. 173. 
42 C. Barrow, 1993, Critical Theories of the State p. 102. 
43 D. Harvey, 1982, The Limits to Capital Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 18-19. 
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as the infrastructural needs of capital that cannot be produced directly or spontaneously by 
individual private businesses.44 
Secondly, in addition to these relatively generic requirements there are the more 
contingent conditions pertaining to fractions and/or moments of capital. For capital is not an 
"undifferentiated unity"; it is rather, "something which is heterogeneous and internally 
contradictory".45 One may, for example, speak of sectoral needs (ie. industrial, finance, 
merchant, and landed forms of capital), geographical needs (local, regional, national, and 
increasingly transnational business groupings), or the requirements of various organisational 
forms Goint stock companies, small businesses, cooperatives, trusts, etc.).46 The needs of 
these layers and fragments of capital are in constant transition and conflict such that the 
exigencies of particular patterns of accumulation establish crucial and specific impulses for 
state action.47 
The maintenance function can also be described as the need to overcome threats to 
the orderly pursuit of profitable capital accumulation. At a fundamental level, these threats 
may be understood as either internal contradictions of capitalism per se (such as 
ecologically exploitative relations, class antagonisms, etc.) or as externally sourced threats 
(disease, war, natural disasters, etc.). In political terms, they may manifest themselves as 
threats from competing fractions of capital, or from non-capitalists (or capitalists 
functioning in non-capitalist capacities) such as many environmental advocates. In sum, the 
sources and forms of threat to, as well as the preconditions of, capitalist relations are 
manifold. This necessarily raises the question as to how the state actually performs the 
maintenance task. Most particularly, just how the state manages the strategic challenge of 
articulating and enforcing the 'general interests' of capital. I will discuss this only in 
abstract terms. 
Offe has asserted that "selective mechanisms" operate within the state apparatus to 
systematically deliver the policies and interventions necessary for general accumulation.48 
Barrow summarises Offe's argument: 
First, to fulfil its maintenance function, coordinative mechanisms within the state apparatus must 
insure that state policies possess the requisite rationality, that is, that state policies will in fact 
induce optimum levels of investment and employment State personnel must be able to 
recognise and select the general interests of the capitalist class amid the competition of special 
interests. Likewise, the state apparatus must be sufficient for the purpose of implementing and 
administering maintenance policies. Second, repressive mechanisms within the state apparatus 
must function simultaneously so as to filter out any non-capitalist policies which have not 
effectively been negated at the structurallevel.49 
What Offe is describing are general mechanisms that must be seen as operating 
transfactually and tendentially. In addition to the constraints established by countervailing 
44 Elmar Altvater (a derivationist) has discussed such needs in depth: 1973, "Notes on Some Problems of State 
Interventionism (I)" Kapitalstate No. 1. pp. 97-108; 1973, "Notes on Some Problems of State 
Interventionism (I)" Kapitalstate No.2, pp. 76-83. See also; B. Jessop, 1977, "Recent Theories of the 
Capitalist State" Cambridge Journal of Economics Vol. I, pp. 361-4. 
45 D. Harvey, 1996, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference Blackwell Publ., Cambridge Ma, p. 65. 
46 Ibid. 
47 H. Gulalp, 1987, "Capital Accumulation, Classes and the Relative Autonomy of the State" Science and 
Society Vol. 51, No. 20, p. 311. 
48 C. Offe, "Structural Problems of the Capitalist State: Class Rule and the Political System. On the 
Selectiveness of the Political System" In C. Beyme, (ed.), 1974, German Political Studies Vol. I, Sage 
Publications, Beverly Hills, pp. 39-40. 
49 C. Barrow, 1993, Critical Theories of the State p. 101. 
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social mechanisms and tendencies, these selective mechanisms will also fail at times 
because of internal contradictions and deficiencies. There will be crises of rationality 
(knowledge, coordination, deployment, etc.), and most especially there will be confusion as 
to the general, as opposed to particular, interests of capital. A crucial issue here will be the 
temporal question of the long, medium and short-term interests of capital. The upshot of 
this uncertainty and contestability is summed up by Jessop when he notes that the specific 
modes of intervention are "not unambiguously beneficial to capital".50 
In addition to these 'internal' constraints, the ability of the modem state has been 
greatly circumscribed through wider transformations (both internal and external) in the 
mode of accumulation - viz. the shift from Fordist to 'flexible' accumulation noted at the 
beginning of this chapter. Harvey discusses this effect: 
Arenas of conflict between the nation state and trans-national capital have, however, opened up, 
undermining the easy accomodation between big capital and big government so typical of the 
Fordist era. The state is now in a much more problematic position. It is called upon to regulate 
the activities of corporate capital in the national interest, to create a . good business climate' to 
act as an inducement to trans-national and global finance capital, and to deter (by means other 
than exchange-controls) capital flight to greener and more profitable pastures.51 
The potential power that business derives from this type of structural leverage is discussed 
later in this chapter. 
An additional point, is the observation that the maintenance function actually brings 
the state into conflict with private capital. For in addition to the fact that the general 
interests of capital, as articulated by the state, may be in conflict with the narrow interests of 
fractions of capital or individual capitalists, there is a general tension which arises out of the 
mutual existence of the dependency, maintenance and exclusion principles. For: 
[T]he ability to exercise these general interests through social policy requires that a certain 
amount of surplus value (taxes) be allocated for the maintenance of the state and state personnel. 
Taxes are an appropriation of value that is no longer available for capital investment or for 
private distribution as profits, interest, or rent. Consequently, on both fronts, individual 
capitalists confront the state as a source of constant annoyance that is parasitic, wasteful, and 
expropriative in its interventions. 52 
Such inherent contradictions53 lie at the heart of Offe's depiction of the state in advanced 
capitalist society. Discussion now turns to the fourth principle,legitimation, which stands in 
a complex antagonistic-yet-synergetic relation with the maintenance function. 
5.3.(iv) Legitimation 
The state has to manage the consent of the populace, whilst maintaining the consent of the vested 
economic powers. Sailing between the Charybdis of social unrest... and the Scylla of capital 
flight ... 54 
50 B. Jessop, "The Democratic State and the National Interests" In D. Coates and G. Johnston, (eds), 1983, 
Socialist Arguments Martin Robertson, Oxford, p. 91. 
51 D. Harvey, 1989, The Condition of Postmodernity.' An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, p.170. Also: S. Picciotto, and H. Radice, 1973, "Capital and State in the World 
Economy" Kapitalstate No. I, pp. 56-68; Holloway, 1. 1994, "Global Capital and the Nation State" Capital 
and Class No. 52, Spring, pp. 23-49. 
52 C. Barrow, 1993, Critical Theories of the State p. 102. For an in-depth discussion on this issue see; C. Offe, 
1973, "The Abolition of Market Control and the Problem of Legitimacy (1)" Kapitalstate No.1, pp. 109-16. 
53 Offe comprehends the notion of contradiction in a specific sense, where: "A contradiction is the tendency 
inherent within a specific mode of production to destroy those very preconditions on which its survival 
depends". 1984, Contradictions of the Welfare State Heinemann, London, p. 132. 
54 M. Williams, and G. Reuten, 1993, "The Political-Economic Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe: 
A Tragic Neglect of Civil Society" Working Paper Series 2/93 Graduate School of Business and Government 
Management, Victoria University of Wellington, p. 17. 
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The state's existence in a liberal capitalist democracy and its ability to pursue the 
maintenance function is dependent upon it reconciling that function with another crucial 
imperative: the need for legitimacy. Offe describes this dynamic: 
In parliamentary-democratic political regimes, any group or party can win control over 
institutional state power only to the extent that it wins sufficient electoral support in general 
elections. This mechanism plays a key role in disguising the fact that the material resources of 
state power, and the ways in which these are used, primarily depend upon the revenues derived 
from the accumulation process, and not upon the voting preferences of the general electorate. In 
other words there is a dual determination of the power of the capitalist state: the institutional 
form of this state is detennined through the rules of democratic and representative government, 
while the material content of state power is conditioned by the continuous requirements of the 
accumulation process.55 
There is here a structural disjuncture between the democratic jonn of the state and its 
capitalist functions. Of course the legitimatory imperative is not restricted to formal 
parliamentary-democratic modes of integration. The politics - democratic praxis - of 
advanced capitalist societies is characterised by fluid patterns of interest group activity (the 
undoubted insight and strength of pluralism). Networks of political influence are diverse 
and complex, fonnal and infonnal, ephemeral and relatively enduring. In response to 
political advocacy and struggle the state is forced to open itself to divergent interests, 
including non-capitalist interests, and it is obliged to make material concessions which may 
be immediately or partially subversive of capitalist accumulation. The dilemma here is that 
while such accommodation may well "constitute an inherent limit upon the ability of the 
state to facilitate capital accumulation", it is also a sine qua non of any successful system-
wide accumulation.56 It thus acts as a set of boundary conditions upon the economy. The 
attendant question that arises is just how much of a constraint upon accumulation is the 
legitimation imperative? Before I deal with that question, however, I would like to consider 
a critical observation of Offe's on the subject of legitimation. 
This is regarding the state's strategic response to the structural disjuncture between 
democratic fonn and economic function. There are two interconnected subsidiary. 
mechanisms at work: First of all, the state deploys concealment mechanisms that enable the 
"adoption and implementation of maintenance policies outside the sphere of class struggle 
and special interest".51 Administrative secrecy is an example of this fonn; And secondly, 
the state mobilises ideological mechanisms in order to "convey the image of an organisation 
of power that pursues the common and general interests of society as a whole, allows equal 
access to power and is responsive to justified demands" [myemphasis).58 
The historical importance of the legitimatory function is given its fullest treatment in 
the crisis element of systems analysis - in particular, here, the notion of legitimation crisis.59 
In general terms, the theory forecast that advanced capitalist states would respond to 
widespread crises of accumulation (i.e. declining profitability) by undertaking extensive 
55 C. Offe, 1984, Contradictions of the Welfare State Heinemann, London, p. 1 
56 C. Barrow, 1993, Critical Theories of the State p. 91. On this particular dilemma see; 1. Hirsch, "The State 
Apparatus and Social Reproduction: Elements of a Theory of the Bourgeois State" In, 1. Holloway, and S. 
Picciotto, (eds), 1978, State and Capital.' A Marxist Debate Edward Arnold, London, pp. 57-107, specifically 
here p. 100. 
51 C. Barrow, 1993, Critical Theories of the State p. 101. 
58 C. Offe, In L. Lindberg, (ed.), 1975, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism DC Heath and Co., 
London, p. 127. 
59 Cf. 1. Habennas, 1975, Legitimation Crisis Beacon Press, Boston. 
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agendas of structural adjustment aimed at retrenching the welfare state. Such programs 
would seek on the one hand to capitalise, or commodify, social expenses (ie. opening up a 
greater portion of social life to profitable accumulation), and on the other hand to reduce the 
fiscal burden that the state poses to private capital.6O Offe and Habermas predicted such a 
roll-back of the welfare state would stimulate widespread opposition, particularly in the 
form of radicalised new social movements, thus constituting a general and acute crisis of 
popular support - a legitimation crisis. However, this prognosis is now seen as totally 
overblown on the evidence of the actual nea-liberal reform programs of the 1980s and 
1990s. While these programs did indeed stimulate widespread opposition in many 
countries, they did not create the kind of fundamentally destabilising crisis conditions 
predicted by systems analysis.61 
This evidence provokes two important correctives. The first of these is recourse to 
the realist methodology. Offe's principles are, as I have forcefully stated already, to be 
conceived as transfactual mechanisms. Furthennore, the totalising or holistic characteristics 
of the systems-analysts' models - those elements which generate strong predictions -
cannot hold under realist tenns. Despite these constraints, the principles do hold potential 
explanatory value, but such insights will only accrue if these abstract principles are more 
fully worked out on the basis of empirical investigation. Hence, the second corrective is a 
modified understanding of legitimation. It was noted in the previous footnote that systems 
analysts overemphasised the link between nonnative loyalty to the state and tangible 
resource allocations. This factor is accounted for in part by Williams and Reuten where they 
highlight that "the bourgeois state is grounded first in its positing of right as law, and second 
in its legitimation by the will of the subjects".62 They expand on this later: 
In addition to the specification of the content of negative Right through the framework of law, 
the legitimation of the bourgeois state requires a further positive specification of these rights -
grounded in welfare policy and the institutions of civil society. This distinction is manifest in 
that between pure bourgeois equal opportunity for all to compete for all scarce use-values 
(including education, health care. housing etc.). on the one hand, and equal rights to concrete 
material and social well-being, on the other - fonnal equality of process confronts concrete 
equity of outcome.63 
This dual specification of Right - and hence legitimacy (for legitimacy can be equated with 
'rightfulness') - offers a convincing (albeit partial) explanation as to why a legitimation 
crisis has not arisen despite the fiscal austerity measures of recent neo-liberal reforms. For 
neo-liberal refonners have complemented their attack upon positive rights with a greater 
60 The neo-liberal agendas seek to restore the delicate balance between accumulation and legitimation by 
converting unproductive social expenses to productive social capital. J. O·Connor. 1973. The Fiscal Crisis of 
the State St. Martin·s Press, New York. p. 221. 
61 Clyde Barrow suggests four broad reasons for this: First, the neo-liberal reforms have been relatively 
successful in their aims of capitalising and rational ising social expenses; Secondly. many of the production 
costs which were socialised in Western nations following WWII, were motivated by political reasons rather 
than because of any functional need to subsidise capital accumulation; Thirdly, because systems analysts 
overemphasised the link between normative loyalty to the state and tangible resource allocations. Most 
notably, "crisis theory failed dramatically in not being able to anticipate the way that neoconservatives have 
redefined the rules of legitimacy by invoking symbolic myths that explicitly discount the state's 
responsibility for economic growth. individual well-being, and distributive justice"; And fourthly, that such a 
prediction of crisis necessarily presupposes the existence of a closed-system. C. Barrow, 1993, Critical 
Theories of the State pp. 121-2. 
62 M. Williams. and G. Reuten, 1993, ''The Political-Economic Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe: 
A Tragic Neglect of Civil Society" p. 10. 
63 Ibid, p. 16. 
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ideological emphasis upon negative right (the liberal equation of bourgeois equuality), and 
by the strategy described by Barrow above, of discounting the state's responsibility for 
economic growth, individual well-being, and distributive justice.64 
While I reject the strong crisis component of systems analysis (so that legitimation 
crises may rather than will happen at particular conjunctures), the process of legitimation is 
still considered to be a crucial functional dynamic affecting state action. This process will 
operate complexly - incorporating the wider understanding of legitimacy and dual 
specification of Right - and like the other mechanisms it will, in all likelihood, be of varied 
and sometimes contradictory effect across the matrix of historical state forms and functions. 
5.3.(v) Reconciling the Principles: Contradiction, Crisis, and Contingency 
While I have sought to modify elements of Offe's framework, the core dynamics remain. It 
is critical to acknowledge that none of these principles pre-exist the other, for as I suggested 
earlier they stand as a complex of synergetic-yet-antagonistic mechanisms and tendencies, 
mutually reinforcing yet also internally and externally contradictory, and constantly 
transforming. But throughout this complex there is a strong sense of the primacy of 
accumulation and the political power that necessarily accrues from ownership and control of 
commodity production. 
This is also a model that recognises the contingency of social relations, which 
incorporates, as Jessop puts it, "economic determination without determinism".65 Thus, for 
example, it is possible to see the political agenda is limited in so far as certain issues are 
viewed as peripheral or beyond the sphere of state action. There exists a set of 
"institutionalised 'selection rules' that filter out the more radical demands" of reformist 
interests and fundamentally shape the nature of policy discussion,66 - where those seeking 
social change accommodate their proposals to the limits of adaptability of the prevailing 
business order.67 Strategies are formed with the tacit recognition that there exist structural. 
limitations and that the rules of the game are overwhelmingly influenced by the exigencies 
of capital accumulation. 
These principles are utilised in my analysis of the two case studies of environmental 
conflict in tWo broad ways: First, through direct application, where I endeavour to identify 
how these dynamics operate historically. Because they are held to operate transfactually it 
may be necessary to infer their exercise. This will warrant supplementary discussion about 
the economic and political circumstances that surround the individual conflicts; Secondly, 
these structural principles will be of indirect value in that they underpin the more specific, 
and hopefully empirically fertile, mechanisms posited in the next section. For example, the 
function of property rights can be grounded in both the fundamental exigencies of 
commodity circulation and in the maintenance function of the state. 
'. 64 David Harvey covers this ground in his penetrating study of the economic and cultural transfonnation -
including the attendant nonnative/ideological shift - from 'Fordist' to 'flexible' modes of accumulation. 
1989. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change Basil Blackwell. 
Oxford. Ch's 9 and 10. 
65 B. Jessop. 1990. State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their Place Polity Press. Cambridge, p. 81. 
66B. Head. 1984, "Recent Theories" p. 41. 
67C. Lindblom. 1977, Politics and Markets p. 210. 
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5.4. Mechanisms of Business Dominance 
In general, when one looks at the current conditions and trends in environmental politics, one 
sees evidence for a systematic imbalance of power between industry and environmentalists - one 
that is likely to continue and perhaps even worsen. Environmental groups have all the 
disadvantages in political and economic power that afflict most public interests groups. 
Typically, they have limited staff, little money, and face an uphill battle to organise citizens 
around issues whose impacts are so diffuse. In contrast, industry organisations are well staffed, 
amply funded, and have a direct financial interests in these issues.68 
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In this passage, Amy is drawing attention to structures of business domination within the 
realm of environmental conflict. Mechanisms - in this case, unequal resources and modes 
of collective action - function to systematically privilege business interests relative to those 
of environmentalists, In this final section I focus upon a series of such causal mechanisms, 
including those noted by Amy, They are; (i) the ability of business to exert sanctions upon 
society, (ii) the privileging of private property rights, (iii) disparate resources, (iv) the ability 
to define the tenns of discourse, and, (v) modes of collective action. These mechanisms are 
both causes and manifestations of business power. Needless to say, this is not an exhaustive 
list and there will be other sources of domination. I have chosen these particular forms 
because they have been either singularly or conjointly identified as significant causal 
features within the existing literature on environmental conflict (see 1.4.). Each mechanism 
is at once vertically embedded within the wider structural dynamics theorised in the 
previous section, and laterally connected with some, if not all, of the other mechanisms. 
What follows is an argument about structural advantage. 
5.4.(i)The Business Sanction 
Central to the argument in the previous section was the recognition, first, that society is 
dependent upon resources created in the process of accumulation, and secondly, that the task 
of organising this process is almost exclusively the domain of the private capitalist. 
Capitalists thus inhabit a crucial structural position. The economic security of everybody 
rests in their hands, and in this regard they can be said to perfonn "public functions".69 This 
structural role, and the state's attendant relation (described by the exclusion, dependency 
and maintenance imperatives), underpin a crucial mechanism of business power - the ability 
of business to inflict punishment upon society when business interests are threatened. 
The business sanction is the strategic leverage that fractions of capital derive from the 
potential cessation, translocation, reduction, or even withholding of future investment and 
production, within a given geo-historical context. This mechanism operates on a continuum 
from overt and deliberate action to subconscious structures of in-action or constraint. Like 
military power, the business sanction is premised upon the Willingness and capacity of 
capitalists to act when their interests are threatened. There has, of course, to be a real 
possibility that sanctions will be applied. But while business power ultimately flows from 
this possibility, its strategic articulation may take the form of direct threats of action such as, 
68 D. Amy, 1987, The Politics of Environmental Mediation Columbia University Press, New York. p. 205. 
69C. Lindblom, ICJ77. Politics and Markets p. 172. Also: C. Lindblom. 1982, ''The Market as Prison" Journal of 
Politics Vol.44, p. 327. 
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for example, "plant shutdowns, disinvestment or capital strikes".7o One particular form of 
threat commonly deployed by business in environmental conflict is that of 'job blackmail' , 
whereby businesses 'warn' communities of the job losses that would potentially ensue if the 
demands or interests of environmentalists were to be met thus establishing unwanted costs 
for capital.71 However, in many instances this mechanism will operate in a more subtle 
manner. Businesses will ..... predict, not threaten, that adverse consequences will follow a 
refusal of their demands".72 Finally, the mechanism of business sanctions may function 
independently of conspiracy or intention.73 Lindblom describes this process: 
[A]cross the entire array of institutional changes that businessmen themselves do not like, an 
automatic punishing recoil works to repress change. In that broad category, change - and often 
even the threat of change - adversely affects performance, hence adversely affects employment. 
Anticipations of change are enough to trigger unemployment 74 
At all levels and modes of operation this 'punishing recoil' is dependent upon a crucial 
understanding, namely, the predisposition of both public officials and many private citizens 
to the needs of capital.75 These are the same assumptions that undergird the day-to-day 
functioning of the maintenance dynamic - a consensus between business and government 
about the needs of accumulation.76 Lindblom calls these: 
ff]he grand issues of politico-economic organisation: private enterprise, a high degree of 
corporate autonomy, protection of the status quo on the distribution of income and wealth, close 
consultation between business and government, and restrictions of union demands [and other 
interest groups considered a threat] to those consistent with business profitability .... 77 
Elsewhere he refers to an "unspoken deference of administrators, legislatures and the courts 
to the needs of business".78 The upshot of this is that, subject to such pervasive constraints, 
the scope of any environmental initiative may be severely limited if the program is 
considered to pose a potential threat to the conditions of accumulation.79 
Spatial considerations are very important here. Business sanctions occur in response 
to various levels of threat (system-wide or particular), and they function through the spatial 
7Or. Schrecker, 1990, "Resisting Environmental Regulation: The Cryptic Pattern of Business-Government 
Relations" in R. Paehike and D. Torgerson (eds), Managing Leviathan Broadview Press, Ontario, p. 168. 
71 An in-depth investigation of this phenomenon is contained in R. Kazis and R. Grossman, 1982, Fear at Work: 
Job Blaclanail, Labour and the Environment Pilgrim Press, New York. Schrecker also provides examples of 
this mechanism, 1990, "Resisting Environmental Regulation" pp. 168-9. 
72 C. Lindblom, 1m, Politics and Markets p. 185. 
73 C. Lindblom, 1982, "The Market as Prison" p. 326. 
74 Ibid, p. 328. 
75 C. Stone, 1980, "Systemic Power in Community Decision Making" American Political Science Review Vol. 
74, No.4, p. 984. 
76 The development of this consensus can be seen to follow from the constant feedback from business about 
their needs, some of which is through explicit advocacy such as that of business organisations, but much of 
which is through the 'recoil' itself. Brian Roper observed this process in the New Zealand context: "For 
business managers do not merely register a vote of confidence in or dissatisfaction with the government once 
every three years: they are daily making decisions as to whether or not their companies should invest in the 
productive base of the New Zealand economy, decisions which ultimately determine the general rate of 
productivity, output and employment growth". 1990, "The Policy Making of Business Organisations: From 
Keynsianism to Neoclassicism" Paper presented to the New Zealand Political Studies Association Annual 
Conference, University of Otago, Dunedin, pp. 9-10. The most in-depth investigation of this relationship in 
recent times is Roper's PhD thesis: 1990. "The Dynamics of Capital in Crisis: A Critical Analysis of New 
Zealand's capitalist Class, from 1974 to 1987" PhD Thesis, Griffith University, Brisbane. 
TIc. Lindblom, 1m, Politics and Markets p. 205. 
78 Ibid, p. 179. 
79 Nole that environmental initiatives will not necessarily pose such a threat, indeed they may at times facilitate 
further accumulation, or more complexly (as shall be observed in the second case study) they may do both 
simultaneously. 
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transfer of capital across varying geographical scales (local, national, global). Indeed, the 
business sanction is particularly effective in environmental conflict because of, on the one 
hand, the relative mobility of capital8o, and on the other hand, the absolute immobility of 
ecosystems and limited mobility of human communities.sl This is especially the case where 
tactics such as 'job blackmail' stimulate internecine conflict between members of local 
communities - where jobs and environmental quality are sold as a zero-sum trade-off. 82 
Lastly, following Blowers (whose work I referred to early on in 1.2.(iii», I would 
like to note that it is expected that the strategic power of business (sanctions etc.) will 
fluctuate over time due to the relative strength of the economy. When the wider economy is 
strong with high levels of wealth creation and employment, then the potential influence to 
be gained through the exercise of individual sanctions will in all likelihood be 10wer.83 
In summary, the business sanction is seen as a crucial source of influence, and it is 
indubitably the case that unlike business, the dissatisfactions of other groups in society "do 
80 The power that business derives from its mobility - especially the power that transnational capital holds over 
individual nation states - has been of great interests to academics. Cf. D. Andrews, 1994, "Capital Mobility 
and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International Monetary Relations" International Studies 
Quarterly Vol. 38, pp. 193-218; S. Picciotto, and H. Radice, 1973, "Capital and State in the World 
Economy" Kapitalstate No. I, pp. 56-68; Holloway, J. 1994, "Global Capital and the Nation State" Capital 
and Class No. 52, Spring, pp. Z3-49. 
81 Ted Schrrecker has made a similar point 1990. "Resisting Environmental Regulation: The Cryptic Pattem of 
Business-Government Relations" in R. Paehlke and D. Torgerson (eds), Managing Leviathan Broadview 
Press, Ontario, p. 186. 
S2 The causal efficacy of the business sanction has, however, been questioned by neo-classical pluralists such as 
Vogel in the context of a general critique of the 'structuralist' elements of neo-pluralism. It is appropriate to 
deal (albeit briefly) with these criticisms here. Vogel has put forward the following arguments: That capital 
strikes hurt business in much the same way that labour strikes hurt labour; That not all capital is mobile; That 
governments/states are not necessarily adverse to policies or decisions which increase unemployment; And 
that it is wrong to reify business - the government may have to provide inducements to capital in general, but 
not to any particular fraction of capital. (D. Vogel, 1987, "Political Science and the Study of Corporate 
Power: A Dissent from the New Conventional Wisdom" British Journal of Political Science Vol. 17, pp. 
393-5. See also: 1987, "The New Political Science of Corporate Power" The Public Interest No. 87, pp. 63-
79; 1983, "The Power of Business in America: A Reappraisal" British Journal of Political Science Vol. XIII, 
pp. 19-43.) My rejoinder to Vogel's argument is as follows: First, that tactics such as capital strikes will 
indeed incur some costs to business (this will vary). However, like labour strikes such short term losses are 
strategically necessary for long term gain; Secondly, that while not all capital is equally mobile, it is, rather, 
an issue of relative mobility and liquidity. I grant, however, that Vogel's caveat is an important one in 
individual cases. I would add here that with regard to the less liquid forms of investment - say, for example, 
a large manufacturing plant that must be located near to some strategic resource - business threats may be 
more credible in the planning stages (although not necessarily so, consider for example the ongoing leverage 
exercised by Comalco in bargaining with the New Zealand Government over electricity supplies to its Bluff 
aluminium smelter (See N. Peat, 1994, Manapouri Saved! New Zealand's First Great Conservation Success 
Story: Integrating nature conservation with hydro-electric development of lAkes Manapouri and Te Anau, 
Fiordland National Park Longacre Press, Dunedin.); Thirdly, that while it is true that New-Right 
governments have placed less emphasis upon the employment effects of policies and decisions, the business 
sanction involves the withholding of wealth creating investment - a matter of universal interest to such 
administrations. Furthermore, many environmental conflicts are played out at the level of local or regional 
politics where questions of employment are nearly always of considerable interest and consequence; And 
finally, while the state may at times discriminate against individual fractions of capital, the argument here is a 
tendential one. 
83 A. Blowers, 1983, "Master of Fate or Victim of Circumstance - The Exercise of Corporate Power in 
Environmental Policy-Making" Policy and Politics Vol. II, No.4, pp. 393-415; 1984, Something in the Air: 
Corporate Powers and the Environment Harper and Row, London; Blowers, A. and Pepper, D. (eds), 1987, 
Nuclear Power in Crisis: Politics and Planning for the Nuclear State Nichols Publishing Co., New York, pp. 
1-35. An extensive empirical study with similar conclusions is; M. Hill, S. Aaronovitch, and D. Baldock, 
1989, "Non-decision Making in Pollution Control in Britain: Nitrate Pollution, the EEC Drinking Water 
Directive and Agriculture" Policy and Politics Vol. 17, No.3. 
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not result in disincentives and reduced performance that impose a broad, severe and obvious 
penalty throughout society".1W 
S.4.(ii) The Double Privilege of Private Property Ownership 
The concept of property is a protean one, encompassing a multitude of historical forms and 
possibilities.85 To speak of property in anything but the most inchoate and abstract terms 
(ie. "as a system of rules governing access to and contr?1 of resources"86) is to refer to a type 
of social relation which is the result of historically specific and contingent forces. Hence my 
concern here is with the system of rules that is private property within advanced capitalist 
society. I argue below that this particular form of property regime confers a double strategic 
privilege upon its owners (and thus capitalists who are by definition accumulators of private 
wealth) through, on the one hand, the internal logic of the private right,S? and on the other 
hand, the external structural political-economic bias which creates, sustains and legitimates 
this type of property rule. I deal with these aspects in turn 
The most basic precept underpinning a system of private property is that each 
resource belongs to some individual. Jeremy Waldron (a liberal theorist) describes the 
concomitant notions of private property and ownership as thus: 
In a private property system, a rule is laid down that, in the case of each object, the individual name that 
is attached to that object is to detennine how that object shall be used and by whom. His decision is to 
be upheld by the society as fmal. When something like the idea of a name/object correlation is used in 
this way as a basis for solving the problem of allocation, we may describe each such correlation as 
expressing the idea of ownership or belonging.88 
And in later discussion he adds: "The owner of an object is the person who has been put in 
that privileged position" [my emphasis].89 This description is, of course, an ideal typical 
one. Any historical example of private ownership will express a sui generis bundle of 
rights, powers, liberties and duties. Nevertheless, it reveals the essence of private property. 
At its heart there is a privileged relation of power (power2) over the resource itself, and over 
the rest of society. In the context of environmental conflict this constitutes both a social and 
a socio-ecological privilege.9O 
The second aspect is the system-wide privileging of this nuclear form. It is a truism 
that all forms of property are political.91 Take C.B. Macpherson's observation that "what 
distinguishes property from mere momentary possession is that property is a claim that will 
be enforced by society or the state, by custom or convention or law".92 The enforcement 
element necessarily implies some potential exercise of authority - the political. But this 
84 C. Lindblom, 1982, ''The Market as Prison" p. 328. 
85 For as Marx rightly observed: "In each historical epoch property has developed differently and under a set of 
entirely different social relations". In D. Harvey, 1982, The Limits 10 Capital p. 353 
86 1. Waldron, 1988, The Righi to Private Property Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 31. 
87 Note here that I will not seek to avoid the liberal discourse of rights. I am not so much considering the 
legitimating philosophies of private property, rather my concern lies with the substantive socio-ecological 
implications of this form. 
88 1. Waldron, 1988, The Right to Private Property p. 39. 
89 Ibid, p. 47. 
90 It is conceivable that there may be incorporeal forms of private property that will not apply to portions of the 
physical environment 
91 Certainly from Rousseau onwards. 
92 C. Macpherson, (ed.), 1978, Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions University of Toronto Press, 
Toronto, p. 3. 
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does not in itself establish or explain the normative connection that exists between the state 
and the specific form private property in advanced capitalist society. The essence of this 
particular connection lies, at least in the first instance, with the fulcrum and mainspring of 
capitalism - commodity relations. The possibility of commodity production and exchange 
requires ownership. As Lindblom notes, "property is one of the foundations of market 
exchange, since people cannot exchange assets or money for assets or services if they do not 
'own' the assets and money".93 Capitalism is a system where individuals acquire, 
transform, exploit, and alienate, their own private property. 
Production and exchange in the market economy thus require the operation of a 
particular property rule.94 A strong private property regime is the sine qua non for capital 
accumulation, and involves the legal entrenchment, ideological support, and physical 
protection of private property rights.95 Such seemingly impregnable rights have important 
ramifications for environmental disputes such as those investigated in the following studies. 
Indeed, as Knetsch notes, resource disputes can be seen to be "about the extent to which a 
right is protected or accorded preference over another entitlement."96 Consequently, to 
acknowledge the existence of a structural bias which favours private property rights over 
other forms of property or non-property relations is to recognise that environmental 
advocates will be disadvantaged when they challenge the rights of business to degrade, 
destroy, or otherwise misuse, and exclude others from use of natural resources in their 
private ownership; "to use or dispose of their property as they see fit".97 Or alternatively, to 
question the export of negative environmental 'externalities' from the productive activities 
of business into surrounding environments not held under private ownership. 
The spatial dimension of private property is worthy of note. In the earlier section on 
commodification, I referred to Harvey's observation that such a process was predicated 
upon the atomistic "Cartesian-Newtonian-Lockeian and in some respects 'anti-ecological' 
ontology".98 This point is relevant here also. Most particularly, with property rights ove~ 
land there is always the question of boundedness - the imposition of fixed borders around 
discrete portions of the globe, which, more often than not, have no regard for the form and 
function of open, and highly integrated, natural systems. Another issue of space and the 
attribution of rights, is that of the multiple-valuations/uses which apply to the environment. 
93 C. Lindblom, lrrl7, Politics and Markets p. 164. 
94 T. Schrecker, 1990, "Resisting Environmental Regulation" p. 186. 
95 P. Cerny, 1990, The Chnnging Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency, and the Future of the State Sage 
Publications, London, p. SO. It is important to make the linkage here with the maintenance function 
discussed above. The state's function in establishing and protecting (including legitimating) private property 
rights is one of the most direct connections that it has with capitalist economic relations. The significance of 
this function cannot be understated. For example, in the context of environmental conflict Peter Victor notes: 
"Some adopt the position that the state is so intimately involved with the interests of private property that it 
cannot be relied upon to protect the environment if such protection is incompatible with the interests of 
private property". in W. Leiss (ed.), 1979, Ecology Versus Politics in Canada Univesity of Toronto Press, 
Toronto, p. 48. 
96 J. Knetsch, 1983, Property Rights and Compensation: Compulsory Aquisition and Other Losses Butterworths, 
Canada, p. 2. See also: G. Calebresi and A. Melamed, 1972, "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral" Harvard Law Review Vol. 85, No.6, pp. 1089-1128. 
97 R. Benjamin and S. Elkin (eds), 1985, The Democratic State University Press of Kansas, Kansas, p. 38. Once 
again, this is a tendential connection, as it is entirely feasible that there will be instances where 
environmental advocates hold private rights over areas threatened by external forces. 
98 D. Harvey, 1996, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference p. 153. 
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The private property rights that protect business interests over these 'discrete portions' serve 
to protect some monopoly uses or values (ultimately exchange-value) at the expense of other 
potential values (a tension which underpins much environmental conflict). There are, of 
course, innumerable mechanisms devoted to mitigating this tension (eg. planning rules and 
resource laws which do attenuate the freedoms of owners). But in a system that 
substantively privileges the private rights of capital, there will always be a bias that excludes 
alternative non-commodified uses and values.99 
Finally, the above definition of the private property right centred upon the 
association and location of the right with an individual person. This begs the question as to 
how the property of business can be considered private property when more than one person 
is involved. Macpherson deals with this specific issue: 
In the case of private property the right may, of course, be held by an artificial person, that is, by 
a corporation or unincorporated grouping created or recognised by the state as having the same 
(or similar) property rights as a natural individual. The property which such a group has is the 
right to the use and benefit, and the right to exclude non-members from tIie use and benefit, of 
the things to which the group has a legal title. Corporate property is an extension of individual 
private property.loo 
This is a very important factor when considering the property holdings of business within 
the following studies. I now tum to the issue of resources. 
5.4.(ili) The Unequal Distribution of Resources 
Freedom remains a hollow abstraction unless it is accompanied by the material capacity to 
exercise free choice.101 
The generic definition of powerl was earlier equated with the transformative capacity 
inherent in action. Such a capacity, whether intrinsic or extrinsic to the individual, is 
predicated upon the existence of resources. It is thus possible to sunnise that resources, 
their forms and distributions, lie at the heart of most, if not all, power relations, and, ergo, 
that a relation of dominance is most often a relation of unequal resources (either qualitative 
and/or quantitative).l02 In the case of actual social relations, however, the question of 
resources will be complex, and there will be other causal mechanisms at play. The issue 
here is therefore what form of resource advantage business takes into environmental 
conflict. Most particularly, what type of resource advantage specifically accrues as a 
function of the ownership and control of the means of production in advanced capitalist 
society. 
Charles Lindblom's discussion of the strategic resources of business is accurate here: 
No other group of citizens can compare with businessmen, even roughly, in effectiveness in the 
polyarchal process. How so? Because, unlike any other group of citizens, they can draw on the 
resources they command as 'public officials' to support their activities in polyarchal politics. 
And later; 
All citizen groups compete in politics with the use of their members' own incomes and energies. 
Except for businessmen. They enjoy a triple advantage: extraordinary sources of funds, 
organisations at the ready, and special access to government 103 
99 Control of access is an extremely important issue here. 
100 C. Macpherson, (ed.), 1978, Property p. 5. 
101 N. Low, 1991, Plannillg, Politics and the State: Political Foundations of Planning Thought Unwin-Hyman, 
London, p. 6 . 
102 Anthony Giddens makes this point when he notes that resources function as the "media through which power 
is exercised, and structures of domination reproduced". 1979, Central Problems in Social Theory Macmillan, 
London, p. 91. 
103 C. Lindblom, 1977, Politics and Markets pp. 193-4. 
Chapter Five: Business, State and Environment 97 
I will deal with these three advantages in turn. 
First, that businesses possess superior financial resources seems obvious. The 
primary concern of business is the accumulation of wealth. The strategic value of these 
financial resources cannot be overstated, for they can be readily and effectively mobilised 
toward political goals. For example, corporate resources are directed towards the funding of 
political campaigns, to "lobbying and other forms of communication with governmental 
officials, to political and institutional advertising in the mass media, to educational material 
... and to litigation designed to influence government policy or its enforcement". 104 This is 
in stark contrast with the financial resources available to environmental groups who do not 
accumulate wealth as a primary goal - as an end in itself. For these groups the procurement 
of financial resources is purely to provide the organisation with the means to advocate for 
environmental values. As such, they are, on the whole, dependent upon the voluntary 
financial contributions of their individual members to fund themselves in the pursuit of this 
goal,lOS 
Secondly, the extant organisational resources of the business unit are of great 
importance as a political resource: 
Citizens can organise themselves if they are willing to pay the price in time, energy, and money. 
But the corporation is already there as an organisation. Organised for other purposes, it is at 
hand, ready to be used by its executives for political activity ranging from discussions with civil 
servants to financial support of political parties. Its personnel are available. Political action does 
not require the tedious or frenzied energies of organisers. And the political workers in a 
corporation are not volunteers of dubious reliability but paid employees.106 
In the previous footnote I referred to the Steel et al. study of lobby groups in US forest 
politics. What that study fails to reveal, however, is that each separate business enterprise is 
able to act as an interest group, whereas individual citizens typically cannot do so. 107 
Thirdly, as Schrecker observes in his analysis of environmental conflict, the resources 
of business "are not just quantitatively superior to those of other parties to environmental 
conflicts, they are qualitatively. superior as well".108 The most notable qualitative distinction. 
is the ease of access to key decision-making arenas available to business (this means of 
influence derives not only from the material resources of business for advocacy, but also 
from the strategic relationship outlined in 5.3.(iii». Indeed: 
Because of their privileged position in government and politics, they are already known to 
government officials, already attentively listened to, already engaged in negotiation. When they 
104 Ibid, p. 194. 
105 The Steel, Pierce and. Lovrich study of political struggles over forest policy in the Pacific Northwest (USA) 
is relevant here. The study examined the resources available to environmental' (n=126), passive recreation 
(n=28), intensive recreation (n=142) and industry-support (n=32), groups and correlated this with the types of 
strategies U'led They found that the environmental groups surveyed had a mean budget of $374,000 as 
opposed to $924,000 for industry groups. The sources of income also differed greatly, with environmental 
groups on average 57 per cent dependent upon membership dues, compared to 35 per cent for industry 
groups. B. Steel, J. Pierce, and N. Lovrich, 1996, "Resources and Strategies of Interest Groups aIid Industry 
Representatives Involved in Federal Forest Policy" The Social Science Journal Vol. 33, No.4, pp. 409-10. I 
would qualify this, however, by noting that these figures do not take into account the potential strategic 
resources available to these groups - with business groups having access to huge reserves when needed In 
the New Zealand context, the annual reports of the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society (the second 
largest environmental organisation after Greenpeace) reveal a much higher dependency upon individual 
subscriptions and contributions (78 per cent in 1988 - during the period of the following studies). Royal 
Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc., 1988, Annual Report Forest and Bird, Wellington, p. 
10. 
106 C. Lindblom, IfJ77, Politics and Markets p. 196. 
107 Ibid, p. 197. 
108 T. Schrecker, 1990, "Resisting Environmental Regulation" p. 186. 
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reappear in the role of ordinary citizens engaging in polyarchal politics. neither they nor 
government officials will ordinarily note the difference. They will enjoy all the advantage of 
their privileged role. an advantage not available to their citizen competitors in interest-group 
activity. 109 
98 
These avenues of communication and influence are also underpinned by the consanguinity 
of business and government elites, whether in terms of social class, education, or ideological 
disposition. This connection has in recent decades, been exacerbated by 'revolving door' 
employment practices, seeing a higher degree of mobility between the public and private 
sectors, and by a blurring of the institutional boundaries between the two (eg. state owned 
enterprises). 
It must be acknowledged however (in the New Zealand context), that 
environmentalists have in recent decades gained access to policy arenas, and that the 
influence of some key environmentalists/environmental groups has been significant. 110 But 
this episodic and compartmentalised influence has by no means been comparable to the day-
to-day influence of business across the whole spectrum of state activity. 
The resource issues discussed here are connected with all of the mechanisms posited 
in this section - there is a catch-all element here. Nevertheless the investigation of business 
resources vis-a-vis the resources of environmental and other groups in resource conflict, will 
be a crucial element of analysis in the following studies. Finally, much of the above 
discussion about business is framed in the context of corporate capital, and it must be 
acknowledged here that petit-bourgeois fonns of enterprise will not necessarily, or even in 
any likelihood, have recourse to these advantages. 
5.4.(iv) The Power to Define Reality and the Distortion of Communicative Processes 
Offe has stated that business is able to "define reality". It is useful to take this statement in 
context: 
Capitalists and conservative political elites 'ex.aggerate' the harm imposed upon them by welfare 
state arrangements. To be sure, in the political game they have good tactical reasons to make the 
welfare state burden appear more intolerable than it 'really' is. The question boils down then to 
what we mean by - and how we measure - 'reality' in this context In answering this question. 
we will have to keep in mind that the power position of private investors includes the power to 
define reality. That is to say, whatever they consider an intolerable burden in fact is an 
intolerable burden which will in fact lead to a declining propensity to invest. at least as long as 
they can expect to effectively reduce welfare-state-related costs by applying such economic 
sanctions. The debate about whether or not the welfare state is 'really' squeezing profits is thus 
purely academic because investors are in a position to create the reality - and the effects - of 
'profit squeeze' .111 
While Offe is immediately concerned with capital's response to the welfare state, the 
mechanism at work here is equally relevant to the environmental domain. For example, in 
discussing the phenomenon of job blackmail, Schrecker notes that: "realism in this context 
is ... defined in terms of the realities of the company president".112 By this he means that 
business is able to establish the terms of discourse - in this case that environmental 
regulation will result in job losses, not because of any necessarily consequent critical decline 
109 C. Lindblom, 1977. Politics and Markets p. 197. 
110 For example, within the process of the reform of environmental administration and legislation throughout the 
1980s and early 1990s. See: T. BUhrs. and R. Bartlelt, 1993, Environmental Policy in New Zealand: The 
Politics of Clean and Green? Oxford University Press. Auckland, Chapters 5 and 6; P. Ali Memon. 1993, 
Keeping New Zealand Green: Recent Environmental Reforms University of Otago Press, Dunedin. 
111C. Offe. 1984. Contradictions of the Welfare State Heinemann. London. pp. 150-1. 
112 T. Schrecker. 1990, "Resisting Environmental Regulation" p. 186. 
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in profitability (objective function), but because the company president has said it will be so 
(on the basis of wider strategic interests). 
This particular mechanism is, however, dependent upon the ability of business to 
actively create the outcome it has foretold. But the power of business to control the mode 
and content of discourse is not solely dependent upon this praxiological capacity, business is 
also able to systematically distort the communicative process per se. 
Each of the structural mechanisms discussed in this section, in the previous section, 
and in the earlier disquisition on value-form, can be seen to affect the discourses of 
environmental conflict in one way or another (ie. the dominant language of monetised 
values l13 , the suppression or promotion of a specific discourse, and the establishment of 
boundaries upon discourse). Attention must be given to this in analysing the case studies. 
But I want to supplement those elements here by concentrating upon the ways that business 
actively controls the content of discourse - viz. its ability to withhold, distort and 
disseminate information - for these factors are also fundamental in establishing the 'reality' 
of a particular discourse. John Forester summarises here: "By informing or mis-informing 
citizens. power works through the management of comprehension or obfuscation; of trust or 
false assurance; of consent. or manipulated agreement; and of knowledge, or 
misrepresentation ... ".114 Once again. the exercise of such power is both conscious and 
unconscious, ad hoc and systematic. 
However, while neither volition nor conspiracy are necessary prerequisites for the 
exercise of such widespread influence. corporate enterprises have gone to remarkable 
lengths to deliberately control environmental discourse. Sharon Beder has investigated what 
she labels the "new corporate activism" - the utilisation of sophisticated political strategies 
and techniques by business organisations in a systema~ic. pro-active and sustained attempt to 
combat environmentalism.11s In Table 5.1. I list some strategies noted by Beder that may be 
used by business in New Zealand, and to provide the kind of concrete examples that may be 
evident in the following studies: 
Table 5.1. Strategies of Corporate Activism 
(i) The use of punitive lawsuits to deter environmental advocacy 
This has become a widespread stratagem throughout western democracies. Like other business 
tactics the threat of litigation has proven an effective deterrent (consider the issue of costs in the Fast 
Ferries case discussed in Chapter One).116 
(ii) Conservative think tanks.l 17 
Think Tanks have played a fundamental part in the ascendancy of New-Right politics. The 
environment has not escaped the attention of these well resourced institutions. Take, for example, 
the recent publication Conservation Strategies for New Zealand by Professor Peter Hartley, then 
Director of the Tasman Institute - an Australian right wing think: tank - for the New Zealand 
113 Money as the language of social power as well as form of social power. D. Harvey, 1996, Justice, Nature 
and the Geography of Difference p. 151. 
1141. Forester, 1989, Planning in the Face of Power University of California Press, Berkeley, p. 45. 
115 S. Beder, 1997, Global Spin: The Corporate Assault on the Environment Scribe Publications, Melbourne, p. 
21. 
116 Ibid., Ch. 4. Beder provides numerous examples of this tactic in the US, Canada, UK, and Australia. It is 
not always an effective tactic - take, for example, the highly publicised McDonalds suit against two 
protesters in Britain which resulted in a great deal of negative publicity for the company. 
117 Ibid., Ch's 5 and 6. See also: R. Desai, 1994, "Second-Hand Dealers in Ideas: Think-Tanks and Thatcherite 
Hegemony" New Left Review No. 203, pp. 27-64. 
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Business Roundtable. In this lengthy tract (which incidentally is of high production standards and 
has the appearance of an official government publication) he goes as far to say that conservation is 
one of the "remaining 'ghettos' of socialism".IIS These organisations advocate the use of market 
instruments and private property rights in establishing and achieving environmental policy goals. 119 
(iii) Environmental public relations. 
Beder writes; "By 1990 US finns were spending about $500 million a year on PR advice on how to 
green their images and deal with environmental opposition. By 1995 that figure had increased to a 
spend of about $1 billion per year". 120 In addition to lobbying public officials PR involves the use 
of media, educational institutions, community forums, conferences, talk-back radio, web-sites, 0800 
numbers, CD Roms and Videos, etc. 
(v) Advertising 
Including 'green marketing', the influence of advertisers on media, the promotion of consumerism 
per se, and political advocacy advertising. 121 
(vi) Reporting on the environment 
There has been a decline since the late 1980s in the reportage of environmental problems - in the US 
it comprised 2 per cent of coverage in 1990 despite a high level of public concern. Studies have 
revealed coverage to be low priority, episodic and superficial, and comprised of little scientific and 
technical information. Moreover, large corporations which sponsor news-casts and run green 
advertising almost never get examined for their environmental record 122 There is also the problem 
of distinct ideological bias. For instance, environmental degradation in ex-communist states has 
been played up, whilst degradation in the West is played down. There has also been a tendency to 
under-emphasise environmental risks - for example, by selectively identifying studies which dismiss 
or down-play the health effects of certain chemical pollutants, even when those studies are dissenting 
from an overwhelming majority of scientific opinion. 123 
While it must be acknowledged that these methods do not always work in businesses favour, 
and that their very existence implies the historical success of the environmental movement in 
placing these issues on political agendas, they do demonstrate a remarkable capacity to distort 
the public discourse on environmental matters. 
The empirical investigation of the issue of power and discourse must proceed on two 
fronts. First of all the systematic distortion of communication must be examined by means of 
dialectical explanations (ie. by identifying, where possible, the disjuncture between 
commonly perceived and 'real' explanations).124 The other approach is to look at the 
strategies used by business such as the mechanisms identified by Beder above. 
S.4.(v) The Dilemma of Collective Action 
Collective action is essentially an effort made by more than one person towards the 
"achievement of a common goal or the satisfaction of a common interest".125 Through 
118 P. Hartley, 1997, Conservation Strategies/or New Zealand New Zealand Business Roundtable, Wellington. 
119 The New Zealand academe and policy circles have been greatly influenced by these ideas. Cf: P. Ackroyd, 
et al., 1991, Environmental Resources and the Market Place Tasman Institute, Allen and Unwin, Sydney. 
120 S. Beder, 1997, Global Spin: The Corporate Assault on the Environment Scribe Publications, Melbourne, p. 
lOS. 
121 Ibid, Ch's lOand 11. 
122 Ibid. p. 213 and eh. 13. On the problem of media bias see: M. Parenti, 1986, Inventing Reality: The Politics 
of the Mass Media Sl Martin's Press, New York; M. Lee, and N. Solomon, 1990, Unreliable Sources: A 
Guide to Detecting Bias in the News Media Carol Publishing. New York. 
123 Cf. Beder's discussion of reportage on Dioxin, pp. 21S-20. 
124 For example, Habennas' efforts to "penetrate the veil of ideology". On this account, we are able to identify 
structures of power by "comparing the prevailing normative structures on the one hand with the hypothetical 
system of norms which would result from a discursive will formation on the other". J. Thompson, 1981, 
Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought 0/ Paul Ricoeur and Jiirgen Habermas Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, p. 95. 
125 R. Wade, 1987, "The Management of Common Property Resources: Collective Action as an Alternative to 
Privatisation or State Regulation" Cambridge Journal of Economics No. II, p.97. 
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association, the members of the group gain the power to defend or promote their collective 
interests. In the following studies I am essentially concerned with two types of collective 
actors - the capitalist and the environmentalist (where they are not functioning as capitalists). 
I argue here that each of these types of actor is systematically exposed to a different set of 
incentives/disincentives to act collectively, and that as a result of this there is a notable 
asymmetry in the capacities of business and environmental advocates to organise themselves 
and act collectively, with the environmentalist being structurally disadvantaged in this 
respect. It is appropriate to acknowledge at the outset that all of the previous mechanisms 
within this section have a bearing upon the collective action issue. 
The starting point for my argument is Olson's seminal work, The Logic of Collective 
Action. Before I detail his argument I need to define the concepts of collective and private 
goods or interests. A collective or public good is defined by two properties: "lointness of 
supply and impossibility of exclusion". 126 In reality very few interests or goods sought by 
groups are pure public goods and most goods exhibit the above noted characteristics to 
varying degrees of approximation. 127 In contrast, a private good is defined by its rivalness 
and exclusivity. The good may be provided to, owned, used, and even consumed by, an 
individual person. Given these definitions, it is possible to make a general association 
between certain social classes or groups and the type of interests or goods that they seek 
(note, this is a tendential and by no means fixed relation). On the one hand, as I have 
repeatedly stated, capitalists are by definition commodity producers (I must emphasise once 
again the use of 'production' in the Marxian sense) and commodities are private goods. 
Hence capitalists in their collective efforts are concerned, certainly in the first instance, with 
private interests. On the other hand, environmentalists are overwhelmingly concerned with 
the pursuit of collective or public interests. That environmental goods are so often collective 
or even pure public goods follows, in part, from an argument which I touched on first in the 
value discussion, and later in the section on property rights, that is, the ontological premise <;>f 
open and highly integrated natural systems. This does not only apply to ecosystems, but also 
to relations such as those involved in the aesthetic appreciation of nature, for example. But 
the collective nature of environmental concerns is not only founded in the intransitive 
dimension, it also derives from the way people perceive their surroundings, and therefore 
includes matters of social practice, mores, ethics, nonnative political aspirations and the like. 
On the basis of these categories the locus of environmental conflict can thus be commonly 
seen as a conflict between interests in these two types of goods. 
Olson's model begins with the assumption that participation in collective action 
involves some costs, whether in time, money or labour. On this basis Olson argues that no 
'rational' individual will assume these costs unless two conditions are met; (i) that the likely 
benefits resulting from participation exceed the benefits which would accrue without 
participation, and (ii) that the benefits exceed the costs of membership and participation. 128 
Steven Davis usefully summarises Olson's argument: 
126 R. Hardin. 1982, Collective Action John Hopkins University Press. Baltimore, p.17. 
127 Ibid. 
128 M. Olson, 1965. The Logic o/Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory o/Groups Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge Ma, pp. 1-52. 
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The precise reason that these constraints prove insunnountable to many latent interests, Olson 
argues, is because of the so-called free-rider problem which occurs when a collective good is 
sought. Because such goods are non-divisible, they can be shared equally by all regardless of 
whether or not they participated. In addition, since collective goods appeal to such a potentially 
broad population, the perceived advantage added to a group by anyone individual's membership 
will likely be calculated as insignificant and so the costs of membership would most often lead to 
costs outweighing benefits. 129 
For interests seeking collective goods, therefore, neither of the aforementioned conditions for 
participation would likely be met. The only way in which an interest group could get around this 
dilenuna and attract members, maintains Olson, is (1) when selective benefits are offered in 
addition to a group's collective goals (these are available only to members and might include 
such incentives as magazines, discounted travel, or insurance), (2) membership is made 
compulsory, or (3) the group is small enough to allow an individual's impact upon achievement 
of the group's objectives seem sufficiently noticeable so that the benefits of participation would 
tend to outweigh the costs. 130 
102 
Thus, in the context of environmental conflict, there are first of all capitalists who are well 
able to dispense selective benefits to attract members/employees, and who by seeking 
exclusive benefits are able to avoid free-rider problems, and secondly, there are 
environmentalists who are far more likely to be hindered by the disincentives of free-riders, 
and who (and here also with reference to the resource issue - see 5.4.(iii)) are less able to use 
selective benefits to attract members. In summary, the corollary of Olson's argument is that 
those who seek collective interests tend to be placed at a greater disadvantage than those who 
pursue more concentrated material benefits. I31 
Olson's schema has been the subject of much criticism. Its biggest weakness is that it 
reduces the cl.?mplexities of collective action to the two very broad principles of the rational 
choice/actor model. The fundamental assumption that people are "fully rational ... with near 
perfect knowledge about costs and benefits" is questionable. 132 Certainly our 'bounded' 
rationality is prone to such influences as emotion, ideology, fear, spite, altruism or 
obligation. 133 It seems common sense to assume that such complex social behaviour must be 
the product of diverse and historically contingent factors. Against this, Olson's model 
appears reductionist, mechanistic and totalising. Nevertheless, few of its critics actually 
reject his argument outright. Olson's argument was a forceful corrective to classical 
pluralism, dispelling (but not in isolation from other arguments) the notion of a level playing 
field for interest groups. It is, however, important to deal with the pluralist rejoinder to 
Olson. Pluralists have argued that in recent decades many liberal democracies have 
experienced a proliferation of interest groups, representing diverse interests - and, contra to 
Olson's schema, often collective or public interests. These groups have in numerous cases 
been able to exert considerable influence upon political decision-making. To account for this, 
129 Elsewhere, Knoke refers to these conditions as the "free rider principle" and the "principle of imperceptible 
effect". D. Knoke, 1990, Organizing for Collective Action: The Political Economies of Associations Aldine 
de Gruyter, New York, pp. 32-3. . 
130 s. Davis, 1996, "Environmental Politics and the Changing Context: Interest Group Organization" The Social 
Science Journal Vol. 33, No.4, pp. 344-5. Davis's study is a useful, although predictable, empirical 
confinnation that in addition to the dynamics of Olson's model, collective action is shaped by a series of 
factors (which I discuss .in the main argument). The strength of his research is that it provides a useful 
empirical reference source regarding resources and methods of environmental and business advocates in 
environmental conflict 
131 R. Andrews, 1980, "Class Politics or Democratic Refonn: Environmentalism and American Political 
Institutions" Natural Resources Journal Vol. 20, p 239. 
132 S. Davis, 1996, "Environmental Politics and the Changing Context" p. 346. 
133 W. Kelso, 1978, American Democratic Theory: Pluralism and its Critics Greenwood Press, Westport Ct, 
Ch. 1. 
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'critical' pluralists have emphasised the importance of such factors as: (i) The differentiation 
of roles and hierarchies within interest groups; (ii) The importance of key actors who perform 
as entrepreneurs/risk takers; (iii) The dedication of key agents to a goal; (iv) The reliance 
upon professional agents such as lawyers and consultants - as high skill levels can enable 
organisations to achieve successes disproportionate to the size of the membership group; (v) 
The importance of government patronage; And (vi) the dynamics of coalition interest groups 
instead of the specific 'atomistic' form of Olson's model. 
These criticisms, notwithstanding, I include Olson's model because it describes a 
specific and important mechanism of business dominance. While I acknowledge that the 
'rational choice' theorem is limited (its application to certain realms of action may be 
severely misguided and can at worst result in perverse political practices), it remains relevant 
to capitalist behaviour. This analytical framework sets out to derive and identify mechanisms 
of business domination which are connected to relatively enduring dynamics of capitalism. 
Whether we call it rational self-maximisation, acquisitiveness or greed, the basic impulses of 
the rational actor model are the drivers (and, indeed, products) of capitalist relations. My 
approach in this class analysis has been to place capital at the centre of the model and, in 
most instances, to treat the complex phenomenon of environmentalism in a residual sense. 
The realist approach allows Olson's model to be treated as one transfactual tendency among 
many, and as a consequence does not rule out recourse to other factors such as those 
contained in pluralist analyses. Its actual causal efficacy in any historical episode, like that of 
the other mechanisms postulated here, will only be revealed through historical investigation. 
5.5. Conclusion 
The analytical framework is made up of two elements. On the one hand, I have developed an 
argument about how business values the world, and on the other hand an argument about t~e 
way that power is derived from the ownership and control of commodity production. 
My argument within this chapter operated on two levels. On one level a series of 
enduring relationships are understood to exist between the business and the state in advanced 
capitalist society. This is the largely theoretical structural analysis that I identified in the 
literature on business dominance in environmental conflict. What I have done is to take one 
representative model - Offe's schema - and interpret it in realist terms as broadly, but not 
exclusively, descriptive of the general business-state-civil society relation. My intention is to 
see how useful that broad theory is for understanding business power in the empirical studies. 
By moving on to include the specific mechanisms that have been studied by neo-pluralists. I 
have sought to connect that generic level with five mechanisms of dominance that have been 
studied usefully in empirical terms. This will enable me to better understand the connections 
between the two levels, and between the five specific mechanisms themselves. It is 
envisaged that each of these levels and the individual mechanisms will be of varied 
explanatory value across the two case studies, but by positing a range of sources of business 
power it will be possible to explain in some useful way how business derived its power in 
each of the case studies. 
Finally, for the sake of clarity I review the key elements of the framework in Table 5.2 
below. This chapter, and the one before it, function as a heuristic guide and general 
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explanatory framework for the examination of business dominance in environmental conflict. 
They are based upon a return to core dynamics of capitalist economic relations. But while the 
emphasis is upon the causal role of economic powers, any deterministic tendencies are 
avoided through recourse to realist principles. More specifically, the realist ontology and 
consequent epistemological limits explicated in the previous chapter ensure that this model 
can only be a partial and relatively enduring explanation of environmental conflict itself. 
Moreover, it is not a totalising theory and it cannot, therefore, predict that business will 
dominate in a particular substantive environmental outcome. Environmentalists - as 
individuals and groups can and do extract meaningful concessions within environmental 
conflict. Nevertheless the argument is that business is able to draw upon a range of 
mechanisms of power that confer upon it significant advantages within environmental 
conflict. Quite simply, there is not a level playing field. However, this is not envisaged to be 
the crucial insight of this thesis. I took the existence of business power as a starting point 
within Chapter One, and the focus here is upon understanding that dominance. It is for the 
discussion in the case studies to reveal how this power does or does not operate in historical 
contexts, and how these mechanisms are mitigated, negated, etc., by countervailing 
mechanisms and tendencies. 
Table 5.2. The Model of Business ])Qminance in Environmental Conflict 
The Analytical Framework: Summary 
4.2. Value-Form and the Study of Environmental Conflict 
In order to investigate the phenomenon of business dominance in environmental conflict I turn first to the 
problem of class-analysis. I place capital at the centre of the model and seek to treat environmentalism in a 
counterfactual or residual sense mther than as a generalised aggregation of actors characterised by a set of 
core features. Instead, I posit - or more accurately, draw together from existing litemture on environmental 
conflict and political economy - a series of structural mechanisms which pertain to the dynamics of capital 
and these form the core of the fmmework. These mechanisms fall into two broad categories: Value and 
Dominance. Value performs a twofold function, on the one hand grounding the class analysis element by 
defming capitalists in fUnctional terms as the producers (producers, exchangers and consumers)· of 
commodities. and on the other hand, by establishing a systematic connection between the political-economic 
category of Capital and that of Nature (or more broadly the 'environment'). Like Bhaskar's model of the 
Social Cube it adds another dimension to the society/person connection - the society/person/nature 
connection. The second category of dominance is concerned with the ways in which capital is able to exert 
power over other actors in environmental conflict. It opemtes on two levels: the system-wide level of the 
functional relations between capital. state and civil society. and the more concrete and specific level of 
particular mechanisms of business dominance. The two levels segue into one-another. 
Part One: Value 
4.3. Value Discourse, Value Form and the BumanHEnvironment Relation 
At the centre of this section is the concept of the commodity. The commodity form is seen to incorporate 
two elements; use-value and exchange-value. In addition to this dichotomy I also discuss the money-form 
(as pure exchange value). Foilowing this I examine the implication of each of these forms for the society-
nature connection, the essence of my argument being that the systematic emphasis upon, priVileging. and 
extension of, exchange-values and the money-form. in capitalist societies is problematical in environmental 
terms. It also establishes a systematic connection between ecological-harm and capital as a social category, 
which links in with the next section. for if capital is seen to dominate in environmental conflict then this will 
have potentially adverse environmental consequences 
Part Two: Dominance 
Sol. Ocre's Strategic Model 
Having reviewed the Iitemture on state theory. I broadly adopt Offe's functional model of the state-capital 
relation, although I amend and supplement his analytical categories (exclusion. dependency, maintenance 
and legitimation) on the basis of the wider political-economy litemture, and on the basis of realist principles. 
I thus seek to avoid the totalising tendencies of his schema. Instead I offer a model which while describing 
a strong tendency for capital to be able to shape the process and outcomes of politics, leaves room for other 
causal elements. not least of which is the role of the historical agent 
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5.4. Mechanisms of Business Dominance 
In this final section 1 outline five broad structural mechanisms which contribute to the dominance of 
business in environmental conflict: the ability of business to inflict sanctions on society, disparate resources, 
the privileging of private property rights, the distortion of environmental discourse, and the logic of 
collective action. These mechanisms complement the functionalist tendencies of the previous section with 
more concrete historical work: for example, in its conception of the state as institutional matrix rather than 
as a series of functions. 
6 
Black Head: Natural Character, Historical Use and the 
Arguments Surrounding Quarrying 
6.1. Introduction 
The Black Head promontory lies on the coast just south of Dunedin. At the time of the 
following dispute, from the early 1980s through to 1990, the seaward faces of the headland 
were made up of a startling series of volcanic rock formations, which rose from below sea level 
to a height of approximately 9Om. In addition, the coastal periphery contained important 
remnants of ecological communities endemic to that stretch of coastline. While Black Head 
had long been quarried for its dense basalt, by the mid-1980s the rate of extraction had 
escalated significantly, and that activity was having adverse environmental impacts. Indeed, it 
had the potential to completely destroy the natural character of the area. That possibility led to 
the formation of a community coalition of Maori, conservationists and recreational users (The 
Friends of Black Head - hereafter the Friends or FoB), for the sole purpose of persuading the 
owners of the quarry (Black Head Quarries Ltd - hereafter BHQ or the Company) to either 
desist extracting basalt at the site, or otherwise modify its operating regime. It is the ensuing 
struggle over this issue that I refer to as the Black Head conflict. 
The study is conducted over the course of four chapters (see 3.3. as to why I have taken 
this approach). The first three of those chapters are largely empirical. My intention is to 
establish a solid contextual foundation upon which to base the critical analysis in Chapter Nine. 
However, this is not to claim that these three chapters are value-neutral, for the empirical work 
is clearly guided by both the focus and information requirements of the analytical framework. 
Yet it is only by setting out the studies this way that I can conduct the theoretical analysis in a 
transparent fashion (see 3.3). The purpose of the present chapter is to background the dispute. 
I describe the area in question, past and present uses and their impacts, before moving on to 
review the arguments for and against the mining of basalt at Black Head. In doing so I pay 
particular attention to the Quarry Company (for example, its general interests and motivations, 
and its resources) in order to provide for both the value and power elements of the framework. 
This is because business power is the essential focus of inquiry. Chapter Seven is essentially a 
historical narrative of the dispute processes. It is organised that way because that form of 
argument usefully conveys the dynamic pattern and causal relationships of the conflict. The 
last of the broadly empirical chapters is Chapter Eight, which deals with the specific question 
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of who prevailed in the dispute in terms of the substantive outcome (which was in the foml of a 
negotiated settlement). Finally, in Chapter Nine, r take each of the elements of the analytical 
f ramework set out in Chapters Four and Five, and systematically investigate their causal 
efficacy in the dispute. 
One remaining point is that this case study, like the Whanganui study that follows, is 
treated in historical terms. Thus I largely set out the arguments and terms of reference, 
including predictions, as they were articulated at the time. I only expand on those arguments 
when clarification seems necessary, and it is certainly not my intention to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis of any sort. Furthermore, I only point to post-settlement developments within 
footnotes or as a postscript. 
6.2. Black Head: The Place, the Quarry, and the Impacts of Quarrying 
Figure 6.0. Map of Dunedin Volcano and Location of Black Head 
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6.2.(i) The Natural Character of Black Head 
Black Head juts out into the sea five kilometres south along the coast from St Clair beach in 
Dunedin (see Figure 6.0.). The huge geological structure was formed eleven million years ago 
during the third and final eruptive phase of the Dunedin Volcano. At this time the volcano 
produced a massive upthrust of basaltl and phonolite which spread out over a wide area.2 
Black Head itself, lies at about the southern limit of the volcano's lava deposits. In the ten 
million years since volcanic activity ceased the headland was further shaped and transformed 
due to a variety of forces. The huge block of basalt has been down-thrust along a fault line that 
runs along its landward margin. The landward contact across the fault is with Caversham 
sandstone, which also underlays the basalt formation at a depth of approximately 30 metres 
below sea level. Due to the extensive faulting, outcrops of the older Caversham sandstone can 
also be found high on the inland crest of the headland. The headland area has also been built 
up with layers of scoria, clay and topsoil.3 The area has also been worn down by wave action 
and weathering.4 The effects of these erosive processes are most profound on the seaward side 
of the promontory where the geological formations at the centre of the dispute are to be found 
(see Figures 6.1, and 8.1- the Black Head photographs are located in attached envelope). 
As the molten lava slowly cooled and hardened some of the rock stressed and fractured, 
forming regular symmetric patterns of vertical columnar jointing.S Most of the basalt deposit at 
Black Head is jointed into polygonal blocks and columns (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3). The crests 
of the steep faces display examples of the larger blocks and boulders, but the thickest and 
longest columns are to be found on the lower faces. The most striking examples of the 
columnar formations skirt the southern periphery of the headland, where the basalt is displayed 
in water worn form, seawater and spray having kept the basalt a dark grey colour. The few 
other examples of columnar basalt in the Dunedin area feature at a higher level and have 
developed a light grey rind due to weathering. In the lower outcrops of Black Head, n~ar 
vertical columns, mostly 30-4Ocm thick and five to seven sided in section, step back from the 
sea with their flat tops in an irregular staircase pattern. In addition to vertical formations there 
are horizontal columns, and a "diversity of fan, basin and chevron structural patterns". 6 
There are - or were at the time of the dispute - several distinct formations of note. The 
'Roman Baths' was a large amphitheatre-like basin with a salt water pool, enclosed by 
1 "The most abundant rocks of the Dunedin Volcano are broadly described as basalt. They are dark rocks 
because they are rich in minerals with abundant iron and magnesium (eg. olivine, augite, magnetite) and 
poor in the lighter 'felsic' minerals (feldspar, nepheline, quartz)." New Zealand Geological Survey. 1989. 
The Dunedin Volcano Pamphlet, DSIR, Dunedin. 
2 Ibid. This burst of activity was centred on the north and west sides of the mountain, and because of that, the 
YOWlgest volcanic rocks are not found on the Peninsula proper. Today they form the high peaks of Hagstaff, 
Swampy, Cargill and Mihiwaka. 
3 Black Head Quarries Ltd, November 1989. "Draft Management plan" Fairfield, Dunedin, p. 2. 
4 This effect would have been accentuated by the variation in sea levels which occurred during the ice ages of 
the Pleistocene times (2 million to 12,000 years ago). New Zealand Geological Survey, 1989, The Dunedin 
Volcano. 
S For more information about this process see:A. Aydin and J. De Graff, 1988, "Evolution of Polygonal 
Fracture Patterns in Lava Hows" Science Vol. 239. January. pp. 471-5. 
6 Friends of Black Head, October 1989, "Black Head: The Conservation Case" Submission made by the Friends 
of Black Head. DWledin, p. 3. 
Chapter Six: Black Head: Natural Character, Historical Use, Substantive Arguments 109 
columns, and with a mosaic floor made up of the water worn ends of columns (see Figure 6.4).7 
Nearby, was 'The Dock'. A causeway of columns that reached out into the sea at an oblique 
angle (see Figures 6.8, 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11). Also there were the towering Eastern Bluffs which 
rose directly from sea level to a height of over 80 metres. The upper levels of the cliffs were 
dominated by large overhanging cusps of fan and basin aligned columns (see Figures 6.6 and 
6.7).8 Finally, there were a number of rare basaltic caves submerged beneath the ocean surface. 
The slopes of Black Head have in recent times provided habitat for a range of vegetation 
types characteristic of the botanically distinct Dunedin coastal headlands.9 Dr Peter Johnson, a 
botanist from the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Botany Division, recorded: 
The next cliffed portion of coastline to the south, starting at the Nuggets and extending around 
the Catlins coast. is botanically different in many ways. Also different in their plant cover are 
the next cliffed headlands to the north (only Cape Wanbrow before Banks Peninsula). 
Compared with other Dunedin headland vegetation, Black Head offers the richest example of 
low divaricating scrub in a windswept coastal site. A broad representation of coastal plant 
species is present 10 
In an earlier report he alluded to the unique characteristics of the scrub, noting that the 
vegetation was "dwarfed to a degree not seen on other parts of the Dunedin coast, yet still 
comprising a wide variety of shrub and tree species".l1 Some examples being "stunted ngaio 
scrub, flax and shore hebe" .12 Distribution of vegetation types on the coastal faces can be 
broken down into five main communities; the distribution being detennined by the nature of the 
substrate and the degree of exposure to salt and wind. These communities are: 
i) Coastal grasses and herbs on upper rock faces; 
ii) Prostrate divaricating shrubs on the upper talus slopes; 
iii) Flax, grasses and dwarfed coastal trees on lower talus slopes; 
iv) Low scrub of shore hebe, spleenwort ferns and native ice-plant, and; 
v) Salt tolerant herbs on the moist lower ledges. 13 
The area is also notable in that several alpine species are found upon the coastal slopes, and a 
number of plants are at the limits of their distribution, for example, "a species of fine-leafed 
speargrass, Aciphylla subflabellata , usually found in mountain areas, occurs at Black Head at 
about its southern limit". 14 
The headland had also provided habitat for a range of wildlife. Both black and Stewart 
Island shags, as well as black-back gulls had nested in the area. There were reports of 
endangered yellow-eye penguins sheltering along the shoreline. IS It was also thought that 
yellow-eyed, crested and probably little blue penguins, roosted and moulted in the 
neighbouring areas, although no penguins had been found to actually nest there.16 Finally, 
7 P. Johnson, February 1986, "Black Head Near Dunedin: A Case for Preserving Features of Scenic, Geological 
and Botanical Interest" Unpublished report, Botany Division DSIR, Dunedin, p. 2. 
8 Friends of Black Head, October 1989, "Black Head: The Conservation Case", p. 3. 
9 P. Johnson, February 1986, "Black Head Near Dunedin" p. 2. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid. 
14 Otago Daily Times 11 June 1988. 
IS Otago Daily Times 13 March 1989. 
16 Friend'! of Black Head, October 1989, "Black Head: The Conservation Case" p. 3. 
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there was aquatic life, most notably the large kelp forests that skirted the headland, providing 
habitat for an abundant shellfish population (eg. paua, mussels and crayfish).l7 
6.2.(ii) Quarrying at Black Head 
As I noted at the outset, the Black Head conflict arose in response to the quarry operations. In 
this sub-section I will discuss the historical development of that use, and as I do so I will 
introduce issues such as the particular rights structure that empowered the Company to extract 
basalt. 
It was asserted in the conflict that the headland had a long record as a source of stone for 
human use. 18 Originally known to local Maori as Makereatu or Tinerau, the headland served as 
a stone gathering site for many generations of the Waitaha and Kati Mamoe peoples. 19 Broken 
basalt columns were collected from the lower seaward slopes, and once gathered the basalt was 
then fashioned into tools.20 All activities concerning Makereatu were considered sacred, and 
therefore, extraction was guided by an elaborate system of rules and restrictions in observance 
of the complex tapu.21 Any impact made by this activity was insignificant as extraction relied 
upon columns that had been broken due to natural processes. 
The origins of large-scale extraction can be traced to 31 July 1844, when the Otakau 
(Otago) Block purchase was made. Representatives of the New Zealand Company (the 
southern Wakefield settlement) purchased 200,000 hectares of land from Ngai Tabu for the 
price of £2,400. The area of land ran from the Otago Harbour in the north to Nugget point in 
the south, and included the headland later known as Black Head.22 The bulk of that land 
subsequently passed into the ownership of the Crown.23 In October of 1871 under the Waste 
Lands Act 1866, Crown Grant number 12684 was made to Ezekiel Laverty, this grant being 
Section 3 Block XIV of Dunedin and East Taieri Survey District and Sections 154 and 155 
Green Island Bush Survey District. The area covered around twenty-five hectares including the 
approximately fifteen hectares of land known as Black Head.24 
The date at which Mr Laverty acquired the freehold title to the site from the Crown was 
significant in two respects., first, regarding ownership of the mineral resource, and secondly, in 
defining the potential extent of basalt extraction. At common law the holder of the freehold 
title is prima facie entitled to all minerals on or under the surface of their land (except gold and 
silver). However, prior to the enactment of the Mining Act 1971 alienations of Crown land 
were not necessarily subject to reservation of the mineral resource by the Crown. With regard 
to Black Head, it seems that at the time of the 1871 purchase there was no legislation in force 
which retained Crown ownership of the minerals.25 As a consequence, subject to the Quarry 
17 Ibid 
18 I use the term asserted because of reasons that will be explicitly dealt with in 6.4.(i). 
19 Peter Carter (of the Whanau-o-Otokia. Brighton, Dunedin). 2 March 1990. "Black Head" Otago Daily Times. 
20 Friends of Black Head. 1989. "Black Head a Treasure Worth Saving" Pamphlet, Dunedin. 
21 Department of Conservation. 1988. "Values of Black Head" File note 8/366/11. Department of Conservation. 
Dunedin. 
22 H. Evison. 1993. Te Wai Pounamu - The Greenstone Island.' A History of the Southern Maori During the 
European Colonisation of New Zealand Aoraki Press and Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board. Wellington and 
Christchurch. pp. 203-12. 
23 Ibid. Ch. 10. 
24 Title Search. 
2S All alienations of Crown land after 1 April 1973 (when the Mining Act 1971 came into effect) reserved every 
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adhering to the requirements of the relevant legislation, extraction was a legitimate land use. 
An associated consequence was that the Company did not require a mining licence to operate 
the quarry. 
The second crucial feature that derived from the early acquisition of the freehold title is 
that the area of ownership extended right down into the littoral zone as far as the mean high tide 
mark. That situation was somewhat anomalous as at the time of the conflict most of New 
Zealand's coastline, river and stream bank safeguarded by a provision known as the Queen's 
Chain. The Queen's Chain (or 'marginal strip') was a 20 metre wide strip reserved for public 
access and use.26 Because the title was granted prior to the enactment of legislation providing 
for Queen's Chains, the landowners were legally entitled to quarry down to this level (which 
would in effect destroy all of the columnar formations). 
Commercial quarrying of the basalt from the headland probably began as early as the 
1800s when rock was taken for use as ballast on ships returning to Sydney, where it was later 
used as building material. Extraction of such sorts would have been in small quantities making 
only a minor impact upon the headland's physical character. However, Black Head was to 
remain relatively untouched until 1948 when electricity was made available to the area. From 
that date onwards, basalt was constantly extracted for road metal, railway ballast and concrete 
aggregate.27 The enactment of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 was also significant 
for the Company's use rights, because under the Act the quarrying activity was deemed an 
existing use. The quarry owners were thus exempt from having to obtain planning consent for 
their extractive activities. 
But it was only around 1986, when two long established Dunedin companies, Fulton 
Hogan Holdings Ltd and Palmer and Sons Ltd (see 6.3.(i», increased their previous minority 
share holdings to full SO/SO ownership of Black Head Quarries Ltd, that the magnitude of the 
operation increased. At the time of purchase there was pressure upon Fulton Hogan to move 
away from their nearby Saddle Hill operation, where they were beginning to make a hi~hly 
visible impact upon that prominent landmark. Black Head offered a massive source of high 
quality basalt within close proximity.28 
In summary, although there had been a long history of quarrying at Black Head, up until 
thirty years prior to the dispute extraction had only been on a small scale. Indeed, it was only 
around 1986 that the quarry became an immediate and significant threat to the natural character 
of the headland. A very important point here, given the property rights mechanism (S.4.(ii», 
was that the quarry operations was virtually free from any statutory constraints upon its ability 
to flatten the headland to the mean high-tide mark. 
6.2.(iii) The Environmental Impacts of Basalt Extraction 
Examination of environmental problems is often hindered by two factors. First, assessment of 
the impact of a resource use may be unclear, as ecological problems are renowned for their 
mineral existing in its natural condition on or under the surface of the land. G. Hinde and M. Hinde. 1986. 
New Zealand Law Dictionary (revised third edition) Butterworths, Wellington, p. 234. 
26 Conservation Act 1987 S. 24. 
27 Dunedin Star Mid- Week 11 June 1986. 
28 John Fulton (Chainnan of Directors), 14 August 1990, Personal interview. Fulton Hogan Holdings Limited, 
Head Office, Fairfield, Dunedin. 
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complexity. There may be difficulty deciding what exactly one should be looking for, and 
having achieved this there may be further problems regarding measurement. Secondly, there is 
the problem of assessing causality. The researcher can be faced with a proliferation of 
symptoms for which diagnosis may seem problematic. However, in the case of Black Head the 
impact assessment was relatively clear. Black Head was a finite resource, the supply of rock 
being totally fixed. Quarrying was an extractive form of resource use, hence, as the basalt was 
quarried the headland decreased in size. One can, therefore, easily assess the nature of the 
physical impact. Quantitative evaluation is achieved simply by subtracting the amount of rock 
extracted from the total volume of the basalt deposit (which in this case is in excess of 20 
million tonnes29). In causal terms, the following symptoms of environmental degradation in 
the vicinity of the headland were undoubtedly caused by the quarrying activity. In this 
subsection I will describe the bio-physical effects that quarrying activity had already had upon 
the headland at the time of the dispute, and also point to the projected future effects that further 
motivated the case for preservation. 
Prior to the early 1980s, the physical effects of quarrying were mainly confined to the 
inland side of the headland. In a 1982 report Dr Johnson, of the DSIR, noted that there had 
been some moderate damage caused to the biota and columns, caused by spillage of quarry 
debris out over the coastal faces.3o But it was with the escalation of activity in the mid-1980s 
that serious damage began to occur. When he revisited the area in 1986 Johnson recorded that 
the damage was of a much greater order of magnitude.3! It was this visit that motivated his 
action on the issue (see 7.2.(i)). 
I noted earlier that there was a large increase in extractive activity around 1986, when 
Palmers and Sons and Fulton Hogan increased their investments in the operation. To increase 
production, the Company began to strip away the overburden that covered the basalt deposit, 
enlarge the processing facilities (crushing plant etc.), and set aside stockpile areas. In addition, 
there was the impact caused by the extractive activity itself - the removal of the basalt .for 
crushing. 
The stripping process, which by 1989 was virtually complete, involved the removal of 
layers of sandstone, scoria, clay and topsoil in order to expose the basalt.32 This process had 
two immediate impacts; first, the diminution of the headland feature, and secondly, the 
deposition of the unwanted materials over the seaward faces. The cumulative effect of 
stripping and basalt extraction was to lower the headland to a height of somewhere between 80-
90 metres.33 Where in the past the headland had risen steeply to a rounded crest, by 1989 it had 
culminated abruptly in an unnatural plateau. Displaced material had spilled out over the 
seaward faces to create talus slopes that extended into the sea. The pale Caversham sandstone 
of the overburden was highly visible in contrast to the dark natural appearance of the southern 
faces. In addition, the steeper and more isolated eastern faces were also coated in debris.34 
29 Black Head Quarries Ltd, 1989, "Draft Management Plan" Fairfield, Dunedin, p. 1. 
30 P. Johnson. November 1982, "Black Head Near Dunedin: Botanical Notes" Unpublished report, Botany 
Division, DSIR, Dunedin. 
31 P. Johnson, February 1986, "Black Head Near Dunedin" p. 3. 
32 Black Head Quarries Ltd, 1989, "Draft Management Plan" p. 1. 
33 The original height of the headland prior to any quarrying activity was 127 metres. 
34 Lloyd Godman, (Lecturer in Photography at Otago Polytechnic) 14 August 1990, Personal communication, 
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Also during this period, the quarry operation moved to the edge of the headland 
(established quarry practice being to move to the periphery of the deposit and work back35). 
The company engaged in blasting along the rim of the quarry, which added to the already 
considerable spillage.36 A central issue of contention in the dispute was over the motives for 
allowing the debris to spill over the edges, with the conservationists alleging purposeful 
dumping on the part of the company, and the company defending the overflow as "inevitable 
spillage".37 
By the late 1980s there had been substantial damage to the geological, botanical and 
wildlife features previously described. The columnar formations had suffered to varying 
degrees. Landward access to the formations along the tidal area passed under and across 
numerous scree slopes formed by the overburden, with material continually sliding down into 
the sea Many of the columns around the periphery had been smashed and buried by rock falls. 
The formation which suffered the most were the 'Roman Baths' , with many of its columns, egg 
shaped boulders and the sea-water pool having been buried under approximately 100 tonnes of 
rubble.38 As well as the 'Baths', the entrances to the sea caves had been covered in places. 
The biota of the headland also suffered. Between Johnson's 1986 report and 1989, the remnant 
coastal vegetation had been severely damaged, and certain species were feared lost from the 
headland".39 Nevertheless, the surviving vegetation was still considered to be representative of 
the ecological district. In addition, the nesting sites of the various resident bird-life may have 
been destroyed and roosting penguins disturbed. Finally, divers reported that spillage onto the 
sea floor had adverse effected the surrounding sea life.4O 
There were reports of other physical impacts outside the quarry area: The modification of 
the beach on the north side of Black Head where large shingle banks had been replacing the 
sand;41 Vast quantities of dust blowing away from the area in offshore wind conditions;42 And 
also, high levels of noise were emitted from the quarry during working hours. 
The potential environmental impacts of quarrying were also very important in the 
subsequent discourse (see 6.4 below, and Chapter Seven). Attempts to estimate the impact of 
future resource use were, of course, made in the context of risk and uncertainty, but there were 
some reasonable assessments made.43 In the case of Black Head predictions were generated on 
the basis of the continued rate of abstraction. The output of the quarry was put at 192,000 
Dunedin. 
35 John Fulton (Chainnan of Directors), 14 August 1990, Personal interview. 
36 The idea being that "the wall of overburden (poor quality weathered rock) surrounding the pit must be cleared 
away from the edge to allow the quarrying to continue on the next level". Critic 18 April 1989, p.3. 
37 John Fulton (Chainnan of Directors), August 14, 1990, Personal interview. 
38 The Dominion Sunday Times 18 June 1989. 
39 Friends of Black Head, October 1989, "Black Head: The Conservation Case" p. 3. 
40 Friends of Black Head, 1989, "Black Head a Treasure Worth Saving" Pamphlet, Dunedin. There had also 
been a ban placed upon commercial shell fishing in the area by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries due 
to the possible pollution hazard from the Waldronville ocean sewage outfall. Dunedin Slar Weekender 11 
February 1990. 
41 Lloyd Godman, 14 August 1990, Personal communication, Dunedin. 
42 Peter McComb (Surfer), 11 December 1990, Personal communication, Dunedin. 
43 The main example was the work of Dr Ross Cullen, then a lecturer in resource economics at Otago 
University. I will daw upon Cullen's analysis extensively in the following discussion, and most heavily in 
Chapter Eight where I base a lot of my argument on his discounting analysis of the quarry's value, and the 
value of the final negotiated settlement. R. Cullen, 1991, "Discounting the Economic Costs of Conservation 
and Compensation" Environment and Planning A Vol. 23, pp. 1121-32. 
Chapter Six: Black Head: Natural Character, Historical Use, Substantive Arguments 114 
tonnes per annum (this was the figure for 1988, and production dropped slightly to 178,464 
tonnes in 1989).44 Constant extraction at that rate could be sustained for approximately 90+ 
years before it reached the projected floor of 102.00 metres Otago Datum (100.00 metres 
representing the mean sea level), and extended to the landward margin somewhere in the 
vicinity of the fault line mentioned earlier.45 In effect, the headland would virtually disappear 
if the Company chose to quarry to the full potential of its use rights. Such activity WOUld, of 
course, destroy all of the natural features previously discussed. Furthermore, most of the 
botanical features existed above the thirty-metre mark, and would in all likelihood, be 
destroyed at a much earlier date. Similarly, the columnar formations would suffer from the 
depositional effects of quarrying activity well before they became threatened by extraction. 
In summary, the headland was a finite natural resource the supply of which was totally 
constrained. The resource exhibited physical characteristics of a highly specific nature, and as 
such was extremely scarce. The quarrying of basalt intensified markedly throughout the 1980s 
leaving the headland in a highly modified state. The extractive use was enabled by a strong 
private property regime, which effectively obviated the necessity for the company to gain both 
mineral rights and town planning consents. That meant that, other than economic exigencies, 
there was nothing restraining the Company from levelling the headland virtually to sea level. 
Finally, the effects of the extractive use would, in great part, be irreversible in two senses: First, 
because they resulted in "'a user cost', the foregone future extractive output"; And secondly, 
they caused "a loss (in perpetuity) in value from the undisturbed environment".46 
6.3. Black Head Quarries Ltd. and the Arguments for Extraction 
In this section I undertake two tasks: First, I describe various structural features that ultimately 
affected the ability of Black Head Quarries to mobilise and influence in the pursuit of its 
interests, and which also served to define those interests. Discussion therefore begins. by 
examining the Company's position within a wider complex of business ownership and the 
importance of those parent companies within the Dunedin47 (and ultimately national) economy; 
Secondly, I discuss the Company's argument for the extraction of basalt at Black Head. The 
main element of that discussion is to point to the commercial value of the quarry operation. In 
discussing both these elements I provide one basis for the critical analysis contained in Chapter 
Nine, and embrace both the value and power elements of the framework. 
6.3.(i) Black Head Quarries Ltd and the Dunedin Economy 
As I mentioned earlier, Black Head Quarries Ltd was jointly owned by two companies; Fulton 
Hogan Holdings Limited and Palmer and Sons Ltd. At the time of the conflict Fulton Hogan 
was a rapidly expanding unlisted public company. Since 1970, the Fulton Hogan business had 
44 Ministry of Energy, (various yearS) Annual returns of production from quarries and mineral production 
statistics, Ministry of Energy, Wellington. 
45 Black Head Quarries Ltd, 1989 "Draft Management Plan" p. 3. 
46 1. Krutilla and A. Fisher, 1983, The Economics of Natural Environments: Studies in the Valuation of 
Commodity and Amenity Resources Burterworths, Toronto, p. 47. 
47 The 1986 census recorded 102,543 people as being usually resident in the Dunedin area, and 176,223 in the 
wider Otago region (including Dunedin). Department of Statistics, New Zealand Census of Population and 
Dwellings 1986: Regional Summary Series B Report 24, pp. 15,32. 
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developed from an almost wholly Otago operation, to a national one, through purchases and 
takeovers of companies in Nelson, Christchurch, Invercargill and Auckland. By the end of the 
dispute, the Fulton Hogan Group had a permanent branch in Brisbane, and had undertaken 
large contracts throughout the central and south Pacific (for example, the construction and 
sealing of runways in Fiji, Western Samoa, Tonga and in Papua New Guinea). By 1990 it had 
a group turnover of approximately $150 million, and approximately a thousand full time 
employees on the payroll (not including associate companies such as BHQ). The company's 
rapid expansion was enabled by Shell New Zealand's purchase of a 24 percent interest in 1981, 
which was later increased to 38 percent in 1989 (see Appendix E for tables which list Fulton 
Hogan's regional interests, and the company's program of acquisitions since 1970).48 Fulton 
Hogan were undoubtedly a significant business even in the national context, they were tied in 
with wider structures of business ownership in New Zealand, and due to Shell's interests, with 
international capital. By contrast, Palmer and Sons was a smaller private company that 
employed approximately forty staff in the Dunedin area.49 Together these companies exhibited 
a high degree of penetration within the relatively small regional economy. 
Another potential source of influence derived from the personal and social connections of 
the senior managers in the Dunedin community. Most of the businessmen who were directors 
of Fulton Hogan sat on the boards of other companies, some held public office, and could 
exercise considerable influence in their own right. For example, the chairman of the board, Ian 
Farrant, had an estimated personal wealth of $20 million,so he was also chair of the Regional 
Health Authority, and had in that capacity been responsible for overseeing the restructuring of 
the public health system in the South Island. Another board member, and past group policy and 
finance director, William Auld, had been a prominent Councillor on both the Silver Peaks 
County Council, and (following boundary changes) the Dunedin City Council (both local 
authorities respectively had responsibility for the territorial area that included Black Head).51 
The overall impression is of a large local company thoroughly enmeshed in the commu~ty 
power structure of both Dunedin and the Otago region. 
A further potential source of influence derived from the type of operations owned by the 
two parent companies. All but one of the basalt quarry sites in the Dunedin area were owned 
by either one or the other of the two companies (the exception was the unused Mt Zion Quarry 
owned by the Dunedin City Council).52 Palmers' owned the other major active quarry at 
Logan Point in Dunedin.53 Furthermore, not only were the two companies major suppliers of 
quarry materials in the region, they also had extensive investments in the downstream 
industries which made use of these products - there was a vertical integration of their activities. 
Fulton Hogan was one of the largest, if not the largest, roading and sealing contractors in New 
48 A. Tyrell, 1992, The Fulton Hogan Story 1933-1993 Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd, Fairfield, Dunedin, p. 119. 
49New Zealand Business Who's Who 1992, (thirty-third edition) New Zealand Financial Press. Auckland, p. 389. 
SO Otago Daily Times 17 May 1991. 
51 A. Tyrell, 1992, The Fulton Hogan Story p. 107. 
52 G. Wilson (Department of Geography, University of Otago), 25 May 1989, Personal interview with Jolm 
Walrond (Otago Mines Inspector, Ministry of Energy). But it should be noted that in 1988 basalt production 
from Black Head accounted for only 14 percent of the "rock gravel and sand quarried for roading and ballast 
within the Dunedin Mining Inspectorate". R. Cullen, 1991, "Discounting" pp. 1128. 
53 New Zealand Business Who's Who p. 389. 
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Zealand. In addition, both companies owned concreting operations, and Fulton Hogan also 
owned both construction and asphalt firms.54 
In 5.2.(ii), I acknowledged that the state is reliant upon resources created in the 
accumulation process. This structural constraint is no different at the regional and local levels, 
with councils reliant upon thriving communities of ratepayers to fund their activities. Thus, 
with respect to the Black Head quarry, the Silver Peaks County Council and latterly the 
Dunedin City Council, had an interest in the operation at all stages of production, from the 
immediate on-site employment of twelve full-time staff and the associated revenue from the 
. quarrying activity, through to the downstream benefits of the processing activities.55 Although, 
it must be noted that for the councils these benefits were not site specific and could possibly 
accrue from an alternative operation. What I have just described is a particular articulation of 
the dependency dynamic, but the maintenance role was also apparent in the business-council 
relationship (see 9.3.(ii) for analysis). Conscious of the historical decline in the economic base 
of the area, during the latter half of the 1980s the Dunedin City Council was taking an active 
role in "providing economic and political leadership to the region".S6 That the Council was 
strongly motivated by such exigencies will become increasingly apparent as the case study 
progresses. 
The links between the Company (and parent companies) and local government, were 
further strengthened by the fact that most of their business was generated through contracts 
with public authorities (both in and beyond the Dunedin area). Also, those products and 
services were usually for the provision and maintenance of crucial economic infrastructure (eg. 
roads, construction, airports). The provision of these strategic services would no doubt 
heighten the structural influence of the companies within the region. 
Indeed, a recurring theme throughout the dispute was the claim made by the companies 
involved that they were "concerned with the needs of the region", and thus performed a public 
function. The fact that these businesses provide the area with employment, revenue and 
. . 
services was repeatedly alluded to throughout the dispute.57 Also, not only did those 
companies allude to the regional interest but they also justified their operation in terms of the 
national interest.S8 BHQ and the parent companies occupied a powerful position within the 
local economy and tended to equate its own interests with those of the region. 
By its location within a wider and substantial complex of ownership, its economic and 
social interpenetration within the local economy and government, and its role as a provider of 
infrastructure for the local authorities, the Company could, primajacie, be expected to possess 
significant influence in the region. 
54 Ibid, pp. 382,389. 
55 Jim Hunter (General Manager of Black Head Quarries Ltd), 3 August 1990, Personal interview, Logan Point 
Quarry, Dunedin. 
56 Richard Walls (Mayor of Dunedin), 13 November 1990, Personal interview, Dunedin Civic Centre. Also see: 
Dunedin City COWlcil, Annual Plan 199011991 p. 8. Where the second goal of the mission statement was "To 
create conditions in which existing business can flourish and to which new enterprises will be attracted 
primarily through promotional activities and the provision of incentives." 
57 John Fulton (Chairman of Directors, Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd), 14 August 1990, Personal interview. 
58 Peter Constantine (Planning Consultant), 7 July 1989, Speaking on behalf of Black Head Quarries Ltd, Public 
Meeting, Otago Museum, Dunedin 
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6.3.(ii) The Value of the Quarry to the Company 
Earlier in the chapter I noted that the basalt was quarried and crushed to provide aggregate, 
which was then used as road metal, railway ballast, concrete manufacture and in the production 
of panels for facing buildings. The rock was prized highly for those uses because of its 
extraordinary hardness, hence its durability, and also the uniformity of the rock quality 
throughout the whole structure. 59 The other physical source of value emphasised by the 
Company, was the proximity of the basalt resource to its markets.60 These are the use-values 
inherent within the commodified form. However, as I noted in Chapter Four, business is 
indifferent to a particular use-value per se, rather, they are ultimately concerned with the chase 
after exchange-value. BHQ's valuation of the headland was narrow. It was, first of all, 
concerned with a singular extractive use, and secondly with exchange-values derived from the 
sale of that commodity. The basalt deposits had exchange-value in situ, and as a whole, 
because of the perceived future demand for the end products - from the potential revenue 
streams over the quarry's lifespan. A final preliminary point is that the headland was only of 
interest to the owners to the extent that it could generate profits. Profits could be derived either 
directly, through profitable sales of basalt aggregate, or indirectly, by contribution to the 
profitability of the downstream operations of the parent companies. Both of these factors were 
crucial in this case. 
Obviously, a market valuation will only be fully articulated in the exchange process itself. 
Hence, the determination of a market value outside of that process will be an approximation. In 
this sub-section I set out a series of money-valuations of the Quarry that were proffered during 
the dispute. I shall begin with the lower estimates. 
In 1986 Fulton Hogan and Palmers and Sons purchased the balance of ownership (SO 
percent) of Black Head Quarries for approximately $2SO,000. This would suggest an overall 
value of $500,000.61 It is important to note this figure as the subsequent period of dispute was 
characterised by an exponential rise in estimates of the quarry's market value. The n.ext 
important sum on an ascending scale is that provided by the government valuation carried out 
in 1989 which breaks the estimate down as follows: 
Table 6.1. Government valuation of Black Head Quarries 19S¢2 
Interest in stone: 
Interest in land: 
Total 
59 Dunedin Star 7 June 1989. 
Land value 
Capital value and trees 
Improvements 
Land value 
Capital and trees 
$350,000 
$350,000 
$80,000 
$50,000 
$130,000 
$960,000 
60 R. Cullen, 1991, "Discounting" pp. 1128. Although Cullen noted that there was no shortage of rock for 
quarrying in the area, for Dunedin is sited on the base of an ancient volcano, and the deposits of basalt were 
extensive. 
61 R. Cullen (Lecturer in Economics, University of Otago), July 1990, Personal communication, Dunedin. 
62 Valuation New Zealand, Valuation Roll Enquiry, Val Ref 27861 11000 & 27861 10900, Valuation 
undertaken 1 July 1989. 
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This figure corresponds with the Company's paid up capital of $960,000.63 It is not out line 
with the previous estimate when one takes into account the expansion in the operation between 
1986 and 1989. 
Most of the estimates that were alluded to within the conflict discourse were based in 
some way on the revenue streams that could be derived from the operation over its potential 
lifespan. In an earlier footnote I noted that in 1990 Dr Ross Cullen, a lecturer in resource 
economics at the University of Otago, undertook a research project into the economic valuation 
of the basalt resource at Black Head. Cullen's research is drawn upon extensively in my 
analysis of the negotiated settlement in Chapter Eight, but it is appropriate to use the first part 
of his analysis here to provide a nominal valuation of the resource. Cullen used the following 
figures64: 
Projected life of the quarry 
Output (1988) 
Retail value of the rock (1988) 
Costs 
90+ years 
192,000 toimes 
$12 per tonne 
90-95 percent or approx $10.80 per tonne65 
On this basis the potential gross revenue from the quarry can be calculated by, first· 
multiplying the lifespan of the quarry by the annual output, to derive the total output over 90 
years (90 x 192,000 = 17,280,000 tonnes), and then through multiplying this figure by the retail 
value per tonne (17,280,000 x $12 = $207,360,000). But this figure obviously does not take 
into account the high costs of extraction (90 percent) and the relatively low profit margins 
returned to the Company. So, on the basis of historical margins the net revenue would be 
approximately 10 percent of the nominal sum (=$20,736,000). This is a very high figure 
compared to the estimates presented above, and it is in fact grossly inflated because it does not 
take into account the temporal distribution of production over ninety years. An accurate 
valuation requires the discounting of future revenue streams as contained in Cullen's analysis. 
I will not, however, examine his calculations until I focus upon the substantive outcome of'the 
conflict in Chapter Eight. But I have highlighted the approximate figure of $21 m here because 
it approaches the order of magnitude of the Company's tactical valuations. 
As will be made very clear in the narrative of the conflict contained in the next chapter, 
the decision-making process in the Black Head dispute was largely in the form of an informal 
series of negotiations - it was very much a bargaining process. It is not unreasonable to 
suggest that within a bargaining situation participants will exaggerate their arguments and 
positions for tactical reasons. In the Black Head conflict the Company's public estimates 
ranged between $50 m66 and $90 m.67 These figures were not only remarkably disparate from 
one another, they were vastly inflated compared to, (i) the $500,000 and $960,000 sums set out 
63 Black Head Quarries Ltd, March 1988, Form of Annual Return (for the 1987 fmancial year), Companies 
Office. 
64 R. Cullen, 1991, "Discounting" pp. l1Z3. 
65 It is important to note that the most significant cost in the production of aggregate was the transport costs 
($0.75 per tonne per kilometre). The Company frequently alluded to the fact that it was Black Head's 
proximity to the end users that essentially made it a profitable concern. This was true. However, the 
Company's assertion that there were no alternative sites available, was not true. Ibid 
66 Jim Hunter (General Manager of Black Head Quarries Ltd), 3 August 1990, Personal interview, Logan Point 
Quarry, Dunedin. 
67 Listener &; TV Times 22 January, 1990, p. 103. 
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above, and (ii) even the nominal revenue calculation of $21 m. There was no explanation as to 
how the inflated figures had been arrived at. The essential point that should be made here, and 
that will be reiterated throughout this study, is that while the Company's valuations were totally 
overblown, they were still used in the discourse to dismiss the possibility of either selling, 
relocating or even significantly constraining the Quarry operation. They were used to 
communicate the message to those seeking change, that the Company was not open to 
substantive negotiation. 
BHQ's basic argument within the dispute was that the quarry was of considerable 
economic value. That value was said to derive from the physical qualities of the rock, its low 
extraction costs, and its proximity to its markets. It also derived not only from external sales 
but also from the use of the basalt in the parent companies' downstream enterprises. But the 
issue really centred upon the exchange value itself. A number of estimates were provided 
during the dispute. But as I will later show, the Company was in the strategic position of being 
able to stipulate what the quarry was worth, without having to reveal its own financial analysis, 
and it was also able to disregard any external assessments. 
6.4. The Arguments for Preservation 
The extraction of rock from Black Head necessarily incurred opportunity costs. Potential 
benefits from alternative patterns of use, and indeed non-use, were foregone. Some were lost 
forever and others as long as quarrying activity persisted. In the remainder of this chapter I 
focus upon the arguments for the preservation of Black Head that were articulated in the 
dispute. Those arguments were premised on the alternatives that would be foregone if the 
headland were to be destroyed. I split discussion into two subsections; the first of these 
discusses the broad 'conservation' arguments, and the second subsection deals briefly with the 
Maori relationship with the headland. One general point here, was that by time of the c~x 
period of conflict in the late 19808 there had already been significant damage of the area, some 
of it reversible and some not. However, all of the following arguments were premised on the 
belief that the remaining natural character of the headland was worthy of protection. 
6.4.(i) The Conservation Arguments 
Unlike the Wbanganui Minimum Flows Conflict that follows this study, the conservation 
arguments were not presented in any systematic way within the Black Head dispute (why that 
was so will be made clear in the following chapter). In this discussion I draw together the 
eclectic strands of argument that were articulated in the dispute. I do not list the arguments in 
any particular order of importance, although I will highlight those arguments that fonned the 
nub of the conservation case. 
The first strand of argument can be broadly labelled the intrinsic or natural values 
argument; the values inherent in, essential to, and naturally belonging to, the area 68 
Throughout the dispute the Friends of Black Head maintained that the headland was of value, 
68 Significantly, S. 2 of the Conservation Act 1987 uses the term "intrinsic values in its definition of 
'conservation' . 
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in and of itself, independent of whether or not people visited the area.69 The notion of intrinsic 
values is a highly, indeed essentially, contested one in environmental philosophy,70 
Nevertheless, one does not have to subscribe to the idea of an ultimate 'self-sufficient' form of 
value to accept elements of this argument. The 'natural character of the headland' was referred 
to and the scarcity7! values of both the rock formations (see geological argument below) and 
the coastal ecosystem were stressed, and also the 'life support' and 'species value'.72 However, 
most of the arguments were articulated in terms of peoples' direct and indirect valuations of the 
area of the area. 
The core arguments of the conservation case lay with what can be broadly labelled 
landscape values, the first type of which related to the naturalistic or scientific appreciation of 
both the geology and biota of the headland. At the time of the conflict there was a movement 
to identify and protect "a full cross section of the natural landforms, geological features and soil 
types which best characterise each part of New Zealand".73 The criteria to classify potential 
sites ranked them according to their scientific and educational values, whilst taking into 
account the vulnerability of sites to "modification or destruction by human activity".74 On the 
basis of these criteria a number of scientific organisations advocated the preservation of the 
basalt formations at Black Head. For example, the DSIR in Dunedin argued that "because the 
columnar basalts are such a notable feature of Otago coast volcanics, there is good reason for 
protecting examples in their various settings". They emphasised that none of the local 
examples "rival the spectacular outcrops of the Organ Pipes or Black Head".75 A second 
organisation supporting the campaign for the protection of Black Head at both the national and 
regional level was the New Zealand Geological Society.76 In a letter from the Society to the 
Friends they set out their position: 
We consider that the columns at Black Head are a spectacular example of this geologica1landform, and that 
they are of outstanding scenic and educational value. Though not wrique in the Dunedin area we believe 
they are of considerable scientific interest." ... "We would therefore support moves to restrict quarrying to 
the landward side of Black Head, to preserve the remaining columns, and to restore the area at present 
covered with debris from the quarry. We would support appropriate development and promotion of the 
basalt columns area so that public may have better access and enhanced appreciation of them.77 
The ecological arguments were less prominent in the conservation case. However, throughout 
the conflict Dr Johnson of the Botany Division was a vigorous advocate of the need to protect 
the remnant vegetation. He argued that preservation of those communities was justified on 
both scientific and educational grounds.78 
69 Sue Maturin (Chairperson. Friends of Black Head). 2 September 1991. Personal interview. Dunedin. 
70 Indeed. it is taken by many to be the most important issue in environmental ethics. K Parker, "Pragmatism 
in Environmental Thought" In A. Light, and E. Katz, (eds), 1996, Environmental Pragmatism Routledge, 
London, p. 34. 
71 "Geologic formations are, of course. specific to sites, and as has been widely observed in resource economics. 
sites are finite in number and hence absolutely scarce." R. Cullen. 1991. "Discounting" p. 1121. 
72 Sue Maturin (Chairperson. Friends of Black Head). 2 September 1991. Personal interview; Dr Peter Johnson 
(DSIR Botany Division. Dunedin). 22 February 1991. Personal interview. DSIR. Dunedin. 
73 B. Hayward. August 1989, "Saving the Landforms and Rocks" Forest and Bird Vol. 20. No.3. p. 25. 
74 Ibid, pp. 25-26. 
75 P. Johnson. February 1986, "Black Head Near Dunedin" p. 3. 
76 Friends of Black Head. October 1989. "Black Head: The Conservation Case" p. 3. 
77 Geological Society of New Zealand (Otago Branch), 8 August 1989, Letter to the Friends of Black Head. 
Dunedin. 
78 P. Johnson. February 1986. "Black Head Near Dunedin" p. 5. 
Chapter Six: Black Head: Natural Character, Historical Use, Substantive Arguments 121 
But it was the aesthetic arguments, namely the scenic values, which captured the public's 
attention. The headland was an imposing local landmark that could be seen from quite a 
distance away. However, the view from the landward side was dominated by the quarry 
operation. The scenic values were greatest on the seaward side, where the rock formations and 
native vegetation were to be found. The immense fluted cliffs and striking columnar formations 
were considered spectacular and awe inspiring by many, including the quarry owners 
themselves,?9 Standing at the foot of the headland was described as a "primal experience".80 
A crucial issue in terms of the aesthetic of the area and the options for preservation, was 
the issue of reducibility - ie. to what extent could the natural character of the headland be 
reduced to the value of individual components such as the 'Roman Baths' or the 'Dock'? The 
Friends stressed "the attraction and importance of the whole Black Head setting and not just the 
columns".81 This was partly because much of the aesthetic impact derived from the sheer size 
of the promontory, but there was also a strong sense that the formations were part of an 
integrated whole. They thus argued that retention of the central formations without their 
natural setting would see the columns "reduced to a mere curiosity", and as a result the "spirit 
of the place" would be lost.82 This point had great significance within the bargaining process, 
for it meant the protection of all the cliff faces in any agreement was the minimum acceptable 
outcome for the conservationists.83 
Considerable emphasis was placed upon the spiritual values of the area An editorial in 
the Otago Daily Times observed that visitors are often imbued with a "mystical interest" in the 
area 84 This sense of "wonder" and "awe" was the inspiration for a variety of artistic 
activities.85 Lloyd Godman's photographic essay on the area was displayed in a 1986 
exhibition titled Secrets of the Forgotten Tapu, which toured New Zealand and brought 
national attention to the plight of the headland.86 Sculptors also described the fonnations as an 
incredible "sculpture garden", and painters tried to capture the ambience of the headland on 
canvas.87 
This leads to the next elements of the conservation case - the recreation and tourism 
arguments. Many of the science/natural history and various aesthetic arguments were 
predicated upon, or motivated by, people visiting the site. It was argued that the quarry 
operation deterred and diminished the utility of such uses in two key ways: First, because the 
area of greatest public interest was located on the seaward faces there were serious problems 
with access (hereafter the 'access question'). The headland was best viewed from a boat. 
However, it was an exposed stretch of coastline, which limited that means of approach. The 
primary access-way was from the south, along the beach and rocks from the south of the 
79 John Fulton quoted in Otago Daily Times 11 June 1988, "The Demise of Black Head" Feature article, pp. 12-
13. 
80 Listener & TV Times 22 January 1990, p. 103. 
81 Otago Daily Times 8 June 1989. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Sue Maturin (Chairperson, Friends of Black Head)~ 2 September 1991, Personal interview, Dunedin. 
84 Otago Daily Times 17 February 1990, Editorial. 
85 Sue Maturin (Chairperson. Friends of Black Head), 2 September 1991, Personal interview; Neville Peat, 
(Dunedin writer, and core member of the Friends of Black Head) 1990, Personal interview, Ravensboume, 
Dunedin, November. 
86 Otago Daily Times 11 June 1988. 
87 Ibid. 
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headland. The problem with that route was that the company owned the land down to the mean 
high tide mark and, moreover, actively dissuaded people from trespassing on their land. This 
meant that visitors approaching the formations via the coastline had to remain below this line. 
This in tun limited access to periods of low tide and to when sea conditions were relatively 
calm. However, the danger remained of being caught by the in-coming tide or being washed 
from the rocks by rising seas.88 Furthermore, landward access was problematic, not just 
because of the trespass problem, but also due to the dangers of dislodged material falling from 
either the upper slopes or from the quarry itself. Both Black Head Quarries Ltd and mines 
inspectors from the Ministry of Energy stressed the dangers of passing beneath the cliff faces. 
On the one hand, the Mines Inspectorate was responsible for ensuring that the company ran a 
safe quarrying operation, and on the other hand, it was in the interests of the company to 
comply with safety standards to ensure that they remained in business (hereafter the 'safety 
question').89 
Other recreational uses also figured in the conflict: First, surfers held that some of the 
best waves in the country broke off the headland when the wind conditions were favourable. 90 
Local, regional and national surfing championships had been held there over the previous ten 
years.91 However, by the late 1980s quarrying had already adverse affected the quality of the 
surf (namely, because the lowering of the headland meant that the offshore winds flattened the 
waves).92 Also, access to the beach caused much perturbation throughout the 1980s, due to 
both the hurried construction of an unsightly car park, and to a drain conveying wastewater 
from the quarry directly into the sea thus causing some discolouration.93 There were also 
complaints about the dust and noise emitted from the quarry, and incidents of rocks landing in 
the water during blasting operations led surfers to argue for a "buffer zone" around the 
quarry;94 Secondly, divers also expressed their concern over access to, and the adverse effect of 
spillage upon, the basaltic sea caves, large kelp forests and the abundance of aquatic life.9s The 
Southern Sea Divers and the Otago Underwater Club both recommended to the Department of 
Conservation that the area be considered for marine reserve status; Finally, the area was valued 
as a leisure fishing spot although that activity was also hampered by the difficult access and the 
damage caused by the quarry debris.96 
The tourism arguments were predicated on the possibility that some or all of the above 
recreational uses could form the basis for viable commercial enterprise. By the closing stages 
of the conflict an adventure tourism operator was indeed running inflatable boat trips along that 
stretch of coastline to Black Head. However, for most of the dispute, the tourism arguments 
were being framed in terms of the potential of the resource. The Friends of Black Head made 
88 "Five people have drowned on the headland over the past 20 years" The Dominion Sunday Times 18 JWle 
1989. . 
89 Tony Baker (Mines Inspector. Ministry of Energy. DWledin). 9 May 1986. Letter to Peter Johnson (DSIR). 
Dunedin. 
90 Dunedin Star Midweek 6 December 1989. 
91 Department of Conservation. January 1988. Note for Black Head File 8/366/11. Dunedin. 
92 Dunedin Star Midweek 6 December 1989. 
93 Dunedin Star Weekender 28 January 1990. 
94 Otago Daily Times 11 June 1988. 
9S Dunedin Star Midweek 6 December 1989. 
96 Dunedin Star Midweek 6 December 1989. 
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frequent references to comparable sites in both in New Zealand and overseas sites to justify and 
emphasise their claims. Geological features such as the Curio Bay fossil trees in Southland, the 
Moeraki boulders between Dunedin and Oamaru, and the Pancake rocks at Punakaiki in 
Westland, had all been given protected status because of their scientific, educational and 
aesthetic values. The formations at Moeraki and Punakaiki were popular and lucrative tourist 
stops.97 Similar analogies were drawn with the Giant's Causeway in Ireland and Devil' s 
Postpile in California, both were comparable volcanic features that had become world 
renowned scenic attractions.98 No money valuations were placed on the alternative, and less 
environmentally destructive commercial uses. 
As I observed at the beginning of this section some alternative uses (and non-
uses/decisions not to use) were lost forever with the quarrying at Black Head, and others were 
foregone as long as quarrying continued in the vicinity. The conservation argument was that 
both actual and potential uses of the headland were being destroyed by the quarrying activity. 
The emphasis on potential uses inevitably dealt with uncertainties in some realms (such as the 
tourism potential), but on the whole there were a series of valuable alternatives to quarrying.99 
As I will show in the following chapter, the conservationists' focused on two issues - the 
provision of safe access, and the protection of the seaward periphery if not the headland as a 
whole. The fonner argument was, however, essentially dependent upon the success of the 
latter. 
Finally, I would like to stress that I have included the arguments that were variously 
raised in the dispute. Disciplines such as environmental philosophy and resource economics 
have developed a host of value concepts that could be applied to such an issue (for example, the 
ethical obligation not to destroy one's property, the rights offuture generations100, or existence, 
option and bequest values101), nevertheless the issue here is the historical discourse of the 
Black Head conflict. 
6.4.(ii) The Maori Arguments 
The participation of Maori representatives, and their articulation of the historical relationship of 
the Tangata Whenua of Otago with the headland, are delicate matters that remain shrouded in 
uncertainty. In this discussion I will do two things; first, I will set out some contextual 
discussion about the participants and their standing, secondly, I will summarise the Maori 
arguments as they were expressed in the conflict. 
The Maori arguments were presented, both independently and as part of the FoB, by two 
spokespeople; Peter Carter and Chris Baker of the 'Whanau-o-Otokia;. The Whanau was based 
in the small settlement of Brighton, a few kilometres south of the headland, and its members 
had "northern" origins, which meant that they were not immediately affiliated with the local 
97 P. Johnson, February 1986, "Black Head Near Dunedin" p. 3. 
98 Friends of Black Head, October 1989, "Black Head: The Conservation Case" p. 4. 
99 Sue Maturin (Chairperson, Friends of Black Head), 2 September 1991, Personal interview, Dunedin. 
100 O. Young, 1982, Resource Regimes: Natural Resources and Social Institutions University of California 
Press. Berkeley, p. 5; C. Wolf, 1995, "Contemporary Property Rights, Lockean Provisos. and the Interests of 
Future Generations" Ethics Vol. lOS, July. pp. 791-818. 
101 G. Kerr, and B. Sharp, (eds), 1987, Valuing the Environment: Economic Theory and Applications Centre for 
Resource Management, Lincoln University, Christcurch. 
Chapter Six: Black Head: Natural Character, Historical Use, Substantive Arguments 124 
Ngai Tahu at Otakau on the peninsular proper. 102 Ngai Tahu were not the first tribe to settle 
the region, but by the end of the 18th century they had effectively assimilated the Ngati Mamoe 
and Waitaha people who had occupied the area previously. Through intermarriage the 
whakapapa of those tribes became part of the whakapapa of Ngai Tahu to the point that they 
had no separate political identity.103 However, by the time of the dispute there was an 
emergent political movement that was acting to manufacture a distinct Waitaha identity,l04 I 
mention this because the arguments of Carter and Baker were largely based on Waitaha and 
Ngati Mamoe creation myths. Moreover, the Otakau Ngai Tahu played no part in the dispute, 
although both Carter and Baker claimed that they had some support from the Tangata Whenua. 
They also claimed that all Maori treasured the headland, and that the spiritual values of the 
headland superseded any specific tribal interests. 105 There was, thus, some uncertainty, and the 
deafening silence from Otakau could have meant any number of things. 
Nevertheless, both Carter and Baker presented the following arguments that were 
subsequently adopted in a good deal of the conservationists' advocacy: First, that the headland 
was originally known to Maori as Te Wai 0 Tinerau, and was later named Makereatu, and that 
the headland played an essential part in the creation myths of the area;l06 Secondly, that as I 
noted earlier, the area had been valued as a stone gathering site, and the basalt was prized in the 
manufacture of adzes and chisels due to its hardness; Thirdly, that the waters around the 
headland had been, and remained, a mahinga kai resource;l07 Fourthly, that a complex 
structure of rules governed any activity involving the headland. The nature of those rules was 
determined not only by pragmatic considerations regarding the stewardship of the resource, but 
also by the fact that the Maori saw the headland as a sacred, 'tapu', site. As a 'tapu' place 
Makereatu was an area where "people travelling to and from Otepoti [Dunedin] would stop ... 
to conduct cleansing rituals, removing tapu and clearing themselves either for the business at 
hand in Otepoti, or for their journey south".108 Regardless of the wider relevance of those 
arguments within Ngai Tahu and beyond, for Carter and Baker, and the Otokia people the 
headland was of great cultural significance. 
Finally, I would like to touch upon the position that they took towards the quarrying 
activity. Carter and Baker argued that the "continuation of quarrying is grossly offensive to 
tapu ... ".109 As a consequence, the Maori position in the negotiations was more rigid than that 
of the others opposing the quarry's actions - it was a non-reducible position - and they 
consistently argued for the complete cessation of quarrying at the site.l10 
102 Peter Johnson, 22 February 1991, Personal interview, DSIR, Dunedin. 
103 A. Anderson, 1998, The Welcome of Strangers: An Ethnohistory of Southern Maori A.D. 1650·1850 
University of Otago Press, Dunedin, p. 13.; S. O'Regan, 1992, "Old Myths and New Politics - Some 
Contemporary Uses of Traditional History" New Zealand Journal of History No. 26, pp. 5-27; H. Evison, 
1993, Te Wai Pounamu pp. 7-10. 
104 S. O'Regan, 1992. "Old Myths and New Politics" p. 7. 
105 Peter Johnson, 22 February 1991, Personal interview, DSIR, Dunedin. 
106 The re-naming of the headland apparently symbolised the joining together of the Waitaha and the Kati 
Mamoe peoples. "Makereatu means 'to leave a seed' and the name refers to the time when the seed took hold 
and the two people became one." Friends of Black Head, 1989, "Black Head a Treasure Worth Saving" 
Pamphlet, Dunedin. 
107 Critic 18 April 1989, p. 3. 
108 Friends of Black Head. 1989, "Black Head a Treasure Worth Saving". 
109 Otago Daily Times 16 February 1990, p. 1. 
110 Ibid. 
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6.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have: Provided a basic description of Black Head, the volcanic formations and 
the specific ecology that gave it its special natural character; Outlined the history of quarrying 
at the site and, significantly (as will become apparent as the study progresses) the unique 
bundle of use rights that enabled extraction; described the basic pattern of quarrying activity 
and the consequent damage that use had and would have continued to have had upon the 
natural character of the headland. For the purpose of serving the analytical framework, I 
provided some background information on the business enterprise at the heart of the dispute 
such as its ownership structure, strategic function and resources, especially in the context of the 
Dunedin economy; Finally, I went on to set out the basic arguments (which will be developed 
further over the next two chapters) both for and against either the quarrying activity per se, or 
the particular scale and form of that activity. As a preliminary observation, the arguments for 
quarrying were ultimately based on money values. The arguments against quarrying were 
mostly on the basis of non-commodified fonns of value, and in the few instances where 
commercial arguments were presented, they were in tenns of potential uses and no projected 
figures were presented. 
7 
The Fight for Black Head 
7.1. Introduction 
The object of this chapter is to describe the process of conflict from its beginnings in the 
mid-1980s through to its culmination in 1990. Two sets of issues are intertwined 
throughout: First, there are questions concerning the identity and status of the participants. I 
have already made reference to of a number of groups involved in the conflict and more 
information is provided here about those groups and about groups and individuals not 
previously mentioned (Table 7.1. lists the actors involved in the dispute); And secondly, 
there is the focus upon the process of the conflict between the different actors. 
Discussion is structured on a chronological basis and the chapter has three main 
sections. Section 7.2 discusses the gradual emergence of the issue between 1985 and 1989. 
Section 7.3 covers a much shorter time frame covering about 6-9 months during 1989. 
Conflict escalated during that period, leading to significant changes in the strategic options 
facing the Company, and ultimately providing a basis for the final set of negotiations. And 
finally, section 7.4 covers the final negotiations during late 1989 and the announcement of a 
negotiated settlement. 
7.2. The Emergence of Conflict: 1985-89 
By late 1985 it was evident that the damage to the rock formations at Black Head was 
increasing rapidly. Uoyd Godman, a local photographer who had' previously raised his 
concerns about the impact of the quarry operation, renewed his efforts towards gaining 
protection for the headland. He approached DSIR botanist Dr Peter Johnson who authored a 
1982 scientific report (see 7.1.(i». Their discussions resulted in an updated and expanded 
paper produced by Johnson, which went beyond documenting the botanical features of the 
promontory) The report provided a wider discussion of the threat to Black Head from 
quarrying activity, encompassing issues such as the significance of the geological and 
botanical features in terms of the scientific and amenity values of the area; outlining the 
1 Peter Johnson, February 1986, "Black Head Near Dunedin: A Case for Preserving Features of Scenic, 
Geological and Botanical Interest" UnpUblished report, Botany Division, DSIR, Dunedin. 
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physical impact that basalt extraction had upon the feature; and finally, going a step further 
by setting out a series of specific recommendations for the conservation of what he saw to 
be the most important parts of the headland.2 The significance of the report was threefold: 
First, it dealt with the issue in a more comprehensive manner than before, clarifying the 
arguments for preservation as they presented themselves at that date, and suggesting a 
possible solution to the problem. Secondly, the report was notable in that it was an 
unconcealed exercise in conservation advocacy by a representative of a state agency. And, 
thirdly, it provided a basis for a new phase in the dispute following the change in ownership 
of the quarry. 
Table 7.1. Individuals and Groups involved in the Black Head Conflict 1985 - 1990 
Business Interests 
State Actors 
Opposition Groups 
Groups 
• Black Head Quarries Ltd. (BHQ) 
• Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd 
• Palmer and Sons Ltd 
• Department of Lands and Survey - 1987 
• Department of Conservation (DoC) 1987-
• Mines Division - Ministry of Energy - Dec. 1989 
• Energy and Resources Division - Ministry of 
Commerce 1989-
• Silver Peaks County Council (SCC) - Oct 1989 
• Dunedin City Council (DCC) 
• Native Forest Action Council (NFAC) 
• Maruia Society 
• Whanau 0 Otokia - Brighton Maori Committee 
• Friends of Black Head (FoB) 
Key Personalities 
John Fulton, Jim Hunter 
Robin Thomas, A Perrett 
Jeff Connell 
John Walrond, D Butcher 
Murray Grimwood, Mick 
Robertson, Les Cleveland 
Richard Walls 
Sue Maturin 
Peter Carter, Chris Baker 
Neville Peat, Peter 
Johnson, Lloyd Godman 
Johnson outlined what he saw as a 'minimal reserve area'. The line enclosed the 
southern periphery of the headland, an area that incorporated most of the geological 
fonnations as well as the botanical communities of the greatest interest. However, 
conspicuous by their absence were the eastern bluffs as well as the rest of the coastal 
perimeter of the headland. Protection of the whole headland did not seem to be a necessary 
or realistic option. Yet this position is understandable if one considers the fact that the 
submission was compiled with little knowledge of the 'non-reducible' nature of the Maori 
claims, as well as the low levels of public awareness and interest at that early stage in the 
dispute. The emphasis was upon what was seen to be an achievable solution.3 
The recommendation made by the paper was that "the Otago National Parks and 
Reserves Board pursue this case for preservation with the landowners, Black Head Quarries 
Ltd".4 However, pending any official action upon the report, circumstances changed 
considerably when BHQ was subject to a change of ownership. As I noted in the previous 
chapter, Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd and Palmer and Sons Ltd increased their investments in 
2 Ibid 
3 Peter Johnson, 22 February 1991, Personal interview, DSIR, Dunedin. 
4 Peter Johnson, February 1986, "Black Head Near Dunedin". 
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the quarry. Each of the companies now held a 50 percent interest in the quarry. 
Conservation advocates were back to square one in tenns of establishing a dialogue with the 
Company. 
Johnson's report did not itself stimulate any immediate official action; it "just seemed 
to sit there for a while". However, by mid-March a number of options were mooted for the 
protection of the area.s First, as advocated by the DSIR report, the Department of Lands and 
Survey could possibly negotiate with the Company to purchase the area, or part thereof, to 
accord the headland with scenic reserve status. This option was contingent upon a 
willingness to sell on the part of the Company, a willingness and ability to pay on the part of 
the relevant state agency, and ultimately, the negotiation of a suitable price. The second 
option was to explore the possibility a voluntary conservation covenant.6 This could be 
pursued either by the Department of Lands and Survey under the Reserves Act 1977, or 
alternatively, by the Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust, under the QE II National 
Trust Act 1977. Either way, the covenant option would be consequent upon the voluntary 
action of the Company. Motivation for such a move would necessarily be independent of 
any direct fiscal remuneration for the quarry enterprise. However, it was to be mid-I986 
before Lands and Survey approached the Company's new management. 
During early May, two representatives from Lands and Survey, Chief Ranger Perrett 
and Reserves Ranger Stewart, met with John Fulton of Fulton Hogan Holdings, and Jim 
Palmer, of Palmer and Sons. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the possibility of 
fonnally protecting the Black Head features. During the course of the meeting Company 
representatives indicated that it was the Company's intention to lower the headland through 
continued extraction over a period of 50-100 years.7 They emphasised that this activity 
would preclude any provision of safe access to the fonnations. The Company also made it 
clear that protection of the coastal scrub would be impracticable, and that loss of revenue 
through the protection of the area would amount to an estimated $50 million. The onl~ 
concession they would make was a verbal assurance that "every care will be taken to protect 
the Roman Baths and examples of columnar jointing from damage by spillage".8 The 
Company was unwilling to acquiesce on any of the proposals made by the conservationists. 
Following this, the approach taken by the private conservationists and Lands and 
Survey was to continue placing pressure upon the Mines Division of the Ministry of Energy 
to produce a management plan for the quarry in conjunction with the quarry owners.9 By 
mid-June the essence of a plan was revealed in a local newspaper. 10 The Company had 
5 Dunedin Star Weekender 9 March 1986. 
6 "A statutory covenant is an agreement between a private landowner and some representative body of the 
state, to place a restriction on hislher land, which will govern its future use for a fixed period of time, or in 
perpetuity. The owner continues to manage the land in accordance with the conditions of the covenant, and 
the administrating body becomes a mere overseer to enforce the covenant, for its term." V. Edwards, 1988, 
"Harnessing Private Benefits for the Public Good: A Political Economy of Statutory Covenants and their 
Effectiveness in Protecting Conservation Values on Private Land" MSc Thesis (Resource Management), 
University of Canterbury. 
7 D. Wakelin (for the Commissioner for Crown Lands), 14 May 1986, Correspondence to Peter Johnson, 
DSIR, DWledin, Lands and Survey Reference 81366111. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Native Forest Action Council, 10 November 1987, "Slack Head in Need of Protection" Submission to 
Department of Conservation. 
10 Dunedin Star Midweek 11 JWle 1986. 
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agreed to make use of a hydraulic back actor which, following the completion of blasting 
would drag the rock back thus preventing debris from spilling over the seaward periphery of 
the headland and down onto the rock formations.l1 In addition, it was reported that the 
Company was "also prepared to rectify any damage caused in the past and to accept 
responsibility for the long term preservation of the feature". 12 At face value, it seemed the 
Company had some public motivations, ie. that they were concerned about the social costs 
of their actions. The Mines Division and the Company were by this stage very concerned 
about the danger posed by members of the public moving within close proximity of the 
quarry workings. A serious accident would have the potential to bring into question the 
practicability of operating a 'safe quarry' under the then existing conditions. The safety 
question was a direct threat to the quarry's viability. By offering to provide safe access after 
an initial period of "possi bly ten years", the Company was attempting to temporarily placate 
the conservationists whilst ensuring the continuation of basalt extraction in the vicinity of 
the seaward slopes.13 Justification for this proposal was made through arguments such as 
the following, made by the local Mines inspector; "the public good is better served by 
working towards the common objective of safe public access and minimising of lost basalt 
reserves at the quarry".l4 Allusions to the public interest and the economic wellbeing of the 
region were thought to vindicate the loss of any alternative values provided by the area. 
Casting more doubt on the authenticity of the Company's expressed motivations, was 
the fact that not only had the scale of the operation increased since the change of ownership, 
but quarrying activity had intensified above the seaward faces, with a greater volume of 
rubble spilling down into the Roman Baths area lS Not surprisingly, the conservationists 
looked upon the Company's conciliatory gestures with some scepticism. The campaign for 
formal protection of the features continued, and no definitive management plan was 
produced during the 1986-1987 period. l6 
At this point the conservfltionists had yet to organise themselves into any sort of 
formal group. The campaign for the preservation of Black Head was dependent upon a 
number of concerned individuals, with each person acting upon their own initiative. The 
principal reasons for this diffused support, was a fundamental lack of awareness in the local 
community about the existence of the features, and the potential threat that the quarry posed 
to the headland. Hence, the crucial task was for the conservationists to address this 
information gap. The most significant attempt to do this was made by the same 
photographer who had been a prime mover in the dispute from its very inception. Lloyd 
Godman had devoted a considerable amount of time to photographing the area over a 
number of years. The culmination of his labour was the staging of an exhibition entitled 
Secrets of the Forgotten Tapu. The exhibition had the dual purpose of both presenting a 
collection of artistic works in their own right, and also communicating a political message 
11 Tony Baker (Mines Impector. Ministry of Energy. Dunedin). 9 May 1986. Letter to Peter Johnson (DSIR). 
DWledin. 
12 Dunedin Star Midweek 11 June 1986. 
13 Tony Baker. 9 May 1986. Letter to Peter Johnson (DSIR). Dunedin. 
14 Dunedin Star Midweek II June 1986. 
15 Native Forest Action Council. 10 November 1987. "Black Head in Need of Protection" Submission to 
Department of Conservation. 
16 Ibid. 
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about Black Head. The exhibition gained national attention as it travelled to major centres 
and was a successful catalyst for discussion about the plight of the headland. The exhibition 
was also the subject of a considerable number of reviews and notices that featured in the 
media. 17 The result was the creation of a level of awareness and interest that put BHQ under 
increasing pressure, as well as creating public demand for more substantive action on the 
issue, on the part of the relevant state agencies. 
The Company's approach to the problem during this period had been reactive. Their 
interests were well served as long as the preservation of Black Head remained a relative 
non-issue in the region. In the pursuit of their interests, the Company chose to playa 
passive role, meeting accusations either by firmly denying their authenticity or by 
disregarding them completely. For example, in response to questions from a prominent 
local conservationist John Fulton stated that: "Black Head Quarries is not a Fulton Hogan 
operation, it is a separate Company". While this statement held some truth in that BHQ was 
an associate Company, the thrust of the statement was deceptive - Fulton Hogan did hold a 
SO percent share in the operation. 18 
In the broader context, the latter part of 1986 was a period of considerable flux for the 
environmental administration with the dissolution of a variety of government departments, 
and the amalgamation of conservation functions under the umbrella of the Department of 
Conservation (DoC). The Department of Lands and Survey was subsequently caught up in 
this restructuring. For a while at least day to day problems, such as the Black Head dispute, 
took a back seat to organisational questions. It was not until well into 1987 that the newly 
established Department began to tackle the issue. 
By early 1987 the Dunedin offices of DoC were receiving a considerable number of 
enquires from members of the public with regard to the intensification of quarrying activity 
at Black Head, and the highly visible impact that it was having upon the headland. DoC was 
being asked "if they were concerned about the spillage?" and if so "what were they going to 
do about it ?".19 To members of the staff at DoC it was becoming evident that the dispute 
had the potential to become a major issue. Indeed, the newly appointed District Conservator 
for the Dunedin area, Robin Thomas, had previously had the issue brought to his attention 
by Jim Hunter (of Palmer and Sons Ltd.) during 1986, when Thomas was still Ranger in 
Charge of Stewart Island. Jim Hunter had made his concerns about the issue known, and 
was clearly worried about the future difficulties posed by the still nascent conflict.2o In 
response to this pressure, and in the context of the new institutional framework, DoC 
approached the problem tentatively. 
DoC's primary task was to identify the role it was going to play in the dispute, that is, 
if it was to play any active role at all. The barriers facing the organisation were first, a lack 
of knowledge regarding the substantive content of the issue, and secondly, the absence of 
precedent upon which to base their decisions. Despite these obstacles the legal mechanisms 
17 Otago Daily Times 20 October 1986; Dunedin Star Weekender 19 October 1986; Christchurch Star 27 
November 1986; Christchurch Press 26 November 1986; Christchurch Press 29 November 1986. 
18 Neville Peat, November 1990, Personal interview, Ravensbourne, Dunedin. ' 
19 Robin Thomas (District Conservator, Dunedin District), 14 February 1991, Personal interview, Department 
of Conservation, Dunedin. 
20 Ibid. 
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available to DoC were quite explicit. The need was for the Department to examine the 
dispute against the backdrop of requirements and options set out in its legal mandate.21 
Having made the decision to tackle the issue and needing to "know the ground before it did 
anything," DoC set about the task of providing itself with a comprehensive information 
base. However, because of the demands of the organisation's establishment process the 
initial research exercise was stretched out over three months during 1987.22 
The Conservation Department had two major roles set out in its mandate. The first 
was the legal administration of the conservation estate, and the second a wider advocacy 
role, where the Department was to advocate for the conservation of a broad range of natural 
and historic resources.23 In the case of Black Head, it was logical for DoC to commence 
with an examination of its legal position. That is, the Department had to ascertain whether 
or not it had any statutory obligations with regard to the headland. It soon became clear to 
DoC that despite the destructive impact of the quarrying activity, the Company seemed to be 
operating within the law due to the idiosyncrasies of the rights structure that enabled basalt 
extraction. The one practicable option open in terms of the Department's management 
function was to take prosecution action against the Company for the spillage of material 
onto the foreshore, an option which could be pursued under S. 242 of the Harbours Act 
1950. However, at that stage no spillage had in fact gone beyond the Company's land. The 
Department would have to approach the issue purely in terms of their advocacy function. 24 
The approaches open to those seeking preservation of the headland fell into two 
categories; to seek the cessation of quarrying activity per se, or to pursue options that would 
mitigate the impact of extractive activity. The first options explored by DoC representatives 
when they approached the Company were in regard to the former category. DoC asked the 
Company representatives whether they would be willing to sell the headland. Purchase of 
the headland would facilitate protection by enabling the Department to grant the area reserve 
status pursuant to either the Reserves Act 1977, or the Conservation Act 1987. The 
Company's response was that they would only be willing to sell their interest if they were 
offered a "realistic market price". The sum discussed was "somewhere in the order of $30 
million". The justification was that in addition to the initial costs of purchasing the 
operation, the Company had spent $1 million on plant over the course of the previous year, 
and as was to be expected "it was not going to be a matter of the Company walking away".25 
This sum was well beyond any costs envisaged by the Department. The setting of such a 
high price served to communicate to the conservationists the extent of the Company's 
resolve, making it quite clear that the raison d'etre for the quarry operation lay with the 
production of surplus value, and that the Company considered the Black Head quarry to be a 
strategically significant asset. Consequently, avenues other than acquisition of the area 
needed to be explored.26 
21 Conservation Act 1987 The Act established two main roles for the Department of Conservation. The first 
was the management of the conservation estate. and the second was the mandate to advocate for natural and 
historic resources. (copy from Whanganui) 
22 Robin Thomas (District Conservator. Dunedin District). 14 February 1991. Personal interview. 
23 Conservation Act 1987. 
24 Robin Thomas (District Conservator. Dunedin District). 14 February 1991. Personal interview. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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It was clear that any options for preservation which demanded the mitigation of the 
negative impacts of quarrying activity, required as a logical prerequisite some change of 
extractive method on the part of BHQ. Thus, before any options could be suggested. DoC 
representatives needed to have some knowledge of the methods utilised by the Company for 
the extraction of the basalt resource. This information would also have to be ascertained 
with regard to past, present, and future approaches to the Black Head operation. Hence, one 
of the main topics on the agenda during the first meetings between DoC representatives and 
the Company executives was the issue of quarry procedure. As noted earlier, the original 
quarry operation centred upon a small area on the inland crest of the headland, and damage 
to the seaward periphery had been minimal. However, following the 1986 purchase, the 
quarry operation changed not only in scale, but also in terms of the extraction methods. The 
Company had begun to systematically lower the headland in 15 m steps, as it sought to 
quarry the basalt in the most cost-efficient manner possible.27 
The conservationists had also been demanding a definitive statement on the quarry's 
plans for the use of the area. The management plan issue raised its head once again due to 
the failure of the Mines Division and the Company to produce any such document. The call 
for a management plan to be made public arose for a variety of reasons. Before the process 
of criticism, discussion and the suggestion of alternative options could occur, there needed 
to be some terms of reference based on fact. It was thought that the management plan would 
provide this reference point. In addition, the management plan served as a focus for the 
conservationists, in terms of making their interest known, placing pressure on the state 
agencies and the Company to work towards a resolution.28 
The Mines Division's response to the pressure was to re-affirm their intention to 
complete a draft management plan, stressing also that there was no need for DoC to become 
involved in the issue at that point in time (July 1987).29 However, by mid-August there had 
been little p'rogress in the drafting of the document and DoC had to yet again press the 
Ministry of Energy for a response. DoC had repeatedly offered their services to the Mines 
Division to assist with the compilation of the plan and became increasingly impatient due to 
the pressure placed upon them by interest groups such as the Native Forest Action 
Counci1.3o This interchange had been going on between DoC's Regional office and the 
Mines Division of the Ministry of Energy, yet at the same time DoC's District Conservator 
Robin Thomas had also been tackling the issue with the Company. 
Thomas himself thought DoC was really "trying to achieve the unachievable".3! The 
Company appeared resolute in their position, they had a legal right to mine the area, they 
had a substantial financial investment in the quarry, and as such there was little to motivate 
them to forfeit any potential material benefits offered by the operation. By contrast, DoC 
27 Robin Thomas (District Conservator. Dunedin District). 14 February 1991. Personal interview. Department 
of Conservation. Dunedin. 
28 Heather Muir (Committee Member, NFAC). 23 March 1991. Personal interview, Dunedin. 
29 John Walrond (Inspector of Mines and Quarries). 13 July 1987. Letter to Regional Manager Department of 
Conservation Dunedin, Ministry of Energy. Dunedin. 
30 A. Perrett (for the Regional Manager. Department of Conservation. Dunedin), 10 August 1987. Letter to 
John Walrond Inspector of Mines. Dunedin. Also: A. Perrett July 1987. (for the Regional Manager DoC). 
Internal memorandum to Robin Thomas (District Conservator, Dunedin). "Mines have dragged the claim on 
this issue". 
31 Robin Thomas (District Conservator, Dunedin District), 14 February 1991, Personal interview. 
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had no negotiating power, hefty concessions in dollar terms were not feasible, and there 
were "no carrots for them to dangle".32 Nor were there any apparent sanctions that could be 
employed by the state against the Company, at least not while the Company continued to 
operate within the law. Consequently, the approach taken by DoC was to make it clear to 
the Company that beyond the minimalist obligations of their legal right, there were 
significant ethical obligations. DoC's responsibility was to moderate the Company's 
activities by reference to the concerns of the opposition. The problem facing the 
Department was founded in the necessity that they retain the Company's ear, while making 
sure they still managed to convey their fundamental opposition to aspects of the operation. 
Under the circumstances, this was a fine line to tread}3 
The first meetings between DoC and the Company took place in the boardroom of 
Fulton Hogan Holdings, with a significant number of the Company's directors in attendance. 
Robin Thomas recalled facing "a whole line of grey suited individuals", and his initial 
reaction was to feel somewhat daunted at the prospect34 In the event, it seems that for the 
conservation case this was probably a good thing, ie. there were "many more ears in the 
room".35 These meetings were not so much about stating positions as about trying to 
promote some basic understanding of the prevailing motivations of all involved. Thomas 
made use of the various specialists available to him. The Conservancy scientists detailed the 
basic characteristics of the conservation and recreation values of the area. At the same time 
the DoC representatives were attempting to acquaint themselves with the basic tenets of the 
Company's situation. The outcome of these initial talks was not any substantive progress in 
the pursuit of a resolution, but rather the laying of the foundations for further dialogue 
between the groups.36 
DoC's next move was to float a variety of proposals with BHQ. The Company had 
from a very early stage committed itself to the intensive and systematic diminution of the 
headland. As noted previously, the promontory was to be lowered in 15 metre steps down to 
the 30 m level. Any concessions to the conservation of the rock forms would be made in 
terms of attempting to limit the inevitable spillage that would occur in such circumstances.37 
In response to this, the question asked of the Company by Thomas was "why should the 
Company now get themselves involved in things that may never need happen?"38 The point 
at issue was the seemingly steadfast position being taken by the Company and the potential 
it had for ruling out any future options. Consequently, the first proposal made by Thomas 
was an attempt to get the Company to adopt a technique that would not rule out future 
options. It involved the adoption of a minimum impact approach 'to the operation. The 
method mooted by Thomas was that the Company cease its current approach of taking 
layers off the headland by moving to the seaward faces and then moving back towards the 
centre of the quarry. He proposed the quarry engineers extract the rock from the inland side 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 JOM Fulton (Chainnan of Directors. Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd.), 14 August 1990, Personal interview, 
Fairfield, Dunedin. 
38 Robin Thomas (District Conservator, Dunedin District), 14 February 1991, Personal interview. 
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instead. By taking this option the Company could avoid the necessity of tackling the 
conservation issue for a substantial period of time.39 The Company dismissed his solution 
as untenable. The proposal was made in discussions between Thomas and Fulton. Fulton, 
despite his own lack of knowledge regarding quarry method, rejected the suggestion on the 
grounds that it would be impracticable to quarry in such a way. Yet most of the other 
quarries in the Dunedin area used the same approach suggested by Thomas. A more feasible 
reason for the Company's reluctance was in regard to the very low extraction costs incurred 
by the method used by BHQ. Also, there were other psychological barriers involved, as the 
Company inevitably would object to having aspects of their operation dictated by other 
actors. The discussions on quarry method resulted in no immediate changes. 
The second issue raised by DoC concerned the end use of the basalt from the quarry. 
Thomas questioned the efficacy of using what the Company repeatedly described as rock of 
exceptionally high quality for the same end uses as so called "inferior gravels".4O His 
contention was that by the profligate use of the rock for "low grade jobs" the Company was 
failing to utilise the rock in the most efficient manner possible.41 He suggested that a small-
scale operation concentrating on producing "high quality building material" would be far 
more appropriate.42 The Company dismissed this particular option, emphasising their 
already considerable investment in the quarry in terms of plant and machinery, and arguing 
that not only would they have to move into another market for their product, but they would 
effectively have to create that market - an option that they were unwilling to pursue.43 
Underpinning the Company's response was their belief in the sovereignty of the market; the 
"demand for their product was there, and as a business enterprise they would respond to the 
demands of the consumer".44 
The atmosphere in the early meetings between DoC and the Company was particularly 
strained. The Company representatives were polite and courteous to DoC, yet they were 
unwavering in their position with regard to Black Head. Whilst continuing to express their 
Willingness to "listen to reason", their basic stance remained "if you want it, you buy it".45 
For John Fulton, the discussions did not constitute 'negotiations' as such. However, it made 
sense in public relations terms for the Company to be seen to be listening.46 
Local interest groups also established some direct contact with the Company around 
this time. Throughout the dispute Company was reluctant to deal with the private 
conservation groups. The Company made it quite clear that their "real concern has been 
with DoC, as they stand for the whole community".47 However, the rationale for this stance 
39 Ibid. 
40 Lloyd Godman, 14 August 1990, Personal interview, Dunedin. 
41 Robin Thomas (District Conservator, Dunedin District), 14 February 1991, Personal interview. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 John Fulton (Chairman of Directors, Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd.), 14 August 1990. Personal interview. 
Fairfield, Dunedin. 
45 Robin Thomas (District Conservator. Dunedin District). 14 February 1991. Personal interview. Department 
of Conservation, Dunedin. 
46 John Fulton (Chairman of Directors. Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd.). 14 August 1990. Personal interview, 
Fairfield, Dunedin. Also: Jim Hunter (General Manager. Black Head Quarries), 3 August 1990, Personal 
interview, Logan Point, Dunedin. 
47 Ibid. 
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was based not only upon the nature of the organisation's constituency, but also with regard 
to the way the various groups advocated their positions. BHQ considered DoC a more 
rational and realistic agent, with whom they could work constructively towards a 
"reasonable" solution.48 The Company's ambivalence towards the private conservation 
groups resulted in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and conflict. Despite talking 
occasionally with those groups, the Company felt "that if they gave away one inch, the 
conservationists would want three".49 There were no means by which the conservationists 
could force the Company to sit around a table with them, and the Company could determine 
whom they either would or would not deal with. 
By November of 1987, the coalition of conservationists that became the Friends of 
Black Head (FoB) began to form. Although initiated by Lloyd Godman, the group soon 
came to be guided by Sue Maturin, who was at that time the chairperson of the 
Otago/Southland branch of the Native Forest Action Council (NFAC),50 an organisation 
with a tradition of mining protest.51 The coalition was comprised of a small collection of 
representatives from various organisations. Each of these organisations, as well as a number 
of interested individuals, were motivated by differing perceptions of what they saw to be the 
value of Black Head. However, all were in agreement about their ultimate goal, which was 
the conservation of the headland. Over the next year and a half the size of the group 
oscillated around a core of between six to twelve individuals. The nature of the campaign 
over that period lent itself not so much to mass participation, but to the intensive 
involvement of a few devoted actors. Their initial collective action focused upon the 
gathering of necessary information, and the lobbying of both the Company and 
government.52 Finally, an integral element of the FoB was played by the Maori 
representatives Peter Carter and Chris Baker of the 'Whanau 0 Otokia' (see 6.4.(ii)). 
Although the FoB did not perceive it as their role to be the advocates for the Maori position, 
the two groups often acted in conjunction with one another. 53 
During 1987 the conservationists had approached John Fulton "every three months or 
so" to ask him questions about the quarry.54 However, by November Sue Maturin, 
provoked by the increasing damage to the Roman Baths area and by the evident lack of 
progress made by DoC, organised a meeting between the newly established coalition and the 
48 John Fulton (Chainnan of Directors, Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd.), 14 August 1990, Personal interview, 
Fairfield, Dunedin. 
49 Jim Hunter (General Manager, Black Head Quarries), 3 August 1990, Personal interview, Logan Point, 
Dunedin. 
50 Peter Johnson. 22 February 1991, Personal interview, DSIR, Dunedin. 
51 Neville Peat, 1990, Personal interview, Ravensbourne, Dunedin, November. 
52 For example: The preparation of a submission to DoC by the NFAC set out the arguments and options for 
conservation. The options at that time were seen to be; "(I) That the Department of Conservation agree to 
purchase the headland and create a scenic reserve over the area formerly recommended by Dr Peter Johnson 
in 1986; (2) The Department of Conservation negotiate with the company to secure a protective covenant 
over the area recommended for a scenic reserve; (3) The Department of Conservation and Mines Division 
negotiate with the company to create a buffer zone around the rim of the cliff above the coastal features to 
prevent spillage of quarry debris over the sides." With the added qualification "that all of the above options 
should incorporate a requirement that the company restore the Roman Baths." (Although, it is important to 
point out that even at this stage the Eastern Bluffs were not incorporated in the conservationists claims). Sue 
Maturin (Chairperson Otago/Southland branch NFAC), 1987, Submission to the Department of 
Conservation, Dunedin, November 10. 
53 Peter Johnson. 22 February 1991, Personal interview, DSIR, Dunedin. 
54 John Fulton (Chairman of Directors, Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd.), 14 August 1990, Personal interview. 
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Company.55 The meeting was held at the offices of Fulton Hogan Holdings on December 4. 
In attendance were Chris Baker and Peter Carter (Whanau-o-Otokia), Sue Maturin (NFAC), 
Peter Johnson (DSIR), Lloyd Godman, Rod Rust (South Coast Board Riders Association), 
and at the invitation of Peter Johnson, Les Cleveland (a Dunedin businessman and local 
body politician, active conservationist as well as personal friend of John Fulton).56 The 
conservationists put their points of view to John Fulton. Fulton listened to the arguments, 
and in response reiterated the Company's position and emphasised the contribution it made 
to the local economy. He remained non-committal about measures the Company could take 
to appease the coalition. To the conservationists Fulton came across as being slightly hostile 
in his manner. 57 The impression received by Robin Thomas of DoC was that the original 
meetings such as this one between the environmental groups and the Company, most 
probably served to harden the Company's resolve; as the Company felt that they were being 
unjustifiably targeted by the coalition members. 58 
The negotiation framework was already determined at a relatively early stage in the 
dispute. Any outcome regarding the future of the headland would be contingent upon the 
Company's assent, with the Company exercising the power to determine who they were 
going to negotiate with, if indeed they were to agree to negotiate at all. Under the 
circumstances it was to mean that DoC was to be the bargaining agent and advocate for the 
conservation case in any negotiations with the Company. The private conservation groups 
were to be effectively excluded from any direct participation in this process. However, the 
strategic implications of this exclusion proved to be quite convenient in terms of enabling 
DoC to carry out its task. That is, DoC could play itself off against the more extreme claims 
made by the conservation groups. Robin Thomas noted that DoC did not have to ask for 
much less than the FoB before their claims sounded quite reasonable to the Company.59 
As the dispute carried into 1988, it was apparent that positions were hardening, with 
no real progress being made towards a resolution.60 In response to this impasse, coalition 
members approached DoC in an effort to procure an undertaking that the Department would 
continue to "actively pursue the protection of the land and sea values of Black Head".61 
Having obtained this, the task became one of ascertaining the means by which the goal of 
preservation could be sought. The conservationists decided to approach the problem at a 
number of levels. First, following their previous efforts at furthering the Company's 
understanding of their motivations and goals, the conservation groups arranged an 
orientation tour of the basalt formations. This took place in late January, with John Fulton 
and Churchill Walls (Quarry Manager) attending as representatives of the Company. For 
both of these men it was the first time they had seen the formations, other than from the 
vantage point of looking down from the edge of the quarry. Representatives of the state 
55 Sue Maturin (Chairperson Native Forest Action Council). 17 November 1987, Letter to John Fulton, 
Dunedin. 
56 Peter Johnson, 4 December 1987, Notes taken at meeting, Fairfield, Dunedin.. 
57 Peter Johnson, 22 February 1991, Personal interview, DSIR, Dunedin. 
58 Robin Thomas (District Conservator, Dunedin District), 14 February 1991, Personal interview. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Tony Perrett (Principal Conservation Officer), 13 January 1988, Conservation Department File 8/366/11, 
Dunedin. 
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agencies and the coalition also attended, and consequently the atmosphere during this trip 
although remaining civil, was apparently quite tense. A notable feature of interaction 
throughout the dispute was that the more acrimonious meetings occurred when more than 
two parties were involved.62 
Secondly, it was decided that concomitant with activities such as the inspection tour, 
DoC would continue to negotiate with the Company directly.63 The Company was 
amenable to this option, and agreed to meet with Robin Thomas to discuss the matter 
further. 64 To help facilitate this task DoC sought the assistance of Les Cleveland, the 
Dunedin businessman and conservationist mentioned above. It was hoped that by working 
with Cleveland they could possibly bridge part of the abyss that stood between the various 
parties to the dispute.65 And finally, in light of the stalemate, and the resultant need to 
provide the Company with greater incentive to negotiate constructively, DoC once again 
looked closely at the possibility of bringing a prosecution against the Company under the 
Harbours Act 1950.66 
Meanwhile, as the campaign intensified, the extent of public awareness continued to 
increase.67 As well as seeking media attention, the conservationists were targeting specific 
groups, such as the directors of the relevant companies, with letters setting out their 
arguments and demands.68 However, the result was that BHQ felt under siege from the 
conservationists, thus fuelling their intransigence on the matter. The Company became 
much less open in discussion, deciding instead to carry on quarrying the basalt regardless of 
public opinion.69 Recourse to legal mechanisms in the pursuit of preservation seemed more 
inevitable as the year progressed. 
7.3. The Threat of Litigation and the Legal Proceedings 
The Company had thus far approached the dispute as if it were a zero-sum problem. That is, 
in terms of tackling the substantive content of the conflict, BHQ played out their role as if 
they were faced with a simple binary choice: there would be a winner and a loser, with little 
room in between for cooperative strategies. Moreover, while the Company remained in the 
dominant position this situation would prevail. This section examines the process by which 
the Company was encouraged to abandon its uncompromising stance in favour of a more 
conciliatory strategy. Before embarking upon this task it is useful to introduce the concept 
of a participant's BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement).70 
62 Robin Thomas (District Conservator, Dunedin District), 14 February 1991, Personal interview, Department 
of Conservation, Dunedin. 
63 Tony Perrett (Principal Conservation Officer), 13 January 1988. 
64 John Fulton, 3 February 1988, Letter to Sue Maturin, Dunedin. 
65 Peter Johnson, 22 February 1991, Personal interview, DSIR, Dunedin. 
66 Tony Perrett (Principal Conservation Officer), 13 January 1988. 
67 Robin Thomas (District Conservator, Dunedin District), 14 February 1991, Personal interv iew, Department 
of Conservation, Dunedin. 
68 Otago Daily Times 11 June 1988. Also: Sue Maturin (Friends of Black Head), 24 May 1988, Letter, to the 
Directors of Black Head Quarries Ud., Fulton Hogan Holdings and Palmer and Sons Ltd., Dunedin. 
69 Robin Thomas (District Conservator, Dunedin District), 14 February 1991, Personal interview. 
70 See R. Fisher and W. Ury, 1987, Getting to Yes: How to Negotiate to Agreement Without Giving In Arrow 
Books, London, pp. 10 1-110. 
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Within a bargaining situation, a participant's bargaining strength is contingent upon 
factors external to the negotiation process itself; "one's power within the negotiation 
depends on the impact of possible failure of the negotiations".7l Hence, it follows that "the 
consequences of non-agreement detennine the relative attractiveness of settlement".72 
Roger Fisher and William Ury thus coined the phrase BATNA, to describe this measure of 
bargaining strength,73 This concept can be used to provide a clear assessment of two of the 
disputes features; first, the relative bargaining strengths of the various groups, and secondly, 
some indication of how the various actors pursued their goals by improving their alternatives 
to negotiation.74 
At this stage in the dispute the Company was in the position where their alternatives to 
negotiation were preferable to that option. Hence, the Company's capacity to hold 
command over the other agents in the bargaining process. Conversely, the conservationists 
were faced with a less propitious set of alternatives and exercised little influence in the talks 
with the Company. For the conservationists the challenge lay with the task of developing 
their alternative means of pursuing preservation, to "improve the consequences of non-
agreement".75 If they could succeed in doing so then they could possibly alter the dynamics 
of the bargaining framework in their favour. 
The most promising mechanism available to the conservationists was seen to lie with 
the application of some sort of legal sanction against the quarry operation. Within the 
context of environmental conflict, litigation may offer a number of advantages for an 
aggrieved party. To start with litigation can perfonn an agenda setting function.76 Although 
the Black Head dispute was already developing into a major issue in the region by late 1988, 
it is probable that the profile of the conflict was sub~equently raised due to the initiation of 
legal proceedings. However, of greater significance in the case of Black Head was the fact 
that litigation could offer empowerment By opting to litigate a dispute a small group can 
derive some leverage to force some action on the matter in contention (although, the unequal 
distribution of structural resources may mean that small groups such as environmentalistS 
are not be able to pursue legal remedies due to prohibitive financial costs).77 
But in practice, recourse to the courts would be dependent upon, on the one hand, an 
appropriate legal provision, and on the other hand, the evidence necessary to justify the case. 
I now focus on those matters. 
7.3 (i) The Legal Options 
The conservationists were faced with an array of potential legal options, a number of which 
seemed to offer some promise for the mitigation of the impact of quarrying activity. 
However, it was clear that in pragmatic terms certain provisions would afford a greater 
71 L. Bacow and M. Wheeler, 1984, Environmental Dispute Resolution Plenum Press, New York, p. 38. 
n Ibid. 
73 R. Fisher and W. Ury, Getting to Yes pp. 10 1-110. 
74 Although, as I made clear in my review of the ADR literature in Chapter Three, ones' 'power' within a 
bargaining situation will derive from many factors, including those at the heart of this thesis. 
75 L. Bacow and M. Wheeler, 1984, Environmental Dispute Resolution p. 38. 
76 Ibid, p. 13. 
77 Ibid, p. 12. 
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chance of success than others. This was not only due to the applicability of the provisions to 
the case itself, but also to such considerations as cost and the willingness of those charged 
with administering the various statutes to engage in litigation. In the following paragraphs, I 
will briefly outline a few of the more promising options which faced the conservation 
groups, a number of which were pursued simultaneously in an effort to incur some sanction 
against the quarry operation. 
As mentioned earlier, the most prudent option seemed to lie with the possibility of a 
prosecution under the Harbours Act 1950. S. 242. (1) of the Act provided, inter alia, that: 
Every person commits an offence against this Act who does, or causes, or suffers to be done, 
any of the following things so as to be or tend to the injury of navigation, that is to say:-
(a) Casts or suffers to fall, either from on board any vessel or from land, any ballast, rock, stone, 
slate, shingle, gravel, sand, earth, cinders, rubbish, or other substance or thing on any tidal land, 
or into any harbour or tidal water, or into the sea below low water mark ... 
As DoC administered the Act, any chance of a prosecution under S, 242 (1) was reliant upon 
their Willingness and capacity to take up the burden of such a task,18 In the event, DoC was 
to display that willingness. However, the more pressing obstacle was that of proving that 
the debris that had spilled into the tidal zone, and had done so as a result of quarrying 
operations rather than through natural means. If DoC could manage to authenticate its 
claims and succeed in winning a prosecution, then the possibility existed for the issue of a 
removal notice under S. 177 of the Harbours Act. In addition, the Company could be judged 
liable to pay for the removal of the stone, pursuant to S. 242 (2) of the Act. It was not, 
however, until early 1989 that hard evidence could be obtained to substantiate the 
allegations that material had fallen into the sea as a result of extractive activity. 
The second major option arose with regard to the safety question. The quarry at Black 
Head fell under the regulation of the Quarries and Tunnels Act 1982. During 1988 and 1989 
administration of the Act still remained under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Energy 
(today Energy and Resources Division of the Ministry of Commerce), with the policing of 
the provisions of the Act being undertaken by the Inspector of Quarries. A requirement of 
the Act is that quarry managers take all reasonable precautions for the safety and health of 
workers and persons lawfully in or about the quarry.79 Therefore, the FoB contended that 
the quarry operation was "posing a significant danger to members of the public using the 
Crown land below the mean high tide mark".80 The Friends thus proceeded to place 
pressure on the Mines Division to make some attempt to force the Company to alter its 
management regime in such a way as to eliminate this threat to public safety. However, the 
feasibility of using this provision as a lever against the Company was somewhat 
questionable for three reasons: First, in terms of application of the law, factors such as the 
remoteness of the site and its contiguity with the sea would most probably serve to limit the 
utility of the provision for the conservationists if it carne to judicial proceedings; Secondly, 
78 Under S. 252. Harbours Act 1950 the penalty for offences under S. 242 (1) as a fine not exceeding $1000. 
which would not in itself have been a significant deterrent to a company such as Black Head Quarries Ltd. 
During this time, the Friend's of Black Head received free legal advice from lawyers connected to the 
Maruia Society. Their advice was that repeated prosecutions might have some impact P. Majury (Russel 
McVeigh, McKenzie, Bartlett & Co. Barristers and Solicitors, Auckland), 17 February 1989, Letter to Sue 
Maturin. 
79 Quarry Regulations1983 Reg. 10. 
80 Lloyd Godman, 7 March 1989, Letter to the Mines Inspector. Dunedin. Also; Friends of Black Head. 7 
March 1989, Letter to David Butcher (Minister of Energy). 
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there was the problem of organisational recalcitrance, as the Ministry of Energy consistently 
avoided the possibility of their being drawn into the midst of the dispute; Finally, by 
focussing attention solely upon the safety question, debate would be moving even further 
away from the substantive environmental concerns at the heart of the conflict. 
The third potential legal avenue was the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. Under 
S. 77 of that Act the Silver Peaks County Council (within whose district Black Head lay, 
prior to local body reform), had the "duty to keep objectionable elements in connection with 
certain uses of land to a minimum". With respect to Black Head, the problem lay in 
ascertaining whether or not aspects of the quarry operation constituted an 'objectionable 
element'. Although it seemed that the quarry was not in itself an 'objectionable element', 
there remained the possibility of categorising the falling debris as such.81 Once again, the 
execution of this option would be contingent upon both the favourable predisposition of the 
Silver Peaks County Council, and the provision of sufficient evidence to back the claims. 
Before discussion moves on to outline how the conservationists utilised the three legal 
options set out above, I will examine briefly a few of the constraints imposed by litigation 
upon the decision process. 
As a mode of resolution, litigation per se was inadequate and inappropriate in the 
Black Head context for a series of reasons:82 First, due to the focussed nature of the law, 
and the fact that "environmental litigation is ostensibly directed at narrow procedural and 
legal issues", the essence of the underlying environmental question would be neglected.83 
Instead those engaged in the legal process could have found themselves arguing "shadow 
issues" with one substantive issue effectively becoming a surrogate for another.84 All of the 
above potential legal options centred upon the issue of compliance. Each of the three main 
legal arguments essentially called for compliance with various substantive provisions of the 
existing resource regime.85 Here one must remember that the anomalous rights structure out 
of which the conflict arose was in fact part of that same regime; A second problem aro~ 
because "litigation is not a finely tuned device for registering intensities of preference".86 
The content of any judicial decision may have been be far removed from the preferences of 
the general public; Finally, as was noted previously, while the costs of initiating legal 
proceedings may have been relatively low, the later stages of the legal process could be 
costly.87 In light of these three arguments, the most apparent advantage to be gained from 
commencing legal proceedings was the communication of a credible threat of litigation. The 
utility of legal action for the conservationists would, however, diminish as the process of 
litigation progressed. 
81 P. Majury (Russel McVeigh, McKenzie, Bartlett & Co. Barristers and Solicitors, Auckland), 17 February 
1989, Letter to Sue Maturin. ' 
82 These reasons reflect the general thrust of the Alternative Dispute Resolution literature discussed in 3.2(i). 
83 L. Bacow and M. Wheeler, 1984. Environmental Dispute Resolution p. 18. 
84 Ibid. 
85 O. Young. 1982, Resource Regimes: Natural Resources and Social Institutions University of California 
Press. Berkeley, p. 39. See also: O. Young. 1979. Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with 
International Implications John Hopkins Press, Baltimore. Ch. 1. 
86 L. 8acow and M. Wheeler, 1984. Environmental Dispute Resolution p.IS. 
87 Ibid. 
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7.3.(ii) DoC's Changing Role: from Conservation Advocacy to Eliciting Compliance 
The conflict came to a head during the latter half of 1988, when the Company moved its 
activity to the coastal periphery of the headland. This action resulted in the spillage of a 
substantial quantity of rock over the crest of the seaward faces, with some material falling 
down into the sea itself. In addition, further repeated spills over a period of months caused 
the debris to build up at the bottom of the slopes. The spills were significant both in their 
magnitUde, and in the extent to which they were unmistakably caused by quarrying activity. 
As a result of the succession of landslides, the conditions necessary for the execution 
of legal proceedings against the quarry under the Harbours Act were almost fulfilled. 
However, two other requirements needed to be satisfied before legal action could progress. 
The first was the need to obtain sufficient evidence to support any proceedings. The second 
was to make sure that the Department of Conservation, as the agent charged with the 
responsibility of eliciting compliance with the conditions of the existing resource regime, 
would manage to retain the political will necessary for the execution of this task. It was not 
until March of 1989 that these latter criteria were fulfilled. 
On 3 March 1989 blasting operations created a new rock scree which tumbled down 
the seaward faces, burying some of the Roman baths area and spilling into the ocean. The 
spillage was brought to the public's attention by members of the FoB, who had been keeping 
a close eye on the area over the past months in order to catch the Company in the act The 
Department of Conservation was subsequently made aware of the spillage, and DoC staff 
subsequently witnessed material falling into the tidal area. In light of this evidence DoC 
took a step closer towards the possibility of a prosecution by seeking legal advice (before 
moving any further).88 The problem for the conservationis'ts thus turned to the second 
prerequisite, that of the willingness of DoC to become ~ntangled in such a potentially costly 
exercise. Hence, for the conservationists it was crucial they made sure that they could enlist, 
through their media campaign, enough public support to convince DoC of the efficacy of th~ 
legal option. The new agency was still engaged in the establishment process, the extent to 
which the public actively supported their moves would largely determine the path that they 
would ultimately pursue. As it happened, DoC was to proceed with legal action, laying a 
charge against BHQ in the Dunedin District Court.89 The charge was made under the 
authority of the Harbours Act 1950 ss 242 (1) and 252. For the participants in the dispute, 
the initiation of legal proceedings represented a significant change in the conflict's status, 
altering the incentive structures of the participants and providing them with a new set of 
strategic options. 
The legal proceedings would have significant costs for both parties concerned. The 
most apparent cost involved was the financial burden that litigation made upon DoC and the 
Company. First of all, there was the possibility of a fine being imposed against the 
Company under S. 252 for S. 242 (1) and (2) of the Harbours Act. However, it is doubtful 
that the fine per se would have provided sufficient pecuniary sanction against the Company 
to significantly raise the costs of non-compliance, due to the fact that the maximum possible 
88 Otago Daily Times 6 March 1989. 
89 Julian Rodda (the then Regional Conservator for DoC, Otago/Southland Region), March 1989, 
Infonnation, Dunedin District Court, March. 
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fine under S. 252 was only $1000. Even if there were repeated prosecutions against the 
Company, it is doubtful that the accrual of the fines would have in itself affected the 
Company's position. As mentioned earlier, a second possible financial cost the courts could 
impose upon the Company would be the costs involved if the Company were to be issued 
with a removal notice pursuant to S. 177, and judged liable to pay for the removal of the 
stone under S. 242 (2). Such costs could in fact amount to a much greater sum due to the 
complex technical problems posed by such an exercise. However, they too would be 
detenninant upon the successful prosecution of the Company. Under the circumstances, it 
seemed unlikely that such a decision would be made.90 
As well as the financial costs that could potentially be imposed by the courts, there 
were other monetary costs that would accrue to the parties regardless of any final decision 
by the court. Most significant, were the legal expenses that would inevitably be incurred 
over what could possibly have proven to be an extended period of time. BHQ was highly 
motivated in its desire to acquit itself of the charges, and they subsequently hired legal 
counsel at the cost of $250 per hour. For the Company, the costs of providing a defence 
would be sizeable (the projected cost of the defence was seen to lie somewhere between 
$50,000 and $100,000).91 This was large sum compared to the maximum possible fine for a 
proven infringement. For DoC the expense involved would also have been substantial, and 
difficult to justify given the wide demands placed on the Department's small budget.92 
Finally, of some influence, was the consideration that even if the Company succeeded in its 
defence, this would not preclude DoC from attempting to prosecute them again in the 
future.93 A wasteful and unnecessary game of attrition appealed to neither party. It was 
thus in light of these facts that John Fulton clearly stated that as far as he was concerned 
"money was a decisive factor in providing the impetus for a negotiated settlement".94 
However, although the monetary considerations were crucial in detennining the paths the 
various actors were to take, the implications of the legal action were not exclusively 
financial. 
In addition to the financial costs of proceedings there was the issue of public 
perceptions. The consequences of legal action, in public relations tenns, would in all 
probability be asymmetric. BHQ as the alleged violator would incur a significant measure 
of public disapprobation regardless of whether or not they were guilty. Non-compliance 
with the rules of the existing regime would not generate a favourable public perception of 
the Company. On the contrary, the possibility existed for the Company (and more 
significantly its parent companies) to be labelled environmental criminals. Moreover, such a 
perception could ultimately have financial ramifications for those organisations, if their 
business operations were to be adversely affected in any way. For a company that played a 
key role in the local economy such an image would be undesirable. John Fulton went even 
90 Robin Thomas (District Conservator, Dunedin District), 14 February 1991, Personal interview. 
91 John Fulton, 3 February 1988, Letter to Sue Maturin, Dunedin. 
92 Robin Thomas (District Conservator, Dunedin District), 14 February 1991. Personal interview. 
93 John Fulton, 3 February 1988, Letter to Sue Maturin, Dunedin. 
94 Ibid. 
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further when he declared that "the issue was not doing Dunedin any good," ie. what was 
good for the Company was good for the region.95 
The controversy also took its toll in other ways. The potential for escalation of the 
conflict only served to compound the problems. Considerable uncertainty, and the 
possibility of the progressive loss of public goodwill, placed both the officers and the 
employees of the Company under varying degree of stress. This obviously depended upon 
the personality of the participants, yet even Fulton admitted that it was "playing havoc with 
his ulcer".96 For others such as Jim Hunter, the 'bad guy' label was uncomfortable, and 
consequently for him improving the public perception of the Company was the most 
important motive for BHQ to pursue a more conciliatory stance. For Hunter the incentive to 
negotiate was "basically a matter of goodwill", the cost of litigation in dollar terms being 
less important.97 As the companies involved were Dunedin based, and Dunedin being a 
relatively small centre, the influence of community values would be significant, and the 
businessmen making decisions about Black Head would have to live with their actions. 
Before moving on, there are two significant points to note. First, there is the question 
of who was most likely to prevail in a legal battle. In the months that followed the laying of 
charges it became increasingly clear that BHQ was in a comparatively better legal position. 
This was due to a number of reasons regarding both the purpose of the relevant sections of 
the Harbours Act, and the proof of intent on the part of BHQ to cause an offence. BHQ's 
defence was based upon the arguments that the "rock which had fallen into the sea was not 
in fact cluttering up the waterways", and in addition, that it was not a case of purposeful 
dumping, but rather it was "inevitable spillage",98 The Company was confident of winning 
its case in court,99 whereas DoC was uncertain whether they should go through with the 
action. lOO However, as mentioned above, the possibility existed of repeated prosecutions 
under the Act, regardless of who initially prevailed in court. 
The second point deals with an issue raised in Chapter Six; that the exchange-value o~ 
the Black Head operation was, in all likelihood, far smaller than the excessive estimates 
regularly suggested by the officers of BHQ. Indeed, as discussion in Chapter Eight will 
show, the costs to the Company of any concessions to the conservationists were also far less 
than the Company were admitting. Thus litigation was not necessarily the most attractive 
option. 
In the months that followed the filing of charges in the District Court, the level of 
public interest and the intensity of the conservationists' campaign rose to unprecedented 
levels. Contemporaneous with the Harbours' prosecution there were a series of alternative 
paths pursued in the quest for protection of the headland. 
In my previous discussion of the legal options I touched upon the 'safety question' , 
and concluded that the provisions of the Quarries and Tunnels Act 1982, and the Quarries 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Jim Hunter (General Manager. Black Head Quarries). 3 August 1990. Personal interview. Logan Point. 
Dunedin. 
98 Ibid. Also: John Fulton. 3 February 1988, Letter to Sue Maturin. Dunedin. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Robin Thomas (District Conservator, Dunedin District), 14 February 1991, Personal interview. 
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Regulations 1983, were not the most promising legal options available to the 
conservationists. However, the safety question was an important component of the dispute, 
and one that was dealt with concomitant with the Harbours Act action. In March 1989 the 
FoB initiated correspondence with various government agencies emphasising the danger to 
the public that the quarry operation posed, and maintaining their longstanding contention 
that the Company was failing to take "all reasonable precautions for the health of all workers 
and persons in or about the quarry". 101 They invited both the local Mines Inspector, and the 
then Minister of Energy, David Butcher, to remedy the situation. 102 To encourage a 
response on the matter (the Ministry of Energy had consistently displayed a reluctance to be 
drawn into the dispute) the Friends enlisted the support of Michael Cullen, the MP for St 
Kilda and minister in the Labour Cabinet. Cullen sent letters to his colleagues Phillip 
Woollaston (Minister of Conservation) and Butcher, stating his concerns about the plight of 
the headland. 103 
The Minister of Energy's reply to the conservationists was clear; the Mines Division 
were not going to pursue sanctions against the Company.104 Indeed, if the Ministry of 
Energy was to take any side, the impression was that it would be with the Company and the 
status quo: 
It would appear to me that you have not told me the full story in your letter of 7 March in that in 
fact the area is a very dangerous one regardless of the quarry operations. There are a number of 
recorded drownings at Black Head and without the presence of quarry personnel there could 
have been more ... 
And also: 
My staff and I are naturally concerned for the public welfare at all times, and I would be 
distressed to think that the ignoring of safety warnings was being condoned simply to pursue 
other interests. 
I would suggest that in view of the recent tragedies further down the coast, and as the Company 
have already made it plain that they propose in the future to provide safe access, that you accept 
their commitment. lOS 
As far as the Mines Division was concerned the inherent dangers of the headland were~ 
in part, mitigated by the presence of the quarry. Moreover, BHQ was also performing a 
public function by decapitating the peninsula with the promise of safer and easier access to 
the rock formations in the future. The benefits that access could provide to society over the 
next 70 years did not justify consideration. Not unexpectedly, this response caused some 
consternation amongst the conservationists who continued to push for change in the quarry's 
management and operational practices. 106 By this stage, however, circumstances offered 
more propitious options for preservation. 
7.4. The Final Negotiations 
The public campaign reached its height during the latter half of 1989. At the beginning of 
this period two significant meetings were held. The first was organised by the FoB, and was 
101 Friends of Black Head, 7 March 1989, Letter to Mines Inspector, Department of Mines, Dunedin. 
102 Friends of Black Head, 7 March 1989, Letter to Minister of Energy (David Butcher). 
103 David Butcher (Minister of Energy), 1 May 1989, Letter to the Friends of Black Head. 
104 Ibid. 
lOS Ibid. 
106 Friends of Black Head, 5 May 1989, Letter to Minister of Energy (David Butcher). 
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held in the Otago Museum Auditorium on June 7. A large crowd of over 250 people 
attended 107, representing a broad cross section of the community. \08 The meeting was 
organised to provide a demonstration of public opposition to the destruction caused by the 
quarry,l09 to raise public awareness about the issue,1I0 to promote dialogue and to bring the 
Company to publicly account for its actions. 
The key business actors were conspicuously absent from the meeting. Instead, they 
sent a planning consultant Peter Constantine as their representative on the discussion 
panel. lll The panel consisted of Constantine, Guy Salmon (National Director of the Maruia 
Society), Cr Murray Grimwood (Silverpeaks County Council), Sue Maturin (FoB), Peter 
Carter and Chris Baker (Whanau 0 Otokia). Proceedings began with the Maori 
representatives and Sue Maturin outlining the case for the preservation of the headland. 
Peter Constantine then spoke, detailing the Company's revised management plan -
essentially to quarry to the 30 m level around the coastal periphery so as to provide 'safe' 
access. The non-attendance by officers of the quarry Company caused considerable 
frustration that was exacerbated by Constantine's repetition of the Company's 
uncompromising position added to this. u2 
The meeting quickly got heated. A large group of quarry employees were in the 
audience, which lead to a strong exchange of words across the floor. Constantine said that 
this was discussion by "mass hysteria and histrionics" and "what was needed were reasoned 
and rational people".1l3 He did make one inadvertent concession: that in the course of 
quarrying the Company would move away from the coastal faces for a period of up to eight 
years. 1l4 (When the conservationists tried to make something of this statement in their later 
correspondence with BHQ, they were met with silence. US) Guy Salmon then spoke, 
outlining the importance of protecting not only the formations, but also their setting. He 
also questioned the right of private property holders to destroy their property in such 
circumstances,1l6 and outlined the political and legal options available to the public. 1l7 The 
meeting ended with two resolutions being passed: The first was aimed at BHQ and called for 
the preservation of the entire coastal perimeter by means of a QEII Covenant, the cessation 
of spillage onto the coastal strip, and their participation in the clean-up of the formations; 
The second motion targeted the territorial authorities in the coastal Otago area, calling for 
their support for the preservation of the headland and requesting that they notify the 
Company of their intention to purchase rock supplies from alternative sources. U8 
107 P. Mclennan. 22 January 1990, "Watch on the Rocks" Listener & TV Times p. 102. 
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The museum meeting ended with little progress being made towards resolving the 
dispute. Peter Constantine had stated that the problem of communication was central to 
Black Head. 1l9 However, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the problem was far 
more than one of communication. As was revealed in the previous chapter, the dispute 
evolved out of a fundamental conflict of interests arising out of the prevailing relations of 
production. The meeting did, however, stimulate increased public support and greater 
resolve to settle the dispute from local body politicians and DoC representatives. 120 
The amount of attention the issue received in the media steadily increased over this 
period. The result was a higher level of public awareness in the Dunedin area and a 
heightening of opposition to the quarrying activity. One means by which this opposition 
was made manifest was through the compilation of a public petition protesting the negative 
environmental impact of basalt extraction, and calling for the abatement of these effects. 
The petition was targeted primarily at the Silver Peaks County Council which was the 
territorial authority responsible for planning issues affecting Black Head. l2l It was hoped 
that the council could be stimulated into playing an active role in the quest for preservation. 
More specifically, there was the possibility that particular externalities, such as falling debris 
and excess noise, could be considered an "objectionable element" under the provisions of 
the Town and Country Planning Act 1977.122 In purely procedural tenos, the efficacy of 
this avenue was somewhat questionable. In addition, the Silver Peaks County Council was 
subject to various structural constraints (eg. limited resources, dependence upon such 
enterprises) and was soon to be caught up in the exercise of local body refono,123 However, 
the petition itself was useful in tenos of articulating a genuine concern on the part of the 
local community, and was a useful indicator for the conservation groups when presenting 
their case in various forms. 
The petition, with 6114 signatures, was presented to the Silver Peaks County Council 
by a FoB deputation at the June 26 council meeting. l24 At that meeting, Cr Grimwood who 
had taken part in the museum meeting, suggested that a mediation meeting be held at the 
Silver Peaks offices. l25 The main parties were subsequently invited to attend a meeting at 
the council chambers to be chaired by the Council Chainoan Mick Robertson on 27 July. 126 
BHQ said they would not be ready by the 27th to present a decision, but that they would 
attend the meeting.127 The FoB set about lobbying councillors. l28 
The meeting itself was attended by representatives from BHQ, FoB, Maori interests, 
DoC, Silver Peaks County Council and the Mines Inspectorate of the Ministry of 
Commerce. The atmosphere, although at times heated, was mostly amicable. Proceedings 
119 P. Mclennan, op. cit. p.l02. 
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began with John Fulton presenting his Company's position. Once again. he talked about 
lowering the headland to the 30 metre level to provide safe access to the formations and to 
enable the restoration of the Roman Baths area. 129 Fulton had brought along Jim Hunter. 
the General Manager of BHQ. to the meeting. Hunter said that the public "hullabaloo" had 
prompted the Company to pull back for a while; it was for the present concentrating its 
operations on the north side of the headland instead.l30 Peter Constantine said the 
management plan was stilI being worked on and that BHQ was having discussions with the 
QEII Trust. He also said the Company would consult with the Friends on the management 
plan issue. Peter Carter and Chris Baker then spoke for Maori interests, putting their case 
quite forcibly. 131 They were followed by the FoB representatives, Dr Peter Johnson and 
Neville Peat, who reiterated the concerns of the conservationists. 132 They also pointed out 
that the Company's position had not changed in two years and that under such 
circumstances they would have no choice but to continue with the campaign. 133 
On the surface it seemed that little progress had been made at the Silver Peaks 
meeting. This view was felt strongest by the conservationists who maintained that no 
breakthrough had been made at all. 134 Indeed, Sue Maturin saw the gathering as a non-
event. 135 Others who attended the meeting saw it in a different light. For Jim Hunter, the 
Silver Peaks meeting was a significant juncture in the controversy. 136 Prior to the meeting, 
John Fulton and Robin Thomas (District Conservator) had carried out negotiations between 
BHQ and DoC, and the talks had reached an unfortunate stalemate. But in mid 1989 DoC 
went through a second phase of restructuring, and as a result responsibility for Black Head 
fell upon the new Regional Conservator for Otago, Jeff Connell. 137 Connell attended the 
Silver Peaks meeting with Thomas. During the course of discussion, Connell said that the 
Company had to be given credit for agreeing not to quarry above the prize formations - his 
comments were noted by the Company representatives.as a positive signal. 138 In an 
informal discussion after the meeting Jim Hunter and Jeff Connell expressed a common 
desire to resolve the conflict. 139 Connell asked Fulton and Hunter how the issue could tJe 
resolved without going to court.140 As a result, Hunter agreed to meet for further 
discussions with Connell at the Department of Conservation regional offices in Dunedin.141 
Although a disappointment for the conservation groups, the Silver Peaks meeting facilitated 
an important change in the dynamics of the central negotiations. The initial contact 
129 Peter Johnson, 27 July 1989, Notes taken at Silver Peaks meeting. Dunedin. 
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established at the meeting led to Jim Hunter taking over from Fulton in the negotiations. 
Hunter's more conciliatory style and greater conservation sympathies proved to be a key 
factor in the success of the final negotiations. 
At this point Jeff Connell had three bargaining chips: The first was the prosecution 
that had already been lodged against BHQ under ss 242 (1) and 252 of the Harbours Act; 
The second was an alternative section of the Harbours Act (S. 244 (3)), which seemed to 
Connell a much more useful provision (Connell had a legal background). Although not 
watertight, Connell"believed this section to be arguable. He subsequently sent a letter to the 
Company notifying them that under S. 244 (3) they would require a consent from the 
Minister of Conservation to spill any material at all onto the foreshore (see Appendix C); 
And the third bargaining chip was the increased pressure the conservationists' campaign 
generated against the Company. 142 
A series of negotiations involving five or six meetings began after the Silver Peaks 
gathering. l43 John Fulton attended the first meeting at the DoC offices. However, most of 
the other talks were between Hunter and Connell. Their initial contacts involved the 
establishment of dialogue. Connell began on the wrong foot by presenting Hunter with an 
aerial photograph of the headland with a bold black line denoting the FoB's claims. l44 The 
mistake was twofold: he had identified himself too closely with the conservation campaign; 
and also, a positional strategy was bound to constrain the search for a creative common" 
solution. Hunter did not like this approach, commenting that he had hoped for a sensible 
and constructive dialogue. Things, however, did eventually settle down. Subsequent 
meetings were held not only at the DoC offices but also at Hunters's office at the Logan 
Point quarry in Dunedin. This enabled Connell to gain a working knowledge of quarry 
method; there was a "steep learning curve" for both parties.145 
It was decided that the appropriate mechanism for protection was a statutory covenant 
(see para 8.2). The thrust of Connell's argument was that if the line around the headlan~ 
were raised from the 30 metre position advanced by BHQ to 70 metres above the main 
formations, this would retain much of the atmosphere of the setting. It would also protect 
the flora on the slopes above the basalt columns. Although Hunter agreed to Connell's 
proposal, he did harbour reservations about selling the deal to the board and John Fulton. l46 
In late September Connell sent a letter to BHQ setting out the conditions of a draft 
agreement. 147 All the directors agreed to the position of the line. l48 The dimensions of the 
area to be covenanted constituted the major element of the settlement, yet there remained a 
number of outstanding questions that had to be dealt with before anything concrete was 
agreed upon. A central point of contention was the extent of spillage to be allowed. It 
would be necessary to remove unstable rock from above the area to be protected, and any 
spillage was to be confined as much as possible. The difficulty lay in setting guidelines for 
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this procedure. These questions were sorted out in the remaining negotiations during late 
1989. 149 Personalities had been very important in detennining the success of the 
negotiations. The fact that Hunter had taken over the negotiations from Fulton made it 
much easier for the Company to change its stance without it being seen as a back down. It 
also enabled a good working relationship to develop between Hunter and Connell, based on 
considerable mutual respect. ISO 
During this period, BHQ made it clear they did not want to deal with the FoB. They 
did not, however, have any objection to Connell consulting with the conservationists. 151 
The exclusion of the conservation groups from the central dialogue generated inevitable 
frustration and anger. 152 In an effort to mitigate this tension Connell communicated 
regularly with the FoB during the negotiation process. These talks served to keep FoB 
infonned of the progress, and acted as a conduit for the concerns of the conservationists. To 
Connell it was clear that he could not possibly get an agreement that the Friends would be 
happy with,L53 and he was very frank about the invidious position he was in,154 Maturin's 
concern was that she thought Connell was more interested in achieving an agreement per 
se. 155 Under the pressure that Connell faced, it would have been strange if he wasn't partly 
driven by such an imperative. Yet discussions were on the whole amicable,156 Members of 
the FoB thought that under the circumstances Connell did a good job both of keeping them 
infonned157 and in his conduct of the negotiations,158 In retrospect, DoC and the FoB 
played necessary interdependent roles, enabling a hard/soft bargaining strategy to develop. 
The more radical the demands made by the conservationists, the more reasonable Connell's 
suggestions seemed to the Company,159 This may have been reasonably effective under the 
circumstances, but as shall be revealed in the next chapter, the exclusive nature of the 
decision-making process led to greater resentment and dissatisfaction with the final 
settlement. 
On February 13, 1990, the Otago Daily Times reported the Company had reached a 
settlement with DoC. The imminent deadline for withdrawal from the legal prosecution had 
forced the parties to finally agree. Subsequently, at a pre-trial conference on February 13, 
DoC instructed the Crown Solicitors Office to withdraw the prosecution. 160 Following this, 
the details of the agreement were to be made public on 15 February at a gathering at the 
quarry site. However, any public relations benefits to be gained from this public 
announcement quickly disappeared when disgruntled FoB members pre-empted the fonnal 
announcement. Due to Connell's efforts the FoB had been privy to the content of the 
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151 Jeff Connell (Regional Conserv ator, Otago Region), 12 August 1991, Personal interv iew. 
152 Sue Maturin, 2 September 1991, Personal interv iew, Dunedin 
153 Jeff Connell (Regional Conservator, Otago Region), 12 August 1991, Personal interview. 
154 Neville Peat, November 1990, Personal interview, Ravensbourne, Dunedin. 
155 Sue Maturin, 2 September 1991, Personal interview, Dunedin. 
156 Peter Johnson, 22 February 1991, Personal interview, DSIR, Dunedin. 
157 Sue Maturin, 2 September 1991, Personal interview, Dunedin. 
158 Neville Peat, November 1990, Personal interview, Ravensboume, Dunedin. 
159 Jeff Connell, 12 August 1991, Personal interview, Department of Conservation, Dunedin. 
160 Otago Daily Times 13 February 1990. 
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settlement, and there was an informal agreement that they would not publicly comment on 
the settlement until after it was formally announced. 161 Maturin, however, saw the 
settlement as totally inadequate and issued a press release to the Otago Daily Times 
criticising the agreement. 162 On February 16 the front page of the Otago Daily Times 
featured a large photograph depicting the extent of the protected area. Far from extolling the 
success of the agreement the attached headlines read: "Pact Leaves Eastern Bluffs 
Unprotected".163 The conservationists had cast a dim light over the agreement. Yet the 
1990 pact did end the dispute despite the conservationists dissatisfaction. 
7 .5. Conclusion 
In summary, the Black Head conflict was a relatively small-scale environmental conflict, and 
the substantive issues were relatively uncomplicated. The dispute did, however, stimulate 
intense reactions on both sides of the argument It also attracted some national interest in the 
issue, in terms of media attention as well as political intervention. Its format was largely 
informal and fluid, and the emphasis upon processes of private negotiation allowed business to 
dictate many of the terms of the conflict (see Chapter Nine). The Black Head conflict was very 
different to the large scale, highly structured and substantively complex Wbanganui dispute 
that is discussed later. By comparison with this chapter, the following chapter is relatively 
brief and deals with the negotiated settlement. 
161 Jeff Connell. 12 August 1991. Personal interv iew, Department of Conservation, Dunedin. 
162 Otago Daily Times February 14, 1990. 
163 Otago Daily Times February 16, 1990. 
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The Conservation Covenant: A Pyrrhic Victory 
8.1. Introduction 
The essential question that I discuss in this chapter is whose interests were served by the 
negotiated settlement? Any answer to this question will provide a useful starting point for 
my analysis of business influence and dominance in the following chapter. It is important to 
reiterate that my framework of business dominance is conceived in realist tenus. It treats the 
generative mechanisms of business power as transfactual tendencies within complex open 
systems, and because of this is not a totalising theory; it cannot predict that business will 
dominate in a particular substantive outcome. Nonetheless, it will be valuable to set my 
investigation of business power (Chapter Nine) against an understanding of whose interests 
prevailed, were accommodated, marginalised, etc. 
I organise the chapter on the following basis: I begin with a basic factual description of 
the components of the settlement, and their purposes; Next, I set out the responses and 
analyses of the various participants to the agreement; I then provide an overview of the 
economic analysis of the settlement undertaken by Ross Cullen. Cullen's basic conclusion 
was that (at discount rates of 4 percent or higher) the settlement appears to have awarded a 
windfall to the quarry owners. This analysis is of fundamental importance in the context of 
this thesis because, as I shall show, while conservationists were dissatisfied with the 
agreement there was still a general belief that the Company had made a significant financial 
sacrifice. By setting these two analyses against one another it is possible to provide for the 
kind of dialectical explanation envisaged by critical realists (see 2.4). In Chapter Nine I 
argue that this disjunction was largely a product the power of business and its manifest 
ability to define reality; Finally, since some time has passed since the settlement I will 
provide a brief postscript on the environmental developments. 
One final point is that my arguments are based on the types of values articulated in the 
dispute, some of which were quantified and measured in money tenus and some not. No 
attempt is made to 'commodify' the 'non-commodified' values. This is consistent with 
Cullen's approach where "in some instances these difficult questions of valuation can be 
avoided by calculating solely the values of the market-detenuined benefits and costs, and by 
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considering their magnitudes in relation to subjective estimates of the non-marketed 
values."l 
8.2. The Settlement 
The agreement between the Department of Conservation and BHQ initially involved the 
placing of a caveat upon the certificate of title to the land.2 This caveat had the effect of 
protecting the area of land to be covenanted pending the drafting and ratification of the more 
detailed final documents (Figure 8.1 is an aerial photograph with the covenanted area 
marked; NB the excluded Eastern Bluffs are obscured - although see Figures 6.6 and 6.7). 
This temporary status prevailed for fifteen months until 14 May 1991 when the final 
signatures of the Minister of Conservation, Denis Marshall, and BHQ's Managing Director, 
Jim Hunter, were attached to the conservation covenant. In the eyes of the signatories this 
endorsement signalled the resolution of the controversy - the Black Head dispute was 
effectively over.3 
The settlement had two main elements: First, the conservation covenant and the 
associated promises made by the Company to consult with the Department of Conservation 
in the future; And secondly, DoC agreed to withdraw its prosecution against BHQ, and 
would also issue the Company with a consent under the Harbours Act to allow it to quarry 
around the coastal faces with relative immunity from prosecution. 
8.2.(i) The Conservation Covenant 
A conservation covenant is a fonn of contract. Restrictions are placed upon the future use of 
an area of land either for a limited time or in perpetuity, with the landowner (Covenantor) 
contracting to manage the land in accordance with the conditions of the agreement.4 An 
interest in the land is vested in the recipient of the covenant (the Covenantee). The covenant 
itself is both "exclusive and unique to the land to which it is attached" and can be "designed 
for particular purposes and the accompanying restrictions can be tailored to suit the specific 
characteristics of the land".5 Registration against the title to the land affords the covenant 
pennanent legal status, and ensures that both present and future owners of the land are bound 
by the tenns of the covenant. 
Like the majority of conservation covenants the Black Head covenant was a statutory 
covenant. The Minister of Conservation (the Minister) received an interest in the land by 
virtue of S. 27 of the Conservation Act 1987, which provided that; "there may be granted or 
1 R. Cullen, 1991, "Discounting the Economic Costs of Conservation and Compensation" Environment and 
Planning A Vol 23, p. 1121. 
2 "A caveat is a notice of a claim which mayor may not be a valid claim .... The normal purpose of a caveat is 
to warn all persons who might deal on the faith of the register, and also the registered proprietor himself, 
that the caveator claims an interest which is not disclosed on the register." G. Hinde and M. Hinde. 1989. 
New Zealand Law Dictionary Butterworths, Wellington. 
3 Otago Daily Times 13 February 1990. 
4 V. Edwards and B. Sharp, 1990, "Institutional Arrangements for Conservation on Private Land in New 
Zealand" Journal of Environmenlal Mallagement No. 31, p. 317. 
5 V. Edwards. 1988. "Harnessing Private Benefits for the Public Good: A Political Economy of Statutory 
Covenants and their Effectiveness in Protecting Conservation Values on Private Land" MSc Thesis, 
Resource Management, University of Canterbury, p. 24. 
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reserved over any land any covenant for conservation purposes in favour of the Minister".6 
The Crown, through the Minister as the covenanting entity was the beneficiary of the 
covenant. In addition to the costs of setting up the covenant, the beneficiary has the burden 
of maintaining the conditions of the covenant, and eliciting compliance in the event of any 
infringements. Enforcement of the requirements could be facilitated, if necessary, by a legal 
suit against the landowner'? Having briefly set out the basic features of the statutory 
covenant as a policy instrument I tum now to the specifics of the Black Head agreement 
(The Black Head Covenant is reproduced in full in Appendix A). 
The parties to the agreement were Black Head Quarries Ltd as the "Land holder", and 
the "Minister". In recital B, the Land holder's relationship to the covenanted area was 
established, the area of land was described and illustrated graphically in the attached 
elemental plan. Conditions 14(a)-(d), made it clear that the covenant was granted in 
perpetuity and that it would continue regardless of any change in ownership, or change in 
form of ownership. The four objectives of recital C provided the agreement with a clear 
purpose. Objectives (i), (ii) and (iii) were concerned with the preservation of, access to, and 
rehabilitation of, the basalt formations on the land. Objective (iv) focused upon the 
protection and restoration of the flora and fauna of the covenanted area. 
Most of the conditions governing the management of the land dealt with the 
conservation objective and the prevention or mitigation of potential threats to the area. Strict 
limits were imposed upon modification of the land. Any subsequent deviation from those 
restrictions was contingent upon the Minister's approval (the onus was quite clearly upon the 
Minister's discretion). The conditions relating to change dealt firstly with threats emerging 
as a direct consequence of quarrying activity. The inevitability of debris spilling into the 
area meant that some provision had to be made for that particular eventuality. While seeking 
to mitigate the extent of damage from that source, the agreement facilitated the final 
extraction of material from the periphery of the covenanted area. The Company in its desire 
to be rid of the conflict, made it clear that it intended to concentrate its activities in the 
vicinity of the boundary area, thus enabling it to focus upon future extractive activity without 
the problem of spillage onto the protected areas.s Guidelines for that exercise were set out in 
the attached Harbours' consent, which to a degree served to protect the Company from 
future legal prosecution under the Harbours Act 1950. The prescribed limits to change set 
out in the agreement also dealt with other conceivable threats. Protection of the biota was 
provided for with a ban upon the removal of, or damage to, any native or exotic vegetation; 
there was a restriction upon the additional planting of vegetation, and a requirement to keep 
the area clear of both noxious plants and exotic tree species. 
The crucial issue of public access was also addressed. The agreement established a 
duty upon the Land holder to "discuss from time to time with the Regional Conservator the 
matter of public access to the land with a view to permitting public access across the land 
when it was reasonably safe and appropriate to do so". As a consequence, the duty was to 
discuss, while any obligation to provide access to the public remained contingent. 
6 V. Edwards and B. Sharp. 1990. "Institutional Arrangements" p. 319. 
7 Ibid. p. 318. 
S Black Head Quarries Limited. November 1989. Draft Management Plan. Fairfield. DWledin. 
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Subsequent conditions did allow for the possibility of public access in the future, providing 
for the erection of signs and notices relating to the existence of the covenant, warning of 
risks, and interpreting the features. In addition, there was allowance for future construction 
to facilitate public access. Notwithstanding this, the question of public access remained 
uncertain. 
The conservation covenant was the cornerstone of the negotiated settlement, as the 
institutional solution to the question of how to protect the coastal periphery of Black Head. 
As I mentioned earlier, the establishment of this mechanism involved substantial 
modification of the Land holder's property rights. In signing the agreement the Land holder 
relinquished much of their control over the resource, restricting land use options previously 
open to them. In Chapter Seven I examined the incentives for BHQ to reach some sort of 
settlement with the conservation interests. In resisting a compromise the Company was 
certainly incurring significant transaction costs, both in dollar and PR tenns. Moreover, it is 
not unreasonable to suggest that for the Company there were also potential future benefits in 
protecting the area. However the concessions made by the Company in its decision to place 
a covenant upon the area make more sense when the remaining part of the agreement is 
considered; where the stream of benefits flowed towards the Company, providing, in effect, 
a compensatory quid pro quo. 
8.2.(ii) The Compensating Quid Pro Quo 
The formula of the Black Head settlement involved two major concessions to the Company. 
The most immediate was the withdrawal of ,the legal proceedings against BHQ by the 
Department of Conservation, an inevitable step if a settlement was to be achieved. Of 
greater significance, however, was the second concession in the fonn of a consent pursuant 
to S. 244(3) of the Harbours Act 1950 (see Appendices B and C). It was noted previously 
that one purpose of the consent was to enable the Company to extract the remaining quantity 
of basalt cotenninous with the protected area without the possibility of future legal action. 
Indeed, this is an important function of the consent. Yet, the area subject to the consent 
extended beyond that directly contiguous with the covenanted land, to include the greater 
part of the vertical eastern bluffs. Thus in addition to facilitating the ultimate protection of 
the covenanted area, the consent enabled BHQ to quarry the eastern bluffs with virtual 
impunity from prosecution under S. 244(3). The consequence of this dispensation was to 
allow the Company to quarry a large quantity of rock that it may not have been previously 
able to, without the threat of legal action. And, furthennore, there was the potential for 
much reduced extraction costs resulting from this Iicence.9 Some estimates of the value of 
these concessions will be suggested later in the discussion. 
9 Ross Cullen (Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics, University of Otago), 16 February 1990, Letter to 
Jeff Connell, Regional Conservator, Otago Conservancy, Dunedin. 
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8.3. The Participants' Reactions to the Agreement 
The Company were clearly pleased with the outcome,10 which they believed served both the 
"public and private interests".ll At the same time BHQ emphasised the sacrifices that they 
had made in shaping this compromise. Protection of the covenanted area had the effect of 
tying up 2.5 million tonnes of rock that could otherwise have been extracted. The Company 
subsequently estimated that the forfeiture of that resource represented a loss of $30 million 
in potential revenues. 12 This figure was quoted repeatedly by the representatives of both the 
Company and (crucially) DoC when referring to the content of the settlement. 13 In some 
instances this figure was further qualified by noting; it "represents the gross revenue 
expected from sales of the 2.5 million tonnes",14 if "processed and sold by the Company 
today".IS In the next section I critically examine that estimate. For the time being it shall 
suffice to say that the sum was a gross overestimate, utilised to convey the impression of a 
great sacrifice on the part of the Company - to ask any more of them would be totally 
unreasonable. It was also used by DoC to emphasise their gains. This tactic is wholly 
consistent with much of the literature on bargaining behaviour. In a situation where a party 
gives up a little, it might want to exaggerate what it is giving up. And, of course, the reverse 
applies to the contending parties who will attempt to minimise the general perception of 
what they are getting (DoC was the exception here),16 
The Company also presented their part in the agreement in tenns of the deviation from 
their original bargaining position. For example (note that in general tenns, the higher the 
level above sea level the greater the conservation benefits): 
Position A - No compromise, the status quo prevails; 
Position B - Willing to protect area below the 30m mark; 
Position C - Final concession, protect area which extends, in part, to the 70m level. 
My point is that the final compromise was made to appear by and large to be a reasonable 
and considered solution 17, simply because it was just that, a compromise. The focus upon 
the bargaining process and the strong emphasis upon the resolution of conflict per se as an 
objective, subsumed that of the substantive content of the agreement. The settlement was 
seen in a favourable light independent of how it might fare when measured against wider 
criteria. 
10 Churchill Walls (Quarry Manager, Black Head Quarries), quoted in Otago Daily Times 13 February 1990. 
11 John Fulton (Chainnan of Directors, Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd.), 14 August 1990, Personal interview, 
Fairfield, Dunedin. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Phillip Woollaston (Minister of Conservation), 15 February 1990, "Black Head Formations Saved" Press 
Release, Wellington; John Fulton (Chairman of Directors, Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd.), 14 August 1990, 
Personal interview, Fairfield, Dunedin; Otago Daily Times 16 February 1990; Jim Hunter (General 
Manager, Black Head Quarries), 3 August 1990, Personal interview, Logan Point, Dunedin. 
14 Otago Daily Times 16 February 1990. 
15 Phillip Woollaston, (Minister of Conservation), 15 February 1990, "Black Head Formations Saved". 
16 H. Raiffa, 1982, The Art and Science of Negotiation Harvard University Press, Cambridge Ma., p. 17. 
Elsewhere, Hodge notes that: ..... if the intention is to pay the farmer full compensation [for nature 
conservation], another incentive is created That is, for the farmer to understate his true costs of 
development or to overstate his expected returns in order seek compensation in excess of the loss." I. 
Hodge, 1989, "Compensation for Nature Conservation" Environment and Planning A Vol. 21, p. 1032. 
17 John Fulton (Chainnan of Directors, Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd.), 14 August 1990, Personal interview. 
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As noted above, there were potential gains for the Company from the settlement. For 
example, an improved public image for BHQ and its parent companies and the activity 
facilitated by the Harbours' consent. However, it was in the interests of the Company to 
down play or even deny those benefits. As a result, they received scant mention. 18 In 
addition, despite the Friends of Black Head managing to pre-empt the announcement of the 
covenant, an action which diminished the possible public relations benefits to the Company, 
there was little protest activity post-agreement. This was certainly appreciated by the 
officers of the Company. 19 
It was inevitable that DoC, as the other agent involved in negotiating the settlement, 
would attempt to portray the agreement as a favourable solution. The Regional Conservator 
had invested considerable time and energy in negotiating the settlement; a solution that he 
perceived as a very good one.20 However, it is important to take note of the context of the 
negotiations. As I made clear in the previous chapter, the private conservationists placed 
considerable pressure upon DoC to act on the Black Head issue. As soon as DoC made the 
initial decision to engage itself in the controversy (an action which, due to that public 
interest, was probably inevitable) it was subject to the following imperative; facilitate the 
resolution of conflict, or face a loss of mana - an outcome which could threaten the 
credibility of DoC as an advocate for conservation values within the Otago region. 
Furthennore, the pressure upon DoC to vigorously pursue the case came not only directly 
from the local community, but also from Wellington, due to the influence of Dr Michael 
Cullen and the Phillip Woollaston, both Ministers in the then Labour Government. There 
were considerable incentives for DoC to make sure the settlement was seen as an acceptable 
outcome.21 
DoC promoted the agreement as a reasoned solution - one that represented a "fair 
balance between the interests of the Company and the wider community".22 Again, there 
were allusions to reason and fairness. The Company had previously made it quite clear that 
if they could satisfy DoC, they would satisfy the general public. In their view the 
Department was seen to represent legitimate conservation interests, and would pursue those 
interests in a reasoned and respectable manner (the inference being the private conservation 
groups would not).23 Consistent with this emphasis DoC representatives repeatedly stressed 
the need to recognise the limits of the possible - to acknowledge that "DoC has to be 
practical in the final approach".24 Subsequently, the Department justified the settlement on 
the pretext that the inclusion of the eastern bluffs, or any other area of Black Head, would 
have required compensation to be paid to BHQ, in the order of millions of dollars (note the 
18 Sue Maturin (Friends of Black Head Spokesperson), 2 September 1991, Personal interview, Dunedin. 
19 Jim Hunter. (General Manager. Black Head Quarries). 3 August 1990. Personal interview. Logan Point, 
Dunedin. Also: John Fulton (Chainnan of Directors. Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd), 14 August 1990, 
Personal interview. -
20 Jeff Connell (Regional Conservator. DoC, Otago Conservancy). 12 August 1991. Personal interview, 
Dunedin. 
21 Phillip Woollaston, (Minister of Conservation). 15 February 1990. "Black Head Fonnations Saved" Press 
Release, Wellington. Also: Phillip W oollaston, 6 April 1990. Letter to Friends of Black Head, Wellington. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Jeff Connell, 12 August 1991, Personal interview. 
24 Robin Thomas (District Conservator, Dunedin District). 14 February 1991, Personal interview. Department 
of Conservation, Dunedin. 
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Company's status as a price setter). The payment of such sums to the Company was ruled 
out at an early stage in the dispute. The priorities question demanded that DoC measure the 
benefits of such expenditure against those to be gained through the purchase of other areas in 
its land acquisition programs. Jeff Connell also thought the highly modified state of Black 
Head, and the existence of other examples of columnar basalt (see 6.4.(i) served to vitiate the 
case for greater government expenditure on the headland.2S 
Yet some DoC officers did continue to harbour reservations about the agreement. 
Robin Thomas, who managed the earlier discussions with the Company, felt that if caught at 
an early stage the negotiations could have taken a different path. He felt that the Company 
could possibly have been encouraged to adopt a quarrying technique that would not rule out 
future options, and that the parties to the agreement had not fully explored the potential for a 
creative solution.26 
The announcement of the settlement was also received favourably in other quarters. In 
a press statement (released simultaneously with the Minister's), the Mayor of Dunedin, 
Richard Walls, congratulated all parties involved in the agreement, stating that he was 
"naturally pleased with the agreement".27 This initial public reaction is revealing when set 
against the view later expressed by Mr Walls in a personal interview, where he stipulated 
that the "outcome was not a wholly acceptable one" in terms of accommodating conservation 
interests.28 The disjunction between the Mayor's two statements either raises questions as to 
the extent of business influence over local government, or was just an example of political 
double-speak. Also of note was the prominent editorial in the Otago Daily Times that 
followed the public announcement of the settlement. The agreement was heralded as a 
"sensible compromise", made more acceptable because concessions were made without the 
need to compensate the Company using public monies. The paper's line of argument was 
founded upon the premise that if the community desired further protection then this would be 
entirely dependent upon the public's willingness to pay; The essential problem was to save a 
portion of the "visually dramatic headland at a price all of us, together, are willing to pay".29 
There was no mention of the unequal distribution of resources/capacity to payor collective 
action problems - which would have constrained or ruled out, any such initiative. 
The appeal to reason - that stressed the necessity of compromise and mutual 
adjustment - was received sympathetically by some members of the conservation coalition. 
The DSIR botanist, Dr Peter Johnson, sanctioned the agreement to the extent that it 
prevented the Company from "going the whole hog in extracting the basalt".30 Johnson 
regretted the exclusion of the eastern bluffs from the covenant, and also the fact that so much 
damage had already been allowed to happen. However, as with the conservation officers, he 
stressed the limits of the possible.31 
2S Jeff Connell. 12 August 1991. Personal interview. 
26 Robin Thomas (District Conservator. Dunedin District). 14 February 1991. Personal interview. Department 
of Conservation. Dunedin. 
27 Richard Walls (Mayor of Dunedin), 15 February 1990. Press Release. Dunedin. 
28 Ibid. The mayor also made it clear to the Department of Conservation that he thought the agreement to be a 
good one. Jeff Connell. 12. August 1991. Personal interview. 
29 Otago Daily Times 17 February 1990. 
30 P. Johnson (DSIR botanist. Dunedin). 22 February 1991. Personal interview. Dunedin. 
31 Ibid. 
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Most members of the conservation coalition maintained a more equivocal perception of 
the settlement and were generally dissatisfied with the agreement. Despite welcoming the 
partial protection of the headland as a move in the right direction32, they observed that there 
would be significant environmental losses. 
Their main concern was that there was only partial coverage of the headland, the most 
notable omission being the immense eastern bluffs from the covenant, which was considered 
a terrible loss.33 The FoB suggested at the time that they would have been satisfied with the 
covenant if the boundary had been shifted 80 meters along the coast, thus protecting the 
bluffs, shoreline and the wildlife that inhabited the area.34 Sue Maturin pointed out that not 
only would the Harbours' concession allow BHQ to quarry the eastern bluffs (in addition to 
the possibility of reduced extraction costs), it would provide an apparent incentive for the 
Company to quarry that area sooner than it would otherwise have done so (see next section). 
Furthennore, coalition representatives seriously questioned the two main arguments offered 
by the signatories when ruling out the protection of the bluffs as a practical option. The 
conservationists contended; firstly that the estimates of the exchange-value of the rock were 
deliberately exaggerated by the Company as a negotiation tactic,35 and secondly, that the 
Company's argument that the quarry would become uneconomic if the eastern bluffs were 
protected, was in fact wrong.3637 As well as their opposition to the exclusion of the bluffs, 
the Friends of Black Head harboured reservations about the management of the covenanted 
area as set out in the agreement. 
The conservationists also held that the removal of the bulk of the headland, and the 
protection of a narrow wedge38 of land around a portion of the periphery (see Figure 8) 
would destroy the general setting and atmosphere, and that there would be a loss of 
"wildness" with the protected area essentially an artefact.39 The loss of the bulk of the 
headland would thus lead to a loss of the various landscape values discussed in Chapter Six. 
It would also effect such activities as the surf break which as I made clear in 6.4.(i) was 
dependent upon the topography of the headland for shelter. Also, there was no prospect that 
ongoing externalities such as noise, dust, and the detritus from blasting, would be 
mitigated.4O 
The restoration issue was also important. I noted in 8.2.(i) that some of the objectives 
established for the management of the area, were concerned with the restoration of the 
natural features of the covenanted area. However, the coalition contended that despite the 
32 Otago Daily Times "Pact leaves eastern bluffs unprotected" 16 February 1990; Taieri Herald, 20 February 
1990, "Further action proposed"; Dunedin Star Weekender 11 March 1990 "An open letter to Black Head 
Quarries Ltd. "; Friends of Black Head, 15 February 1990, News Release, Dunedin. 
33 Sue Maturin, 2 September 1991, Personal interview. 
34 Friends of Black Head, 15 February 1990, News Release, Dunedin. 
35 Ibid. 
36 R. Cullen (Lecturer in Economics, University of Otago), 16 February 1990, Letter to Jeff Connell (Regional 
Conservator, DoC Otago), Dunedin. 
37 Dunedin Star Midweek "Field Trip to Black Head", March 14, 1990. Also: Sue Maturin (Friends of Black 
Head Spokesperson), 1989, Letter to Phillip WooUaston (Minister of Conservation), Dunedin, October 10. 
38 For on the landward side the quarry pit would ultimately rise up in 15 metre steps to the crest of the 
protected area. 
39 Neville Peat, November 1990, Personal interview, Ravensboume, Dunedin; Sue Maturin (Friends of Black 
Head Spokesperson), 2 September 1991, Personal interview, Dunedin. 
40 Ibid 
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exposition of this goal there existed no duty on either party to pursue the task of restoring the 
area. There was also no reference to the mechanics of how such an exercise could be 
undertaken.41 
The access issue was similarly uncertain. Although within the settlement public access 
was established as an objective, the duty upon the Company was only to discuss this 
question. The FoB contended that no access to the fonnations would be allowed in the 
immediate future, and that this would preclude the enjoyment of the landscape values and 
other use values through visits to the area for a long time to come.42 
The announcement of the settlement Was of fundamental concern to the 
conservationists because of its likely strategic effect. The Friends of Black Head had been 
holding out for a moratorium on mining in the vicinity of the coastal periphery of the 
headland, and ultimately, the pennanent protection of at least all of the seaward faces. 
However, the settlement served to pre-empt the conservationists' strategy, which almost 
certainly ruled out the negotiation of a more comprehensive deal that could have protected 
the eastern bluffs and dealt with the access question in a more satisfactory way.43 
Finally, as I observed in 6.4.(ii), the Maori position throughout had been non-reducible, 
and the reaction of the Whanau-o-Otokia representatives mirrored that position. In a front 
page Otago Daily Times, Chris Baker commented "grossly offensive to tapu" and 
consequently the only acceptable solution would be the complete cessation of quarrying 
activity.44 For others, the spiritual value of Black Head might persist despite some 
continuation of extractive activity. However, as with the aesthetic value, the destruction of 
the immense eastern bluffs and the wider setting would lessen the quality of experience 
gained by visitors to the area. 
8.4. The 'Costs' of Conservation to the Company 
As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, I draw heavily upon Cullen's economic analysis 
within this section. I do, however, discuss his investigation the context of the wider 
understanding of business power and behaviour contained in this thesis. This analysis will 
reveal that for the Company, entering into the covenant probably involved negligible costs, if 
not a net benefit. 
8.4.(i) The Economic Costs of the Covenant 
As a capitalist enterprise BHQ was without doubt motivated primarily by the pursuit of 
profits - the chase after exchange vale. Thus, if their conduct in the negotiations was to be 
"substantively rational" (appropriate to the achievement of given goals4S) then they would in 
all likelihood have pursued strategies that on the whole maximised their financial gains and 
41 P. Jolmson (DSIR botanist. DWledin). 22 February 1991. Personal interview. Also: Sue Maturin (Friends of 
Black Head Spokesperson). 2 September 1991. Personal interview; Sue Maturin. 10 October 1989. Letter to 
Phillip W oollaston (Minister of Conservation). Dunedin. 
42 Sue Maturin. 2 September 1991. Personal interview. Dunedin. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Chris Baker (Spokesperson for the Te Whanau 0 Otokaia). quoted in Otago Daily Times 16 Feb 1990. 
45 R. Bartlett. 1986. "Ecological Rationality: Reason and Environmental Policy" Environmental Ethics Vol 8. 
Fall. p. 224. 
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minimised their losses. This is not to say that other motives would not have affected their 
conduct - only that the accumulation dynamic would most probably have been central. To 
ascertain whether the Company acted in this way their actions need to be examined against 
the complementary criteria of cost-minimisation and profit-maximisation. 
Some pressing questions are raised by the Company's exaggerated estimates of the 
cost of conservation. If the Company's $30 million estimate is to be accepted as accurate, 
one would as a matter of course have to consider the Company's action in covenanting the 
area as a highly irrational move. This is most unlikely, and so the Company's actions in 
protecting the area only serve to confirm that the value of the quarry was far less than they 
claimed. As I have already maintained, the $30m estimate must be understood as a 
deliberate tactic of negotiation. Further, both the Company and the Minister of 
Conservation, did at one time or another acknowledge that the figure was based on the gross 
revenue that would be derived if the 2.5 million tonnes of rock protected by the covenant had 
been extracted immediately. That they were aware of, on the one hand, the gross revenue 
factor, and on the other hand, the temporal issue (see below), only compounds the argument 
here that the discourse was distorted by business influence. 
Cullen set out to determine the costs of conservation to the Company - viz. the 
approximate exchange-value of the rock protected. As I noted at the beginning of this 
chapter, these estimates are founded upon a single type of resource use - the extraction of 
rock - for which a market already existed. Cullen based his analysis on the following data46: 
Projected life of the quarry 
Output (1988) 
Retail value of the rock (1988) 
Costs 
90+ years 
192, ()()() tonnes 
$12 per tonne 
90-95 percent or approx $10.80 per tonne47 
The first step in his analysis was to calculate the annual surplus from the quarry operation; 
"If it is assumed costs are 90% of retail price we can calculate the net annual surplus from 
the quarry operation: that is its output multiplied by net revenue per tonne, equal to 
192,000*(12-10.8), a total of $230,400 per year".48 
As I noted above, the covenant had the effect of reducing the amount of rock that 
could, potentially, be quarried by 2.5 million tonnes. On the basis of the above annual 
quarry output that loss would equate to a reduction in the life of the quarry by 13 years to 77 
years. He then set out two working assumptions: First, he argued that because the quality of 
rock was consistent throughout the whole structure (this was the case) one tonne of rock was 
a perfect substitute for any other; Secondly, if the protective covenant had no influence on 
extraction costs over the 77 years following the settlement, then the protective covenant 
46 R. Cullen, 1991, "Discounting the Economic Costs of Conservation and Compensation" Environment and 
Planning A Vol 23, p. 1123. 
47 It is important to note that the most significant cost in the production of aggregate was the transport costs 
($0.75 per tonne per kilometre). The Company frequently alluded to the fact that it was Black Head's 
proximity to the end users that essentially made it a profitable concem This was true. However. the 
Company's assertion that there were no alternative sites available, was not true. Ibid. p. 1128. 
48 Ibid. p. 1123. 
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would "only have a negative impact on the supply of rock, on company profits, and the New 
Zealand economy, in the year 2068, when the quarry ceases",'-I9 
The crucial point was the costs of lost production would not accrue for a long time. 
The next stage of his analysis hinged on the assumption that "human behaviour indicates that 
we discount distant events".50 This contentious notion underpins the theory of economic 
discounting, and I will not get into the debate over its application.51 The method is treated as 
legitimate in this context because it is a method that businesses such as BHQ and the parent 
companies regularly use when making investment decisions. In other words, I consider it 
appropriate to critique the Company's actions within the terms of their own discourse. 52 
Cullen goes on: 
Using any chosen discount rate we can calculate the present value of the profits that will be 
foregone by the quarrying company. It is simply the sum of the discounted profits that would be 
earned between the years 2068 and 2080. If we assume the extraction rate and net profit in real 
terms will remain constant at 192,000 tonnes and $230,400 per year, respectively, we can 
calculate the present value of the foregone profits. This is the present value of the annuity 
$230,400 between the years 2068 and 2080 . .53 
The formula used by Cullen is set out in Appendix D. Table 8.1 (which largely follows that 
provided by Cullen) sets out the net present value (NPV) of the foregone profits from 
quarrying. It does so for both the southern cliffs that were included in the covenant, and for 
the eastern cliffs that were excluded. I will discuss the eastern cliffs next. 
Table 8.1. Discount Rates and NPV of Foregone Profits from Quarrymg54 
Discount 
Rate % 
A. Southern Cliffs 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
B. Southern Cliffs 
Eastern Bluffs 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
+ 
NPV $ Discount 
Rate % 
2995200 5 
1299366 6 
569119 7 
251624 8 
112 Z77 9 
5299200 5 
2419732 6 
1 118245 7 
522860 8 
247272 9 
NPV $ Discount NPV $ 
50552 
22962 
10520 
4861 
2264 
118 
240 
57150 
27911 
13770 
6859 
Rate % 
10 
11 
12 
13 
10 
11 
12 
13 
1063 
503 
240 
115 
3449 
1751 
896 
463 
The inclusion of the eastern bluffs is useful because it provides an indication of how much 
the company would have foregone in NPV terms, if the covenant had extended to those 
important features - this is especially important because (as noted above) it was the 
49 Ibid, pp. 1123-4. 
50 Ibid, p. 1124. 
51 An excellent summary of the debate over discounting and the environment can be found in A. Clayton, and 
N. Radcliffe, 1996, Sustainability: A Systems Approach Earthscan Publications, London, pp. 122-32. 
52 An example of why a company such as BHQ would use this decision tool is provided by Clayton and 
Radcliffe: "One of the most important reasons for discounting is the existence of net productivity and 
interest rates. Capital invested today, at interest, will earn a profit If the capital does not become available 
until tomorrow, then today's potential profit is lost This is why high interest rates generally co-vary with 
high discount rates". Ibid., p. 123 . 
.53 R. Cullen, 1991, "Discounting the Economic Costs of Conservation and Compensation" p. 1124. 
54 Ibid. 
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exclusion of those bluffs that fonned the main criticism of the settlement. The volume of 
rock involved would have been 1.89 million tonnes, which was roughly equivalent to a 
further 10 year reduction of the quarries life to 2058.55 
From the above values it becomes clear just how crucial the detennination of an 
appropriate discount rate is to the approximation of the net present value of the resource. As 
noted by Cullen "conservation in this case is most likely to be judged economically 
defensible if high discount rates are used in the NPV (net present value) caIculations".56 He 
subsequently focused upon two rates. The first was the rate that was likely to be used by 
government in calculating the costs of an investment - in this case the cost of conservation -
this was likely to be the public sector discount rate (PSDR) which was approximately 10 
percent. 57 However, Cullen considered that rate to be unreasonably high given the much 
lower real long-tenn borrowing rate for government, and he instead suggested a figure of 5 
percent would be appropriate.58 The second discount rate requiring consideration was the 
rate applicable to the private sector, and Cullen observed that major companies in New 
Zealand were using much higher rates in the order of 13 to 15 percent.59 
So, according to Cullen, the conservation covenant had cost the company $50,552 in 
NPV tenns at the 5 percent rate. At the likely private sector rate of around 13 percent the 
NPV dropped to the paltry sum of $115. Either way, these figures were only a fraction of 
the crude nominal estimates (ie. $30 m for the covenanted southern cliffs) that were utilised 
in the negotiations and in the public statements made by both the Company and DoC. As a 
brief aside, it is also worth noting that the NPV costs of protecting the eastern bluffs and the 
southern cliffs at these two rates would have been $522,860 and .$443 respectively. 
As a final point here, it is appropriate to deal with the Company's other main objection 
to the option of protecting the eastern bluffs, which was that the quarry would be no longer 
viable if it was subject to those constraints.6O Cullen noted, however, that there were other 
smaller local quarries operating profitably at the time.61 
8.4.(ii) The Economic Benefits to the Company of the Compensatory QuidPro Quo 
Cullen's analysis suggests that BHQ's forfeiture of future income amounted to a fraction of 
the commonly perceived value. However, his analysis also incorporated the consideration of 
the potential stream of benefits that accrued to the Company from the second element of the 
agreement - the compensating quid pro quo. As I noted in my description of the settlement 
in 8.2.(ii), in addition to facilitating the ultimate protection of the covenanted area, the 
consent enabled BHQ to quarry the eastern bluffs with virtual impunity from prosecution 
under S. 244(3) of the Harbours Act. An important consequence of that dispensation was 
that it allowed the Company to quarry a large quantity of rock that it may not have been 
previously able to, without the threat of legal action. And, furthennore, there was the 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Compensation payments made by DoC under S. 15 of the Conservation Act 1987 or Ss 62 and 105 of the 
Public Works Act 1981. were likely to use the public sector discount rate. 
58 R. Cullen. 1991. "Discounting the Economic Costs of Conservation" p. 1126. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Otago Daily Times 16 February 1990. 
61 R. Cullen. 1991. "Discounting the Economic Costs of Conservation" p. 1126. 
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potential for much reduced extraction costs resulting from that Iicence.62 The agreement 
established more liberal rules governing the ejection of quarry debris into the area within 
DoC's jurisdiction. Despite the conservationists' contention that it was the concession, per 
se, that would enable BHQ to quarry the eastern bluffs, this was highly unlikely. The 
Company would certainly have made efforts to quarry the area despite the strict regime.63 
But the consent would "give the Company more flexibility in its quarrying methods".64 It 
can thus be concluded that the costs of extraction would decrease as a direct result of the 
agreement. 
In his paper Cullen calculated the costs that would accrue to the Company from 
reduced cost of extracting the 1.89 million tonnes of rock in the eastern bluffs. His analysis 
was founded on the assumption that quarrying of the eastern bluffs would begin in 1995 and 
continue for twenty-two years. He suggests two alternative levels of cost reduction; the first 
is a decrement of $0.30 per tonne, the second, $0.12 per tonne.65 Table 8.2 sets out the 
figures for each of the two hypothetical levels of cost reduction, each subject to a variety of 
discount rates. 
Table 8.2. Discount Rates and NPV of Cost Reductions from the Harbours Consent66 
Discount NPV$ 
Rate % 
A. $ 0.30 per tonne 
0 576000 
1 494488 
2 426528 
3 369603 
4 3217(13 
B. $ 0.12 per tonne 
0 230400 
1 197795 
2 170611 
3 147841 
4 128681 
Discount NPV$ 
Rate % 
5 281216 
6 246808 
7 217537 
8 192443 
9 170868 
5 112486 
6 98723 
7 87015 
8 69775 
9 68347 
Discount 
Rate % 
10 
11 
12 
13 
10 
11 
12 
13 
NPV$ 
152244 
136104 
122065 
109 807 
60897 
54441 
48826 
43923 
I will focus upon the same two discount rates as used before. At 5 percent the savings 
to the Company would be $281,000 at a cost reduction of $0.30 per tonne, and $112,486 at 
$0.12 per tonne. At 13 percent the savings are $109,807 and $43,923 respectively. But the 
most revealing consequence of the settlement is revealed when one subtracts the NPV of cost 
reductions from the foregone profits from quarrying the southern cliffs. Cullen provided the 
following table. 
62 Ross Cullen (Senior Lecturer. Department of Economics. University of Otago), 16 February 1990. Letter to 
Jeff Connell. Regional Conservator. Otago Conservancy, Dunedin. 
63 The Company made it clear that it would have made use of appropriate technology to facilitate extraction in 
the vicinity of the coastal periphery. Indeed, a 'back actor' (a machine which drags material back from the 
edge) has been operating above the formations for some time: John Fulton, (Chairman of Directors, Fulton 
Hogan Holdings Ltd), 14 August 1990, Personal interview, Fairfield, Dunedin. Also; Phillip Woollaston 
(Minister of Conservation), 6 April 1990, Letter to Sue Maturin. 
64 Phillip Woollaston. (Minister of Conservation), 6 April 1990, Letter to Sue Maturin. 
65 R. Cullen, 1991, "Discounting the Economic Costs of Conservation" p.ll25. 
66 Ibid. Note the discount procedure is the same as above. See Appendix D for discounting formula. 
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Table 8.3. Net Changes In Net Present Value at Various Discount Rates67 
Discount 
Rate % 
NPV $ Discount 
Rate % 
NPV $ Discount 
Rate % 
o 2764 800 5 -61934 10 
1 1101571 6 -75761 11 
2 398508 7 -76495 12 
3 103 783 8 -64914 13 
4 -16404 9 -66083 
164 
NPV$ 
-59834 
-53 938 
-48 586 
-43808 
NB: These figures are calculated by subtracting the NPV of cost reductions at $0.12 per tonne from that of 
foregone profits from quarrying the southern cliffs. 
What is apparent from Table 8.3 is that at a discount rate of 4 percent or higher (both 
of the relevant discount rates used above are higher) the Company received a windfall profit 
from the settlement. 68 
There was, therefore, a huge disparity between the general perception of the costs of 
the agreement and a more realistic assessment of those costs. It is useful to note the reaction 
of the participants to Cullen's calculations when they were introduced into the discourse. 
I observed earlier that a primary reason why the discounting methodology is 
appropriate in this instance is because the method is regularly utilised by businesses when 
making investment decisions. That is, to use this method is to critique the Company's claims 
within the bounds of their own value discourse. However, when Company representatives 
were presented with Cullen's estimates they rejected them outright as being totally 
ridiculous.69 From this response one can conclude either of two things: First, that the 
representatives were aware of the validity of the method, and ultimately a more realistic 
exchange-value of their resource, but chose to consciously reject the figures for strategic 
reasons (i.e. they would subvert their case) - the Company's dominant position as a price 
setter thus allowing them to control the content of the debate; The second possible 
interpretation is that the Company representatives were either unaware of the procedure, or 
could not understand the concept. It would seem that the most likely option would be the 
former as it simply was not in the Company's interests to allow the figures any validity 
within the discourse (that is if the Company was to act in a substantively rational manner in 
the pursuit of its goal of profit maximisation). 
The Company's response served to shape those of the other participants. Some, such 
as the Mayor of Dunedin, mirrored the Company's complete rejection of the figures, 
labelling them totally unreaIistic.7o Others, such as the Minister of Conservation, while 
"appreciating the validity and value" of Cullen's methodology, noted that the figures could 
only be utilised as a negotiating too\.71 It should be mentioned here that by this stage the 
negotiations were already complete, with little hope of the renewal of discussion.72 Thus 
Cullen's figures were effectively redundant for such a purpose. The conservationists' 
67 Ibid, p. 1129. 
68 Ibid, p. 1128. 
69 John Fulton, (Chairman of Directors, Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd.>, 14 August 1990, Personal interview. 
Also: Jim Hunter, (General Manager, Black Head Quarries), 3 August 1990, Personal interview. 
70 Richard Walls (Mayor of Dunedin), 13 November 1990, Personal interview, Mayoral Chambers, Dunedin 
Civic Center. 
71 Philip Woollaston, 11 April 1990, Letter to Dr Ross Cullen. 
72 Ibid. 
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response is also of some interest. The Friends of Black Head dismissed the figures as 
impracticable noting that, the determination of the magnitude of any compensation would be 
concomitant with the provisions of the Public Works Act 1981 and would essentially be 
contingent upon the negotiation of an appropriate market price.73 It seems that even the 
conservationists had missed Cullen's point that the entire motivation for the application of 
the discounting methodology was to provide a market valuation that could indeed be used 
within the negotiation framework. So, for the purposes of the conservation case, the 
economic analysis carne to nothing. However, for the present purpose - a critical appraisal -
the methodology proves valuable. 
8.5. Postscript: Johnson's 1994 Report 
By May 1994 the Company had completed their work in the area above the covenanted area, 
thus ending the major phase of induced rock and debris fall down the outer faces. To 
establish some baseline data for the site vis-a-vis future regeneration and the need for 
remedial work, Dr Johnson (now working for Maanaki Whenua - Landcare Research) was 
contracted by the Otago Conservancy to conduct a botanical survey. That assessment also 
included general observations about the landscape impacts (although it is important to 
highlight that this assessment does not incorporate the ongoing destruction of the eastern 
bluffs that was central to the conservationists' objection to the agreement).74 Johnson's 
observations can be summarised as follows: 
Physical Changes. The crest of the slopes had been lowered to that of the line on 
Figure 8.1. Three types of rock-fall had resulted from that activity: First, sporadic falls of a 
few rocks at a time had caused a substantial impact. Many of the most notable formations 
were chipped from the bombardment, and the Roman Baths were filled with debris; 
Secondly, the dislodgement or disintegration of a mass of rock at one time had produced 
bouldery talus slopes. Some of those slopes were wholly of rock material; Thirdly, there had 
been local accumulation of stone chips and quarry grit in descent chutes. One overall effect 
of these three types of fall, had been to cause a net movement down-slope of existing soil 
deposits.7S 
Botanical Changes. Twelve native shrub and tree species were no longer present at the 
site. Although far less abundant, some native woody plants had survived, and some of those 
species displayed an ability to re-invade disturbed slopes. A few of the native herbs and 
ferns listed in 1982 and 1986 were no longer present. There had been an apparent increase 
in native herbs and grasses, which had move in to colonise the disturbed areas, and there had 
also been an invasion of introduced weed species. Johnson warned that gorse should be kept 
at bay at all costs. While there had been very significant damage to the biota there were 
reasonable prospects for regeneration at the site if the Department of Conservation controlled 
some of the weeds and undertook an extensive replanting program.76 
73 Sue Maturin. 23 November 1991. Personal communication. Dunedin. 
74 P. Jotmson. 1994. "Black Head: Vegetation Condition After Quarrying" Conservatioll Advisory Science Notes 
No. 95 Department of Conservation. Wellington. 
7S Ibid. pp. 4-5. 
761bid. pp. 6-8. 
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As I noted above, lohnson's assessment was only a partial impact report. It did not 
include the important areas outside of the covenanted area, the seabed, or the fauna. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that while the biota could regenerate, many of the fonnations 
within the area were lost or degraded, and that others such as the Roman Baths needed 
clearing of rubble. 
8.5. Conclusion 
The Black Head settlement effectively detennined the long-tenn future of the headland as 
many of the effects would be irreversible. The fluted eastern bluffs continue to be quarried, 
and if the quarry remains economically viable over its projected lifespan, they will disappear 
altogether. The protected columns of the southern periphery are already damaged. While 
highly degraded the biota is the only element of the natural character that can recover to a 
degree with intervention. But overall there has been, and will in all likelihood continue to be, a 
loss of natural character (and if recognised, the intrinsic values). This loss which was 
recognised by the conservationists and Maori who participated in the dispute, would also affect 
the wider public and, indeed, future generations. However, for the quarry Company the 
situation is the reverse, they will probably accrue no net financial losses from the settlement 
itself, and there is a good possibility they will receive a financial windfall. That is, in addition 
to the profits that they will derive from the rest of their operation. This is contrary to the 
general presentation of the agreement as a fair solution involving a very generous compromise 
on the Company's part It is because of this that I have portrayed the agreement as a Pyrrhic 
victory for those seeking protection of the area. 
The Black Head dispute was a relatively small-scale conflict, the substantive issues 
were fairly straightforward, and the dispute played out within the relatively confined fonnat of 
mostly bilateral negotiations. Not only did the Company prevail in terms of the substantive 
outcome, they retained a high degree of control over the process throughout. In the next 
Chapter I will set out to see how the eleven mechanisms/principles contained across the 
analytical framework can help explain these events. 
9 
A Critical Analysis of the Black Head Conflict 
9.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the theoretical elements contained within the 
analytical framework (Chapters Four and Five) to the Black Head study. This is a two-way 
operation involving, on the one hand, the use of theoretical precepts to explain, in some 
meaningful part, the processes and outcomes of that conflict, and on the other hand, to let 
the historical evidence reflect back upon the framework itself - to scrutinise the posited 
mechanisms of business dominance, and to signal those elements of the framework that are 
of greater or lesser explanatory value. In doing this the greatest difficulty is to detect or 
infer the exercise (or non-exercise) of these mechanisms within the 'noise' of the complex 
conjuncture. 1 
Discussion follows the progression of the arguments within the framework. Hence, I 
begin with the issue of value-form. As I noted at the beginning of Chapter Four, the 
distinction between use-value and exchange-value, and in applied terms, commodified and 
non-commodified values, performs a dual function. First of it acts analytically as a broad 
ordering principle for the discussion of environmental politics. Secondly, it allows for a 
systematic connection to be made between socioeconomic function and environmental 
harm. Both of these aspects are dealt with in the context of the Black Head dispute. But the 
bulk of the chapter is concerned with the mechanisms of power set out in Chapter Five. 
Like discussion in that chapter, my investigation will progress from the strategic level of 
politics - that is, the general causal imperatives that are the subject of Offe's schema - to the 
more specific generative mechanisms such as the matter of property rights or the dilemma of 
collective action. 
9.2. Value-Form 
As I made clear in Chapter Four, the discussion of value-form is only a preface to the central 
questions of the political schema - the framework of business power and dominance. The 
1 Remembering that the posited structural relationships. and specific mechanisms of business dominance, must 
be conceived as trans/actual entities (Chapter Two). 
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application of the value argument to the case studies is largely a matter of a simple 
assessment of whether or not there was a general fit between the types of actors in the 
dispute and the types of value-holdings that motivated their political action. But I will also 
ascertain whether there was a noticeable prima facie connection between value-fonn and 
environmental hann - namely, were the commodified interests also the interests that 
potentially or actually resulted in the greatest environmental hann? 
9.2.(i) Comnwdijied and Non-Commodified Value Arguments 
In the Black Head conflict, commodified values featured in the discourse in at least two 
ways; first in tenns of the articulation or expression of the substantive arguments, and 
secondly, there was the matter of essential motivations. In respect of the fonner, 
conservationists did refer to the value of Black Head as a potential tourist site and resource 
(and by the end of conflict it was indeed on the itinerary of an eco-tourist operator). But 
there was never any attempt to put a dollar value on that use. The Company was the only 
actor that ultimately utilised commodity valuations as a substantive expression of value. 
There was an even more marked correspondence with the value schema in tenns of 
the actors' motivations. While the conservationists had alluded to possible commodified 
uses, none of their group was engaging in the dispute because of those values. Thus, BHQ 
was the only actor whose driving force was the "passionate chase after exchange-value". 
For the Company the dispute was solely about defending their investments in both the 
quarry operation and in their downstream enterprises that utilised the rock. Marx argued 
that "it is only in so far as the appropriation of ever more and more wealth in the abstract 
becomes the sole motive of his operations, that he functions as a capitalist".2 On such an 
account BHQ was the only agent that can be clearly classified as having acted as a capitalist 
in the conflict. 
Focusing, conversely, upon the non-commodified arguments further strengthens this 
. . 
assessment. Again, there were the two dimensions. In tenns of the articulation or 
expression of value, non-commodified arguments were utilised by all of the actors in the 
conflict. The Company constantly referred to the use-values of the basalt resource. For 
example, the rock was incredibly dense and it was unifonn in quality, or the vicinity (spatial 
characteristics) of the quarry in relation to the downstream operations and markets was 
valued. But as I noted in 4.3.(i), although the commodity is an entity of double fonn - and 
with the commodification of natural resources there will be a necessary material substratum 
of use - BHQ was ultimately concerned with the value of the commodity in exchange. The 
hardness of the basalt was only a means to an end, and the Company's interests were 
essentially financial. By contrast, the conservation campaigners articulated their interests 
through reference to a wide array of non-commodified fonns of value. The Whanau-o-
Otokia referred to spiritual, mahinga kai, rock gathering and other historical values. None 
of those arguments were expressed in money tenns. The wider conservation case embraced 
a rich array of value types: The intrinsic and natural values arguments, including the 
scarcity, life-support, and species values; The crucial landscape values, including 
naturalistic and scientific interest (again largely predicated on scarcity) in both the 
2 K. Marx, 1958 (1867), Capital Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, pp. 152-3. 
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geological and botanical val ues, aesthetic arguments, spiri tual val ues, etc.; And the various 
recreational values referred to the various uses such as surfing, diving and fishing. There 
were thus many languages of value articulated in the conflict 
Yet the significant issue here, as earlier, was that although BHQ referred to specific 
use-values of the headland (which were in themselves destructive consumptive uses) they 
did not pertain to its essential motivations. As I have already observed, the material 
characteristics of the basalt formation were only of interest in so far as they affected the 
overall profitability of the business, and not for their own sake. For the conservationists the 
situation was totally the reverse. They were essentially motivated by non-commodified 
interests, and where they did allude to money values they did so in the abstract - as 
unquantified potential benefits - and even then it was only in support of their essential 
interests. It is possible to conclude that there was a strong correspondence between the type 
of social actor in the dispute and their type of value holdings. Thus, for the purposes of the 
following political analysis, I will classify and treat BHQ solely as a capitalist enterprise, 
and the conservationists/Maori advocates in a residual sense as environmentalists/non-
capitalists. 
9.2~(ii) Value-Form and Environmental Harm in the Black Head conflict 
The task here is to ascertain whether there was a prima facie connection between value-form 
and environmental harm - namely, were the commodified interests also the interests that 
potentially or actually resulted in the greatest environmental harm? 
In Chapter Six I established that the escalation of quarrying activity at Black Head 
had led, and would continue to lead, to significant environmental damage. Damage that was 
in the greatest part irreversible; there was a loss in perpetuity to the natural and social 
worlds. It would also lead to the increased scarcity of such sites (on the basis of the 
geological values). There was, moreover, a tendential connection with the greater the 
quarrying activity the greater the consequent harm to the environment (although there were 
qualitative impacts in that quarrying at the seaward margins was considered a greater threat 
than on the inland side). By contrast none of the alternative uses proposed by the 
conservationists involved any apparent environmental harm. The only readily conceivable 
exception would be if the loss of rock production at the Black Head site were to necessarily 
lead to substitution from other sites, which in tum led to environmental damage elsewhere -
but with the high number of potential sites around Dunedin that was doubtful. So, once 
again, there was a strong fit with my framework. 
In Chapter Four I listed four ecological difficulties posed by the commodity form. 
All of those difficulties were of some relevance in this case. However I will pay particular 
attention to three of those. The first internal mechanism was the observation that the use-
value/exchange-value split within the commodity form involves an inherent disconnection, 
and that no systematic relation exists between the two. I argued that the consequence of the 
blindness of exchange-value to the rich and manifold qualities of things, and to the 
peculiarities of the production process (other than in the minimisation of the financial costs 
of manufacture and maximisation of exchange-value), is that many environmental costs are 
subsequently externalised - they are not included within exchange-values. The production 
of aggregate at Black Head was a clear case of business externalising its environmental costs 
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whilst internalising (the private good) benefits. On the face of it, the move by the Company 
to place a covenant over a portion of the seaward faces (thus foregoing future production) 
can be seen as a move to internalise a degree of those costs. However, Cullen's analysis 
seems to negate that interpretation. The second ecological difficulty, is that commodity 
exchange is based upon a logic of equivalence (in the abstract) not one of reciprocity. The 
Company mined the headland and in return received profits. However, in that process 
nothing was returned to the headland. Finally, as observed by Harvey: "Money prices attach 
to particular things and presuppose exchangeable entities with respect to which private 
property rights can be established or inferred. This means that we conceive of entities as if 
they can be taken out of any ecosystem of which they are a part."3 For the Company, rock 
from any part of the headland was substitutable, regardless of its connection to the headland 
as a whole or any particular setting, or indeed as providing habitat for a distinct ecology. I 
make these three points to highlight that not only was BHQ the primary cause of 
environmental harm but that the way that the Company valued the resource was part of the 
process of causing that harm. 
9.3. Business, State and Environment: Offe's Model 
The power and politics element of my framework operates in two parts. The first phase 
works at the level of broad structural relations that persist between business, the state and 
other social agents (in this case environmental actors) in advanced capitalist societies. It is 
based upon 'state theory' - in this case the work of the post-Marxistlneo-Weberian Claus 
Offe - and it is, in great part, state centred. My intention is to examine in tum each of 
Offe's four general principles, to see (where they can be either observed or inferred) 
whether they operated and affected the pattern of events in the Black Head dispute. As I 
noted in Chapter Five, Offe and others such a James O'Connor and Jurgen Habennas, 
developed totalising models that predicted the emergence of legitimation crises. However, i 
have sought to avoid that mistake by understanding the four principles in realist tenns as 
transfactual tendencies within a stratified and open world. There can be no prediction as to 
how they will come together at any time, but their use may well explain how and why the 
patterns and outcomes of conflict in the Black Head dispute happened the way they did. 
9.3.{i) Exclusion 
The exclusion principle describes the division of labour that divorces the state from 
organising commodity production and assigns that task to the capitalist. The essential point 
here is that "political power is prohibited from organising material production according to 
its own 'political' criteria; property, whether in labour power or capital, is private".4 Two 
important caveats were made in the original discussion about this principle; (i) that this is a 
functional division that may not be obvious at the level of events (it is understood to be both 
tendential and transfactual), and (ii) that this division is constantly threatened by 
countervailing pressures on the state to secure the reproduction of capitalist relations - it 
3 D. Harvey, 1996, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference BlackweU Publ., Cambridge Ma, p. 153. 
4 C. Dffe, 1984, Contradictions of the Welfare State Heinemann, London, p. 120. 
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stands in a tensed relation with other elements of the schema. Nevertheless, this principle is 
absolutely crucial in distinguishing between, and indeed defining, both state and capital in 
the model of politics utilised here. 
In the Black Head conflict this demarcation can be viewed on two levels. The first 
stratum is the contextual level of general state~apital relations during the period of the 
dispute. This period was in fact characterised by a comprehensive and sustained withdrawal 
of the state from its previously widespread involvement in commodity production.S The 
nea-Iiberal economic reforms of the Fourth Labour Government were entirely consistent 
with, and driven by, the very exigencies that underpin the exclusion principle. However, the 
only explanatory value that can be derived from this in the case of Black Head, is that there 
was a general reluctance within the state to become actively involved in organising 
commodity production. 
The second stratum is at the particular level of the actors involved within the dispute. 
The quarry production was wholly owned and controlled by a private enterprise, with all 
levels of the state (local, regional and national government, and the various agencies 
thereof) divorced from direct involvement in that process. Moreover, this had been so since 
quarrying began in the nineteenth century. There was, therefore, a strong correspondence 
between the exclusion principle described earlier and the manifest elements of the Black 
Head dispute (the level of events). The exclusion principle thus broadly describes the 
division of labour in the dispute, but it does not in itself tell us much about that division. 
9.3.(ii) Dependency 
The dependency principle is the straightforward acknowledgment that the strength of the 
capitalist state depends in some considerable part upon the strength of the economy as a 
whole. In Chapter Five I asserted that this dependence incorporates two interconnected 
elements. First, the material capacity of the state to make decisions, and act upon them, is 
predicated upon the resources that it extracts from private accumulation (and that the abilitY 
of the state to extract such material concessions will be dependent upon the performance of 
the economy itself). Secondly, that the state's legitimacy is, in great part, dependent upon 
the economy, and this in tum is a powerful motivation for the state to serve the interests of 
capital. 
The dependency relationship functioned in the Black Head dispute at a number of 
levels. At the most general level, participating in the conflict were agencies of central 
government that were ultimately and wholly dependent upon tax revenues and finance from 
capital markets. At the regional level there were local government actors who were 
S That reform program is of much greater relevance to the Whanganui dispute (see 11.1.(ii». On that crucial 
period of restructuring see for example: J. Boston, and M. Holland., (eds), 1987, The Fourth LAbour 
Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand (first edition) Oxford University Press, Auckland; B. 
Easton, (ed.), 1989, The Making of Rogernomics Auckland University Press, Auckland; M. Holland, and 1. 
Boston, (eds), 1990, The Fourth LAbour Government (second edition) Oxford University Press, Auckland; 
1. Boston, 1. Martin,1. Pallot, and P. Walsh, (eds), 1991, Reshaping the State: New ZealaJld's Bureaucratic 
Revolution Oxford University Press, Auckland; B. Roper, and C. Rudd, (eds), 1993, State and Economy in 
New ZealQlld Oxford University Press, Auckland; A. Sharp, (ed.), 1994, Leap into the Dark: The ChQIIging 
Role of the State in New Zealand since 1984 Auckland University Press, Auckland; 1. Kelsey, 1995, The 
New Zealand Experiment: A World Model for Structural Adjustment? Auckland University Press, 
Auckland. 
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dependent upon a buoyant regional economy with a thriving community of rate payers. The 
strategic imperatives deriving from this dependency relationship undoubtedly served, at 
some fundamental level, to constrain the actions of the state in the conflict and possibly 
limited the options for the preservation of the headland (see 'maintenance' function). It is, 
however, extremely difficult to discern just how much of a constraint it was at the level of 
events. But one possible factor in explaining the extent to which the actions of each 
particular agent of the state were constrained in their actions could be the proximity of the 
respective decision-makers to their revenue base. Hence, the exigencies of the fiscal 
constraints were likely to be of more direct influence upon the mayor of Dunedin and local 
councillors than upon the regional manager of DoC. This is not to say that the actions of 
DoC were not fundamentally restricted by their budgetary obligations, but rather that the 
actions of the department were not largely dictated by the needs of the local economy. In 
addition to being funded out of the general tax revenues, DoC was also buffered from the 
demands or needs of capital by the nonnative prescriptions set out in its legislative mandate. 
But ultimately, the 'dependency' relation is a deep structural imperative. It operates 
in the background, and certainly underpins some of the other mechanisms that are dealt with 
later. But in tenns of explaining the specifics of an environmental dispute such as this, it is 
like the exclusion principle a blunt and indirect explanatory factor. 
9.3.(iii) Maintenance 
The dependency principle motivates the state in the perfonnance of the crucial third element 
of Offe's schema - the maintenance function - whereby the state seeks to create, sustain and 
modify the conditions in which capitalists engage in production for profit As I observed in 
the analytical framework, this role is carried out both in the broad context of the system-
wide needs of capital, and the narrower contexts pertaining to fractions andlor moments of 
accumulation. I also asserted that particular patterns of accumulation establish crucial and 
specific impulses for state action (and, for that matter, in-action). 
Of the ways that the state responds to the system-wide needs of capital, one stands 
out as having been of importance in shaping the Black Head conflict; the state's 
enforcement of property rights. The property rights issue will be dealt with at length in 
9.4.(ii), but it is important to highlight that no matter how anomalous and anachronistic the 
Company's entitlements were, the state did not unilaterally act to constrain those rights. 
However, the maintenance role is best understood in the Black Head dispute in tenns of 
threats to the orderly pursuit of profits. 
The Black Head controversy arose out of the process of commodity production as 
the Company internalised the benefits of production and externalised its costs. The 
operation of the quarry had already caused significant environmental and hann, and would 
in all likelihood have even more deleterious effect in the future. These effects led to a 
public campaign whereby significant pressure was brought to bear upon the company. In 
the current context, that opposition amounted to a perceived threat to the process of 
profitable accumulation at the level of the individual accumulating unit - the capitalist finn. 
Unlike nonnal business competition this threat did not come from a rival capitalist 
enterprise, but rather, from non-capitalist interests. The agents of the state were subject to 
competing pressures; there was on the one hand, the imperative to protect the necessary 
Chapter Nine: A Critical Analysis of the Black Head Conflict 173 
conditions for profitable accumulation, and on the other hand, the need to be seen as being 
responsive to the legitimate struggle and demands of environmental and other community 
interests (legitimation imperative discussed next). 
A number of state actors participated in the dispute. At the central government level 
the principal agencies involved were the Mines Division of the Ministry of Energy and the 
Department of Conservation. As previously observed the regional offices of both 
departments exercised considerable autonomy in their approach to the problem. Yet the 
head offices and ministers responsible for each agency were frequently consulted, and 
certainly influenced their respective stances. 
A significant feature of the dispute was the variance in the way the maintenance 
dynamic affected each state actor. The task of maintaining and sustaining the requisite 
conditions necessary for accumulation appears to be the primary dynamic that shaped the 
actions of the Mines Division. A number of examples from the case study illustrate this. 
First of all, there was the Division's call to minimise the potential loss of aggregate reserves 
and future production that would result if the conservationists were successful in protecting 
the headland. Indeed, the Ministry of Energy underlined the economic importance of the 
extractive resource through appeals to the public good (7.2). Secondly, there was the 
Division's approach to the safety question. As far as the Ministry of Energy were concerned 
the solution to the safety problem was simple - the public should keep away from the area 
until some unspecified date in the future when the quarry operations moved away from the 
seaward periphery of the headland. There was a clear bias because the hazards were being 
exported out into the adjacent areas held in public ownership, the company was obliged 
under the Mines Act to operate a safe quarry,6 yet the burden of change was to be borne by 
those members of the public who were quite lawfully in the vicinity of the headland. 
Thirdly, there was the organisational recalcitrance exhibited by the Division when it came to 
the compilation of a management plan for the area7 Finally, during the early stage of the 
dispute the local mines inspector counselled the Department of Conservation not to enter the 
controversy (see 7.2).8 
In contrast to the Mines Division which appeared to be driven in a pro-active way by 
the maintenance dynamic, the influence of the same imperative upon the Department of 
Conservation was one of constraint. Despite, on the one hand, a very clear conservation 
mandate - both in tenns of statutory management and advocacy - and on the other hand, a 
very strong case for preservation in this instance, DoC still approached the issue tentatively. 
DoC representatives sought to reassure the Company and the public, that they wanted to 
avoid adverse repercussions upon business activity,9 The accusation that DoC was 
6Quarry Regulations 1983 Regulation 10. 
7 A. Perrett (for the Regional Manager, Department of Conservation, Dunedin), 1987. Letter to John Walrond. 
Inspector of Mines, Dunedin, August lO. Also stated by: A. Perrett (for the Regional Manager DoC), July 
1987. In an internal memorandwn to Robin Thomas (District Conservator, Dunedin): "Mines have dragged 
the chain on this issue". 
SJohn Walrond (Inspector of Mines and Quarries), 13 July 1987. Letter to Regional Manager Department of 
Conservation Dunedin, Ministry of Energy, Dunedin. 
9 Jeff Connell (Regional Conservator, Otago Conservancy). 12 August 1991, Personal rnterview, Department 
of Conservation, Dunedin. 
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inherently anti-development had dogged the Department from its inception. lO Another 
notable constraint was the way the maintenance imperative limited the options for 
pres~rvation of the headland. The issue of property rights will be discussed in more detail in 
9.4.(ii). However, it is crucial to acknowledge here, that private property rights remained 
sacrosanct in the dispute, with all the options for preservation consequent upon the voluntary 
action of the company. Another significant constraint upon state action was that of 
" 
budgetary constraints. Huge demands were placed upon the small conservation vote, and 
there was very little discretionary spending available for the purchase threatened areas such 
as Black Head ll - even if the headland were to be valued in adjusted NPV terms (which was 
never contemplated by the negotiators), the costs would have remained prohibitive (certainly 
at lower discount rates). The Department's representatives seemed to be constantly aware of 
all of these constraints upon their action and the statement that they had to acknowledge the 
"limits of the possible" captures their attitude. 12 The mandates of the two agencies were in 
conflict with one another, with each exhibiting a different response to the maintenance 
dynamic. 
At the local government level, the Dunedin City Council too was affected by the 
maintenance dynamic. Like the Mines Division, the City Council sought to sustain business 
activity through the pro-active support of commercial enterprise. For example, the Council 
pursued a policy of interventionism through its ownership and management of the local 
authority trading enterprise's (LATEsI3), and by nurturing business ventures in the region 
via its business development unit. Indeed, as I noted in Chapter Six, the Mayor of Dunedin, 
Richard Walls, emphasised that it was the responsibility of the Council to provide 
"economic leadership" in the region. 14 These goals and activities coexisted with the 
Council's environmental and social functions. While Council representatives acknowledged 
that the destruction of the headland was undesirable, there was no subsequent move by any 
Council arm (such as a reserves department) to seek to protect what was a considerable 
conservation and recreation asset to the region. The local body organisation was much 
smaller than the central government apparatus, with the functional arms of the City Council 
contiguous, if not actually intertwined with one another. Furthermore, the mandates of those 
functional arms were not as clearly defined as those of central government, and they were 
without the support of a 'responsible minister' to defend their actions at the political level. 
Richard Walls, in his handling of the dispute, revealed these ambiguities of purpose. On a 
number of occasions throughout the controversy the Mayor paid lip-service to the 
widespread public opposition to the quarry, expressing his sympathi'es and support for the 
10 See most recently: P. Hartley, 1997, Conservation Strategies for New Zealand New Zealand Business 
Roundtable, Wellington. 
11 Jeff ConneU (Regional Conserv ator, Otago Conservancy), 12 August 1991, Personal Interv iew, Department 
of Conservation, Dunedin. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Which could be seen as contravening the exclusion principle, and would in tum explain the movement to 
force local bodies to divest themselves of such enterprises. See J. Kelsey, 1995, The New Zealand 
Experiment: A World Modelfor Structural Adjustment? Auckland University Press, Auckland, p. 130. 
14 Richard Walls (Mayor of DWledin) , 13 November 1990, Personal interview, Dunedin Civic Centre. 
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conservationist's case. IS However, such gestures were confined to rhetoric and he 
undertook no substantive action in defence of the landforms. 
At the local government level the autonomy of the state to act in defence of 
environmental quality was especially constrained by the maintenance imperative. The most 
feasible explanation as to why local government was so susceptible to business influence 
would once again be the proximity of local decision-makers to the conflict. The position of 
the company in the local economy and its established links with local structures of 
government were discussed in 6.3.(i). With a thousand full time employees and a group 
turnover of $150 m in 1990, Fulton Hogan was a very important business and employer at 
both the local, regional, and national levels. The parent companies received contracts ffrom 
both the Silverpeaks and Dunedin Councils. Moreover, these were long established 
Dunedin companies firmly entrenched in the community power structure. I have already 
identified the dependency relationship linking the state and accumulation at this level. The 
corollary of this relationship was that local government was strongly predisposed towards 
the needs of the Company. The strategic consequence of that relationship was that the 
Dunedin City Council played no real part in the conflict despite the pressure of the 
conservationists. 
An argument could be made that the tourism values of the headland should have 
been a motivation for the Councils. However, there are at least three reasons why the 
Councils were unaffected; (i) the tourism options were always discussed in hypothetical 
terms, (ii) no dollar values were attached to the suggestion, and (iii) it was the 
conservationists and not business who were talking about tourism - that is there was no 
established operator who could have mobilised any of the mechanisms of business influence 
discussed later. 
The maintenance imperative does explain certain contextual elements of the Black 
Head dispute. Most notably the Mines Division's role in the conflict, certain limits upon 
DoC's agency, and the non-involvement of the Dunedin City Council. 
9.3.(iv) Legitimation 
It is imperative upon the State (in a liberal democracy) that it be seen to "pursue the 
common and general interests of society as a whole, allows equal access to power and is 
responsive to justified demands".16 This is the legitimatory function. Following Williams 
and Reuten, it is understood here that the legitimation of the State involves both the 
"specification of the content of negative Right through the framework of the law", and "a 
further positive specification of these rights - grounded in welfare policy and the institutions 
of civil society".l7 The question then is just how did this dual process of legitimation 
manifest itself in the Black Head dispute? 
IS Sue Maturin (Friends of Black Head Spokesperson), 2 September 1991, Personal interview, 
Dunedin;.Richard Walls (Mayor of Dunedin), 15 February 1990, Press Release, Dunedin. 
16 C. affe, in L. Lindberg, (ed.), 1975, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism D C Heath and Co., 
London, p. 127. 
17 M. WiUiams, and G. Reuten, 1993, "The Political-Economic Transfonnations in Central and Eastern 
Europe: A Tragic Neglect of Civil Society" Working Paper Series 2/93 Graduate School of Business and 
Government Management, Victoria University of Wellington, p. 16. 
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To begin discussion on the issue of legitimation I will suggest that the Black Head 
dispute arose to a limited extent because of the historical failure of the state to constrain the 
property rights of the Company. By the time of the dispute most of New Zealand's coastline 
was in public ownership (ie. in the form of a marginal strip or Queens Chain I8), many 
quarry operations required a mining licence, and most natural resource based business 
activity was in some way regulated by planning rules. All of those normal mechanisms of 
constraint had to some degree emerged because of wider social interests in those areas; a 
process of legitimation (although they can also be said to have arisen because of the 
maintenance role). However, because BHQ was largely exempt from such constraints there 
was in a sense the historical failure of legitimation - to accommodate the interests of wider 
societal interests. Schrecker makes a relevant comment here: "The property rights from 
which corporations derive their authority do not, as a rule, depend on the continued or 
renewed consent of any party, but only on the legality of prior acquisition",19 That is, the 
legitimacy of private property is in the form of negative right as opposed to positive right. 
The next point to be made about legitimation is in terms of "mediating disputes and 
installing compromises between the requirements of accumulation and the need to stabilise 
and legitimate the system".20 Two state actors performed this function in the dispute. The 
Silverpeaks County Council (especially Les Cleveland, see 7.2 and 7.4) acted in the purest 
sense as a mediator, holding to no particular substantive position - their apparent motivation 
was the resolution of conflict. DoC's role in the dispute can also be partly explained by this 
need, as it sat between the polarities of on the one hand the Company and on the other hand 
the conservation advocates. 
But DoC also functioned as an advocate.21 The Department of Conservation was to 
not only manage the Crown lands under its direct stewardship, but also to act as a wider 
conservation advocate. The existence of DoC and its mandate is wholly in line with the 
notion of positive right explicated in the analytical framework - the state is forced to open 
itself to non-capitalist interests, and it is obliged to make material concessions which may be 
immediately or partially subversive of capitalist accumulation. Indeed, the existence of DoC 
was, in some considerable part, a response to wider historical struggle by environmentalists. 
DoC's mandate gave it the power to act, but its participation in this particular 
dispute, as with the earlier limited actions of the Reserves Rangers from the Department of 
Lands and Survey, was prompted and henceforth sustained by the vigorous lobbying of 
Maturin, Godman, Carter, Baker and others. The state responded to direct political struggle 
(this was through both direct lobbying and via lobbying of the local MP, Michael Cullen, as 
well as the Minister of Conservation Philip Woollaston). This was also a manifestation of 
positive right. DoC's role in the dispute was absolutely crucial to the (in this case putative) 
success of the conservation case. Because of its powers under the Harbours Act DoC was 
18 S. 24 Conservation Act 1987. 
19 T. Schrecker. 1985. "Resisting Regulation: Environmental Policy and Corporate Power" Alternatives Vol. 
13. No.1. p. 16. 
20 B. Head. 1984. "Recent Theories of the State" Politics Vol. 19. No. 20. p. 41. 
21 Prior to the creation of DoC. the Department of Lands and Survey had a responsibility for the protection of 
natural features. Lands and Survey pursued this function in conjunction with sometimes conflicting 
developmental functions. The difficulties presented by this dual commission were subsequently removed 
through the restructuring of the environmental administration. 
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the only agent that was both able and willing to exert leverage against the Company (by 
contrast, the Mines Division was able but not willing). However, while it did indeed 
instigate legal proceedings, DoCs approach was always reserved. The Department 
proceeded cautiously, and ultimately strove to portray itself as a moderate and reasonable 
bargaining agent compared to the independent environmentalists.22 Also, there was a strong 
sense of its legitimacy deriving from the fact that it represented the broader public interest. 
But there was also a sense that the DoC decision-makers did not want to engage in an open 
conflict with an important local company (completely private as opposed to an SOE). 
At the local government level the legitimation function was never strong enough to 
cause state agents to transcend the constraints of the maintenance imperative and actively 
seek the preservation of the headland. The Silverpeaks County restricted itself to the 
mediation role, and the City Council sat on the sidelines of the conflict. 
The fonn negative right did not play any notable causal role. This fonn of right 
embraces the legitimacy that is derived from the framework of the law, for example, fonnal 
equality of process. While the dispute proceeded within the bounds of the law, there were 
no fonnal rights of participation or equality of process that guaranteed the conservation 
actors a role in the decision-making process. This is in contrast to the juridical process 
within the following Whanganui study. 
One other point of interest vis-ii-vis legitimation is in tenns of the outcome of 
conflict. The general perception was that there had indeed been an accommodation between 
the needs of business and conservation. Yet Cullen's analysis suggests that business had 
given up little, if not gained financially from the settlement. The Minister of Conservation 
in a letter to Cullen had acknowledged the validity of his method of valuation, but dismissed 
its efficacy given the power of the Company to dictate tenns. So, on the one hand DoC was 
considered successful in extracting a deal from the Company, but on the other hand the 
substance of that deal was quite different, and moreover, the Department were aware of that 
fact. This misconception was the key to the state's accomplishment of legitimatory 
function. Indeed, the state and the company were so successful that they had the 
conservation advocates doubting the validity of their own analyses of the agreement (see 
8.4.(ii». This is consistent with the idea that the state seeks to "convey the image of an 
organisation of power that pursues the common and general interests of society as a whole, 
allows equal access to power and is responsive to justified demands" [myemphasis].23 
The concept of a legitimation function does usefully explain some important 
elements of the dispute. Most significantly, it led to DoC perfonning dual roles as both a 
mediator concerned with the cessation of conflict and as an advocate for conservation values 
- motivated by a statutory mandate that had been the product of wider political struggle, and 
by the immediate political action of the conservation campaigners. 
22 Although in the Black Head dispute this cautionary approach was partially explained by the limited legal 
options. 
23 C. Orre, in L. Lindberg, (ed.), 1975, Stress and Contradiction p. 127. 
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9.3.(v) The Strategic Picture 
All four of Offe's imperatives can be seen to have been operating in some way in the Black 
Head conflict. The crucial issue, however, is assessing how useful they were in 
understanding business power in the dispute. The exclusion principle operated in the 
background by establishing the broad division of labour between business and the state. But 
it was of little direct explanatory value. Similarly, the dependency relationship describes a 
generic relation between the state and business, but its influence at any moment is difficult 
to infer. Although I did make the point that the closer unmediated relationship between 
local government and ratepayers could suggest a greater consciousness of the dependency 
relationship amongst those actors. Nevertheless, like the exclusion principle the dependency 
relationship operates as a secondary or deep mechanism, underpinning other elements of the 
framework. The maintenance role appeared to operate in three ways: First, it explains why 
the Mines Division (and their Minister) actively supported the Company in the face of a 
threat to accumulation; Secondly, it seems to have been a factor contributing to the 
conscious non-involvement of the Dunedin City Council in the dispute despite considerable 
community support for the issue; Thirdly, it acted to subtly constrain DoC's approach to the 
issue, which was particularly cautious. The legitimation principle was also evident in a 
variety of ways, most distinctly, the dual role of DoC as mediator and advocate. Finally, 
because the settlement was widely perceived as an acceptable final solution to the dispute, 
opposition to the quarry was effectively destroyed. This meant that the state had succeeded 
in shaping an accommodation that would almost certainly preclude future threats to the 
productive enterprise from conservation interests. The state was highly successful, first in 
balancing the exigencies of accumulation with the need to accommodate competing 
interests, and secondly, in keeping the costs of conflict to a minimum. 
9.4. Mechanisms of Business Dominance 
I turn now to the more specific mechanisms of business dominance. As I noted in Chapter 
Five, each mechanism is understood to be at once vertically embedded within the wider 
structural dynamics theorised by Offe, and laterally connected with some, if not all of the 
other mechanisms. 
9.4.(i) The Business Sanction 
The business sanction is the strategic leverage that fractions of capital derive from the potential 
cessation, translocation, reduction, or even withholding of future, investment and production, 
within a given geo-historical context. It is a mechanism that operates on a continuum from 
overt and deliberate action to subconscious structures of in-action or constraint, and it is 
premised upon the willingness and capacity to act when their interests are threatened. It is also 
important to reiterate here that this mechanism ultimately rests upon the recognition that 
society is largely dependent upon resources created in the process of accumulation, and that the 
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task of organising this process is almost exclusively the task of the private capitalist. Hence, 
business can be said to perform "public functions".24 
The business sanction operated on two levels in the Black Head dispute. First it is 
probable that it functioned as a broad constraint. BHQ was itself a small business actor in the 
Dunedin economy with only 15 full time staff. Its importance was largely overstated in the 
dispute, in particular through the Company's inflated estimates of the quarry's worth (between 
$50 and $90 million). But in terms of its political power, BHQ cannot be treated in isolation 
from the parent companies; the company derived power vis a vis its position as a subsidiary 
enterprise within a wider complex of ownership. As I have noted already, Fulton Hogan had a 
thousand full-time staff and a group turnover of $150 million in 1990. Palmer and Sons were 
much smaller with forty staff. Once again, both companies were firmly entrenched in networks 
of community power in the region (ie. as local body representatives, interlocking directorships, 
ongoing commercial relationships with the local authorities and informal connections). As 
with the dependency relationship, it is likely that local state actors were strongly disposed 
towards the needs of the Company, and that resulted in the Dunedin City Council's non-
involvement and the Silver Peaks County Council's functioning as no more than a mediator. It 
probably also served to shape the wider public response to the issue, with the Company 
identifying their own interests with the needs of the region throughout the conflict. 
The second level was in terms of the Company's willingness and capacity to act when 
threatened; the strategic level. Three examples are apparent. The first was in terms of BHQ' s 
ability to determine which options were 'feasible' and which were not. The Company 
consistently stated that the protection of the area would have adverse consequences for 
production, and this would in tum have downstream consequences for the parent companies 
and the local community. One specific example, was regarding quarry size; John Fulton and 
others argued that the protection of the eastern bluffs would render the operation commercially 
unviable (although as Cullen pointed out there were other smaller operations operating quite 
successfully in the area(8.4.(i». It was through this specification of the possible that the 
company established the baseline options in the decision-making process. 
A second example, is that of the phenomenon of job blackmail. The Company 
continually emphasised that fifteen full time jobs existed at the quarry itself in addition to other 
jobs in downstream enterprises. It was implied that those jobs would be lost if the whole or 
any significant part of the area were to be conserved. However, three arguments undermined 
the Company's implied sanction; the quarry would not necessarily stop being commercially 
viable, there was a constant demand for aggregate, and the presence of other sources of supply. 
Even if the Company had to move away from the headland those jobs were probably not site 
specific. Yet the company never acknowledged this fact. Indeed, as I noted in 7.4, quarry staff 
turned out en masse, and got quite agitated at the public meeting held in the Otago Museum in 
1989 - an act that suggests that the quarry managers recognised the utility of 'potential job 
losses' as a persuasive argument within their overall case. 
The Company in its dealings with the FoB exercised a third form of strategic sanction -
the environmental sanction. This was the implication that BHQ could in some way inflict 
24 C. Lindblom. 1977. Politics and Markets Basic Books. New York. p. 172. Also: C. Lindblom. 1982. "The 
Market as Prison" }ourfUll of Politics Vol.44. p. 327. 
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punishment upon the conservationists. Such punishment would be exercised through the 
Company pursuing an unnecessarily hard-line approach that would rule out future options for 
the preservation of the headland, for example, by purposefully quarrying near the coastal faces, 
or by deciding to quarry to the limits of their legal entitlement.25 BHQ's capacity to use this 
pressure was enabled by the liberal provisions of the resource regime, with few formal 
constraints upon the extractive process. However, while the Company had the ability to carry 
out such a threat their willingness to do so would have decreased over time as the momentum 
of the campaign built up and the negotiations with DoC developed. But it should be noted that 
even fairly weak threats might have some influence in circumstances where the effects of 
continued business activity are irreversible. 
The business sanction thus worked on two levels: First of all as a broad form of 
constraint that potentially limited participation in the dispute; And secondly, it was used 
strategically, to determine what were seen as feasible options for conservation and to suggest 
potential job losses, and finally, the conservationists were wary of forcing the Company into a 
hardline stance that would see greater environmental damage (an impression the Company 
failed to dispel). 
9.4.(ii) The Double Privilege of Private Property Ownership 
In Chapter Five I asserted that a private property regime confers a double privilege upon its 
owners. On the one hand, there is the internal logic of the private right - a privileged relation 
of power over the resource and over the rest of society - and on the other hand, there is an 
external structural political-economic bias that creates, sustains and legitimates this type of 
property rule. I shall relate each of these elements to the Black Head study. 
The immediate task is to examine the Company's property right The property regime 
that governed the use of the headland was an extremely strong private property regime. First, 
the headland was held in freehold title - it was private property. Secondly, the fact that title. to 
the land was acquired from the Crown in 1871 had two major implications; (i) there was no 
Crown reservation of minerals meaning that no mining licence was required, and (ii) there was 
no provision for a marginal strip along the coastline so quarrying could extend lawfully into the 
littoral zone. The third major factor was that since the quarry was operating prior to the Town 
and Country Planning Act 1977 it was deemed an existing use and thus exempt from planning 
prescriptions that would otherwise have circumscribed the operations. The Company thus held 
a highly anomalous and anachronistic bundle of rights that facilitated a high level of protection 
for the Company's interests, placed few constraints upon their operations, and imposed strong 
concomitant duties upon other members of society to refrain from interference with the quarry. 
The Company's rights structure certainly constituted the privilegedform private property. 
The other area of consequence in a review of the Black Head property rights structure is 
the coastal strip contiguous with the seaward periphery of the quarry. The export of debris 
from the quarry encroached upon the rights that pertained to that area. The Crown owned the 
coastal zone that was administered by DoC - it was public property. This area was to a degree, 
protected by the provisions of the Harbours Act 1950, and it was the quarry's subsequent 
25 Sue Maturin (Friends of Black Head Spokesperson), 2 September 1991, Personal interview. 
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infringement of this regime that facilitated the legal remedy that was to lead to the negotiated 
settlement. 
That property regime perfonned a crucial role in shaping the conflict As I established 
in Chapter Six, prior to the mid-1980s quarrying had relatively little impact upon the natural 
character the headland. No material spilled out over the seaward faces and as a consequence 
the quarry did not encroach upon the regime governing the coastal periphery. In addition, there 
was little public awareness of the headland's remarkable geological features, with the result 
that there were few stresses upon the existing structure of property rights. The 
conservationists' campaign for fonnal protection of the headland was stimulated by the rights 
structure; it was the property regime that facilitated the escalation in quarry production, 
allowed spillage over the coastal faces, and entitled the Company to potentially mine the area 
to sea level. Any accommodation of the conservation interests would inevitably involve 
modification of the existing rights structure by establishing constraints upon the Company's 
private use rights. Moreover, not only did the conservationists want the headland protected 
from irreversible effects, but they also wanted the right to use the headland, to have access to 
the benefits that would accrue from alternative uses.26 The conservationists subsequently 
demanded recognition of their interests through the assignment of some fonn of 
common/public property rights over a part or whole of the headland. Such an assignment 
would necessarily require the taking, purchase or gifting of use rights from the quarry owners. 
In this way the conflict was manifest as a dispute over property rights. In the following 
discussion I shall review this conflict over rights, noting the influence of these structures upon 
the process and outcome of the dispute. 
The nature of the property regime had two further effects upon proceedings; first, it 
affected the power of the disputants within the negotiation process, and secondly, it shaped the 
options for preservation. I will deal with each of these matters in tum. 
To explain the impact of the property rights structure upon the negotiation process I 
will resurrect the notion of a BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement). Throughout 
most of the dispute BHQ's BATNA was clearly preferable to a negotiated agreement. To a 
large degree this situation can be attributed to the property regime which guaranteed the 
security of BHQ's right to the use of the resource virtually regardless of external pressure. By 
contrast all the conservationists could do was lobby DoC to mobilise in defence of the Crown's 
interests in respect to the coastal lone. This begs the question of why BHQ engaged in 
negotiation at all, but can be explained in part by the rights structure, as it was the spillage of 
material onto Crown land that furnished DoC with the grounds for legal prosecution. It was 
the Crown's countervailing right that enabled DoC to commence legal proceedings and gain a 
degree of leverage by making BHQ's BATNA less attractive. Although it should be noted that 
the legal penalties for the infringement were relatively minor, and it was the de facto 
consequences of the prosecution, such as the costs of litigation and adverse public relations, 
that made the negotiation table a more attractive option for BHQ. Again this must be qualified 
by reiterating that once the parties entered into negotiations the company retained its capacity 
26A key issue here is one dealt with in Chapter Two. that is. the extent to which the competing uses were 
mutually exclusive. This question was a critical determinant of the fonns of accommodation considered, 
and the equation flDally agreed upon. 
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to hold command over the process. Ultimately, the structure of rights at Black Head ensured 
the preeminence of BHQ throughout the process of the dispute.27 
The paucity of legal options available to the conservationists also related to the 
structure of property rights. In 7.3. I outlined the main avenues that existed, and observed that 
no legal means dealt with the essence of the dispute, which was the substantive arguments 
about conservation and extraction. Instead, the disputants were forced to skirt around the issue, 
focussing upon subsidiary 'shadow' questions in order to force BHQ to negotiate. Moreover, 
even when BHQ and DoC set aside the prospect of litigation and engaged in substantive 
negotiations it was the rights structure that still detennined the options. Indeed, the covenant 
option that was finally agreed upon can be clearly seen as a product of the exigencies of the 
property regime. It was obvious that any final option would require the voluntary consent of 
the company. Once this was clear, the strength of the property regime ensured the power of 
BHQ to set the tenns and act as a price setter in negotiations. The Company would not sell a 
portion or the whole of the area other than for a vastly inflated sum, and consequently the 
options narrowed to the pursuit of a low cost solution that the company would agree to. 
Furthennore, such a solution would necessarily be founded upon the need to keep to a 
minimum any alienation of the company's use rights.28 The Black Head negotiations tended to 
confinn Karl Polanyi's notion that "".markets are political structures in which property 
relations are realised in action".29 
I will briefly examine the settlement in tenns of its effect upon the structure of rights. 
The execution of the conservation covenant established an explicit duty upon the company and 
the rest of society not to use the covenanted area in ways that would further violate its natural 
integrity. This was a non-use right, and was also significant because it did not involve a flow 
of rights from one agent to another. Essentially there was no right to destroy.30 However, 
because the agreement did not adequately deal with the issue of public access, there was no 
conferral on the public of any use rights (only the possibility that that might occur in the 
future). Enjoyment of the alternative uses of the headland would be contingent upon the 
provision of access at a later date. The other element of the agreement, the harbours consent, 
involved a flow of rights towards the Company. DoC conferred on the Company a limited 
immunity from prosecution in respect of limited spillage into the coastal zone. This lowered 
the level of protection accorded to DoC's interests, and for the Company it implied an 
27 An interesting question with respect to the rights of adjacent property holders (in this case the publicly 
owned coastal area administered by DoC) is whether the conservation options and subsequent outcome of 
the dispute would have been any different if the adjacent land had been held in private ownership, say by 
another capitalist organisation? 
28 This is called a property rule: DoC was unable to take actions that interfered with BHQ without the latter's 
consent Furthermore, the procurement of such consent would have required a large compensation payment 
- which under the circumstances would have been out of the question. BHQ thus held a right against the 
state and the rest of society that was protected by a property rule, and which subsequently explains BHQ's 
position as a price setter. The implication of such a rule for environmental conflict is that it always favours 
the property holder who is rarely the environmental advocate. 
For an introduction to the variOUI) forms of property entitlements see: D. Bromley, 1978, "Property Rules, 
Liability Rules and Environmental Economics" Journal of Economic Issues Vol. 12, pp. 43-60. 
29 Cited in: N. Low, 1991, Planning, Politics and the State: Political Foundations of Planning Thought 
Unwin-Hyman, London, pp. 272-3. 
30 For an interesting engagement with the question of whether or not a property right entails a right to destroy 
see: R. Goodin, inG. Oddie and R. Perrett, (eds), 1992, Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society Oxford 
University press, Auckland. 
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expansion of freedoms. This analysis reveals something of the directions of the flow of 
benefits. However, it is only when the value of those costs and benefits are considered that the 
agreement can be assessed, and as I demonstrated in Chapter Eight, the Company ceded far 
less than commonly acknowledged. The settlement thus stood as a concretisation of the 
underlying power relations that existed in the dispute, with a marked asymmetry between the 
power of business and the power of environmentalists. 
In summary, BHQ held a remarkably strong private property right. That entitlement 
was efficacious in: First, stimulating the conflict by enabling the environmental damage to 
occur, and the possibility of much 'greater damage to persist; Secondly, enabling the Company 
to control the process - by determining who, where and when it would deal with other parties; 
Thirdly, allowing BHQ to shape the options for settlement, including defining the 'limits of the 
possible'; And fourthly, by determining that the Company received a very favourable 
settlement in the face of considerable public pressure for change. The private property right 
was the most significant mechanism of business power in the Black Head conflict. 
9.4.(iii) The Unequal Distribution of Resources 
Charles Lindblom observed that business advocates enjoy a triple advantage over other civil 
actors in polyarchal politics; "extraordinary sources of funds, organisations at the ready, and 
special access to government" .31 The task here is twofold, to broadly identify the distribution 
of resources in each of Lindblom's categories as they applied to the Black Head conflict, and to 
ascertain where possible, just how those distributions affected the strategic course of the 
dispute. While my focus is upon the nature and use of the resources possessed by BHQ, to 
speak of unequal resources is, perforce, to speak in relative terms, and hence my review covers 
the other main advocates. Before proceeding, however, it should be acknowledged that a large 
part of this present chapter has been concerned with resource questions. For example; the 
economic resources of BHQ, the Company's importance in the local economy and the 
associated dependency relationship that the state has upon such resources, and private property 
rights as resource entitlements. 
I will start by examining the Company's resources. Once again, while BHQ was itself 
a small subsidiary enterprise, as a political actor it was inseparable from the parent companies; 
Fulton Hogan with a thousand full-time staff and a group turnover of $150 million in 1990, and 
the much smaller Palmer and Sons with forty staff. Both companies were firmly entrenched in 
networks of community power in the region (ie. as local body representatives, interlocking 
directorships, ongoing commercial relationships with the local authorities and informal 
connections). BHQ could therefore draw upon a substantial pool of financial, organisational 
and political assets. 
The influence that derived from those resources can be understood in two ways. First, 
there was the potential power that it represented. For example, the Company representatives 
may have had private reservations about the efficacy of defending the legal proceedings, but 
the outward appearance was that they were not only willing to defend themselves, but they 
possessed the financial resources to do so in the face of repeated prosecutions. The Company's 
resources could thus act as a deterrent. The extent to which they did deter the other actors is, 
31 C. Lindblom, IfJ77, Politics and Markets Basic Books, New York, pp. 193-4. 
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however, unclear - it certainly did not deter DoC from instigating legal proceedings and 
conveying the impression that they were willing to pursue the prosecution. 
The other way was in terms of the mobilisation of those resources. The Company was 
satisfied with the status quo as it existed, and due to the Company's structural preponderance 
there was no foreseeable need for it to take an offensive stance. BHQ therefore pursued a 
reactive and defensive strategy in the dispute; it did not conduct a campaign, nor did it engage 
in any substantive lobbying. At a late stage in the dispute it did undertake some public 
relations initiatives. However that only involved liaison with the media at little cost. 
Organisational resources (mostly staff time) were used during meetings and negotiations, once 
again at little cost. In all likelihood the only significant financial costs were legal fees, the cost 
of having planning consultants compile the elemental plan and plans for the restoration of the 
quarried area, and to have Peter Constantine represent the Company in the public meetings. 
Probably the greatest tax on the Company was that the issue demanded a great deal of John 
Fulton's and Jim Hunter's time and energy. Both men observed that the issue took a personal 
toll.32 In sum, the resources expended by BHQ within the dispute, while not insignificant, 
represented only a small drain on the Company's resources. That they could so successfully 
minimise their procedural costs can be largely attributed to their existing position of strength 
deriving from the property regime. There was a crucial synergy between the two mechanisms. 
The private conservationists, by contrast, possessed few financial, organisational or 
political resources. For the same reasons that the Company was able to be reactive in its 
defence of the status quo distributions, the conservationists had to pursue a pro-active strategy. 
With few structural resources and hence no real power the conservationists faced the difficult 
task of gaining the influence needed to bring about such change. Such influence would have to 
be derived through association, and the potential financial and political resources that could be 
mobilised through collective action (see 9.4.(v)). With no organisation already in existence, 
the conservationists had to initially devote their energies to this task, in addition to the task of 
raising the financial means needed for any form of political action.33 Like many other 
conservation actions this lack of resources meant that the public campaign was organised not 
only to place direct pressure upon the company but also to recruit the state, with its 
considerable resources and rights, to their cause. The paucity of available resources also 
determined the tactics used by the conservationists in their campaign. They relied upon low-
cost methods such as petitions, letter-writing campaigns, a profile-raising concert, media 
involvement (not through expensive advertising but rather by stimulating the controversy as a 
newsworthy 'issue'), and efforts to increase public awareness through trips to the site in 
question.34 All these tactics required little formal organisation, and they probably benefited 
from having a small, highly active core group that could deal with the more intensive and 
sensitive efforts at lobbying and negotiation. The small core was also crucial for the 
coordination of the campaign, minimising internal conflict and making communication much 
32 John Fulton (Chainnan of Directors, Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd.), 14 August 1990, Personal interview; Jim 
Hunter, (General Manager, Black Head Quarries), 3 August 1990, Personal interview, Logan Point, 
Dunedin. 
33 Neville Peat, November 1990, Personal interview, Ravensboume, Dunedin; Sue Maturin (Friends of Black 
Head Spokesperson), 2 September 1991, Personal interview; Lloyd Godman, 14 August 1990, Personal 
interview, Dunedin. 
34 Ibid 
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easier.35 The conservationists' greatest resource was the willingness and ability of individuals 
such as Sue Maturin, who between 1987 and the settlement fought unceasingly for the 
headland. Without such commitment it is doubtful if the any measure of protection would have 
been conferred upon the headland, at least in the short term (and in the long term the natural 
character would have diminished thus reducing the force of the conservation argument).36 
One other matter that should be noted here is that the private conservationists devoted 
considerable energies to mobilising DoC to act on the issue. As a state actor DoC lies outside 
the business-civil actor divide theorised by Lindblom, but the resources of that agency were 
used in the dispute. Robin Thomas, and later Jeff Connell devoted considerable time to the 
issue. Moreover, the leverage gained by the legal prosecution was premised upon the ability of 
DoC to pursue the proceedings. DoC's political, organisational, and to a limited degree 
financial resources, were all relevant to the pursuit of the conservation case. There were, 
however, real constraints upon the resources that the Department could devote to the issue (for 
example, it did not possess the resources needed to purchase part or the entire headland). 
To conclude, the asymmetry of resources that existed in the Black Head dispute meant 
that there were few constraints upon the Company's ability to act and many constraints upon 
the conservationists'. At the same time the disparity meant that there was little need for the 
Company to pursue a pro-active strategy. By contrast, the imperative for the resource poor 
conservationists was to maximise the potential for agency. This resulted in adaptive and 
dynamic strategies that were designed to achieve maximum influence utilising minimal 
resources. It is difficult to assess how successful the conservationists were in their efforts, 
although the final settlement can be taken as a measure of achievement - part of the headland 
was in fact saved from destruction. Nevertheless, the Company was greatly advantaged by its 
possession of superior resources. 
9.4.(iv) The Power to Define Reality and the Distortion of Communicative Processes 
In the Black Head conflict the Company retained a remarkable capacity to control the terms of 
the discourse and define reality. Indeed, it was very much like Schrecker's observation that 
"realism in this context ... is defined in terms of the realities of the company president".37 I 
will first discuss the ways that the Company shaped the discourse of conflict, before focusing 
upon the general perceptions of the settlement and Cullen's analysis. 
There were at least six ways in which the BHQ controlled the discourse in the conflict: 
First, there was the dominance of monetised values. While the conservationists were able to 
express their non-commodified values in the wider public arena, in the substantive process of 
negotiations the Company's valuation was paramount; Secondly, the Company was then able 
to consistently and successfully overstate the commercial value of the area. Indeed, as was 
revealed in Chapter Eight, they exaggerated the costs of conservation by many orders of 
magnitude; Thirdly, they withheld, and only reluctantly disseminated, crucial information 
about the quarry. The most notable example was the management plan issue where over a 
number of years the conservationists lobbied both the Company and the Mines Division, in an 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 T. Schrecker, 1990, "Resisting Environmental Regulation: The Cryptic Pattern of Business-Government 
Relations" in R. Paehlke and D. Torgerson (eds), Managing Leviathan Broadview Press, Ontario, p. 186. 
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effort to get them to jointly prepare a management plan that would reveal the Company's plans 
for production (7.2.). This made it difficult for both the FoB and DoC to engage in a 
meaningful substantive dialogue with the Company; Fourthly, the Company was able to state 
that that the protection of the eastern bluffs would render the quarry uneconomic When, as 
Cullen observed, other smaller quarries were operating successfully in the region; Fifthly, the 
Company was able to determine which institutional options for preservation were considered; 
And finally, and very significantly, they were able to exclude the private conservationists from 
the substantive negotiations, and in doing so they effectively suppressed the full expression of 
the conservation arguments. Together these examples demonstrate a marked ability on the part 
of BHQ to withhold, distort, disseminate and suppress information. 
But it is the disjuncture between the general perceptions of the settlement and Cullen's 
discounted figures that provides the most invaluable insight into the way business power can 
distort the terms of discourse. While I have already made much of this divergence, there are 
two points I would like to reiterate. One is that the geneml perceptions of the settlement arose 
on the basis of the inflated valuations that the Company had used throughout the process, and 
on the basis of the $30 m sum referred to by the Company upon the announcement of the 
settlement - the sum which was utilised in the media. So there was a very clear case of the 
Company's ability to determine the terms of discourse. The other issue was the geneml 
labelling of Cullen's figures as unrealistic - however that was on the basis of a reality that was 
being defined by the Company (8.4). The Company was clearly able to define reality and its 
ability to do so flowed largely out of its property rights. 
The are two final observations that I will make here. The first is that none of the 
strategies of corporate activism identified by Beder seem to have operated within the Black 
Head conflict. This could have been because of the limited scale of the dispute, but it is also 
likely that the Company's strong position within the dispute meant that it did not have to be 
pro-active in dealing with the issue. The last point is that the unlike the following Whanganui 
study, there was no formalised decision-making process that provided for public input and·the 
scrutiny of parties' claims. The Black Head dispute may have proceeded quite differently if 
that had happened. 
9.4.(v) The Dilemma of Collective Action 
The starting point for my investigation of collective action must (following Olson's schema) lie 
with the basic distinction between the private good/interest and the public or collective 
good/interest. A geneml connection can be made between certain groups and the type of goods 
or interests that they seek. On the one hand, BHQ's primary concern was with the production 
of basalt aggregate for exchange. Thus in its collective efforts it was, at least in the first 
instance, motivated by private interests. On the other hand, the conservation and Maori 
participants were concerned, in the first instance, with collective or public interests. This is 
consistent with the original assertion that the locus of environmental conflict can be commonly 
seen as a conflict between interests in these two types of goods. The next step is to ascertain 
whether the incentive/disincentive structures that attend each type of good (in theory) actually 
worked to privilege business in its collective pursuit of its interests. Before I do so it is useful 
to recall that Olsen's model works from the basic assumption that collective action involves 
some costs, whether in time, money or labour (see 5.3.(v». He argues that no 'rational' 
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individual will assume these costs unless two conditions are met; (i) that the likely benefits 
from participation exceed the benefits that would accrue without participation, and (ii) that the 
benefits exceed the costs of membership and participation.38 
Olson's model is useful in explaining both the Company's early in-action, its reluctant 
participation in the negotiations. In the early stages of the dispute BHQ and the parent 
companies (which I shall understand as a collective) were unresponsive to the conservation 
campaign - they simply did not act. This is largely explained by the first of Olson's 
conditions; namely, the benefits of not participating outweighed the benefits of participation 
(this is analogous to the BATNA argument mentioned earlier). BHQ's existing position of 
dominance meant that there was no need for it to act at all (this was largely a result of the 
property regime). However, the costs of not participating subsequently rose (ie. because of the 
prospect of legal proceedings and the effect on the Company's corporate profile) to the point 
that the Company decided that the benefits of engagement outweighed the costs. The private 
good element is relevant because those costs and benefits would accrue directly to BHQ, and 
hence the parent companies. The individual participation of the Company officials is explained 
by both the identification of their own interests with the Company's interests, and the simple 
fact they were paid to pursue those interests (the Company was able to dispense selective 
benefits). One final point is that the Black Head enterprise was only one of many investments 
held by the parent companies, and they benefited from the ability to mobilise their wider 
collective resources in defence of the Black Head quarry. Olson's model largely explains the 
logic of BHQ's participation within the dispute 
Where BHQ began the conflict in a position of power with no immediate need to 
mobilise collectively, the converse applied to the public good advocates. They approached the 
issue from a position of weakness, and hence there was an absolute need to gain power through 
association to further their goals. The form of that collective action was the issue specific 
coalition. This involved costs such as time, money and labour. Indeed, for participants such a 
Maturin the personal costs were very great indeed. The Friends of Black Head was a fluid 
grouping that allowed the member groups and individuals to pursue their own strategies (for 
example, the Whanau-o-Otokia's separate approaches to the Company). At the core of that 
grouping was a committee of Maturin, Carter, Baker, and a handful of other committed 
participants. Some of those committee members were participating as representatives of 
organisations, and were thus able to calion the resources of those groups (for example, 
Maturin was the Chairperson of the Otago Branch of the Maruia society - a national 
conservation organisation).39 As I noted in my discussion on resources earlier, the strategies 
that were adopted were relatively low-cost, and centred upon raising the profile of the issue by, 
among other things; seeking media attention, distributing pamphlets, and Lloyd Godman's 
national photographic exhibition. In addition, and crucially, Godman, Maturin, Carter and 
Baker directly lobbied the Company and DoC throughout.4O The result of this political action 
was that the Friends of Black Head were able to extract a compromise of sorts; the southern 
slopes of the headland were protected from seemingly inevitable destruction. That 
38 M. Olson, 1965, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge Ma, pp. 1-52. 
39 Neville Peat, November 1990, Personal interview. 
40 Lloyd Godman, 14 August 1990. Personal interview, Dunedin. 
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accommodation was extracted because of the collective efforts. However, the issues here are 
first, the relative need to act, and secondly, the relative ability to act. Environmental 
campaigners, such as Maturin, will often have to make extraordinary sacrifices in the pursuit of 
their goals. 
Olson's rational actor model can only partially explain why people acted collectively to 
protect Black Head. For example, it offers an explanation as to the form of the group - a small 
number of skilled and committed individuals who could each point to the value of their 
contribution. However, its greatest strength lies in its insight as to why people may not have 
participated (ie. free rider problems). That over 6000 people signed the petition in Dunedin yet 
the active membership remained small suggests this. That few people acted on the issue even 
though significant numbers supported the cause could be explained by the fact that (i) selective 
benefits were not offered, (ii) membership was not compulsory, and (iii) that the costs of 
participation outweighed the immediate benefits. Olson's model is important because it 
identifies a powerful structural mechanism at work - an underlying asymmetry in the incentive 
structures between capitalists and environmentalists. 
But to elicit a greater understanding as to how public good advocates can overcome or 
mitigate that underlying asymmetry it is necessary to turn to explanations such as those of 
pluralists identified in S.4.(v). Thus, there was a differentiation of roles in the coalition, with a 
core group in control, this core group acted as entrepreneurs and risk takers, they could call 
upon voluntary services of experts (for example, the legal opinion), they did not have to devote 
energies to maintain a membership, etc. 
But, business was noticeably privileged, in that first it did not need to mobilise support 
as it operated from a position of privilege, and secondly, it possessed an existing organisation 
that it could mobilise in the pursuit of its interests at little cost. The conservationists did mount 
a vigorous and partially successful campaign. However it was undertaken at the great personal 
sacrifice of the core members41, and it failed to mobilise mass participation. 
9.5. Conclusion: Business Power in the Black Head Conflict 
In this chapter I have used the analytical framework to explain how the Company was able to 
prevail so overwhelmingly in the Black Head dispute. First of all there was a clear correlation 
between the study and the value-form arguments. Both the political split between business and 
conservation, and the substantive divide at the heart of the dispute, were described by the 
value-form distinction. I distinguished two levels on which value-form operated. One level 
was as an expression of value (means argument). At that level there was some crossover; BHQ 
did utilise use-value arguments, and the conservationists alluded (albeit in the most abstract 
manner) to the possible commercial benefits of protection. But in terms of distinguishing 
between social actors it is the level of the parties' motivations (ends) that is crucial. On that 
level it was only the Company that was motivated by the chase after exchange, and conversely, 
the conservationists that were motivated by various non-commodified interests. In addition, I 
also examined the connection between commodity valuation and environmental harm and 
41 Neville Peat, November 1990, Personal interview; Sue Maturin (Friends of Black Head Spokesperson), 2 
September 1991, Personal interview. 
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noted that the way the Company valued the resource at Black Head was in some part causative 
of the destruction. Most significantly, the way that BHQ internalised its benefits and 
externalised its costs. 
I then proceeded to examine the power element. Because the Black Head conflict 
played out largely at the level of local politics, Offe's principles were somewhat limited in their 
explanatory power. However, it was also probable that those principles were shaping the 
behaviour of the local government actors. I concluded that the exclusion and dependency 
mechanisms operated in indirect and secondary (or deep) ways. That is, the exclusion principle 
accounted for the broad division of labour that tended to operate between the state and capital, 
and the pressure upon the state not to become directly involved in organising commodity 
production. The dependency principle described an undoubted relationship between the state 
and business across both state and local government actors. I concluded that strategic 
implications of that relationship were probably strongest at the local government level with the 
close relationship between the councils and BHQ and its parent companies. By contrast, DoC 
was relatively buffered from that pre-disposition. Of most use as tools of explanation were the 
maintenance and legitimation principles. The maintenance role clearly accounted for the 
actions of the Mines Division, probably explains the non-participation of the Dunedin City 
Council, and in some part DoC's hesitant approach to the issue. The legitimation role was 
articulated in two ways, firstly to motivate both the Silverpeaks County Council and DoC to act 
as mediators or intermediaries seeking the resolution of conflict, and most significantly, in 
mobilising DoC's actions as an advocate (response to political struggle). 
The five specific mechanisms of business dominance were of more concrete 
explanatory power (although they were all connected in some meaningful way with the wider 
mechanisms). The business sanction did play some part, both as a general constraint upon the 
actors, and more concretely, in limiting which options for protection were feasible, the subtle 
exercise of job-blackmail, and the possibility of the environmental sanction. The role of 
private property was singularly the most important source of business dominance in the Black 
Head conflict. The Company held an anomalous and anachronistic bundle of use rights that in 
considerable part caused the conflict, and subsequently enabled BHQ to control the dispute 
process, and ultimately the options for preservation. There was a strong asymmetry of 
resources between the actors, although that was partly mitigated by DoC's advocacy on behalf 
of the conservation interests. One interesting point in respect of resources was that the power 
that the Company derived from its property right meant that it did not have to mobilise any 
significant resources in defence of its interests. As Cullen's analysis revealed the Company 
displayed a remarkable ability to define reality within the dispute. This happened throughout 
the conflict as BHQ constantly distorted the valuation of the headland and determined what 
options were technically and commercially feasible. But it is the disjuncture between the 
general perceptions of the settlement and Cullen's discounted figures that provides the most 
invaluable insight into the way business power can distort the terms of discourse. Finally, the 
dilemma of collective action was useful in explaining why the business acted collectively 
within the conflict, and why people may not have played active roles, however it cannot 
explain the commitment and sacrifice of the core conservation and Maori campaigners. 
The analytical framework has thus been of considerable value in explaining the ability, 
exercise and consequences of business power in the Black Head dispute. Although elements of 
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the framework were of varied explanatory value, Offe's principles revealed some interesting 
relationships. However some of the insights were necessarily tentative because it was difficult 
to elicit a thorough picture of their operation (this was in some part due to the relatively small 
scale of the dispute and the paucity of documentary material). The operation of those strategic 
principles may be better understood on a larger scale and with greater attention to the wider 
political context. This is something I will pay attention to in the development of the following 
study of the Whanganui River Minimum Flows dispute. 
The Black Head study provides a striking example of the ability of business to 
dominate both within the process of conflict and in terms of the substantive outcome. Much of 
that power flowed from what I have described as an anomalous and anachronistic bundle of 
private property rights. This does not necessarily imply that the ability of business to dominate 
was also anomalous, and it is envisaged that other mechanisms will come to the fore in other 
disputes. One final point is that the analytical framework is intended to be of value in 
explaining conflicts where business did not prevail, for example, by coming to understand the 
preconditions of the mechanisms of business power. The emphasis in this thesis is upon 
understanding the nature of business influence. 
10 
The Whanganui River and the Tongariro Power Development 
10.1. Introduction 
The Whanganui River minimum flows (WRMF) dispute of 1977-1992 was one of New 
Zealand's most complex and costly natural resource conflicts. The dispute centred upon the 
abstraction of water from the head waters of the Whanganui River for the purposes of hydro-
electricity generation. As part of the Tongariro Power Development (TPD) water from the 
western watershed of the Tongariro massif had been diverted north through a series of tunnels 
(the Western Diversion) into Lake Rotoaira, Lake Taupo and ultimately the Waikato River, thus 
boosting the outputs of the Tokaanu power station at Turangi and the eight existing hydro 
stations on the Waikato. It was this taking of water and the consequential reduced flows in the 
Whanganui and its tributaries that formed the substantive basis of this dispute. 
like the Black Head dispute, the causal mechanics of the physical resource problem were 
extremely clear - abstraction of water leads to reduced flows. However, over the course of, the 
following case study it will become evident that in every aspect the Whanganui River minimum 
flows issue was a far more complex dispute than the Black Head controversy. The challenge 
here is to disentangle the welter of competing discourses and layers of complexity that 
characterised this conflict, in order to 'get at' the mechanisms of business dominance which are 
the essential focus of this thesis. As with the Black Head dispute there are important elements of 
the case study which are not explained by the theoretical framework - for example, it is not a 
psycho-analytic model and therefore sheds no light on the function of personalities, nor does it 
fully explain the complexities of organisational behaviour. As indicated at the beginning of this 
thesis, these factors will not be ignored, rather the intention is to make studied judgments where 
it is considered appropriate. Finally, another consequence of the scale and complexity of the 
WRMF dispute is that due to the dictates of space it will be analysed on a more general level than 
the first case study. 
lO.1.(i) The Structure of the Study 
like the Black Head study, the Whanganui case study is carried out over the course of four 
chapters (see 3.3. regarding why I have taken this approach). In this first chapter I background 
the dispute with the principal aim of providing reference points for later analysis. The focus here 
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is upon the biophysical, rather than social, basis of the dispute. For a great part of the chapter I 
am concerned with the description of (i) the Whanganui River system itself, and (ii) the genesis 
and operation of the TPD. Then in the final section these two strands come together as I 
examine, albeit in a general manner, the effects of (ii) upon (i). In doing this I attempt to provide 
some baseline information against which later discussion of various flow management regimes 
(which were the substantive outcomes of each stage of the conflict) can be understood and 
assessed. Social factors do inevitably wend their way into the discussion. Most particularly, in 
describing the genesis of the power scheme I necessarily refer to historical sources and contexts 
of conflict (political, economic and institutional). While discussion in this chapter may seem 
ostensibly removed from the concerns of the analytical framework, a broad understanding of the 
substantive arguments and historical context is an absolutely necessary basis for the subsequent 
narrative of conflict and critical analysis. In Chapter Eleven I set out the arguments surrounding 
the abstraction of water from the Whanganui catchment system. The chapter is split into two. In 
the first section I deal with the arguments underpinning generation. Discussion progresses from 
the general to the specific. That is, I begin by examining the wider political-economy of 
electricity generation, before moving on to ascertain the role and value (commodified and non-
commodified values) of the Western Diversion. In doing this I deal not only with the value 
question but also with the frameworks of ownership and control which affect the advocacy 
issues in the following chapter. The second section reviews the range of arguments for the 
retention of greater minimum flows. In Chapter Twelve I consider the processes and outcomes 
of conflict. The chapter is predominantly a historical narrative because that form of argument 
best presents the pattern and causal relationships of the conflict. Discussion is restricted to the 
period between the setting of an initial minimum flows regime in the early 1980's, and the March 
1992 High Court decision on flow levels. The final chapter of the study is Chapter Thirteen, 
which is identical in structure to the final chapter of the Black Head case study. That is, it 
systematically reviews the WRMF conflict on the basis of the structural mechanisms posited in 
Chapters Four and Five. 
10.2. The Whanganui River and Catchment 
The Whanganui River and Catchment is a complex natural system consisting of numerous 
interconnected, interdependent and dynamic elements. The following review of the biophysical 
characteristics of the river and catchment is underpinned by this notion of a system - a theme and 
heuristic device that will recur throughout the case study. Such a conceptualisation is useful 
here. Where I might otherwise have considered such various natural features as geology, 
landforms, climate, hydrology, and biota in relative isolation from one another, I must now 
consider the arrangement of these elements in relation to one another. Similarly, it is important 
to present more than a static picture of these features - continual change (albeit at vastly differing 
rates) is an ever present feature of natural systems. The strength of this approach will be further 
revealed later in this chapter when I consider the scale and nature of the biophysical disturbances 
to the Whanganui River and Catchment system caused by the construction and operation of the 
Western Diversion. 
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On the basis of mean flow the Whanganui River is the second largest river in the North 
Island and the ninth largest in New Zealand.! It has a catchment area of approximately 7,120 
2 
km ,2 and a total length of approximately 290 km, making it the third longest river in New 
Zea1and.3 
The Whanganui itself rises on the north-west slopes of Mt Tongariro (1968 m). The 
river flows 65km towards the north-west before turning southward at Taumarunui for the 
remainder of its journey to the sea. The following profile of the river system is structured on the 
basis of this pathway, and there is greater emphasis on describing the upper reaches. This is 
because the WRMF dispute centred upon disturbances to these upper reaches, with the associated 
assumption being that the effects of altered flows diminish the further one gets away from these 
point sources of disturbance.4 This structure also provides a greater sense of the physical 
processes and connections that function within the catchment system. 
lO.2.(i) The Upper Reaches 
The diverted sub-catchment upstream of the intake structures and tunnels of the Whanganui 
2 
diversion encompasses an area of about 320km , representing approximately 5% of the total 
catchmentS This area can be generally characterised as a volcanic, high rainfall region quite 
distinct from the rest of the Whanganui watershed. Most of the area falls within the boundaries 
of the Tongariro National Park and other lands managed for conservation purposes, and exists in 
a state relatively unmodified by human activity.6 All of this area has a volcanic geology. 
Dominating the landscape are the three central volcanoes: the older multi-coned strato-volcanoes 
Tongariro and Ruapehu (2797m), and the younger, more physically active single cone of 
Ngauruhoe (2291m). The steeper slopes of these mountains are surrounded by lava ring plains, 
and throughout the area there is a sharp contrast of substrate between soft fine material and hard 
abrupt, often vertical, surfaces caused by alternating bands of volcanic rock and ash. 
The significance of this mountainous sub-catchment within the context of the hydrology 
of the greater river system is due to a considerable extent to the high levels of rainfall experien~ 
as prevailing north-westerly winds leave most of their moisture on the western slopes of the 
volcanoes. Annual precipitation in this area is usually in the region of 2200mm, with it raining 
an average of 184 days a year.7 Hence this small segment of the Whanganui catchment receives 
a large share of the total precipitation in the drainage basin. Furthermore, it also leads to 
considerable short term variability in run-off patterns in the head water streams. 
1 With a mean flow of 224 cmnecs at the Paetawa river flow station approximateiy 30km upstream of the river 
mouth at Whanganui City. P. Rodley, 1986, cited in: D. Young, 1986, Faces of the River TVNZ 
Publishing, Auckland, p. 213. 
2 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70f90, p. 5. 
3 Department of Statistics, 1993, New Zealand Official Yearbook 1993 Government Printer, Wellington. 
4 As Petts notes: "Whilst head water streams are highly sensitive to catchment changes such effects may be 
buffered downstream due to mixing of runoff from unaffected or differently affected catchments." However this 
does not always follow: "alternatively, downstream the cumulative effects of a variety of changes may give 
rise to significant ecological impacts". P. Calow, and G. Petts, (eds), 1994, The Rivers Handbook: 
Hydrological and Ecological Principles. Volume Two Blackwell Scientific, Oxford, p. 9. 
5 John Garrett (then Resources Technical Manager, Central Districts Catchment Boards), 1989, Evidence 
presented at Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 16. 
6 Apart from the Whakapapa ski field and village. 
7 Whanganui River Flows Coalition, 1989, Legal submissions in Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 6. 
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In addition to the Whanganui River itself, which rises on the upper slopes of Mt 
Tongariro, there are a number of headwater streams that are also diverted. Fast flowing 
mountain streams, with clear high quality water due to the relatively undisturbed state of this 
area, tumble steeply down the flanks of the mountains, cutting tortuous gorges through the rock 
and ash substrate of the surrounding plains. The most notable of these tributaries is the 
Whakapapa River which drains small glaciers and snow fields on the western slopes of Mt 
Ruapehu. This river is from time to time subject to floods of volcanic debris and acid water 
caused by lahar events in Ruapehu' s crater-Iake.s 
Periods of volcanic disturbance have also influenced vegetation types in the National 
Park, with tussock, woody shrubs and flax dominating in the most affected central region, 
locked in a continual process of disturbance and succession. In other parts of this alpine sub-
catchment beech forest predominates. At lower altitudes, as the streams near the Western 
Diversion intakes, the volcanic soils are richer and the climate milder. The Whakapapa River 
flows through dense, luxuriant podacarp forest in its gorge at the southern end of the Tongariro 
Conservation Park. To the north, the Okupata, Taurewa, Tawhitikuri and Mangatepopo streams, 
and the Whanganui River, flow off the lava ring plains, through patches of plantation forestry 
and into the Tongariro Conservation Park where their waters are also diverted through concrete 
intake structures (a description of the power scheme is set out laterin 10.3.(ii)).9 
In terms of size, the Whakapapa is the most significant of the headwater streams, being 
substantially larger than the Whanganui by the time it reaches their confluence at Whakapapa 
Island near Kakahi. The pre-diversion average flow (the natural flow) of the upper Whanganui 
River was approximately 3.94 cumecs (m3/s),lO contrasted with 15.5 cumecs for the 
Whakapapa (readings taken at the footbridge flow gauging station 900 m below intake).l1 The 
Whakapapa River flows in its steep sided gorge for much of its course from the intake to the 
Whanganui confluence. The forested slopes on either side of the river remain undisturbed for 
virtuaIly the whole of the river's length, with access down to the river being especially difficult in 
the section above the Otamawairua Stream. In this spectacular upper section there are numer:ous 
rapids, many graded 3-4 under average natural flow conditions. 12 Below the Piopiotea stream 
the rapids are less severe (numerous rapids graded 2-3), and access to the less entrenched gorge 
becomes easier with private farmland to the west. Along this stretch the river flows past the 
Owhango, and later, Whakapapa Island scenic reserves, and the eastern bank falls mainly within 
the boundaries of the Tongariro Conservation Park. Towards the confluence with the 
8 Such events may temporarily devastate the biotic communities in these streams. Wayne Donovan (Consulting 
biologist). 1988, Eiectricorp evidence, Catchment Board hearing, p. 5. . 
9 These forests were home to a diverse native bird-life, however introduced mammals such as deer, possums, cats, 
rots and stoats, had diminished bird populations, either through competition for food or through direct 
predatiOIL Department of Conservation, 1990, Tongariro National Park Management Plan: Volume One -
Objectives and Policies Department of Conservation, Turangi, p. 4. 
10 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ud v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, p. 126. The Planning Tribunal did not stipulate where exactly this figure was gauged. 
The mean annual flow of the Whanganui at the intake is only 1.6 cumecs according to Electricorp, but if you 
add the flows from the Okupata, Taurewa, Tawhitikuri and Mangatepopo streams then 3.94 cumecs is probably 
a good indication of the natuml mean annual flow of the Whanganui upstream from Whakapapa Island. 
11 John Garrett (then Resources Technical Manager for the Central Districts Catchment Boards), 1989, Evidence 
presented at Planning Tribunal hearing, Appendix E, Table 1. 
12 Tony Parker (Director of Plateau Guides Ltd), 1989, Evidence presented at the Planning Tribunal hearing, pp. 
8-9. The system used here to grade the river conditions is that used by canoeists and rafters, and is essentially 
a scale of navigability based upon such factors as channel morphology, substmte chamcteristics and hydmulic 
conditions. See Appendix F for an outline of the classification system. 
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Whanganui River at Whakapapa Island the landscape opens up and the river flows through 
paddocks dotted with isolated to tara. 13 
From its diversion weir the upper Whanganui River flows in a north-westerly direction, 
at first through a relatively open valley which has been modified by logging and is today planted 
in radiata pines, and then on into the Tongariro Conservation Park. Winding its way in between 
forested hills, its volume increases with the waters of the Mangatepopo, Waione, Waipari and 
several other small tributaries. The natural flow is, as noted above, fairly small but because of 
the nature of the headwaters there is considerable variation of river levels. 
From its confluence with the much larger Whakapapa River the Whanganui flows 
through rolling farmland until it reaches the small railway town of Taumarunui (1986 popUlation: 
6,354), which services the agriculturally based central King Country.14 In this stretch the river 
is wide and fairly shallow, braiding in places, and with the occasional deep pool. The bed of the 
river is made up of boulders and shingle (which has historically been extracted for various local 
uses).15 At Piriaka, approximately 10 km up-stream from Taumarunui, a concrete weir 
intersects the river and a substantial portion of the river's flow is diverted into a small 'run of the 
river' hydro-electric power station (installed capacity 1 MW) operated by the local territorial 
authority. The water is then returned to the main river channeL16 
The quality of the water in this section is generally very high, especially in the reaches 
between the Western Diversion intakes and Whakapapa-Whanganui confluence. The clear blue-
green water flowing off the central volcanoes is added to by clean dark water filtered through the 
floor of the Tongariro forest. Despite runofffrom the cleared farmland below Kakahi, the water 
quality does not deteriorate significantly until Taumarunui and its confluence with the Ongarue 
River. 
The essential biotic components of the lotic ecosystems of the headwater streams are: 
Periphyton - the "matrix of algae, bacteria, fungi, detritus, and inorganic particles" which is 
found upon the surfaces of stable objects within the stream;17 Aquatic invertebrates - which 
include, for example, various genera of the mayfly and caddisfly families which graze upon 
periphyton; and, Fish and birds - many of which depend upon the invertebrate populations as 
their primary food source. Furthermore, this is a relatively open system with terrestrial matter 
also entering the food web. There is scant quantitative data on the abundance of periphyton, 
invertebrate and fish populations of these upper reaches prior to water abstraction, a factor which 
hindered efforts to assess the physical impacts of the TPD. However it appears that in their 
natural state the upper reaches sustained a diverse and abundant stream life. 1S The build up of 
periphyton (and hence the nature of the stream ecology) depends to a great extent upon loss 
13 Ibid. 
14r use the 1986 figures because that date was just prior to the main period of the dispute. I would also like to 
mention here that the northern section of the Whanganui Catchment surrounding Taumarunui is part of the 
King Country. It has greater flUlctional relationships with Te Kuiti and the Waikato than it does with the 
lower Whanganui Catchment area James Clarke (Planning Consultant), 1989, Electricorp evidence, Planning 
Tribunal hearing, p. 6. 
15 Wayne Donovan (Consulting biologist), 1988, Electricorp evidence, Catchment Board hearing, p. 15. 
16 "A flow of at least 1.5 ml/s is retained in the river channel for environmental purposes. This section between 
the diversion weir and the powerhouse tailrace is about 1400m long and is known locally as the Piriaka loop. " 
Department of Conservation, 1988, "Whanganui River Minimum Flows Submission to the Rangitikei-
Whanganui Catchment Board" Whanganui, Part 10, p. 2. 
17rbid., Part 6, pp. 12-15. 
18 Ibid. 
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processes, such as through sloughing and abrasion. This is largely determined by the current 
velocity. This explains the prevalence of thicker, darker (and to many observers unsightly) 
periphyton as the gradient of the river becomes less steep, most significantly in the stretch 
between Kakahi and Taumarunui. 
Many of the twenty species of fish that have been recorded in the Whanganui River 
system penetrate well upstream of Taumarunui. In addition to trout (predominantly brown, 
although some rainbow in the Whakapapa), eels, lampreys and other native fish are also present 
in these reaches. 19 Also, of much concern during the dispute was the welfare of the small but 
significant population of the endemic blue duck (Whio). This endangered species is one of only 
four specialist mountain-river ducks in the world, in the North Island it exists in only two 
isolated pockets, the most significant being the population centred upon the Whakapapa River. 
lO.2.(ii) Taumarunui to Whanganui 
More than two-thirds of the Whanganui District is steep hill country, a sharply dissected 
landscape of deeply entrenched river valleys separated by razorback ridges. Structurally this 
region is a synclinal basin of tertiary sandstones and mudstones (papa), uplifted and tilted by a 
succession of earth movements so that the landscape slopes gradually towards the south. The 
soft homogeneous substrate has enabled smaller tributaries to branch out freely from the channels 
of the main consequent streams, cutting back into the plateau so that today a dendritic drainage 
pattern is clearly evident across the region. 20 
The Whanganui River carves its southward path through this landscape. For most of the 
stretch between Taumarunui and Pipiriki the river flows in a deep inaccessible gorge, walled in 
between steep hillsides, high sandstone bluffs, papa cliffs and the remnants of "rock-cut 
terraces" .21 David Young provides a vivid description of the riparian zone: 
... the banks are often steep papa or sandstone, bare or covered in moss, liverworts, parataniwha 
and tangled festoons of kiekie. Sometimes the banks are broken by exotic openings, cracks, 
coves and caves, now yielding to tall and slender cascades, now breaking open to admit one of 
the river's tributaries. Behind the smaller plants and wnbrella punga the cover rises 
magnificently into taw a, karnahi and rimu, rewarewa and occasionally rata and totara.22 
This forest cover reaches almost to the skyline on both banks of the river for virtually the whole 
length of the middle reaches. Since its gazettal in 1986, much of the stretch between Te Maire 
(15 km downstream of Taumarunui) and Pipiriki, and some discrete stretches between Pipiriki 
and Whanganui, flow through the Whanganui National Park. The National Park covers 
approximately 74,231 ha., and includes extensive and valuable tracts of podacarp/hardwood 
forest. The river is not, however, included in the National Park. 
In addition to these large areas of protected land, a significant portion of the Whanganui 
District has been modified by human activity both prior to, and since European colonisation.23 
Today large areas of land previously logged or cleared for agriculture but always marginal due to 
the unstable and easily eroded steep-land soils, and the problem of isolation, has reverted to 
19 Wayne Donovan (Consulting biologist), 1988, Electricorp evidence, Catchment Boord hearing, pp. 9-15. 
20 D. Day, 'Landforms' in: B. Saunders (ed.), 1968, Introducing Whanganui The Geography of New Zealand 
Study No.2, Department of Geography, Massey University, Palmerston North, p. 30. 
21 Ibid., p. 30 
22 D. Young, andB. Foster, 1986, Faces of the River TVNZ Publishing, Auckland, p. 17. 
23 For an excellent history see David Young 1998, Woven By Water: Histories from the Whanganui River Huia 
Publishers, Wellington 
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scrub and regenerating forest. Pockets of fannland, mainly extensive hill country stations, still 
dot the landscape near the river and its tributaries, mostly in the stretches between Taumarunui 
and the Retaruke confluence (significant here is the 1200km2 Ongarue catchment which is 
virtually all in pastoral production) and below Pipiriki with small settlements scattered along the 
river (Piriaka, Jerusalem, Ranana, Matahiwi, Koriniti etc.). It is below Piriaka that the valley 
opens out slightly and access to the meandering river improves with the river road. Towards the 
coast, and surrounding the city of Whanganui, there are gently rolling hills and flat-land mainly 
in improved pasture, with some areas of plantation forestry. 
Over the 240 km of river between Taumarunui and Whanganui the river falls 160m, an 
overall gradient of 1:1500. In the section between Taumarunui and Pipiriki the gradient is 
1:1150, dropping to 1:3300 between Pipiriki and Paetawa, and levelling out to 1:26000 in the 
final 25krn stretch to the sea.24 There are 293 rapids between Taumarunui and the lower tidal 
reaches, but no significant drops, which explains why the Whanganui is the longest continually 
navigable river in New Zealand. Navigation, at least by powered vessels such as the river boats 
which plied the stretch between Whanganui and Taumarunui from the late 1880s until well into 
this century, was facilitated by significant modification of the river channel through such means 
as the construction of concrete groynes to channel the flow, removal of snags and dredging of 
the stream bed in shallow sections. 
Between Taumarunui and Whanganui the volume of the river increases notably as it is 
augmented with the waters of tributaries such as the Ongarue, Ohura, Retaruke, Tangarakau, 
Whangamomona, Manganui-o-te-Ao and other lesser streams. At the Te Maire flow gauging 
station just south of Taumarunui the pre diversion mean annual flow is 89.1 cumecs, more than 
double that at Piriaka 25km upstream. By the time the river reaches Paetawa, just upstream of 
the river's tidal limits, it has a mean annual flow of 219.4 cumecs.25 The extreme variation of 
flows in the Whanganui is evidenced by the difference between an average annual seven day low 
flow at Te Maire of 28 cumecs and an average annual flood flow of 840 cumecs, the same 
figures for the flow gauging station at Paetawa are 46 cumecs and 2400 cumecs respectively.2.6 
Below Taumarunui there is a significant and continuous deterioration in water qUality. 
The river becomes progressively more muddy in appearance as its sediment load increases.27 In 
addition to the natural erosion of the soft sedimentary substrate in the river banks and channel, 
widespread forest clearance and the subsequent modification of land use within the catchment 
since European settlement has led to accelerated erosion and large increases in stream sediment 
loads and nutrient levels.28 The biological quality of the river water is also significantly 
degraded in this section due to; the discharge of waste - the most notable point sources being 
primary treated sewerage from Taumarunui and untreated sewerage from Whanganui City, 
leachates from refuse sites, and the runoff of animal faecal matter from agricuituralland. Such 
24 L. Krenek, 'Whanganui River' in: B. Saunders (ed.), 1968, Introducing Whanganui The Geography of New 
Zealand Study No.2, Department of Geography, Massey University, Palmerston North, p. 49. 
25 John Garrett, 1989, Planning Tribunal Evidence, Table la, p. 2. 
26 Tonkin and Taylor Ltd, 1978, "Water Resources of the Whanganui River" Report to the Rangitikei-
Whanganui Catchment Board. 
1:7 L. Krenek, 'Whanganui River' p. 50. 
28 There are many historical reports which allude to the "clear waters of the Whanganui". Ibid. Such an increase 
in turbidity influences such factors as: "light penetration, depth to which photosynthesis can proceed, and 
visibility of sight-feeding fishes". G. Petts, 1984, Impounded Rivers: Perspectives for Ecological 
Management John Wiley and Sons, London. p. 88. 
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contamination has been a longstanding source of conflict in the Taumarunui and Whanganui 
areas.29 Anecdotal evidence suggested that there had also been a decline in the native fishery 
(eg. lampreys, eels, bullies and smelt) of these reaches concomitant with the deterioration in 
water quality.30 
The city of Whanganui and harbour are situated just upstream from the river's mouth. In 
1986, just prior to the WRMF dispute, the city had a population of 37,839,31 almost two thirds 
of the total population of 60,854 for the Whanganui River catchment (Taumarunui County and 
Borough, W~marino District, Waitotara County, Whanganui County and Whanganui City).32 
Wbanganui is the major financial, service, and social centre for the lower catchment.33 Finally, 
for Wbanganui the direct economic significance of the river has varied considerably at different 
times, for example, the decline of the river as the principal transport route to Taumarunui and the 
interior obviously affected the town. Yet, as will become evident over the course of the study, 
the identity of Whanganui as a town, and later as a city, has centred upon the river to a degree 
that transcends its economic significance. 
10.3. The Tongariro Power Development (TPD) and the Western 
Diversion 
lO.3.(i) The Historical Development of the TPD and the Western Diversion 
The design and construction of the TPD was ultimately driven by the need to provide for a 
projected shortfall in generating capacity. The post-war boom of the 1950s saw the New 
Zealand economy expand at an unprecedented rate, which in conjunction with technological 
development led to a sustained increase in consumer demand for electricity.34 Official 
projections foresaw the continuation of this trend, with the prospect of power shortages by the 
early 1960s and beyond. To those responsible for electricity planning it was imperative that new 
generating plant be brought on line as soon as possible. In the North Island the potential of the 
Waikato River was almost fully exploited by existing hydro-stations and stations under 
construction, and the engineers of the State Hydro-electric Department thus turned their attention 
towards other rivers.35 
The idea of diverting water from the upper reaches of the Wbanganui Catchment 
northwards into Lake Taupo in order to boost the generating capacity of the Waikato hydro-
stations was first raised in 1947 by an engineer working in the Taumarunui office of the State 
29 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional· Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, p. 109. 
30 Department of Conservation, 1988, "Whanganui River Minimum Hows Submission to the Rangitikei-
Whanganui Catchment Board" Whanganui, Volume 2, Part 6, pp. 9-13. 
31 James Clarke, (Planning Consultant), 1989, Electricorp evidence, Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 11. 
32 Ibid., p. 5. 
33 Ibid 
34 The period of sustained economic growth between 1945 and 1973 is commonly referred to as the 'long boom'. 
Between 1954 and 1974 the average annual increase in real GDP was 4% compared with 1.9% during the 
following decade. Brian Roper in: B. Roper, and C. Rudd, (eds), State and Economy in New Zealand Oxford 
University Press Auckland, p. 2, Table 1.1. 
3~he State Hydro-electric Department was established by the Electricity Act 1945. It became the New Zealand 
Electricity Department in 1958, and was responsible for the generation of electricity. Responsibility for the 
construction of power projects rested with the civil and power engineering divisions of the Ministry of Works. 
A high degree of collaboration existed between the two agencies. L. Cleveland, and A. Robinson (eds), 1972, 
Readings in New Zealand Government A.H and A.W Reed, Wellington, p. 37. 
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Hydro-electric Department. Official response to the proposal was initially guarded, yet there was 
enough interest to ensure that the concept was explored further. Preliminary studies were 
conducted and the scope of inquiry subsequently widened to the possible diversion of water from 
the whole central volcanic region above 650m.36 By 1955 the Government was sufficiently 
committed to the proposal to engage consulting engineers Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners of 
London to conduct detailed investigations. The consultants produced a preliminary report in 
1957 detailing various options and potential power outputs. Concurrent analysis of the scheme 
by Ministry of Works officials established that the project was not only technically but also 
economically viable.37 
The fullest exposition of the Government's strategic planning for hydro development at 
the time was set out in the 1958 white paper on electric power development.38 The document 
dealt with the range of generation options (including nuclear power) that were potentially 
available to provide for the projected short to medium term increase in load growth. A significant 
portion of the white paper was devoted to the TPD (then referred to as the Upper Waikato 
Development) and it is apparent that the scheme was favoured by decision-makers for a number 
of important reasons. First of all, it would be possible to undertake the construction of the 
project in a series of discrete stages, meaning the scheme could begin to contribute power to the 
North Island grid well before its ultimate completion. Secondly, construction of the TPD would 
place little or no call upon overseas funds.39 Thirdly, and consequentially, the long term hydro-
development of the Waikato River was nearing completion and there would be a large skilled 
work-force to draw upon. And finally, the proposal to lay a power cable across the Cook Strait, 
thus enabling the North Island to draw upon the vast hydro potential of the South Island, had for 
the time being been deferred. All these factors combined to convince decision makers of the 
efficacy of the proposal. 
It is difficult to determine the exact point at which the decision was made to proceed with 
the detailed design, and construction, of the TPD. Although formal Cabinet approval for the 
construction of the first three stages of the project was given as late as September 1964,40 it is 
evident from government actions that the development was a virtual certainty well before this 
date. In October 1958 legal authority for the construction and operation of the scheme was 
granted by an Order in Council issued pursuant to Section 311 of the Public Works Act 1928 
(presented in full in Appendix G). 41 The Executive Order vested the Minister of Electricity with a 
sweeping authority: 
... empowering the Minister to raise or lower the level or divert the waters of the rivers COIn!med 
and of any tributary lake, river, or stream and so make use of the whole of the Waikato, 
Whanganui and Rangitikei Catchment areas for hy~electric purposes, to ,construct incidental 
and related works such as dams, tunnels, transmission lines etc., and to sell the electrical energy 
generated. 42 
36 J. Martin, (ed.), 1991, People, Politics and Power Stations: Electric Power Generation in New Zealand 
1880-1990 Bridget Williams Books and Electricorp, Wellington, p. 221. 
37 Ibid., p. 224. 
38 Report of the State Hydro Electric Department for the year ended31 March, 1958, Appendices to the Journals 
of the House of Representatives D-4. 
39 This was a critical factor as the New Zealand economy had slowed and overseas reserves were low at this time. 
40 J. Martin, (00.), 1991, People, Politics and Power Stations p. 226. 
41 See: 1958, New Zealand Gazette Vol. 3, No. 66, pp. 1463. 
42 Office Solicitor, Ministry of Works, October 10, 1958, Internal memorandum to the General Manager 
recommending that the Order in Council receive the Governor General's signature. 
Chapter Ten: The Whanganui River and the Tongariro Power Development 201 
According to the Government, the Executive Order was a legal formality that enabled the 
technical investigations to proceed (ie. to provide for the installation of flow gauging stations, 
drilling operations etc.).43 Yet the comprehensive delegation of powers authorised by the Order 
in Council not only facilitated the detailed investigations but also, over the following decades, 
formed the substantive legal basis for the entire TPD. That the Government was committed to 
the project at this early stage is also suggested by a second action, the provision for increased 
generating capacity in the design of some of the Waikato stations on the basis of the potential 
increased base flows that would result from the TPD.44 Such additional expenditure would not 
have occurred ifthere had been any real uncertainty. 
In promulgating the Order in Council, the Crown vested in the Minister of Electricity an 
expansive range of use rights. On a general level these rights enabled the construction and 
operation of the entire TPD. But of most direct relevance to this case study is the establishment 
of an unfettered right to abstract water from the headwaters of the Whanganui River for the 
purposes of hydro-electric generation - a right which was, most significantly, granted in 
perpetuity. This authority to take and divert natural water was subsequently recognised in 
statute by S. 31 of the Water and Soil Conservation Amendment Act 1973. The implications 
of this allocation of use rights will be discussed in a later chapter. 
As noted above, the mandate for hydro-planning and development lay with the New 
Zealand Electricity Department (NZED) and the Ministry of Works and Development (MoW). 
Both agencies were ultimately driven by the exigencies of economic development, charged with 
the responsibility of constructing and maintaining strategic economic infrastructure. It is not 
surprising in this context that these development functions overshadowed the regulatory 
responsibilities of these agencies. This strategic mandate meant each organisation was in a 
powerful institutional position, with decision-making power further enhanced by their large 
scale, highly centralised and hierarchical organisational structures. The planning process 
proceeded within a development oriented and tightly focused bureaucratic framework, which as 
has been observed, was almost solely concerned with technocentric criteria. Furthermore, these 
monolithic agencies were at the time unfettered by environmental and planning legislation and 
thus did not need to obtain the consent of local authorities, examine environmental and social 
effects, and nor were they required to undertake meaningful consultation. In this context there 
was little scope for public involvement in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, some 
consultation did occur and it is appropriate to detail the nature of those discussions, not only 
because of their substantive impact upon the shape and operation of the final scheme but also to 
help reveal the extent to which the WRMF dispute was a legacy of the inadequacies of the 
original planning process. 
Inter-departmental discussions during 1955 identified a number of interests that would be 
potentially affected by the construction of the project, principally "tourist fishing interests and the 
land and fishing rights of the local Maori landowners, particularly the Ngati Tuwharetoa".45 An 
43 Ibid. 
44 In 1960 a well known contemporary academic and activist. Dr John Salmon, noted: "The chain of Waikato 
power stations was designed to use more water than normally flows in the river". Undoubtedly a clear 
indication that the Tongariro development was a foregone conclusion from the mid to late 1950's on. 
Heritage Destroyed: The Crisis in Scenery Preservation in New Zealand A.H. and A.W. Reed, Wellington, 
p.89. 
45 J. Martin, (00.), 1991, People, Politics and Power Stations p. 223. 
c:-I 
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initial meeting was held in October of that year at Hirangi Marae in Turangi focusing upon the 
TPD and Lake Rotoaira (but not about the plans to build a construction town at Turangi). But 
then things went quiet, and by the time Ngati Tuwharetoa were again consulted, construction had 
already commenced on the project. This process has most recently been the subject of a 
successful claim to the Waitangi Tribunal.46 But while the power planners made some small 
effort to consult with those affected parties with recognised use-rights and property entitlements 
over land, the issue of water use was perceived as subsidiary or inconsequential. Hence 
discussions did not include a wider representation of stakeholders within the potentially affected 
catchment areas.47 Stakeholders from the Whanganui catchment had little, if any, substantive 
input during this formative period despite the publicly aired concerns of groups such as the 
Waimarino Acclimatisation Society (responsible for the trout fishery in the upper Whanganui 
catchment).48 Most significantly, the Tangata Whenua - Te Atihau-nui-a-Paparangi - of the 
Whanganui River were not consulted during this design phase. An often repeated anecdote from 
this time is of the public meeting held in Taumarunui with the electricity officials from Wellington 
in attendance. When Mr Hikaia Amohia - kaumatua, kai korero and rangatira of the upper 
Whanganui - rose to speak he was promptly asked to sit down.49 The planning process 
certainly followed a top down methodology. 
The Taupo-Tongariro trout fishery was one notable area where concessions, other than 
for engineering and economic considerations, were made during the design phase. However the 
means used to protect the fishery were essentially operational rather than in construction - Lake 
Rotoaira (an important feeding ground) was to be managed within its natural levels, and after 
research by the Wildlife Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs and the Marine Department 
a minimum flow was set for the Tongariro River. In contrast, the upper Whanganui-Whakapapa 
fishery received scant attention, a fact which was noted by the newly formed Nature 
Conservation Council in 1963.50 
At a wider level, during the late 1950s and early 1960s there was increasing public 
concern about the impacts of hydro-development ('the great hydro-electric era'51). :me 
conservation movement labelled the massive civil works programme 'state sponsored 
vandalism', highlighting the devastation that resulted from such acts as; the raising of Lakes 
Monowai (in 1925), the lowering and 'subsequent raising of Waikeremoana (1948), the complete 
hydro-development of the Waikato River (including the inundation of the spectacular geo-thermal 
area at Orakeikorako, and the drowning of the Aratiatia Rapids), and the potential impacts of 
46 Waitangi Tribunal, 1995, Turangi Township Report 1995 (Wai 84), Brookers, Wellington, Ch. 2. 
47 During the long boom of the post-war period it became increasingly apparent that the existing (indeed to a 
great extent absent) institutional mechanisms for dealing with the management of water resources were 
woefully inadequate when faced with the escalating demands of users. This procedural lacuna was not dealt 
with until the enactment of the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967. A detailed history of the development 
of institutions for water and soil management in New Zealand can be found in: M. Roche, 1994, Land and 
Water: Water and Soil Conservation and Central Government 1941-1988 Historical Branch, Department of 
Internal Affairs, Wellington. 
48 J. Martin, (ed.), 1991, People. Politics and Power Stations p. 223. 
49 Cf. D. Young, 1989. "River of Great Waiting" New Zealand Geographic Vol. 3, July/September, pp. 95-
115. 
50 J. Martin, (ed.), 1991, People. Politics and Power Stations pp. 224-5. 
51 R. Noonan, 1975, By Design Ministry of Works and Development, Wellington. 
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proposed schemes such as the TPD and the Manapouri development.52 A major source of 
discontent was the nature of the planning process which, as in the case of the TPD, served to 
marginalise the public from decision-making and prevented the inclusion of a wider range of 
values in the planning function. It is, however, doubtful that this increasingly vocal body had a 
significant impact during the design and construction stages of the TPD. Any concessions to the 
conservation lobby came later and in the form of changes to the operating regime. 
Bureaucratic obfuscation, specifically the suppression of detail about the form of the 
scheme and the status of the decision-making process, limited opposition to the project during the 
design phase. However the publication of the 1963 Power Planning Report, which described the 
project and set out a provisional timetable for construction, raised the profile of the scheme and 
stimulated concern among groups which had hitherto been silent on the issue (for example, the 
Whanganui River Scenic Board and the Wbanganui Harbour Board). The ante was further 
increased when the Minister of Electricity, Tom Shand, announced approval in principle for the 
first three stages of the Development (April 1964) and later that year when formal Cabinet 
approval was given (September).53 Oearly a Catch 22 situation prevailed; where previously 
public involvement had been stifled by a lack of information, by 1964 the situation was quite the 
reverse - plans were fully formed, technical investigations were at an advanced stage and 
construction of the Western Diversion had already begun. Moreover, this inertia (and by this 
stage huge investment of public resources) effectively ruled out the possibility of major 
substantive change in the design of the scheme. Opposition groups thus concentrated upon 
eliciting guarantees from the government, seeking to mitigate the scheme's impacts upon their 
interests - principally through regulation of the operating regime - and negotiating compensation 
for costs associated with diminished flows. Two agreements reached during this period would 
have a direct bearing upon the operation of the Western Diversion. 
The Piriaka Compensation Deed During 1964, the Taumarunui Borough Council 
vigorously petitioned Tom Shand and the NZED. Their claims centred upon the costs that the 
Borough would potentially incur due to low flows in the upper Whanganui (viz. the loss of 
generation at the Council's Piriaka hydro-scheme, the impact upon Taumarunui's water supply 
and sewage disposal, and further loss of amenity). Negotiations ensued between the parties in 
both Wellington and Taumarunui, and a series of well attended «600) public meetings were 
held. Eventually, with little to bargain with, the community was forced to accept the 
government's terms.54 Under the settlement the Crown entered into a number of commitments, 
the agreement guaranteed a minimum flow at Piriaka to satisfy generation needs,55 and, if at any 
52 The New Zealand Scenery Preservation Society was fonned in 1959, and was to work closely with the Forest 
and Bird Protection Society in opposing the Manapouri scheme. The scale of opposition was demonstra~ 
when later that year the New Zealand Travel and Holidays Association produced 50,000 copies of a pamphlet 
entitled "Are We Carving Up New Zealand's Scenery?", which considered the 'systematic destruction' of scenic 
beauty carried out by the Electricity Department, and predicted a 'national disaster' if the government went 
ahead with its plans to raise Lakes Manapouri and Te Anau. See: N. Peat, 1994, Manapouri Saved: New 
Zealand's First Great Conservation Success Story Longacre Press, Dunedin, pp. 36-7, and passim. 
53 J. Martin, (00.), 1991, People, Politics and Power Stations pp. 224-5. 
54 F. Stenner (Taumarunui Borough Town Clerk), 1964, Letter on behalf of the Council to Shand outlining in 
detail the Borough's difficulties with the proposed settlement, August 20. Also, the Taumarunui Press 
devoted considerable space to coverage of this dispute. Cf. 31 July and 21 August 1964. 
55 New Zealand Electricity Division, 1982, "Submission to the Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Boord" 
Wellington, p. 3. 
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stage flows fell below this base level due to the operation of the Western Diversion, the NZED 
would compensate the Council on aper diem basis.56 
The Kakahi Temperature Agreement A further undertaking was made by the 
Minister in 1964 that efforts would be made to mitigate the effects of the diversion upon the trout 
fishery in the upper Whanganui-Whakapapa area. 57 A pennanent reduction in flow levels would 
certainly have some unavoidable impacts upon the lotic system. However the most serious 
threats to the trout populations would arise if during hot dry weather the water temperature rose 
to levels which could stress and potentially kill fish. Subsequently, in 1%5 the NZED and the 
Department of Internal affairs entered into an agreement: A continuous minimum flow of 0.6 
cumecs would be maintained directly below the Whakapapa intake, and special releases of water 
would occur during dry periods to prevent the water temperature rising above 23°C at Kakahi.58 
lO.3.(ii) Physical Description 
The Western Diversion must be considered in its functional context within the Tongariro Power 
Development (see Figure 10.2). As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the Western Diversion 
is an integral part of a vast water collection system - an elaborate network of intake structures, 
tunnels, dams, lakes, aqueducts and canals which divert water from a catchment of 2600km2 
northwards. into Lake Taupo and the Waikato River.59 Also integrated within this system are 
two power stations (Rangipo and Tokaanu) which utilise some of the considerable head between 
the upper levels of the diversions and Lake Taupo. The intention here is to provide an overview 
of the scheme. A closer examination of the operation of the Western Diversion follows. 
Stage 1: The Western Diversion Constructed between 1964 and 1971. Stream bed 
intakes on six headwater streams (Whakapapa, Okupata, Taurewa, Tawhitikuri, Mangatepopo 
and the Upper Whanganui) divert water northwards through 16.1 km of tunnels, two purpose 
built reservoirs - Te Whaiau and Otamangakau (created by earth-fill dams) - and 8.9 km of 
canals (Te Whaiau, Otamangakau and Wairehu) before flowing into Lake Rotoaira. Prior to. the 
commissioning of Stage 2 in 1974, the water exited through the natural lake outlet, down the 
Poutu Stream, Tongariro River and on into Lake Taupo. The Western Diversion provides for a 
mean flow of 20 m3/s, with a maximum interception of 41.6 m3/s.6o Also of note, a series of 
automatically flushing screens which prevent fish life from the Whanganui catchment (in 
particular eels and lampreys) from entering into Lake Rotoaira and the Lake Taupo Catchment 
through the diversions.61 
56 During these negotiations Torn Shand was adamant that the Government would only provide compensation for 
measurable "concrete damage", "payment for intangibles [ie. loss of aesthetic value] was a different matter". 
He also stated, somewhat high-handedly, that: "the river belonged to the people of New Zealand and he had no 
right to make any payment to a section of the people who happened to live on the Banks of that river". 
Tawnarunui Press July 30, 1964. 
57 New Zealand Electricity Division, 1982, "Submission to the Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Boord" 
Wellington, p. 3. 
58 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, p. 8. 
59 "This extra water amounts to an increased inflow of some 25 percent on a mean flow basis". New Zealand 
Electricity Division, 1982, "Submission to the Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board" Wellington, p. 5. 
60 Ibid., p. 2. Also: J. Martin, (ed.), 1991, People. Politics alld Power Stations pp. 222. 
61 Leonard Malcolm (Manager Tokaanu Hydro Area, Electricity Corporation of New Zealand), 1988, Electricity 
Corporation evidence, Catchment Boord hearing, p. 5. 
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Figu r e 10.2. The Tongariro Power Scheme 
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Stage 2: Tokaanu Constructed between January 1968 and July 1973. This stage 
incorporated a number of elements constructed simultaneously. A concrete gravity dam 13.1 m 
high and 150 m long regulates the outflows from lake Rotoaira. A large streambed intake at 
Beggs Pool on the Tongariro River diverts water through a 2.8 km long tunnel and along the 5.6 
km Poutu canal into Lake Rotoaira. From Lake Rotoaira a 6 km tunnel transports water 
northwards beneath the slopes of Mt Tihia to a surge chamber from where penstocks plunge 
down the hillside to the Tokaanu power station. The station utilises the 200 m of head between 
Rotoaira and Tokaanu, and has capacity of just over 200 MW. From the powerhouse the water 
flows into Lake Taupo.62 Lake Rotoaira itself has a very limited storage capacity; without 
inflows it has roughly enough water to run the Tokaanu station at full capacity for only 24 hours. 
Stage 3: Moawhango (Eastern Diversion) Constructed between 1969 and 1979. 
Counterpoised with the Western Diversion, Stage 3 involved the abstraction and diversion of 
water from catchments to the east of the volcanic spine northwards into the Tongariro River. The 
Wahianoa aqueduct runs across the south-eastern slopes of Ruapehu intercepting tributaries of 
the Whangaehu River but not the Whangaehu itself which is highly acidic due to inflows from 
the mountain's crater lake. From the aqueduct water flows through the 1280 m long Mangaio 
tunnel into the Mangaio Stream and ultimately the Moawhango reservoir. The reservoir was 
created by the impoundment of the Moawhango River (a major tributary of the Rangitikei River) 
by a giant 325 m long and 68 m high gravity-arch dam. From the reservoir the diverted water is 
conveyed via a 20.1 km long tunnel to the Tongariro River at a position just upstream of the 
Rangipo dam (see Stage 4). 
Stage 4: Rangipo Constructed between 1974 and 1983. The Rangipo concrete-
gravity dam is a control and intake structure on the Tongariro River. In addition to the 
supplementary flows from the Moawhango diversion, the Tongariro's volume is also augmented 
by water from the Waihohonu catchment between the lower slopes of Ruapehu and Ngauruhoe 
(by means of a 1000 m diversion tunnel). The central feature of Stage 4 is the Rangipo power 
station which is a run of the river station with an installed capacity of 120 MW. The Rangipo 
station is remarkable in that it is completely underground - the powerhouse cavern (55 m long, 
18 m wide and 36 m high) is accessed via a 680 m long tunnel - and is normally operated 
remotely from the project's central control room at Tokaanu. From the Rangipo intake the water 
flows via a series of tunnels into the Tongariro River at a point just above the Poutu intake (see 
Stage 2). It is also interesting to note that the Rangipo project was the first, and only, stage of 
the TPD to be subject to an environmental impact report.63 
Finally, in addition to the functional components outlined above, the scheme involved the 
construction of a sizeable network of supporting infrastructure such as; roads, transmission 
lines, works depots and housing. The most significant development being the complete 
transformation of the small, principally Maori, settlement of Turangi, which as the project's 
621. Johnstone (Hydro Resources Manager. Electricity Corporation of New Zealand). 1993. "Resource Users am 
the RMA: Some Practical Aspects of Being a Resource User in a Green World" Unpublished paper. Hamilton, 
p. 15.: 1. Martin. (cd.). 1991. People. Politics and Power Stations pp. 222. 
63 1. Martin. (00.). 1991. People. Politics and Power Stations pp. 232. 
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headquarters burgeoned from a population of 500 prior to 1964 into a town of 6,000 residents by 
1971.64 
lO.3.(iii) The Operation of the Western Diversion 
In functional terms the Western Diversion is simply a conduit for the inter-basin transfer of 
water. The mechanics of its daily operation are relatively uncomplicated. Yet it was the 
operational details of the diversion, the specificities of day to day management, which formed the 
manipulable core of the WRMF dispute. Beyond the ultimate question of the validity of the 
existence of the diversions, the conflict derived from, and focused upon, the operation of these 
structures, and any solution (other than complete cessation and removal) would necessarily 
involve changes to the management regime. Analysis of the effects of the diversion (beyond the 
impacts of construction per se) demands a preliminary account detailing its operation. As I am 
concerned here with the origins of conflict and with establishing an empirical foundation for 
analysis, this account will cover the period prior to the establishment of the 1983 minimum flow 
regime. The details of later operating regimes will emerge over the course of the chronologically 
ordered narrative in Chapter Twelve. 
Certainly the raison d'etre of the TPD, like any other power scheme, was to generate as 
much power as possible given the available resource. When considering the operation of the 
scheme there were, on the one hand, questions about the availability of the resource, and on the 
other hand, questions about the mechanics of efficient utilisation. In practice these issues were 
intertwined, and nowhere were they more clearly embodied than in design. 
The foremost consideration in the design and operation of the diversion system is the 
physical availability of the water resource. This was of course a function of rainfall and other 
catchment characteristics and hence not easily manipulated. The system was thus designed, and 
subsequently operated, within that physical context. What is revealing here is that for the 
scheme's designers the assumption was that all flows would be available for diversion (with the 
exception of extreme events such as floods). All of the intakes and tunnels were subsequently 
designed to take up to twice the long term mean annual flow (see Table 10.1), with excess flows 
(from minor freshes to major floods) passing down the natural stream bed channe1s.65 In 
addition to the issue of natural river flows (and setting aside the option of structural 
modification), the design specifications established basic limitations upon the operation of the 
diversion. 
64 Ibid. pp. 225. The process by which the government appropriated tribal land for this project had been the 
source of considerable grievances with Ngati Tuwharetoa. and was the subject of a recent Waitangi Tribunal. 
report. Waitangi Tribunal. 1995. Turangi Township Report 1995 (Wai 84). Brookers. Wellington. Ch. 2. 
65 New Zealand Electricity Division. 1982. "Submission to the Rangitikei-Whanganui Catclunent Boord" 
Wellington. p. 12. 
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Table 10.1. Western Diversions: design constraints upon flow management66 
Intake 
Taurewa 
Tawhitikuri 
Mangatepopo 
Whanganui 
Intercepted 
flow 
A. Estimated long-
tenn mean annual 
flow 
14.5 m3 /s 
B. Design 
capacity 
29.1 m3/s 
A. 0.5 m3/s 
B. 1.0 m3/s 
A. 0.3 m3/s 
B. 0.6 m3/s 
A. 0.2 m3/s 
B. 0.4 m3/s 
A. 2.0 m3/s 
B. 4.0 m3/s 
A. 1.6 m3/s 
B. Up to 8.5 m3/s 
Features and management options 
Major intake 
Compensation flows required 
Compensation flows can be released by opening one or both of 
the scour gates. Gates can be operated remotely from Tokaanu 
control room 
Residual flows are measured by a reooroor 914 m downstream 
from the intake. Data is transmitted to Tokaanu where it is 
displayed 
_ J~~~ tJ1I!l1~'-C<!Il)~ 9~~.!e.!ll.9t~1:y [rQIlll0!a!ll!.u _______ _ 
No requirement to pass compensation flows 
No measurement of flows below intake or of intercepted flows 
Not possible to pass compensation flows without modification 
_Yf~~!~~ __________________________ _ 
No requirement to pass compensation flows 
No measurement of flows below intake or of intercepted flows 
Not possible to pass compensation flows without modification 
_Yf~~!~~ __________________________ _ 
No requirement to pass compensation flows 
No measurement of flows below intake or of intercepted flows 
Not possible to pass compensation flows without modification 
_Yf~~~ __________________________ _ 
No requirement to pass compensation flows 
No measurement of flows below intake or of intercepted flows 
Not possible to pass compensation flows without modification 
_~f~~!~~ __________________________ _ 
Intake gate leads into Te Whaiau culvert 
Gate can be controlled locally and remotely 
Diverted flows are measured in culvert and transmitted to 
Tokaanu. yet 
residual flows are not. 
Could POtentially pass compensation flows 
For the purposes of establishing and modifying minimum flow regimes a key issue was 
how much control could be exerted over the operation of the structures? In essence, how much 
control was there over the level of abstraction, or conversely, what capacity existed for. the 
release of residual flows down the natural stream channels? In Table 10.1 I set out the 
capabilities of each diversion intake. These structures functioned simply by diverting all of the 
stream-flows within their respective capacities, with excess flows passing over the tops of the 
weirs. In this way they coped automatically with the natural fluctuation in water levels without 
mechanical adjustment The Wbakapapa intake was also the only intake where, by utilising 
scour gates to alter the discharge downstream, a degree of flow management was possible.67 
The alternative options for control were either to shut down an intake68 or to make expensive 
changes to the structures themselves. 
In addition to design capability, the ability to manage flows also required a concomitant 
ability to monitor river levels. Measurement of flows occurred at a limited number of points in 
the Western Diversion system, and the data was subsequently transmitted to the Tokaanu control 
66 Table based upon evidence presented by: Leonard Malcolm (Manager Tokaanu Hydro Area. Electricity 
Corporation of New Zealand). 1988, Electricity Corporation evidence. Catchment Board hearing. pp. 12-25. 
67 The scour gates were designed to discharge water for the purposes of flushing out the chambers that prevent 
gravel from passing through the intakes into the diversion tunnels. 
68 This could be done by remote control at the larger intakes. but elsewhere must be carried out on site. New 
Zealand Electricity Division. 1982. "Submission to the Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Boord" Wellington. 
p. 12. 
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room. Water flowing into and through the diversion was measured at only two locations: The 
Whanganui was the only diversion flow metered individually, and that was done at the Te 
Whaiau culvert which channelled the Whanganui waters into Lake Te Whaiau; flows from the 
remaining intakes were measured in aggregate at the Te Whaiau cana1.69 Information about 
individual downstream flows was only recorded at one location - 914 m downstream from the 
Whakapapa intake (which is consistent with the Whakapapa's function in maintaining a residual 
flow and with the policy of drawing off all flows at the other intakes). Finally, the flow 
recording station at Piriaka was also monitored, but the data generated provided only a very 
rough indication of stream-flows in the upper Whanganui catchment 
On the basis of purposively rational criteria, the Western Diversion was a robust system 
which performed a clear function efficiently. However, the very simplicity of design that made it 
robust also served to constrain the measure of precision that could be exercised in its operation. 
Such difficulties were compounded by the limited distribution of flow measurement sites. The 
established operating policy (prior to 1983) was driven by a straightforward rule - "simply to 
take as much water as the diversion can intercept" - subject to modest constraints.70 
To conclude, the history of the operation of the diversion was symptomatic of the same 
dynamic which shaped the project from the outset. Powerful economic imperatives underpinned 
a singular drive to maximise power output. Although that dynamic was subsequently tempered 
by countervailing environmental and socio-economic initiatives, there were few substantive 
constraints (other than natural flow levels and design factors) upon the operation of the Western 
Diversion prior to 1983. 
10.4. The Environmental Impacts on the Whanganui River and 
Catchment System 
The task of assessing the environmental impacts of the Western Diversion upon the Whanganui 
catchment is a difficult one. This was fiercely contested terrain throughout the WRMF dispute -
... 
a broad and complex discourse encompassing disputed epistemologies, methodologies, 
69 Leonard Malcolm, 1988, Electricity Corporation evidence, Catchment Boord hearing, p. 18. 
70 New Zealand Electricity Division, 1982, "Submission to the Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Boord" 
Wellington, p. 12. Those requirements were: 
The Piriaka Deed As noted in lO.3.(i), this agreement guaranteed a minimum flow at Piriaka to satisfy 
generation needs there. If flows in the Whanganui River (measured at the Piriaka flow station) fell below 14.2 
cwnecs compensation would be payable to the Tawnarunui Borough Council, and if below 9.9 cwnecs then a 
greater level of compensation would accrue. The agreement provides for an a1;>solute minimum flow of 7.1 
cumecs.70 
Kakahi Temperature Agreement Also noted in 1O.3.(i). In order to extend a degree of protection to the 
fishery a minimum flow of 0.6 ml/s to be maintained in the Whakapapa stream channel. In order to avoid 
adverse stress to lotic biota ad hoc releases required when water temperature at Kakahi nears 23°C. 
Lake Taupo - maximum control level So as to comply with the Lake Taupo Compensation Claims Act 
1947 the diversion of foreign water into Lake Taupo had to cease when the level of Lake Taupo was nearing, 
or at, its maximum control level. This was to avoid flooding in the Waikato catchment. 
Other storage levels In addition to the level of Lake Taupo, the diversion was also constrained by the 
capacities of all the storage lakes and reservoirs through which the diverted water flows. 
Emergency procedures When extreme events occurred, such as a volcanic eruption or lahar, in the Whakapapa 
River or any other of the diverted streams, then the diversion would desist. 
Flood During large floods in the Whakapapa River diversion of water would be temporarily discontinued to 
prevent large quantities of silt from entering the tunnels. 
Given typical operating conditions it was normally only the first two conditions that effect the day to day running 
of the diversion Leonard Malcolm, 1988, Electricity Corporation evidence, Catchment Boord hearing, p. 26-9. 
Also: New Zealand Electricity Division, 1982, "Submission to the Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Boord" 
Wellington, p. 13. 
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measurements, and ultimately interpretations. This discursive process was undoubtedly 
constrained and shaped by the adversarial nature of the proceedings. Also, there were other 
important obstacles, not the least of which was the almost total lack of baseline data (especially 
quantitative) on the pre-diversion state of the catchment. Yet on close examination it is possible 
to discern considerable substantive agreement - at least on core physical changes - and this shall 
be the ground covered here. Some of the more disputed issues will be dealt with in later 
discussion. Finally, the purpose here is to provide an overview of the basic biophysical impacts. 
The 1990 Planning Tribunal decision provides a useful and extensive summary of various 
impacts. It is, however, a direct product (and indeed constituent part) of the discourse which is 
under critique and must therefore be treated with some circumspection. The approach taken here 
has been to structure the review on the basis of recent river management literature. Information 
such as is contained within the Planning Tribunal's decision is thus interpreted within a more 
integrated systems framework. 
At the beginning of section 10.2 I noted that the river and catchment function as a 
biophysical system. The assumption being that although the boundaries of this system are open, 
it does possess a high level of functional coherence and can therefore be considered, analytically, 
as a totality. It is also a relational concept. Its defining characteristic is the fundamental 
connectedness that exists within its borders - "complex interactions between the physical, 
chemical and biological components that occur in space and time".71 This has important 
implications here where the focus is upon disturbances, for it suggests that major perturbations 
have potentially far reaching consequences, and they do. The problem is that when assessing the 
impacts of anthropogenic disturbances the focus is upon causal connection, but river systems 
with their multiplicity of dynamic interactions can make detection or proof of such linkages very 
difficult. 
The most immediate and fundamental physical effects of the diversion were hydrological 
- changes to flow patterns. At the catchment scale, hydrological patterns and in-stream 
hydrological conditions are important, if not primary, determinants of ecosystem structure and 
function.72 In broad terms, the abstraction of water resulted in significantly reduced flows 
below the diversion structures (as a proportion of natural flows, disturbances were greater 
directly below the intake structures, as inflows from tributaries downstream buffered the 
hydrological effects). This was in itself a critical indicator, yet it is also possible (despite 
considerable natural annual variation in flows) to identify more specific changes to flow patterns. 
These were expressed in the hydrographic record for the Whakapapa, and are termed artefacts 
of the regime. They are listed below: 
Reduced mean flow Pre-diversion flows were in the order of 15.1 cumecs at the Whakapapa 
recorder and 89.1 cumecs at Te Maire. Following the diversion the mean flows dropped 
dramatically. The reduction was attenuated slightly with the implementation of the 1983 
minimum flow regime,73 but, at 2.3 cumecs at Whakapapa and 68.5 cumecs at Te Maire, they 
remained a fraction of the natural mean flow.74 
71 P. Calow, andG. Petts. (eds), 1994, The Rivers Handbook p. 1. 
72 J. Gore. "Hydrological Change" In Ibid. p. 33. 
73 The 1983 regime involved (in addition to the previous restrictions outlined in 1O.2.(ii». a minimum flow at Te 
Maire of 22 cumecs between 1 January and 14 February. and at Easter, and 16 cumecs at all other times. 
74 John Garrett (then Resources Technical Manager for the Central Districts Catchment Boards). 1989. Evidence 
in rebuttal, Planning Tribunal hearing. p. 2. 
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Reduced minimum flows For the Whakapapa the natural minimum !low was 5.8 cumecs, 
and the natural average annual low flow 8.5 cumecs. This dropped to the guaranteed minimum 
of 0.6 cumecs after the diversion. 
Absence of seasonal variation in base flow Because the dversion was designed to 
automatically draw off up to twice the mean annual !low there was less seasonal variation 
directly below the control structures. 
Negative surges Instances where flows dropped below the stipulated absolute minimum (0.6 
cumecs) had been recorded Such events had deleterious effects upon the stream biota, at least in 
the downstream vicinity. 
Adhoc releases 
Reduced peak flows These were more significant in medium flow events (freshes and minor 
floods). It was thought that this reduced the river's ability to transport sediment. 
Reduced number of peak flows The floods on the river tended to be fewer and larger (that 
is as a proportion of base-flow). 
Truncated recessions Increasing flows were abstracted up until capacity of diversion, then 
the flows in the river rose very rapidly, and similarly decreasedquite suddenly. It is thought that 
this also constrained the rivers' ability to transport sediment. 
High natural flow High natural flows after a period of abstraction could be ddeterious to the 
stream biota.75 
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Together these artefacts represented a substantial transformation in the flow regime for the 
Whakapapa, causing significant modification to the in-stream physical conditions. It is highly 
probable that these effects also occurred in the other affected tributaries - indeed, without the 
provision of residual flows, streams such as the Mangatepopo and the upper Whanganui were 
completely de-watered in the reaches below the intakes. Such physical changes can be 
considered in a number of functional contexts. 
The first involves the role of stream-flow in defining the environmental domain within 
which biological communities develop and survive. A series of changes to in-stream biotic 
controls resulted from the altered hydrological regime: (i) A reduction in wetted area - notably, in 
those reaches immediately below the intakes;76 (ii) Altered hydraulic conditions - the diversion 
resulted in a decrease in hydraulic heterogeneity, reduced mean velocity and depth, principally in 
the upper reaches.77 It is generally recognised that the "pattern of velocity variation in space and 
time has a strong influence on biota, especially benthic invertebrates and fluvial algae",78 with 
reduced variation leading to less biotic diversity;79 (iii) Modified thermal regime - although it 
was argued in the Planning Tribunal that the rate of discharge is but one of many factors wpich 
would affect water temperature, the reduced flows undoubtedly conduce to some increase in 
mean annual, and mean summer, temperatures. As noted previously, the management regime 
was tailored to avoid or mitigate extreme rises which would threaten trout survival, but there 
remained considerable disagreement about the necessary temperature preferences of trout, and the 
optimal conditions for growth (there were also concerns for the native fishery);80 (iv) 
Diminished water quality - earlier in this chapter I touched upon the problems of increased 
sediment loads and the degraded biological quality of the river. water, especially below 
75 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, pp. 107-8. 
76 Wayne Donovan (Consulting biologist), 1988, Evidence presented on behalf of Electricorp, Catchment Boord 
hearing, p. 6. One of the effects of the decrease in wetter area was the increased spalling of the papa ledges 
once they were exposed to air, thus contributing to the level of grey silts in the civer. John Hawley (Manager, 
Division of umd and Soil Sciences, DSIR), 1989, Evidence on behalf of the Minister of Conservation, 
Planning Tribunal hearing. 
77 Ibid 
78 P. Calow, andG. PeUs, (eds), 1994, The Rivers Handbook p. 10. 
79 J. Gore, "Hydrological Change" In Ibid, p. 48. 
80 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand lid v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, pp. 110-11. 
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Taumarunui. Historically, both problems derived from changing land use patterns within the 
greater catchment area (viz. forest clearance, agricultural practices and increased population etc.). 
However, it was argued by a range of parties that reduced headwater flows served to exacerbate 
these phenomena. The Planning Tribunal subsequently found that the diversion had little effect 
upon the biological quality of the water in the more affected lower reaches - meaning that the 
release of water for the purposes of dilution would not mitigate this problem. It did conclude, 
however, that increased flows would facilitate some improvement in the clarity of the river water, 
but was unable to provide quantitative predictions.81 
The issue of sediment loads crosses over into the second functional context - the role of 
flow in determining the nwrphology of the river channel and riparian areas throughout the river 
corridor.82 The focus here is upon changes to the river's sediment regime (transport, erosion 
and deposition). In the upper section a major impact was the reduction in bed-load discharge due 
to the diversion of particulate matter through the tunnels (up to 30 percent of sand sizes and 
fines), the main consequence being a lesser proportion of sand in the river channel 
downstream.83 An additional impact (principally in the Whakapapa) of the reduced flows was 
the decreased capacity of the river to transport fine silts, thus resulting in a thin and undesirable 
mantle of this material lining the streambed and banks.84 Furthermore, an increase in suspended 
grey silts was thought to derive from accelerated erosion of the papa ledges exposed as a result of 
lower water levels.85 Lastly, a number of parties to the conflict (most notably the Whanganui 
City Council) held that the diversion had led to increased siltation in the Wbanganui Harbour and 
estuary, however based on the evidence presented the Planning Tribunal rejected any causal 
connection between the two.86 
The effects upon the biota were complex and, in many instances, ambiguous. As with 
the physical changes outlined above, the impacts upon the stream ecology were more easily 
observed, and of greater note, closer to the point sources of disturbance. There was almost 
universal acceptance that there had been significant adverse effects in these reaches - most 
obviously through the reduction in stream habitat resulting in a general decrease in biomass.87 
Within the remaining stream channel there was a "resetting" of the community structure,88 for 
example, below the Wbakapapa intake the river had "assumed the characteristics of a headwater 
area".89 Many effects represented a transformation from a pristine stream environment to 
something different. Periphyton accumulation occurred due to reduced current Velocity, and as a 
consequence there was a change from a rich fauna dependent upon a low periphyton biomass to a 
81 Ibid, p. 109. 
82 O. Pelts and I. Maddock, "Flow Allocation for In-River Needs" In P. Calow, and O. Pelts, (eds), 1994, The 
Rivers Handbook p. 289. 
83 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, p. Ill. 
84 R. Heerdegen, and J. Rosier, 1991, "Knowledge and the Environmental Planning Process" Sites No.22, 
Autumn, pp. 13. 
85 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whangallui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, p. 112. 
86 Ibid, p. 113. . 
87 Wayne Donovan (ConsUlting biologist), 1988, Electricorp evidence, Catclunent Boord hearing, p. 6. 
88 J. Gore, "Hydrological Change" In P. Calow, andO. Petts, (eds), 1994, The Rivers Halldbook p. 35. 
89 J. Richardson, andL. Teirney, 1982, The Whakapapa River: A Study of the Trout Fishery Under a Modified 
Flow Regime Fisheries Environmental Report No.22, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington. 
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community adapted to life amongst periphyton. The most affected rivers were the Whakapapa 
and the Mangatepopo.90 Another important effect was that in addition to a decline in the density 
of organisms, the diversity of species had fallen dramatically (in some locations by up to 70 
percent), with reductions in species richness recorded as far downstream as Taumarunui.9l 
In recent decades, consideration of in-river needs has typically been directed towards 
maintaining habitat for target species - usually salmonid.92 Conforming with this emphasis, the 
WRMF dispute involved the rigorous examination of the effects of reduced flows upon the trout 
fishery. A host of expert witnesses gave evidence and an array of methodologies and 
conclusions were proffered. Yet according to the Planning Tribunal, the results of the debate 
were inconclusive, and the practical implications subsequently uncertain. The Tribunal held that 
there had been a very substantial decline in trout numbers in the Whakapapa between the intake 
and Oio seven kilometres downstream, but that further downstream towards Kakahi (reputedly 
the best fishery) there had been no significant decline.93 With hindsight this conclusion seems a 
very conservative analysis of the scientific evidence presented, and furthermore, was contrary to 
the body of anecdotal evidence presented by local fishers who had observed a marked decline in 
the standard of the trout fishery extending beyond Kakahi. 94 
The impact of the diversion upon the native fishery was also of concern. Over recent 
decades (indeed, since the tum of the century) a drastic reduction in the populations of 
indigenous species (eg. eels, smelt, lampreys, native trout, koura, etc) had been documented 
throughout the Wbanganui River system. The Planning Tribunal determined that: 
On the balance of probabilities that condition is attributable in part to the reduced river flow 
resulting from the Western Diversion. .. ; that it is also attributable to other changes in the 
catchment, including deforestation; and that the relative significance of the various causes cannot 
be reliably assessed on the present evidence.95 
Once more a definitive analysis was hindered by the lack of baseline data. 
Finally, it was also highly probable that the diversion had had a deleterious effect upon 
the blue duck populations - principally through the loss of habitat in the upper Wbanganui and 
the Mangatepopo rivers, and with some reduction in the Wbakapapa. Again there were, in all 
likelihood, multiple causes for the recent decline in numbers (such as exotic forestry in the upper 
Wbanganui) which made it difficult to identify a causal connection with flow levels.96 
The purpose of this section has been to review the core biophysical disturbances that 
resulted from the operation of the Western Diversion. As I pointed out at the beginning of this 
section, an intricate and enigmatic web of causal connection existed within the catchment, and 
moreover, even in a totally natural state the Wbanganui River system remained in perpetual flux, 
and experienced constant disturbance. As a consequence, the task of assessing effects was 
90 Department of Conservation, 1988, "Whanganui River Minimum Flows Submission to the Rangitikei-
Whanganui Catchment Board" Whanganui, Part 6, p. 40. 
91 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, p. 116. 
92 G. Petts and 1. Maddock, "Flow Allocation for In-River Need<I" In P. Calow, and G. Petts, (eds), 1994, The 
Rivers Handbook p. 289. 
93 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, pp. 119-20. 
94 Such as James Gosman and Manu Lala who presented evidence on behalf of the Whanganui River Flows 
Coalition in the Planning Tribunal hearing. 
95 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganu; Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, pp. 121. 
% Ibid, pp. 113. 
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formidable. Such information constraints are commonplace in environmental decision-making 
and it is necessary here, as it was in the dispute itself, to establish some working assumptions, 
listing the probable correlations between flow levels and various biophysical indicators. Across 
the system, two general trends were apparent: First, increased levels of abstraction led to greater 
magnitudes of ecological disturbance (note that this correlation is by no means a linear one); 
Secondly, the biophysical effects of particular flow regimes were more readily identified and 
more profound in the upper catchment, the impacts upon the lower reaches being less certain. 
Within this chapter much has been made of the idea of the river and catchment as a 
system. This suggests a qualitative element Viewed as a totality - as a functionally coherent 
entity - there arises the issue of the system's integrity. On this basis disturbances (whether they 
be anthropogenic or otherwise) insofar as they threaten the integrity of the interconnections 
within the system, necessarily degrade that system. Most importantly, there are thresholds 
where the system's resilience - its inherent capacity to absorb change and recover from it - will 
be threatened. In this particular case these threshold effects were in all likelihood of greatest 
significance at the sub-catchment scale, namely upon particular communities (such as lotic 
communities in the headwaters) or upon threatened species (such as the blue duck). The issue 
of reversible and irreversible effects was also significant here, as certain components of the 
system would not recover even if flows were increased or restored, whereas other deleterious 
effects would only prevail so long as the hydrological regime was affected. 
10.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have: provided a basic description of the Whanganui River system; outlined the 
genesis of the TPD and some important historical matters that were relevant to the later conflict; 
provided a physical description of the TPD and its design constraints; discussed the principles by 
which it was operated for the generation of electricity; and finally, I examined the general bio-
physical effects of scheme upon the river system. The chapter thus acts as a broadly fa~tual 
reference point for later discussion. In the next chapter I will add a second layer to this, focusing 
upon the substantive arguments surrounding the diversion of headwater flows. 
11
The Political Economy of Electricity Generation and the
Arguments Surrounding Diversion
11. Introduction
In this chapter I review the arguments surrounding the diversion of water. Discussion is pivoted
around the substantive divide at the heart of the conflict. The chapter is thus split into two
sections, with the first section dealing with both the historical political economy of electricity
generation, and the specific arguments for the diversion of flows that arose out of that context.
The second section deals with the countervailing arguments for the retention of either an
increased portion or all of the natural flows within the Whanganui headwaters. This information
is crucial to both the presentation of the historical narrative of conflict in the following chapter,
and to the later analysis of the dispute in terms of the analytical framework in Chapter Thirteen.
11.1. The Political Economy of Electricity Generation and the
Value of the Western Diversion
In this section I undertake two tasks: First I describe various structural features that ultimately
affect the electricity generation sector's capacity to mobilise and influence in pursuit of its
interests, and which in fact serve to define those interests. Discussion therefore begins by
examining the functional significance of the electricity generation system within the national
economy (systemic source of influence), and the changing forms of institutional control and
attendant modes of operation/production, of this sector; The second element concerns the
arguments for the diversion of water through the Western Diversion. I examine the functioning
of the national generation network as a whole, before focusing upon the role and value of the
Western Diversion in particular. The idea is that by dealing with the functional and institutional
contexts as well as with the arguments for the operation of the Diversion, I therefore embrace two
important and interconnected elements of the political economy of electricity generation. And in
so doing I incorporate both the political and value elements of the analytical framework (although
that theoretical connection is not explicitly investigated until Chapter Thirteen).
As I noted in the previous chapter, the arguments of the parties involved in this conflict
were diverse and complex, and most importantly, widely and vigorously contested.
Unfortunately, there is no recourse to a commonly agreed standard. Hence to undertake a review
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of the arguments as I do here, it is necessary for pragmatic reasons to generalise and make 
'common sense' judgements. In many instances, I take the Planning Tribunal decision (the core 
decision-making process within the dispute) as, if not an authoritative, then at least as an 
infonned and well reasoned guide. Also, although the approach here is to deal firstly with the 
issue of electricity generation before moving on to review the values and arguments of those who 
opposed abstraction per se or the level of abstraction, I do make reference to dissenting 
arguments (in the fonn of rejoinders, rebuttals, etc.) when I am discussing a particular issue, 
rather than at a later stage. Moreover, due to the complexity of the arguments presented in the 
conflict, I cannot describe these contests in any detail. 
11.1.(i) The Strategic Function of Electricity Generation 
Electricity is a basic commodity that is of fundamental importance in the functioning of any 
modem industrialised society. To note this is of course to state the obvious, nonetheless, it is a 
useful starting point. In essence it is a statement about value - whether it be the overall 
instrumental value of electricity at the scale of society as a whole (underpinning social 
development and economic growth), or at the level of particular uses (specific use values) -
electricity is clearly very important I do not intend to get caught up in examining why this is so 
(see footnote!), so instead, I begin with a series of statistics which detail the historical 
development of the electricity system in the post-war period through to the 1980s. 
The tendency throughout this period was one of constant large-scale development At its 
material core, this has involved the almost exponential expansion of the generating system 
through a massive civil-works program (of which the Tongariro Power Development was an 
integral part). Figure 11.1 documents a twenty-fold increase in generation capacity between 
1942 when the total generating capacity was 340.8 MW, and 1990 when it was 7181.9 MW. 
The mean percentage annual increase in capacity over this period was a phenomenal 6.7 percent, 2 
contributing an average of 4 percent per annum to New Zealand's gross fixed capital fonnation.3 
Predicably, as the capacity of the generation system increased so too did the output - h~nce 
Figure 11.2 describes a similar trend. 
1 The strategic function of the electricity generation network has developed through the historical conjunction of 
both demand and supply-side factors. Demand for electricity is ultimately founded upon its instrumental use-
value, that is, its capacity - mediated, and to a degree determined by, the technologies available (in this case 
electrical) - to satisfy a range of human needs and wants. The supply-side has also been contingent upon the 
state of technological development (eg. of generating plant and transmission system), in addition to other cost 
factors (eg. capital investment, resource/fuel availability and other production costs), and the institutional 
exigencies (eg. required rate of return) and biases (eg. for hydr<rpower) of both electricity production and 
alternative energy forms. These elements are intertwined and do in fact mutually create each other. Mediating, 
and indeed manifesting, this process is the market mechanism (but also other allocatory and regulatory 
mechanisms/interventions). 
2 For full data sets see Appendix H. 
3 Keith S. Turner (Corporate Development Manager, Electricity Corporation of New Zealand), 1989, Electricity 
Corporation evidence, Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 5. 
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Figure 11.1: National Generating System - Total Installed Capacity (MW) 
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This expansion in supply was accompanied by a steady decline in the real retail price of 
electricity, from 18.03 cents per unit:4 in 1942 to 8.85 cents in 1990.5 The number of electricity 
consumers rose concurrently by a factor of more than three, from 455,000 in 1942 to 1,547,600 
in 1990. When this statistic is compared with the substantially higher rate of increase in GWh 
generated it points to at least two associated trends; firstly, a notable increase in per capita use of 
electricity, and secondly, the dramatic growth of commercial and industrial usage of electricity.6 
4 Unit = 1 kilowatt hour (KWh) 
5 Real retail prices calculated on the following basis: Nominal retail prices of electricity are derived from revenue 
from sales divided by units sold Using the Consumer Prices Index of base December 1989 = 1000, nominal 
prices are converted to real prices in March 1990 terms. J. Martin, (ed.), 1991, People, Politics and Power 
Stations: Electric Power Generation in New Zealand 1880-1990 Bridget Williams Books and ECNZ, 
Wellington, p. 294. 
6 This includes the emergence of some very large-scale electricity users. For example the Tiwai Point 
Aluminium Smelter consumes more than 3900 GWh of electricity annually - more than the entire annual 
output of the generating network prior to 1954 (on the basis of a 15,000 KWh required to produce a tonne of 
aluminium and an annual output of 260,000 tonnes). N. Peat, 1994, Manapouri Saved: New Zealand's 
First Great Conservation Success Story Longacre Press, Dunedin, p. 20. 
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By 1989 industry used 41.45 percent of electricity consumed, commercial use was 19.66 percent 
and domestic 35.62 percent. 
On a comparative scale, New Zealand was one of the most energy intensive economies in 
the world (fifth highest energy use per unit of GDP in the OEeD in 19887). Further, over recent 
decades the tendency in developed countries had been for energy intensity to decrease. 
However, contrary to this trend New Zealand increased its energy dependence (which in 
aggregate rose 32 percent between 1970 and 1988). It is within that broader context of 
increasing energy intensity and aggregate use that electricity production and consumption rose.8 
Indeed the rate of growth of the electricity sector surpassed the underlying trend with electricity 
displacing the traditional reliance upon solid fuels and imported oils as sources of energy. The 
following table illustrates this pattern: 
Table 11.1: Consumer Energy Use by Fuel Type 1954 - 1991 (Petajoules)9 
Year Solid Oil Gas Electricity Total 
1954 55 59 2 16 132 
1964 48 90 2 30 170 
1974 41 151 7 58 257 
1984 40 140 48 83 311 
1991 69 160 41 102 372 
Another point of interest when considering the strategic value of the electricity system is 
that independent of the wider instrumental value of electricity to society (in functional terms), the 
electricity industry was itself a very significant locus of capital accumulation.1o For example, in 
1988 in the midst of the WRMF dispute the electricity industry had an annual turnover of $3 
billion - equivalent to 3.2 percent of GDP.ll 
In summary, the historical record reveals electricity to have been of increasingly 
fundamental importance in the functioning of the New Zealand economy and society. This 
strategic function was framed in terms of the 'public', 'strategic' or 'national' interest within the 
dispute. My attention now turns to the issues of ownership and control, and to the attendant 
incentive structures which prevailed during the period of the dispute. 
11.1.(ii) Ownership and Control of Electricity Generation 
As noted at the beginning of this section, the purpose of the present inquiry is to identify the 
structural features which affected the electricity generation sector's capacity to mobilise and 
influence in pursuit of its interests, and which also served to define those substantive interests. 
Thus far I have argued that historically the production of electricity has been a fundamental infra-
7 J. Sheerin, 1993, Measuring Up Department of Statistics, Wellington, Table 2.1, p. 42. 
8 I do not want to convey the idea that this was some ineluctable process. It was, in fact, the result of the 
policies of successive New Zealand governments who treated energy as a "free good". A. Kellow, 1996, 
Transforming Power,' The Politics of Electricity Planning Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 81. 
9 Based on: Department of Statistics, 1998, New Zealand Official Yearbook 1998 GPI Publications, Wellington, 
Table 20.2, p. 432. 
10 In 1984 the State's electricity assets were valued on a current cost basis at $12 billion. Treasury, 1984, "State-
Owned Enterprises Policy Committee Paper" Wellington, p. 275. 
11 Keith S. Turner (Corporate Development Manager, Electricity Corporation of New Zealand), 1989, Electricity 
Corporation evidence, Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 5. Also: In the same year energy as a whole, including 
transport fuels, made a net contribution of 5.2 percent to GDP. 
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structural role which had become increasingly significant in the decades preceding the dispute. 
This constant function (production) must be seen as a potential source of influence. However 
this observation has only general explanatory value without a concomitant analysis of the 
institutional configuration (viz. ownership, organisational fonn and structural location) and 
associated modes of production within the electricity generation sector. 
Historically, the production and transmission of electricity had been almost wholly the 
preserve of a state monopoly generator in one fonn or another. 12 During the primary timeframe 
covered here (1977-92) the wider configuration of the state sector changed radically due to a 
systematic program of governmental refonn. The energy sector was transfonned in this process, 
and although responsibility for the generation and transfer of electricity remained in the hands of 
a state owned monopoly, the institutional structures and exigencies were greatly altered. 
Since the 1950s two tendencies prevailed in the management of energy resources; first, an 
increase in the integration of functions at the central government level, and secondly, a steady 
increase in the role of the state in the provision of energy. These trends peaked in the half-decade 
following the assimilation of the Electricity Department into the Ministry of Energy in 1978 - the 
period when the initial minimum flow levels were being set for the Whanganui River (1978-
1983).13 The Ministry was established in order to provide a coordinated approach to energy 
development at a time of considerable uncertainty in world energy markets (following the 1973 
oil crisis). 14 The emphasis was upon ensuring supply through integrated energy planning and 
by increasing the level of local (NZ) control through the development of indigenous energy 
resources and tighter regulation of use. This integration and expansion of functions led to an 
even greater consolidation of power and control at the centre. This is continned by Duncan and 
Bollard who write: "the Electricity Division was decentralised in an operational sense but highly 
centralised in management, partly because of the influence of the Minister, control agencies and 
the union",1 5 A corporatist political framework prevailed in which the Ministry of Energy, 
Ministry of Works and Development, and the Department of Trade and Industry wielded 
considerable institutional power in the pursuit of their developmental mandates. 
By late 1984 that ascendancy was under threat. The Fourth Labour Government's 
accession to office had signalled the beginning of an expansive structural adjustment program 
across all sectors of state activity and influence. The principles and historical mechanics of that 
nea-liberal program are well documented,16 but in essence, driven by a cadre of powerful and 
12 At the time of the Planning Tribunal hearing, Electricorp produced 96 percent of all New Zealand's electricity, 
with the remainder generated by small-scale local-body owned power stations. Electricity Corporation of New 
Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whanganrli Regional Council October 1990, Judge Sheppard, W70/9O, p. 135. 
13 Report of the Ministry of Energy for the year ended31 March 1985, Appendices to the Journals of the House 
of Representatives 0.6 A, p. 9. 
14 Ibid., p. 11. 
15 I. Duncan, and I. Bollard, 1992, Corporatization and Privatization: Lessons From New Zealand Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, p. 90. 
16 The literature is extensive. A number of volumes provide scholarly insight into this period Cf: A. Bollard, 
and R. Buckle, (008), 1987. Economic Liberalisation in New Zealand Allen and Unwin. Wellington; 1. 
Boston. and M. Holland. (eds). 1987. The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand 
(first edition) Oxford University Press. Auckland; B. Easton. (00.). 1989. The Making of Rogernomics 
Auckland University Press. Auckland; M. Holland, and J. Boston. (eds). 1990, The Fourth Labour 
Government (second edition) Oxford University Press, Auckland; J. Boston. J. Martin, J. Pallot. and P. 
Walsh. (eds). 1991, Reshaping the State: New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution Oxford University Press. 
Auckland; B. Roper. andC. Rudd, (eds). 1993. State and Economy in New Zealand Oxford University Press. 
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highly motivated politicians and technocrats from both the public and private sectors, the agenda 
pursued: 
a. a commitment to the market in preference to the state as a means for allocating resources; 
b. emphasis on individual and corporate freedom as a key to economic progress and social well-being; and 
c. a reduced role for the state in the economy.I7 
The leviathan development agencies subsequently came under a sustained and penetrating critique 
from reformers. A number of strands of criticism emerged. The principal challenges were 
founded upon efficiency arguments - in short, the existing institutional framework was seen to 
provide a poor return on public investment. One crude illustration (but relevant here) was the 
case of the Electricity Division which despite its monopoly position had recorded a 4 percent 
return on assets before tax and interest in comparison to a contemporaneous 11 percent overall 
return in the private sector. Naturally, given the scale of such investments, these arguments 
carried substantial weight. The reasons proffered by Treasury for such institutional failure were; 
"a lack of clear objectives, an operating environment marked by special assistance, lack of 
competition, and an absence of incentives for managerial performance",18 For the electricity 
sector in particular, the existing structures "over many years, had led to an oversupply of 
electrical generating capacity, non-commercial pricing, a high degree of cross-subsidising in 
favour of residential customers, and a lack of focus upon cost-containment and efficiency" .19 
Running parallel to the efficiency arguments were long-standing environmental 
grievances that cut across the whole spectrum of government management20 In the energy 
sector those concerns were principally associated with the adverse effects of the construction and 
operation of major projects (such as the TPD). In addition to the concentration and excessive 
discretionary exercise of power by the development agencies, many problems were perceived to 
have arisen out of the multiple and potentially conflicting mandates which lay with specific 
organisations.21 As noted above, the rationale for the consolidation of functions was to facilitate 
integrated decision~making - yet as a result, significant trade-off's between developmental and 
Auckland; A. Sharp, (00),1994, Leap into the Dark: The Changing Role of the State in New Zealand since 
1984 Auckland University Press, Auckland; J. Kelsey, 1995, The New Zealand Experiment: A World Model 
for Structural Adjustment? Auckland University Press, Auckland. 
17 R. Mascarenhas, 1991, "State-Owned Enterprises" in: J. Boston, J. Martin, J. Pallot, and P. Walsh, (eds), 
1991, Reshaping the State: New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution Oxford University Press, Auckland Jane 
Kelsey, in her analysis of the reforms, lists the following key principles: market and trade liberalisation, the 
contraction of the role of the State, fiscal restraint, 'firm' monetary policy, and de-regulation of the labour 
market. 
18 Treasury, 1984, "State-Owned Enterprises Policy Committee Paper" Wellington, p. 279. Cited in R. 
Mascarenhas, 1991, "State-Owned Enterprises" p. 30. 
19 B. Spicer, et aI., 1991, The Power to Manage: Restructuring the New Zealand Electricity Department as a 
State Owned Enterprise-The Electricorp Experience Oxford University Press, Auckland, pp. 17-18. This 
over-capacity of generating plant was estimated in 1989 to have had a lost opportunity cost to the nation of 
approximately $3 billion. Roger Blakeley (Secretary for the Environment), 1989, Evidence on behalf of the 
Ministry for the Environment, Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 19. 
20 It should be emphasised that these environmental imperatives, although bolstering the argument for 
institutional change, did not arise out of the neo-Iiberal agenda. Rather, it was a case of expediency -
congruent means (institutional reform) but different ends. 
21 With regard to electricity development the most glaring example of multiple objectives was the Ministry of 
Works and Development. This agency was not only involved in project design and construction (as the 
national construction agency) but also functioned as a national land and water resources policy and regulatory 
agency - through its Town and Country Planning and Water and Soil Divisions respectively. P. Ali Memon, 
1993, Keeping New Zealand Green: Recent Environmental Reforms Otago University Press, Dunedin, p. 
35. 
Chapter Eleven: The Political-Economy of Electricity Generation 221 
environmental objectives transpired in an opaque and publicly unaccountable way. Moreover, 
the substantive outcomes were heavily weighted in favour of development. 
The solution, as summarised by Kelsey: 
[W]as to decouple political and economic control. Treasury's fonnula involved separating commercial state 
operations from non-commercial. Where possible, the fonner should be converted into state-owned trading 
enterprises (SOEs) functioning as private sector businesses in conditions of competitive neutrality. 
Pennanent departmental heads would be replaced by entrepreneurial boards of directors and autonomous chief 
executives with incentives to perform. Profit should be the SOEs overriding goal. Spending on non-
commercial activities, such as subsidised utility and social services, could be made transparent through 
explicit contracts with SOEs. ... When no compelling reason for state ownership existed SOEs could be 
privatised, offering "one way the fiscal deficit can be financed in the short tenn".22 Any remaining 
regulatory and policy functions should be allocated to separate agencies or to streamlined, residual 
government ministries with managerial autonomy, perfonnance targets and labour practices along private 
sector lines.23 
This decoupling involved transition through three phases; (i) commercialisation of all 
government activities, and corporatisation of trading activities via changes to the administrative 
environment, (ii) deregulation through the removal of statutory monopoly controls and 
establishment of appropriate market frameworks, and (iii) privatisation through the contracting 
out to of government services to private providers, and the sale of public assets. 
In light of this broader context of reform, the transformation of the electricity sector was 
inevitable. With the passing of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 the institutional 
framework of generation was completely transformed. From 1 April 1987, the state's electricity 
generation and transmission activities became the responsibility of the Electricity Corporation of 
New Zealand limited (hereafter 'Electricorp' or 'the Corporation'). 
Driving Electricorp was the paramount objective established by S. 4(1) - to operate as a 
successful business (my emphasis). Towards this purpose they were to be: 
(a) As profitable and efficient as comparable businesses that are not owned by the Crown; 
and 
(b) A good employer; and 
(c) An organisation that exhibits a sense of social responsibility by having regard to the 
interests of the community in which it operates and by endeavouring to encourage these 
when able to do so (this was known as the 'good corporate citizen' clause). 
It is not possible to overstate the significance of this dynamic for electricity production. Where 
previously the raison d'etre had been the strategic guarantee of supply it was now to run a 
power company as profitably as possible. Accordingly, Electricorp was incorporated as a limited 
liability company.24 The framework for ownership and control, if not identical to, was 
homologous with the private enterprise model. The substantive differences where they existed 
lay in who owned the Corporation and, to a lesser extent, in certain mechanisms for setting 
objectives and ensuring accountability. Shares and equity bonds in the Corporation were to be 
held on behalf of the Crown by the Minister of Finance and the responsible Minister (initially in 
the Minister of Energy but later transferred to the Minister of State Owned Enterprises).25 
Shareholder control over the Corporation was to be facilitated through the Crown's exclusive 
22 Treasury, 1984, Economic Management Government Printer, Wellington, pp. 293-4. 
23 J. Kelsey, (1995), The New Zealand Experiment pp. 115-6. 
24 Under S. 13 of the Companies Act 1955 
25 UnderS.lO of the SOE Act 1986. Shares and equity bonds were to be split equally between the two Ministers. 
Also, shares and equities could not be sold or transferred other than to a Minister of the Crown (S. 11). 
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right to appoint directors, to determine an appropriate dividend payment,26 and to approve the 
annual statement of corporate intent. Transparency and accountability were to be realised through 
the provision to the share-holding ministers and parliament of the statement of corporate intent,27 
annual report, audited financial accounts, and also through ad hoc information solicited by the 
ministers.28 In practice these controls were limited, as the approach was determinedly hands-
off. Strategic oversight of the organisation and its operations was the responsibility of a board of 
directors. Assets were now owned by the SOEs themselves (ie. generation and transmission 
system and associated land and infrastructure, and significant in the context of this study; existing 
rights and obligations), purchased at a price determined through negotiation ($6.3 billion in 
198729). These factors (putatively) enabled the "SOEs to function with clarity of purpose, 
potentially eliminated the practice of cross subsidisation of services, and served to insulate 
management from political control".3o An additional point here is that under this new framework 
social and environmental objectives could be effected through the government contracting the 
SOE to provide designated services at a negotiated market price. 
From its formation (that is for the duration of this study) the Corporation, headed by its 
Chief Executive Dr Roderick Deane3 1, was organised on the basis of four operational divisions -
Production, National Grid32, PowerDesignBuHd and Marketing. The divisions (already 
considerably 'leaner' than the constituent arms of the NZED) were to function as business units 
with strategic accountability (monitoring and control) firmly focused upon financial 
performance.33 
As noted above, fused with the corporatisation program (changes in the configuration of 
production) was the contemporaneous process of market deregulation (modification of the 
framework for commodity exchange). In order to extract economic efficiencies in electricity 
production and supply, and indeed in the energy sector in toto, it was considered necessary to 
~xpose the industry to market imperatives. Spicer et aI., in their sympathetic study of 
Electricorp's genesis, identify three broad areas of enhanced market allocation; input markets, 
competition in generation, and output markets. These categories are adopted here. 
(i) Input Markets. The loosening of regulatory controls and the extrication of the Corporation 
from entrenched statutory relationships freed up competition for input/cost factors within the 
26 Ibid, S.13. 
27 This annual statement specifies the Corporation's business plan for three ye;rrs ahead, and should include: 
objectives, scope of activities, ratio of shareholder's funds to total assets, accounting policies, performance 
targets, likely Crown revenue (dividends, and taxation on assets and revenue), the type of information to be 
submitted to the Ministers, compensation sought by the board from the Crown, and the value of the Crown's 
investment. SOE Act 1986 S. 14. 
28 Ibid. S·s. 15-18. 
29 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand, June 3D, 1988. "Statement of Corporate Intent" Wellington. Geoffrey 
Bertram argues elsewhere that this sum was surprisingly low given the levels of 'resource rents' that couId be 
extracted from monopoly control of the vast-hydro network, and the extant barriers to entry for competing 
generators. 1988, "Rents in the New Zealand Energy Sector" In, Royal Commission on Social Policy, 1988, 
Towards a Fair and Just Society Vol. NGovemment Printer, Wellington, p. 323. 
30 J. Kelsey, (1995), The New Zealand Experiment pp. 118. 
31 Former! y Deputy Govenor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and State Services Commissioner. 
32 Later TransPower - a wholly owned subsidiary of Electricorp solely concerned with the management of the 
national transmission system. 
331. Duncan, and 1. Bollard, 1992. Corporatization and Privatization p. 89. 
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production process. This was most evident in markets for capital (debt)34, fuel (supply)35, 
labour, managers, maintenance services and capital works36. 
(ii) Competition in Generation. Two institutional measures are significant here: First, the 
removal of Electricorp's statutory monopoly position allowed competing generators to sell 
electricity either directly to the Corporation itself or to other customers; And secondly, the 
guarantee of access to the national transmission system for alternative generators, on a non-
discriminatory basis.37 Given the very limited generation capacity outside Electricorp's 
network the substantive threat was mainly that of entry by new generators. Because of this 
the Corporation pursued a dual strategy, seeking to minimise the costs of generation,38 and 
to raise barriers to entry through pricing. But, as evidenced in Bertram's analysis of rent 
taking in the electricity sector, Electricorp had plenty of room to dissuade competition whilst 
simultaneously reaping high returns, at least in the short-tenn.39 In this deregulated 
framework it is necessary to recognise Electricorp's dominance within the market in 
generation, and its consequent ability to control that framework and to exploit its position, 
thereby extracting extraordinary profits.40 
(iii) Output markets. Electricorp's perfonnance in the wholesale electricity market - its primary 
output market - was grounded in its dominance in the generation market as discussed. 
However, an additional constraint upon Electricorp's perfonnance as a wholesaler of 
electricity was competition from substitute energy fonns. The Corporation estimated its 
share of the non-transport energy market at around 45 percent, with approximately 70 
percent of the final use market potentially contestable by alternative fuels (although 
considering the historical tendency detailed in Table 11.1, with electricity constantly 
increasing its share of the consumer energy market, the threat of substitutes should probably 
be seen as potentially constraining further expansion rather than as undermining electricity's 
existing market share).41 Also of consequence here, was that many large electricity 
consumers (again take for example Tiwai Point) were competing in global commodity 
markets and were potentially mobile. As with the threat of entry, the solution focussed 
upon lowering the average price of electricity in real tenns, but it also involved vigorous 
34 On its establishment Electricorp had to purchase its assets from the Crown. The initial sum of $3 billion 
owed to the Crown was to be converted to private debt within three years. This was achieved by accessing the 
international debt market and by the effective creation of a New Zealand corpomte debt market (given the 
unprecedented sums involved). 
35 The Corporation was not bound by existing supply agreements with other Crown entities (e.g for coal and 
gas). 
36 B. Spicer, et aI., 1991, The Power to Manage pp. 67-76. 
371. Duncan, and 1. Bollard, 1992, Corporatization and Privatization p. 84. 
38 The drive to optimise efficiencies and minimise the costs of existing operations penetmted all aspects of the 
organisation's activities. Staff numbers were halved from 6000 to just over 3000 between 1987 and 1992. 
Another significant measure was the rationalisation of assets to reduce surplus capacity (e.g. mothballing 
marginal high cost stations such as the oil-fired Marsden A plant). 1. Duncan, and 1. Bollard, 1992, 
Corporatization and Privatization p. 47; B. Spicer, et aI., 1991, The Power to Manage p. 78. 
39 O. Bertmm. 1988, "Rents in the New Zealand Energy Sector" In, Royal Commission on Social Policy, 1988, 
Towards a Fair and Just Society Vol. N Government Printer, Wellington, pp. 293-325. "Rents" notes 
Bertmm "arise first from the fact that not all economic resources are of equal productive capacity, and second 
from the fact that many real-world market structures are characterised by 'some degree of monopoly' (market 
power). Either or both of these two elements may be encountered in any specific situation" p. 296. 
40 That is subject to the constraining power of the Commerce Act that was to regulate anti-competitive 
behaviour. I. Duncan, and I. Bollard, 1992. Corporatization and Privatization p. 4 
41 B. Spicer. et al.. 1991, The Power to Manage p. 86. 
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marketing of electricity as a 'clean' energy form, and participation in ancillary markets such 
as appliance wholesaling and retail markets as part of Electricorp' s wider strategy to increase 
market share. Finally, Electricorp also marketed the services of its contracting arms -
PowerDesignBuild and Electricorp Marketing Electricity Contracting - both nationally and 
internationally.42 
To summarise, the overriding imperative driving Electricorp was that conspicuously set 
out in S. 4 (1) of the SOE Act: "to operate as a successful business". The production and 
transmission of electricity was organised on this basis - a monolithic corporate enterprise seeking 
to maximise its shareholder's long-term interests (defined solely in financial terms). The 
Corporation's form, interests, and modus operandi were inevitably structured and over time 
transformed by the framework in which it operated - the market. Market disciplines provided 
incentives to reduce costs (narrowly defined), to innovate and pursue various market strategies. 
Also, the government's privatisation agenda further motivated the Corporation's senior managers 
to rationalise and to seek to extract optimal efficiencies from the business - and in so doing 
ensure the maximum market price (net present value) for the asset in the event of a sale.43 But 
the converse also applied, with the market itself being effectively structured and transformed by 
Electricorp's participation. The removal of statutory monopoly controls did not change the 
fundamental reality that Electricorp retained a natural monopoly position in electricity generation 
and transmission. Its extant organisational resources - a vast integrated network with associated 
economies, substantial excess capacity, and sunk costs44 - bestowed upon the Corporation an 
incomparable competitive advantage, enabling it to dominate the production and exchange of 
electricity. 
Both the Electricity Division and Electricorp were powerful actors. Their capacity to 
influence derived principally (although not exclusively) from their respective performance of the 
strategic function of production. Two elements together account for this systemic source of 
influence: First the function itself, which has been identified as increasingly fundamental in the 
operation of technologically advanced capitalist society - this is the underlying level of social.use 
value; And second, there is the issue of monopoly control, with both organisations dominating 
the production function. In addition to this systemic function each organisation was characterised 
by a specific set of structural features (both common and disparate) such as interests/incentive 
structures, organisational forms and institutional settings. The most important point being that 
there was a shift from a state monopoly generator driven by the exigencies of guaranteed supply, 
to a state owned but largely autonomous business monopoly that was almost wholly motivated 
by profitable accumulation. Once again, these are matters that will be explicitly dealt within 
Chapter Thirteen. 
l1.1.(iii) The Management of the Generation Network 
Two points need to be made prior to the following discussion. The first is that to avoid having to 
provide technical datafor the duration of the case study I use 1989 as a base year, that is unless I 
42 Ibid., pp. 86-92. 
43 Rod Deane openly expressed his support for the eventual privatisation of the Corporation. cr. 1989, 
"Reflections on Privatisation" Paper presented to IBM Utilities Industry Executive Conference, Bangkok, 
September 20-22. 
44 I. Duncan. and I. Bollard, 1992. Corporatizatioll and Privatizatioll p. 47 
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state otherwise. This was the year in which the Planning Tribunal hearing was held, and in 
procedural tenns was the crux period of the conflict The other point is that because I have not 
yet described the historical process of conflict I will not, on the whole, refer to anyone flow 
regime, and will instead treat the effects of the diversion in tendential terms (ie.. increased 
minimum flow requirements lead to reduced abstraction leads to decreased electricity generation). 
In 1989 Electricorp's generation system had a total operating capacity of 6815 MW.45 
This capacity existed in the fonn of 29 hydro-electric power stations, two goo-thermal stations, 
and seven thermal stations. All of the geo-thennal and thennal (hereafter 'thermal') stations were 
located in the North Island, with South Island generation being solely hydro-electric. Moreover, 
of the 4287 MW of hydro-electric capacity available, approximately two-thirds (2702 MW, and 
soon to be more with the commissioning of Clyde) were in the South Island, and of the 
remaining third, 86 percent lay in the Tongariro-Waikato system. Lastly, the North and South 
Islands were interconnected by a high-voltage direct-current (HVDC) link across Cook Strait and 
that enabled the system to be operated as a fully integrated national power system. 
Table 11.2. Production and Consumption of Electricity46 
Production 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Fossil fuels GWh 6189 5192 5424 5052 6374 
Geothermal GWh 1109 1174 1183 1237 1805 
Total thermal GWh 7298 6366 6fIJ7 6289 8179 
Hydro GWh 18659 20582 20891 21900 20823 
Total Generated GWh 25957 26948 27498 28189 29002 
Purchased GWh 22 21 20 20 14 
Total available GWh 25g"J9 26969 27518 28209 29016 
Consumption 
Sales of electricity GWh 24241 25187 25772 26436 27374 
Transmission losses and internal use GWh 1738 1782 1746 1m 1642 
Total (!()ffiumed GWh 25g"J9 26969 27518 28209 29016 
The management of this integrated generation network was undertaken on the basis of a 
series of key variables and a multitude of lesser, more contingent, factors. On the basis of 
Electricorp's evidence Judge Sheppard listed (but not in this order)47: 
• Forecasts of energy demand. 
• The availability of generating plant (both hydro and thennal), with allowances for planned 
outages for maintenance, and forced outages as a result of breakdowns. 
• The cost of thermal generation. 
• Water inflows into catchments. 
• Storage capabilities of both water and fuel. 
• Environmental requirements - such as minimum and compensation flows 
In the following discussion I will, in tum, explain each of these parameters/criteria in the context 
of the national framework. The difficulty here is that they are all mutually interdependent, so one 
mechanism does not necessarily precede another. 
45 I have not included the 432MW Clyde hdro-electric station that was still under construction during this period. 
46 Based on: Electricity Corporation of New Zealand. 31 March 1990, Annual Report p. 31. 
47 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70190, pp. 135-8. Following; M. Turner (Production Control Manager. Electricity Corporation 
of New ZealaOO), 1989, Electricity Corporation evidence, Planning TribWJ.a1 hearing, p. 9. 
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Demand for electricity will vary significantly in response to many factors. Four broad 
tendencies are conspicuous here. First, there are marked diurnal fluctuations and spikes of peak 
demand. Such short term variations can on the whole be planned for, however, they do require 
flexibility in the system. In particular the ability to bring certain stations on-line quickly, and to 
vary marginal output almost instantaneously thereby helping to maintain system frequency. The 
second tendency is the seasonal variation, with higher demand in the colder months. As will 
become more apparent later, this is a crucial factor in managing inflows, storage and fuel use. 
Thirdly, there is the problem of predicting medium to .long term changes in demand - this is the 
big factor in planning future construction (or, for that matter, methods for avoiding the 
construction of plant, such as efficiency measures and energy conservation). As is apparent from 
both Figure 11.2 earlier in the chapter, and Table 11.2. above, there has been a historical 
tendency for demand to steadily increase over time. Electricorp argued at the Planning Tribunal 
hearing that this trend would continue in the near future - a prediction that at least in the 
following half decade or so has been proven correct. One must, however, remain cognisant of 
the ability of Electricorp to manufacture this load growth, through pricing structures, marketing 
strategies, etc.48 And fourth, there is the crucial factor that two-thirds of electricity demand was 
located in the North Island. A fact that underpinned the plans for the doubling of the HVDC link 
to 1250 MW in 1991. 
The availability of generation plant is self explanatory. The only point that needs to be 
made about this, is that it also underpins the necessity for, and size of, surplus capacity in the 
system. Electricorp argued that there was enough surplus capacity in the system - given the 432 
MW station at Clyde coming on-line, the cable expansion, and efficiency gains throughout the 
system. But it also argued forcefully, and it was accepted by the Tribunal, that there was no 
hydro-electric surplus. The reasons for this will become evident as discussion progresses.49 
The cost of thermal generation was one of the most critical factors driving the system. As 
has been discussed previously, and is evident from the statistics in Table 11.2, hydro-production 
has been the historically dominant source of electricity in the New Zealand system. By the time 
of the WRMF conflict two-thirds of installed capacity was in hydro plant, and most significantly, 
these stations contributed over three quarters of annual production. The reasons for this are 
complex (eg. natural resource endowments, technical factors, institutional bias and inertia, and 
foreign exchange limitations) but of greatest importance were the principles of valuation that 
drove decision-making about both current operations and future investment. Put simply, the 
choice of energy supply was not made on the basis of capital investment, such costs were to be 
treated as' sunk' (because it was their revenue generating ability that determined the valuation of 
the Corporation's assets). The conventions of economic analysis meant that decisions were 
instead based on the current costs of production. This rule instantly privileged hydro over 
thermal production, for while hydro schemes had very high capital costs, they were in general 
very cheap to operate (say for example, O • .5c/kWh rather than .5c/kWh), while the converse 
applied to fossil-fuel plant, which had low capital costs and high running costs (principally fuel 
48 M. Heffernan (National Wholesale Manager. Electricity Corporation of New Zealand). 1989. Electricity 
Corporation evidence, Planning Tribunal hearing. p. 14. 
49 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand LJd v Manawatu· Whanganui Regional Council October 1990. Judge 
Sheppard. W70/90. p. 148. 
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costs, and were also expensive to maintain).50 Electricorp's approach, like that of the NZED 
before it, was to rank stations on the basis of operating cost. Priority being given to the cheaper 
hydro-stations (themselves ranked on the basis of their differential costs at anyone time) which 
thus provided the base-load capacity. These were followed in tum by the geo-thennal and fossil 
fuel burning stations, with the thennal stations providing 'firming' capacity at the margin. This 
bias was further exacerbated by Electricorp's pricing methodology: 
The cost of energy from the power station which provides the last MW in meeting the demand is said to be 
the marginal cost whether one is referring to the value of water used or the incremental cost of fuel. This 
cost of energy at the margin also provides the basis for the dynamic price signalled to the supply 
authorities.51 
With the exception of periods of abnonnally low demand, or of high inflows and storage levels, 
the last increment of generation would in all likelihood come from thennal generation. As a 
result, the value of water in the system was generally pegged to the value of the fuel burned in the 
marginal station, for example, coal at Huntly. 
The most important consequence of this overall approach was the ability of Electricorp to 
extract sizeable economic rents from its assets. Bertram explains the concept of a rent: 
A rent exists, then, whenever the consumer of a commodity is obliged to pay more than the cost of 
supplying that commodity from the cheapest existing source. In free markets, the price is eltpected to settle 
at rougbly the cost of production from the marginal, not the cheapest, source of supply. Therefore in any 
free-market situation there will be rents gained by the owners of relatively low cost ('intra-marginal') 
supplies.52 
Bertram also provides some indication of the orders of magnitude involved, estimating that of the 
$670 million operating surplus for 1983/4 (of the NZED rather than Electricorp, but the principle 
was the same), $655 million was in the fonn of Salter rents (see previous footnote). He goes on 
in his subsequent analysis to show how a corporatised monopoly such as Electricorp charged 
with the primary goal of profit maximisation, would be able to raise prices towards the LRMC of 
entry, thereby extracting even greater rents.53 
50 Aynsley Kellow has highlighted the perverse outcomes that arise as a result of focussing solely upon cost of 
production in energy planning, and by having little regard to risk assessment. He observes that when the vast 
cost of construction is taken into account in the case of the Clyde Dam (approlt. $1500 million in 1991 
dollars, or $130 million a year at a discount rate of 1000rcent) then: "In 1991 dollars the cost of energy from 
the Qyde Dam - finally commissioned in 1992 - was 11.3 c/KWh, compared with around 5c for combined 
cycle gas stations [higbly efficient dual jet combustion-conventional steam turbines]". A. Kellow, 1996, 
Transfonning Power: The Politics of Electricity Planning Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 80-1. 
51 M. Turner (Production Control Manager, Electricity Corporation of New Zealanl), 1989, Electricity 
Corporation evidence, Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 18. The major exception to this rule is the long term 
contract which eltisted with Comalco for the supply of electricity to the Bluff aluminium smelter. Comalco 
were able to purchase electricity at "a price less than half of the wholesale price to other bulk-electricity 
buyers". G. Bertram, 1988, "Rents in the New Zealand Energy Sector" p. 305. . 
52 Bertram lists a number of types of economic rents which are pertinent to Electricorp's situation. II summarise 
here: 
• Differential rents Including control of especially productive or well-located natural resources ('Ricardian' 
rents), and as a participant in a capital-intensive industry where the costs of entry are high ('Salter' rents). 
• Monopoly rents In Electricorp's case these accrued not because of regulation but because of the Corporation's 
deployment of market power. 
Ibid, pp. 293-5. The deregulated wholesale electricity market established in 1988 was eltpected to result in a 
market price just below the long-run marginal cost of entry to new participants, which at the time was the cost 
of building and operating a combined-cycle thermal station. 
53 Ibid, p. 302. In fact in 1989 Electricorp was pricing above the LRMC - its justification for this was that the 
sale and purchase agreement with the Crown forced the Corporation to adopt this pricing strategy. John 
Femyhough (Chairman of the Electricorp Board) in board meeting 15 March 1990. Recorded by Roger Blakely 
(Secretary for the Environment), Internal Memorandwn NPR 6/4/1, Ministry for the Environment, 
Wellington. 
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On this basis, any loss of hydro-electric energy would be directly reflected in increased 
use of thermal capacity. This rule underpinned the need to optimise the utilisation of hydro-plant 
throughout the system, which in effect meant the efficient management of water resources -
inflows and storage. While the integrated management of inflows and storage involved 
considerable uncertainty, in 1988-89 the utilisation of inflows was as high as 96 percent in the 
North Island and 90 percent for the South Island.54 One of the reasons why it was so high was 
that intake structures, such as those of the WD, were designed to take twice the long-term mean 
annual flows meaning that spillage could be kept to a minimum. Another critical factor in the 
management of the water resource .was that: 
[H]igh inflow periods are generally in late spring an:! summer in the South Island, and mid-winter in the 
North Island, if the usual pattern of rainfall occurs. While North Island inflows follow the demand pattern, 
the South Island inflows are out of step with demand and require the management of water storage to help 
maximise the utilisation of inflows, and minimise the amount of fuel burnt. 55 
However, the storage of water in the system was limited, being equal to only 13 percent of 
overall energy demand. Most notably here, storage in the North Island amounted to the 
equivalent of only 4 percent of North Island demand. Also, in order to allow for the risk of low 
inflows and lake levels, the system was managed on a 'dry year' basis - this placed real limits 
upon the utilisation of water resources, especially in the months preceding the winter demand 
period. 56 
The last of the main constraints or dynamics which determined the operation of the 
system were those of environmental obligations and other resource management restrictions. It is 
into this category that the Whanganui minimum flows fell. The NZED and Electricorp were both 
bound by a multiplicity of historical agreements, including limited rights to use water resources, 
minimum flow regimes, restrictions on lake levels (such as the hard won levels established for 
Lakes Manapouri and Te Anau, but also in the current context, the Lake Taupo levels), 
requirements to maintain fresh water fisheries, ad hoc releases for recreational users, riparian 
zones and sediment transfers. These limitations also affected the thermal plant, such as with the 
temperature limits governing the discharge of cooling waters from the Wairakei, Huntly and 
Meremere thermal stations into the Waikato River, and controls on air emissions, etc. Such 
obligations, some voluntary, some statutory, had substantial system-wide effects upon 
operational decision-making, and certainly placed real constraints upon the utilisation of the 
highly profitable intra-marginal capacity.57 
11.1.(iv) The Value of the Western Diversion to Electricorp 
The value of the WD waters derived not so much from the net volumes abstracted but rather from 
the high potential energy that they could generate. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the 
WD flows passed through not one, but nine, hydro-stations. This potential energy amounted to 
102 MWh per cumec day, a rating only surpassed in the North Island system by the waters of the 
Eastern Diversion which passed through the Rangipo station prior to their confluence with the 
54 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70lCXJ, p. 136. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid 
57 M. Turner (Production Control Manager, Electricity Corporation of New Zealan:!), 1989, Electricity 
Corporation evidence, Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 9, and passim. 
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WD flows. 58 Because of this, the Whanganui waters contributed a total of 10 percent of the 
North Island hydro generation, and approximately 3.5 percent of the total electrical energy 
generated in the national framework. 
Another key factor was that in the North Island the potential value of water tended to be 
highest during the period January to May (this is so as to enable storage in the South Island to 
reach the optimal levels prior to the winter). This had the effect of making the WD flows 
especially valuable due to the particular pattern of higher than average inflows (compared to other 
North Island catchments) into the Whanganui headwaters during this period.59 It should be 
remembered here that this was precisely the period when the Whanganui fishery was 
experiencing the maximum stress from high water temperatures, and it was also the period of 
greatest recreational use. 
An approximate dollar value can be placed on the diversion flows for working purposes. 
In the Planning Tribunal the Corporate Development Manager of Electricorp submitted that the 
WD had the following generation potential in the year 1988/9: 
Tokaanu generation 
Waikato generation 
Di version spill 
Total 
Energy (GWh) 
329 
436 
298 
1064 
Reestimated the value of the 1064 GWh to be $47.9 m per annum. When the spillage factor is 
subtracted the figure is 765 GWh of potential production, or an approximate value of $34.44 
m.60 What should be emphasised here, however, is that while this sum seemed substantial, any 
loss of water to the Corporation through an increased minimum flow regime (other than complete 
cessation) would represent a proportion of this figure. 
A number of specific functions performed by the WD flows and the TPD were said to be 
of strategic value - that is, for the guarantee of the quality and quantity of supply. In particular, 
it was emphasised that the Tokaanu station was, by virtue of discharging into Lake Taupo, able 
to function independently of the Waikato stations (for these would have to generate in unison for 
no substantive storage exists downstream of Taupo). Because of this flexibility Tokaanu was 
engineered to vary its production anywhere within its range from zero to 200 MW and to vary its 
output within a very short lead time - a matter of minutes rather than the hours or days it took 
other stations. This enabled it to (i) maintain frequency control, (ii) provide spinning reserve -
which enabled the system to cope with short term fluctuations in demand, and (iii) to contribute 
to peak loads. It was argued by Electricorp that because of the minimal storage (24 hours max.) 
available in Lake Rotoaira (above Tokaanu) any reduction in WD flows would severely constrain 
58 Ibid, p. 27. Consider that smaller hydro-stations typically rate an average of 15.7 MWh per cwnec day. K. 
Turner (Corporate Development Manager, Electricity Corporation of New Zealand), 1989, Electricity 
Corporation evidence, Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 33. 
59 M. Turner (Production Control Manager, Electricity Corporation of New Zealand), 1989, Electricity 
Corporation evidence, Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 23. 
60 This figure is based upon the 1983 minimum flow regime which represented an average loss of five percent of 
flows, or 376 cumec days. If as Eectricorp asserted, the value of water was $1.7 million per cumec per year 
then the pre minimum flow value would have been approximately $36 million in 1989 dollars. K. Turner 
(Corporate Development Manager, Electricity Corporation of New Zealand), 1989, Electricity Corporation 
evidence, Planning Tribunal hearing, Exhibit 11. See also Exhibit EP 17. 
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the pelformance of these critical system functions, and would decrease the efficiency - utilisation 
- of the Tokaanu station.61 
Having argued successfully that no hydro-electric surplus existed in the system, 
Electricorp then focused its arguments upon the question of how any loss of hydro-capacity 
would be replaced. The Corporation argued that any losses would, in the commercial context 
that it operated, have to be replaced by the next cheapest alternative, which was in its opinion that 
of thermal generation.62 This was a vigorously contested assertion resulting in a wide-ranging 
debate. I will summarise the opposition's response to Electricorp's arguments later. But 
essentially, Electricorp submitted firstly that the Cable expansion and the commissioning of 
Clyde would not deliver a hydro-surplus. They then proceeded to dismiss the possibility of 
replacing any losses incurred by reduced levels of abstraction in the WD: (i) By forgoing 
economically attractive load growth (interestingly, the Planning Tribunal, charged with focusing 
upon the 'public' rather than 'commercial' interest, did not rate this argument highly);63 (ii) And 
by energy conservation and management measures (ECM) - ie.. by using less electricity to get 
the same or better result. Electricorp argued that it was pursuing efficiency measures in all of its 
operating systems but that such savings would not result in a surplus of hydro-energy. It also 
argued that its long-term forecasts took into account energy conservation and management 
strategies in the wider economy (eg. as a constraint upon potential load growth) but that these 
were also insufficient to furnish a hydro surplus. Most revealingly, the Corporation argued that 
under its existing mandate to maximise revenue the benefits of ECM measures would have to 
outweigh their costs (note that assessment did not include environmental or social costs and 
benefits), and that at the time of the dispute the costs exceeded the benefits. The Corporation 
would be unwilling to incur any such costs unless compensated by the government as part of a 
policy initiative;64 (iii) Finally, by replacing the lost generation with alternative sources of 
power. Once again, they argued that on the basis of current technology and fuel costs, thermal 
generation would remain cheaper than the most viable alternatives such as co-generation, wind 
power or solar energy. The Corporation's overall approach was for transparency with regard to 
the costs and benefits of various generation strategies (once again, the 'costs' were narrowly 
61 Only one other station in the North Island (Maraetai II on the Waikato) was capable of perfonning these 
functions. Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 
1990, Judge Sheppard, W70/90, p. 13841. 
62 It is interesting here that Keith Turner submitted on behalf of Electricorp that the Corporation already had a 
considerable investment in thermal plant, and that these sunk costs should be taken into account in deciding 
how any losses in capacity should be replaced (although N. Maxwell, for Electricorp, contradicted this). 
However, as Bertram argued in his evidence for the Minister of Conservation, such sunk costs are normally 
regarded as irrelevant in cost-benefit analysis. The crucial issue here was, rather, the potential costs anj 
benefits from utilising plant in the future - precisely the recision rule which drove e1ectricorp's day to day 
assessment of operating costs. G. Bertram, 1989, Rebuttal evidence on behalf of the Minister of 
Conservation, Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 7. 
63 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Lid v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W7019IJ, p. 151. 
64 Ibid, pp. 151-6. For Electricorp such an equation would be confined to: the loss of revenue from reduced 
sales; the savings in fuel and other marginal costs of generation; the savings from deferred capital expenditure 
on new generating plant; the cost of the ECM scheme to Electricorp, the marginal cost to Electricorp of 
running the scheme; and compensation or revenue received by Electricorp for the ECM scheme. 
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defined). Indeed, the Corporation was averse to any moves on the part of government to provide 
selective incentives (eg. tax breaks or subsidies) for energy efficiency programs.65 
Another strand of Electricorp's argument centred upon the effects of reduced flows on the 
Waikato River. I summarise here: First, they contended that the extra water in the Waikato River 
was vital for cooling at geothermal and thermal power stations, and consequently, that any loss 
of water would decrease the outputs of Wairakei, Meremere, and Huntly at the very time when 
such generation would be in greatest demand; Secondly, it was argued that the Corporation was 
obligated under the Tongariro Offset Works Agreement to provide for flood control works in the 
Waikato catchment and to compensate for any losses incurred as a result of the TPD flows. The 
main effects of this were that this reduced the storage available in Lake Taupo (because lake 
levels had to be kept lower as a buffer for surges in inflows), which in tum restricted the 
flexibility in the system, and that the level of Lake Karapiro was able to be kept lower thus 
smoothing flows in the flood prone lower Waikato; Thirdly, high flows were required 
immediately downstream of Taupo to dilute the town's sewage discharge, and to enhance the 
tourism value of the Huka Falls; And fourthly, that the WD water was useful in maintaining the 
critical conservation values of the Whangamarino wetland - DoC rejected this, however, as a 
new system of weirs was to protect the area from low flow levels in the Waikato.66 
The Corporation emphasised that the positive environmental effects of the diversion flows 
went beyond the impacts on the Waikato. There was prima facie merit in their arguments. The 
hydro-resource was a renewable resource, which meant less consumption of fossil fuels. 67 
While the replacement of lost hydro-resources did not necessarily mean a concomitant increase in 
thermal generation, the Planning Tribunal accepted the argument that in the medium term, and on 
a least cost basis, there would be.68 The fossil fuel issue was a fiercely debated one because it 
touched upon the emergent and complex issues of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. 
The Planning Tribunal accepted the possibility that the replacement of lost hydro output could 
result in increased emissions, that these may contribute to the potential global problem, and that it 
would take this into account in its ultimate balancing of the evidence. But it did qualify this by 
noting that any consequent increase in emissions would be negligible relative to New Zealand's 
total emissions.69 Nevertheless the greenhouse issue was a strong symbolic argument for 
Electricorp. The other main environmental argument proffered by the Corporation was that the 
development of the Waikato River, and the full utilisation of this investment, saved other rivers 
from exploitation. However, the proposition that the loss of the WD water would have an 
"impact on water use in Waikaremoana, in the Waitaki valley and possibly the Manapouri 
catchment",70 seems alarmist given the strict controls that governed those water resources. 
65 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, p. 151. 
66 Ibid., 141-5. 
67 As was argued by Jeanette Fitzsimons (Lecturer, Department of Planning, Auckland University), 1989, 
Evidence on behalf of Electricorp, Planning Tribunal hearing. 
68 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawalu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, p. 159. 
69 Indeed, this was the first major planning appeal in New Zealand to touch upon these issues. Ibid, p. 157-60. 
70 K. Turner (Corporate Development Manager, Electricity Corporation of New Zealand), 1989, Electricity 
Corporation evidence, Planning Tribunal hearing, pp. 16-17. 
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But the main thrust of Electricorp's case was financial. As I noted above, the WD waters 
had a high potential energy rating and contributed to the profitable intra-marginal component of 
the system. While any loss of income from this source may have appeared to be small in 
comparison to the total revenues earned by the organisation, E1ectricorp asserted that such 
relativities were irrelevant, and the Planning Tribunal accepted that point,71 The Corporation 
couched a number of its arguments in terms of the 'public interest' - "the profitability of the 
Corporation is in the interests of all New Zealanders"72. It submitted that if the costs of 
electricity generation were to rise due to the loss of diversion flows then this would cause the 
price of electricity to rise, that any subsequent decline in profitability would result in a decreased 
dividend to the Crown which would in tum cause taxes to rise, and that decreased profitability 
would lead to drop in shareholder's equity. Of these three arguments only the last was held to 
have any merit In a system where the price of electricity was determined by the marginal costs 
of supply, costs could clearly not be passed on to consumers in that way -losses of water would 
instead act to reduce the rents that could be extracted. Nor would the dividends paid to the 
government necessarily decline. The more likely result would have been for the Corporation to 
retain fewer earnings. It is this effect that could lead to a reduction in shareholders' equity over 
time.73 The Planning Tribunal did not consider that these values would be significant.74 
E1ectricorp was trenchant in its advocacy of the public or national interest argument. Dr Turner 
also submitted on behalf of the Corporation that GDP would decrease by approximately 0.3 
percent if 200 GWh were lost. Another Electricorp witness deposed that restrictions on the 
Wbanganui water would affect the competitiveness of export industries.75 Once again the 
Planning Tribunal was not persuaded by these arguments.76 
Electricorp's arguments were clearly driven by revenue questions. The financial costs, 
and the loss of highly profitable intra-marginal capacity, formed the core of its case. Many of its 
arguments identified effects of water losses that would have less direct, but ultimately real, 
impacts upon its profitability. Other arguments were presented to fill out its case, and some of 
these were at best manipulative and at worst vexatious. The most prominent feature of· the 
Electricorp case was its sheer scope and complexity. As I shall discuss in Chapter Twelve this 
was a deliberate strategy to swamp all its opponents in a mire of technical detail. I have in this 
section only presented Electricorp's discussion of its interests, and much of its case related to 
questioning and rebutting the arguments of others. It is not possible to deal with all of those 
arguments in this study and I will, on the whole, restrict myself to an exposition of the positive 
71 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70190, p. 161. 
72 K. Turner (Corporate Development Manager, Electricity Corporation of New Zealand), 1989, Electricity 
Corporation evidence, Planning Tribunal hearing. p. 9. 
73 G. Bertram, 1989, Rebuttal evidence on behalf of the Minister of Conservation, Planning Tribunal hearing, 
pp.4-6. 
74 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard. W70190, p. 161. Nevertheless, with privatisation on the minds of senior Electricorp officials am 
politicians there would undoubtedly have been a strong desire to maximise the potential sale price. 
75 M. Heffernan (National Wholesale Manager, Electricity Corporation of New Zealand), 1989, Electricity 
Corporation evidence, Planning Tribunal hearing. p. 26. 
76 Electricity Corporation of New Zealalld Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard. W70190, p. 168. 
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arguments of the participants. Notwithstanding this, I will finish this section by briefly 
commenting upon the rebuttal arguments mounted against the Electricorp case. 
l1.1.(v) Dissenting Perspectives on the Provision of Electricity 
Opposition to EIectricorp did not target the dollar valuations of the WD water and the special 
functions it performed within the system. It was argued, however, that such valuations did not 
represent the full costs of electricity production, and they vigorously opposed the idea that the 
commercial interests were inviolate. They asserted that investment decisions made in an era 
when expansive use rights were expropriated by executive fiat (the Order in Council), and 
regulatory controls and consultative processes were ineffectual, were issues that should be 
reviewed and brought in line with contemporary frameworks. In other words, the socio-
ecological norms of the 1950s should not be concretised. Indeed it was held that the construction 
costs of the TPD were treated as sunk in economic analysis - they had already paid their way -
then the flows could be returned in full. These assumptions underpinned all of the opposition 
arguments. 
But as I noted above, the element of Electricorp' s case that was most fully contested was 
the issue of the replacement of lost hydro-energy. The environmentalists argued that this would 
not necessarily require thermal generation (certainly not in the medium to long term) if ECM 
procedures were actively pursued and alternative forms of generation were adopted.77 These 
arguments were backed up in principle by government policy.78 However those sentiments 
held little sway given the limited scope and substance of official energy conservation and 
management programs. 
Such hortatory exclamations and policy guidance held little sway in the juridical 
context.79 Certainly, many of the arguments presented by opponents to the diversion (or level 
of diversion) while relevant, were ultimately ultra vir~s. The Planning Tribunal was able to 
express its sympathy for ECM measures, but given the scope of their statutory powers they were 
subsequently limited in their ability to decide on those grounds.8o This was also the case with 
regard to the expression of historical Maori grievances and Treaty claims. The articulation of 
these arguments in the appeals process was more a process of raising agendas, and exerting 
political pressure, than of contributing to the substantive legal discourse. Notwithstanding this, 
the wider context of government policy is relevant to this analysis - and by this I mean on the one 
hand, official obeisance towards the principles of energy efficiency, and on the other hand a 
practical reluctance to induce energy users and producers to internalise their full costs. 
77 Cf. D. Haskell, (Energy management consultant), 1989, Evidence on behalf of the Minister of Conservation, 
Planning Tribunal hearing. Also M. Melhuish (Energy consUltant), 1989, Evidence on behalf of the 
Whanganui River Maori Trust Board, Planning Tribunal hearing. 
78 Cf. Roger Blakeley (Secretary for the Environment), 1989, Evidence on behalf of the Minister for the 
Environment, Planning Tribunal hearing, pp. 16-18. The Director of Energy Policy at the Ministry of 
Energy, Andre Melkop, took a different line than Blakely. Melkop argued that the social costs of reduced 
diversion flows outweighed the social benefits from in-stream effects (although he did coocede under cross 
examination that had not taken into account the Maori arguments). National Radio, 8 September 1989, 
Checkpoint Audiomonitor Trancript, Wellington. 
79 Despite the appearance of senior officials to outline government policy, the Planning Tribunal ultimately noted 
that such policy was an irrelevant consideration. Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawalu-
Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge Sheppard, W70/90, p. 65. 
80 Indeed the Tribunal determined that government energy policy was not a relevant consideration. Ibid, p. 165. 
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I would like to briefly note as an addendum to this section the involvement of Ngati 
Tuwharetoa interests in supporting the Electricorp case. The Lake Rotoaira trustees, the Rotoaira 
Forest trustees, and Sir Hepi Te Heu Heu, owned large areas of land in the Whanganui and 
Wbakapapa headwaters, and a particular interest in Lake Rotoaira which generated revenue for 
the tribe from trout fishing. Also, Tuwharetoa were seeking through the Treaty claims process 
restoration for losses incurred during the construction of the scheme, and it was their belief that 
any reduction in the commercial value of the scheme couId diminish the value of any settlement. 
But ultimately the Planning Tribunal considered these to be economic and not cultural interests. 
The implication of this being that while the Tribunal was to have particular regard to Maori 
cultural and spiritual values in its decision, such economic values were not to be of special value 
in the ultimate balancing process.81 
11.2. In-Stream Values: The Arguments for Increased Residual 
Flows 
In the remainder of this chapter I discuss the central arguments for the increase in residual flows 
in the Whanganui River.82 I split discussion into two subsections. The first of these discusses 
the Maori arguments which figured prominently in the dispute. The second subsection details the 
conservation arguments, and there are two specific points I would like to make about this; (i) that 
I use the tenn conservation very loosely, and (ii) that I can only summarise the most significant 
arguments, and there were many finer points made during the dispute which are not possible to 
deal wi th here. 
11.2.(i) The Maori Arguments 
Ko Ruapehu te maunga 
Ko Whanganui te awa 
Ko Hau-nui-a-paparangi te iwi 
Ko Turoa te tangata 
Ruapehu is the mountain 
Whanganui the waters 
Atihau-nui-a-Paparangi is the tribe 
Turoa is the man83 
The people of the Wbanganui River, Te Atihau-nui-a-Paparangi, trace their Whakapapa back to 
the marriage of their tupuna Tamakehu and Ruaka, who had three children - a daughter 
Hinengakau, and sons Tamaupoko and Tupoho. These three are the eponymous ancestors of the 
river tribes, each associated with a portion of the river: ''The traditional boundaries for 
Hinengakau's Iwi are the upper reaches; for Tamaupoko from the Maunganuiateao to Matahiwi; 
and, for Tupoho from Matahiwi to the sea".84 The river itself plaits85 the three peoples together 
in a bond of identity and kinship. 
81 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, pp. 103-4, 200. 
82 These are the arguments that were presented at the Planning Tribunal hearing - as a consequence they were 
more fully developed than those presented earlier in the dispute. I discuss such developments (albeit in general 
terms) in Chapter Twelve. 
83 Taitoko Rangiwhakateka Tawhiri M.B.E (Kaumatua, Kai Korero, Rangatira), 1989, Evidence on behalf of the 
Whanganui River Maori Trust Boord, Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 1. 
84 Hikaia Amohia (Kaumatua, Kai Korero, and Rangatira of the Hinengakau), 1989, Evidence on behalf of the 
Whanganui River Maori Trust Boord, Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 2. 
85 "Hinengakau plaited a rope of peace with three strands (depicted on the house at Putiki) signifying the unity of 
the people of her brothers and herself'. J. M. Dawson (Counsel for the Whanganui River Maori Trust Board), 
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Maori occupation on the river had waxed and waned. Maori had lived along the river for 
many hundreds of years86 , and in the few hundred years or so prior to this century there was a 
significant population living both up-stream and downstream of Taumarunui.87 It should be 
noted, however, that Hinengakau shared the upper catchment with Ngati Tuwharetoa, and hence 
at the time of the WRNlF dispute both tribes claimed mana in respect to areas of the headwaters. 
Prior to Pakeha settlement Maori pursued a subsistence lifestyle dependent upon the river and the 
forest that surrounded it, and their impact upon the catchment ecosystem was minimal. European 
settlement changed this, with the history of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth century in the 
Whanganui being one of radical ecological and socioeconomic transformation. Land clearance 
for farming, the rise of urban centres with associated pollution and resource use, and the 
modification of the river channel to enable river boat navigation, were among the main causes of 
change. For the Maori communities these were years of dispossession of their territory and 
destruction of their traditional way of life. The effects were both qualitative and quantitative, 
with Maori populations diminishing greatly until the few decades prior to the WRMF dispute, 
when people started trickling back to the area. At the time of the dispute most Maori lived in the 
lower reaches of the river below Pipiriki, and in the vicinity of Taumarunui in the upper 
catchment. The middle stretch through the National Park was virtually unpopulated.88 
Furthermore, many Maori having moved away from the region still retained important links with 
the river. 
Since the arrival of Pakeha, the river had been the source of political struggle. Recourse 
to the courts was by no means a new avenue for the Whanganui Maori. One renowned legal 
action - a claim to the bed of the Whanganui River - was initiated and doggedly pursued to its 
conclusion, by the late Titi Tihu, tohunga of the upper river. The claim was first heard before the 
Maori Land Court in 1938, from whence it proceeded along a complicated path of appeals 
through various courts, a Royal Commission, more courts, before being eventually dismissed by 
the Court of Appeal in 1962.89 Such wider claims to authority over the river were ultimately 
judged to be beyond the scope of the Planning Tribunal's consideration of river flows. 9o 
1989, Opening Submission, Planning TribWJal. hearing, p. 2. It would be wrong, however, to over 
romanticise the relations between these groups, whose history on the river was also one of inter-tribal and 
internecine rivalry. 
86 An estimated 14 generations spanned the period between the lifetime of Hinengakau and the tum of this 
century. D. Young, 1989, Supplementary evidence presented on behalf of the Whanganui River Maori Trust 
Boord, Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 2. Young was basing his comments upon the work of the Maori 
historian, the late Dr Pei Te Hurinui Jones. For an excellent recent history of both Maori and Pakeha 
relationships with the river see: D. Young, 1998, Woven By Water: Histories from the Whanganui River 
Huia Publishers, Wellington. 
87 David Young quoted censll'! figures of 3000 in the 1840's, but noted that this would be a conservative estimate 
as a large number of people from the upper stretches were absent during this period. Ibid 
88 D. Young, 1989, "River of Great Waiting" New Zealand Geographic Vol. 3, July/September, pp. 95-115. 
89 D. Young, 1989, Evidence presented on behalf of the Whanganui River Maori Trust Boord, Planning Tribunal 
hearing, pp. 8-22. 
90 I have noted previously that the Tribunal's scope of inquiry was limited by statute and legal precedent In this 
instance the Planning Tribunal was acting on the basis of Huakina v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 
NZLR 188; 12 NZTPA 129 (HC) where in the consideration of a water right issue Justice Chilwell said: 
"Maori spiritual and cultural values ... cannot be excluded from consideration if the evidence establishes the 
existence of spiritual, cultural and traditional relationships with natural water held by a particular and 
significant group of Maori people". Claims to authority in respect to the river (whether tino ranagatiratanga or 
mana or kaitiakitanga) were judged by the Planning Tribunal to be beyond its powers. Electricity Corporation 
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However, for the Whanganui Maori the issues were inseparable, and in the context of this thesis 
they are vital to the explanation of Maori participation in the conflict. 
The Planning Tribunal listed four broad values that described the Maori relation with the 
river, and underpinned the Trust Board's case. I will deal with each of these briefly. The first 
aspect is that the river was a taonga of central cultural and spiritual significance to the Whanganui 
Iwi. Professor James Ritchie described this relation: 
The people of the Whanganui not only live by the River in the physical sense they live by the river in the 
ideological and cultural sense that it rules and governs the whole of their lives. The River is the central 
image, the creative source of who they are and what they are and everything relates to it. Their kinship, 
tying each to the other is tied back to the River. Their origin myths as well as the whole of the mythic and 
their social history relate primaUy and primarily to the River. Those who speak with authority speak from 
the power of its waters. The air that they breathe is River air; the water in their blood is River water. 
Every concept or conception is in terms of the River.91 
It was a relation of affinity, reverence, prestige, dignity, sustenance, strength and healing. One 
particular aspect of this relation that was constantly raised with reference to the WD was the 
notion that spiritual values are violated when waters are mixed in unnatural ways and between the 
jurisdictions of different tribes.92 However in political terms, it seems more likely that this was 
not a definitive principle, and that the issue was that if waters were to be mixed, then it should 
only be with the prior agreement of the affected tribes. 
Secondly, the river was an important mahinga kai resource. The fisheries were 
extensive, with Maori harvesting a variety of freshwater fish and shellfish (kakahi) species. The 
fishing methods were similarly varied, and of particular historical significance was the use of eel 
baskets (hinaki) and systems of permanent eel weirs that spanned the main river channel (pa tuna 
- and pa piharau to catch the highly prized lamprey), especially in the middle reaches of the river. 
By the time of the WRMF dispute, the traditional weirs had disappeared although some more 
modern versions stood in their place. Hinaki were still routinely used, and there had been a 
recent resurgence of interest in traditional food gathering methods.93 However as I noted in 
Chapter Ten the fishery had experienced a significant decline since earlier this century. The 
variety and stocks of species had reduced due to wider disturbances in the catchment, and 
according to the Maori advocates, the loss of the high quality flows from the headwater streams. 
The loss of the fishery was a source of considerable sadness for the river tribes, partly because it 
reduced their ability to provide traditional forms of hospitality and sharing of resources with 
neighbouring iwi - for this reason it adversely affected the mana of the people.94 Thirdly, the 
river had traditionally been used for recreational purposes such as swimming, and it was argued 
that the decline in water quality and build up of silt had forced the cessation of this activity along 
certain stretches of the river.9S Finally, the river had been a traditional highway for canoe travel. 
The Planning Tribunal did not consider such past uses to be a basis for making a decision about 
the minimum flow. However, it did have regard to contemporary and future use. An example of 
of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge Sheppard, W70/90, p. 
61. 
91 James Ritchie (Professor of Psychology, University of Waikato), 1989, Evidence on behalf of the Whanganui 
Maori Trust Boord, Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 7. 
92 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
93 D. Young, 1989, "River of Great Waiting" pp. 109-11. 
94 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Lid v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, p. 101. 
95 Ibid. 
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such use was the annual pilgrimage of Maori down the river by canoe. The purpose of those 
voyages was to bring the people together with the wairua of the river. The Tribunal did 
recognise that such values would be enhanced by the restoration of flows to the river.96 
The overall attitudes of Whanganui Maori towards the WD and the TPD were not, 
however, straightforward: 
The Maori attitude is that to take some of the water of the river is to take some of the life of an ancestor; 
reduction of the naturnl flow of the river is demoralising for them. An interference with it breaks the sacred 
affinity of the people with the river. and reduces its mana. 
The diversion of some of its headwaters reduces its value and significance and breaches its spiritual 
integrity; its mauri is disrupted; its sacredness is desecrated; and its effectiveness for healing is affected. 
However, there is not absolute opposition to the abstraction of river water. The attitude of the iwi would 
depend on the use to which the abstracted water would be put; and of whether it would come into contact 
with water from another source. Whether abstraction is acceptable would depend on their perceptions of 
whether it is detrimental to the culture, or to the environment (with nature, not against it); on whether the 
abstraction is perceived as a squandering of the resource, a manifestation of greed or selfishness; and on 
whether it is made after reference and regard to the Maori people, and with appropriate rituals am 
observances,97 
In his decision Judge Sheppard quoted two key witnesses, and I include their statements here 
because they reveal the complex nuances of the Maori argument. First, the comments of Taitoko 
Tawhiri: 
''There is enough on the eastern side to provide Electricorp with all the water it requires instead of fishing 
on the source of our Wbakapapa to allow the supply of water so that they can make their millions of 
dollars". 
Yet when faced with the question of whether he had any problem with the waters being taken 
from the Whanganui, Hikaia Arnohia - kaumatua, rangatira and kai korero of the Hinengakau -
answered: 
"Not really when you look at it. I'm talking about balance, power and water and community owned ... 
"98 
Mr Amohia's comments should not be construed as an exculpation of the TPD and the WO, for at 
that time the opposition of Whanganui Maori' was absolute, His comments, instead, spoke of a 
time when mana was restored, and Te Atihau-nui-a-Paparangi free to exercise their tino 
rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga with respect to the river. But the Maori people of the river ~ere 
looking back at a hundred and fIfty years of gradual dispossession of their rohe, and destruction 
of their traditional life along the river. The principles or tikanga that had traditionally guided their 
relationship with their environment were being violated by the diversion. And, not to be 
underestimated, there was much resentment about the way the electricity planners had excluded 
them from the original planning process. 
So while the relationship between Maori and the river was complex, the stance they 
adopted in the dispute was clear. The continuation of the diversion of the water was a grave 
affront to the spiritual values and mana in the river, not to mention the environmental concerns 
held (although these were seen to be inextricably bound together). The Whanganui River Maori 
Trust Board (which consisted of nine members, three from each of the river Iwi) consistently 
advocated for the complete restoration of the natural flows to the river. 
96 Ibid, pp. 10-2. Professor Ritchie also includes the river as a means of communication. 1989, Evidence on 
behalf of the Whanganui Maori Trust Boord, Planning Tribunal hearing, p. 9. 
97 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, p. 102. 
98 Ibid, pp. 102-3. 
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11.2.(ii) The Conservation Arguments: In-stream Values 
The conservation arguments discussed here are founded upon the biophysical effects discussed in 
the latter half of Chapter Ten. I started that analysis by noting the effects of reduced flows upon 
the hydrological record. In the Whakapapa River these were; reduced mean flows, reduced 
minimum flow, absence of seasonal variation, reduced base flows, negative surges, ad hoc 
releases, reduced peak flows, reduced number of peak flows, and truncated recessions. For the 
other intake streams the effects were even more drastic - namely, the complete de-watering of the 
reaches below the diversions. This altered flow regime negatively impacted upon the 
environmental domain, causing; a reduction in wetted area, altered hydrological conditions, 
modified thennal regime and diminished water qUality. It also had deleterious effects upon the 
sediment regime with; decreased bed-load discharge (such as the sand sized particles necessary 
for the 'cleansing' of the river), decreased capacity for the transport of fine silts (hence build up 
of slimy deposits), an increase in suspended grey silts (most notably from the spalling of 
uncovered papa ledges), and probably some increase in siltation in the Whanganui harbour and 
estuary - although the Planning Tribunal noted that this correlation was difficult to maintain. 
The biological effects of the diversion were complex and of varying certainty. The 
impacts upon the stream ecology were more easily observed and of greater note closer to the 
point source of disturbance. As I noted previously, there was almost universal acceptance that 
there had been adverse effects in those reaches. Most notably, (i) the decreases in habitat, 
biomass, and species diversity, (ii) the resetting of community structures, and (iii) the change 
from a rich fauna adapted to low-periphyton levels to a degraded lotic system with increased 
periphyton. The diversion had also impacted upon species further up the food chain. The trout 
fishery had certainly declined in the uppennost reaches (below intakes), and potentially declined 
below Kakahi; the native fishery had similarly declined; ~~)t was highly probable that the 
diversion had had a deleterious effect upon the threatened Blue Duck population. Evidentiary 
matters were crucial here. As I noted previously, the anecdotal evidence, which in many 
instances involved decades of day-to-day close observation, was given some weight by' the 
Planning Tribunal. 99 However, the scientific discourse that required a high burden of proof and 
was constrained by a lack of baseline data, had a conservative effect on the Tribunal. So, for the 
purposes of explicating the conservation argument, it is important to stress that the case argued 
by the conservationists identified far higher levels of disturbance and damage, and a higher 
degree of risk. than was ultimately accepted by the Planning Tribunal. This was not to rule out 
the veracity of their claims. 
The in-stream advocates argued that these biophysical distUrbances had a range of 
negative impacts upon in-stream values. I will discuss these in the following order: ecological 
arguments, landscape arguments, and recreational arguments. Again, each of these categories is 
inter-connected. 
99 For example, a number of people commented on the remarkable quality of the evidence presented by John 
Erceg, a fanner who had lived on the river for 50 years. John Ombler (then District Conservator, Whanganui), 
1998, Personal interview, Wellington. His evidence was that of an experienced naturalist. He had observed: 
Silt where previously there had been sand; Shingle was not moving; The colour was no longer green but 
yellow-brown, and the water unclear; The river smelled rotten; Navigation had deteriornted markedly; Wildlife 
had decreased - eels had died because of increased water temperature, there were no freshwater mussels, lamprey 
or shags, and kingfishers were less common. John Erceg, 1989, Evidence on behalf of the Minister of 
Conservation, Planning Tribunal hearing. 
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The conservationists argued that the biophysical effects of the reduced flows constituted a 
significant ecological cost. This argument was framed in tenns of the intrinsic values of the 
ecosystem. The Department of Conservation defined such values as follows: "A river's intrinsic 
values are those values inherent, essential, and naturally belonging to it. They give it its special 
character and its capacity to sustain life". 100 They then went on to aver: 
The evidence conJained within the DOC's submission has shown how the hydrological regime - that which 
the river evolved with, has been destroyed by headwater diversions. The natural processes and river ecology 
have been severely disturbed and many water quality characteristics of the Whanganui altered. 
The vitality, sparkle and sound of waters cascading down rapids have gone or been much reduced and the 
flow patterns which made the valleys and channels have also undergone major change. 
Though the hydrological regime has been altered in the past by natural and man-induced events, the scale 
and impact of the TPD was of a new order of magnitude. As a consequence, the already altered intrinsic 
values have suffered extreme effects. lO 1 
The notion of intrinsic values is a highly, indeed essentially, contested one in environmental 
philosophy.102 But, as I noted in the Black Head study (6.4.(i), it is possible to grant the force 
of the conservationists' argument - and to speak of natural values - without subscribing to the 
idea of an ultimate 'self-sufficient' fonn of value. l03 As I argued at the close of the previous 
chapter, the very notion of an ecosystem connotes values, hence we speak: of the integrity of the 
system, and disturbances are seen as negative impacts if they weaken the natural processes that 
define the system. This language penetrated the arguments of all participants in the dispute. The 
Planning Tribunal, constrained by the statutory tenns of reference contained within the Water 
and Soil Conservation Act 1967 referred to the 'natural values' of the river, making no mention 
of 'intrinsic' values. 104 But the presumption that nature was fundamentally valuable 
underpinned the discourse. 
The conservation argument can be broken down further. The above quote mentioned the 
ability to sustain life - the life-support argument is a common and forceful one in environmental 
politics. Another important element of the conservation argument, most conspicuous with respect 
to the Blue Duck, was that of scarcity value. This was mainly in respect to the wider contextual 
issues of decreasing bio-diversity and the value of species. It was argued on behalf of .the 
Minister of Conservation that the restoration of natural flows would provide habitat for a further 
12 pairs of the threatened birds,105 A further argument presented was that it was no longer 
ethical to divert all flows from a natural watercourse. The nonns of environmental planning had 
100 Department of Conservation, May 1988, "Whanganui River Minimum Flows Submission" Catchment Bcmd 
hearing, p. 6. 
101 Ibid, pp. 6-7. 
102 Indeed, it is taken by many to be the most important issue in envirorunental ethics. K. Parker, "Pragmatism 
in Envirorunental Thought" In A. Light, and E. Katz. (eds), 1996, Environmental Pragmatism Routledge, 
London, p. 34. 
103 A. Weston, "Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics" In A. Light, aOO E. Katz. (eds), 
1996, Environmental Pragmatism Routledge, London, pp. 285-306. 
104 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v MafUJwatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, 
Judge Sheppard, W70/90, p. 124. 
lOS Ibid, p. 114. Although it was acknowledged that any such estimate carried with it considerable W1Certainties. 
Not the least of which were the effects of terrestrial disturbances in the catchment, and the state of contiguous 
populations. 
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changed since the design and construction of the TPD, and the received wisdom by the time of 
the dispute was that some residual flow was required as a matter of principle. 106 
I have taken some liberty here in drawing out the types of values that were implicit in the 
conservation arguments. The systematic philosophical treatment of value did not figure greatly in 
the dispute. The conservationists were essentially arguing that this catchment system was of 
significant ecological value, that those values were depleted due to the effects of the diversion, 
and that the restoration of flows would have a positive effect upon those values if the new regime 
provided increased habitat, greater flow variability, and an improvement in water quality. 
In many respects the ecological arguments pre-figured the landscape arguments which 
referred to the personal and cultural interpretations of those effects. In the Planning Tribunal 
these were dealt with under the heading wild and scenic qualities. The Tribunal itself observed: 
"Our own visits to the Whanganui and Whakapapa Rivers confirm the common understanding 
that many stretches of them possess natural wild and scenic qualities for which they are highly 
valued",l07 The conservationists argued that both of those types of values were severely 
diminished as a consequence of the WD. They asserted that the upper reaches of the Whakapapa 
River "has such a low flow that it no longer sounds like a free-flowing river; that the high levels 
of algal growth have an unpleasant feel, and at times an unpleasant smell",l08 In the middle 
reaches they utilised arguments of locals such as John Erceg, whose evidence I referred to 
before, he described a loss of quality in the river environment - the discolouration, slime, silt, 
smells, reduction of wildlife, etc. - that diminished the experience of living alongside or visiting 
the river. Such arguments were not restricted to the odd disgruntled resident. As I shall show in 
the next chapter, large numbers of people expressed such sentiments by means of written and oral 
submissions, surveys and participation in interest groups. 
The types of landscape values articulated during the dispute occupied a spectrum which 
included: The straightforward issue of scenery preservation and aesthetics; The naturalistic 
appreciation of biophysical processes, connections, species, natural history, and integrity. 
Perceptions of the natural values discussed above; A historical sense of place and heritage; And 
spiritual connections (in which case landscape may be an insufficient term). 
The conservation argument was that all of these types of landscape values were 
significantly damaged by the reduction in flows. There was some disagreement On behalf of 
Electricorp a consulting landscape architect deposed that although the affected areas were of very 
high quality, none of them were of outstanding value. He went further, noting that although 
increased flows would have positive effects upon the scenic values of the river, they would have 
no effects upon the wild values - such values were more substantially affected by the 
surrounding landscape.109 This point was accepted by the Planning Tribunal. 110 It would 
106 John Ombler (then District Conservator, Whanganui), 1998, Personal interview, WellingtoIt This principle 
was to eventually undergird the government's guidelines for setting flows. Ministry for the Environment, 
May 1997, Flow Guidelines for In-stream Values Ministry for the Environment, Wellington. 
107 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, 
Judge Sheppard, W70/90, p. 12l. 
108 Ibid 
109 William Hansen (Consultant land<lcape architect, Works and Development Services Corporation), 1989, 
Evidence presented on behalf of Electricorp. Planning Tribunal hearing. 
110 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, 
Judge Sheppard, W70/90, p. 122. 
:~., 
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seem, however, that this convenient technical separation of the river from the surrounding 
landscape in determining the 'wilderness' element did not reflect the strong opinions of those 
who were familiar with the area. Finally, the statutory framework within which the Planning 
Tribunal operated ruled out reference to the wider landscape values. 
The last major component of the conservation case revolved around the in-stream needs 
of recreation. The major forms of recreation on the Whanganui River were (i) angling, kayaking 
and rafting in the reaches between the Whakapapa intake and Taumarunui, and (ii) canoeing, jet 
boating, swimming and river-boating, mostly in the stretch between Taumarunui and Pipirikl, but 
also down to Whanganui itself. Although local residents enjoyed many of these activities, the 
vast majority of river users were from beyond the region and hence were tourists. Moreover, 
while many of these activities did not necessarily involve a direct financial charge to the users, 
their presence and activity did bring considerable economic benefits to the region. I will first 
discuss the activities themselves and the associated use-values, before ending discussion with 
reference to the commercial benefits. 
The value of the river for angling was primarily dependent upon the state of the trout 
fishery, and hence the health of the lotic ecosystem in the upper reaches. It was also, to some 
degree, dependent upon the landscape values presented above, which contributed to the ultimate 
quality of the recreational experience. In the past the Whakapapa, in particular, had been a trout 
fishery of some international repute, and ninety percent of anglers came from out of the 
district. lll It had also been of some value as an alternative to the overcrowded Tongariro 
River.1l2 The conserVationists argued that the fishery had suffered as a result of the WD. As I 
recorded in the Chapter Ten, the Planning Tribunal held that there had been a very significant 
decline in trout numbers in the Whakapapa between the intake and Oio seven kilometres 
downstream, but that further downstream towards Kakahi (reputedly the best fishery) there had 
been no significant decline. 113 But also, this was an extremely conservative analysis of the 
scientific evidence presented, and furthermore, was contrary to the body of anecdotal evidence 
presented by local fishermen who had observed a marked decline in the standard of the trout 
fishery extending beyond Kakahi. 1l4 The Planning Tribunal did recognise, however, that the 
increase of algae in the riverbed had diminished the wilderness experience for anglers. 
The other main activities in the upper catchment were white-water kayaking and rafting. 
The conservationists argued that these activities were severely curtailed by the abstraction of 
water, and that the low flows had the effect of reducing the amount of days per year when these 
pursuits could be undertaken, the size of rafts that could be used, and the quality of the 
experience. Both activities had not occurred prior to the diversion. The Tribunal did recognise 
these values, noting that "the Whakapapa River, particularly from the intake to the Whanganui 
confluence, has considerable potential for rafting and kayaking '" and under natural flow 
conditions can provide very exciting white-water experiences". It also acknowledged that the 
111 Ibid, p. 125. 
112 This was vigorously argued by the members of the Minimum Aows Coalition. Cf. Tom Wells (King 
Country resident and retired principal of Whanganui Collegiate), Submission on behalf of the Whanganui 
Minimum Aows Coalition, Catchment Board hearing, Whanganui. 
113 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, 
Judge Sheppard, W70/90, pp. 119-20. 
114 Such as James Gosman and Manu Lala who presented evidence on behalf of the Whanganui River Aows 
Coalition in the Planning Tribunal hearing. 
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numbers of people using the river for these purposes rose vastly when the diversion was shut 
down for any reason. 115 To provide some idea of the popularity of these uses, a survey 
conducted for 1988 estimated 2,809 visits for rafters, canoeists, and kayakers, and 19,630 visits 
for anglers to the upper Whanganui and Whakapapa rivers (note here that these figures were 
under the extant regime). I 16 
The stretch of the river between Taumarunui was, and remains, the most canoed in the 
country. Providing a multi-day wilderness journey through the spectacular river gorges 
described in the previous chapter. In the summer of 1988/89, a total of 18,000 recreational canoe 
days were spent on the river. il7 Jet boating was another important recreational and commercial 
use of the river in this stretch. Also, there had since last century been a history of shallow 
drafted river-boats being used to transport and accommodate tourists and goods through the 
lower and middle reaches of the river. At the time of the dispute, there was one river boat 
operator on the river who wanted to expand his business. lIS The recreation and tourism 
argument was based upon surveys of river users, and the observations of tourist operators, 
Department of Conservation staff and locals. They argued that the reduced flows made 
navigation more difficult at the times of year when the river was under the greatest pressure from 
users - that is the summer months. They also argued that the negative impact upon the ecological 
and landscape values such as smells, discolouration, slime, higher silt load, decreased animal 
life, and degraded riparian zones, all served to diminish the quality of experience for users. In 
rejoinder to this Electricorp's witnesses argued that the WD was only one of many causal factors 
that had led to the overall degradation in such qualities, that navigation troubles had always 
existed in the stretch below Taumarunui, and that the effects on flow levels became negligible 
further downstream. There was undoubtedly some truth to these claims. However they really 
pointed to the solution at the level of total catchment management rather than undermining the 
veracity of the recreational arguments. The Planning Tribunal recognised that a reasonable 
minimum flow level at Te Maire would not always neutralise these problems, but it would 
significantly mitigate these negative effects. 119 
The recreational value was the only in-stream value to be given an estimated money value. 
Electricorp did this as part of its national benefit-cost analysis, which was in fact a very partial 
and incomplete exercise. These values did not represent the total recreational value, but rather 
the additional value of increased flows. There was no effort to calculate the value of existing 
use. Nevertheless the figures are interesting. They calculated figures for each of the potential 
flow regimes, so as with my treatment of the values of generation, I will only include here the 
value of the restoration of all flows to the river. Any other regime would represent a portion of 
these figures: 
Net present value @ 
( discount rate) 
4 percent 
7 percent 
$19.12m 
$ 13.24m 
115 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, 
Judge Sheppard, W70/90, pp. 126-8. 
116 Murray-North Ltd and Survey Research Ltd .• 1989, "North Island Fresh Water Recreation Survey" Murray-
North Ltd .• Auckland. 
117 D. Young. 1989, "River of Great Waiting" p. 98. 
liS This was Winston Oliver who owned the vessel MV Wakapai. As r shall observe in the following chapter. 
Mr Oliver played a significant part throughout the dispute. 
119 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990. 
Judge Sheppard. W70/90. pp. 129-31. 
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Net present value @ 
(discount rate) 
4 percent 
7 percent 
10 percent 
$19.12m 
$13.24m 
$9.69m I20 
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Even despite the neglect of the value of extant use these figures represent a considerable 
economic value. Indeed. the Planning Tribunal concluded that the Whanganui River a tourist 
resource of national significance.l21 The value of the river as a recreational resource within the 
region itself applied aforteriori to this argument. 
Having set out the main arguments on both sides of the dispute. it is important to stress 
that the period of greatest value of the water for Electricorp (late summer) was also the time of 
greatest need within the river system itself. whether in terms of the ecology (ie. the period of 
greatest heat stress) or of human use (the summer-Easter period). The contemporaneity of these 
needs served to heighten the discord between the uses. 
Finally, an undercurrent running through much of the conflict was the tension between 
the regional and national interest. This issue was largely about the ownership and control of the 
water resource. While this issue was ultimately beyond the scope of the legal proceedings it 
permeated much of the argument. It should be noted, however, that this opposition was not 
concomitant with the business-conservation split, for the conservationists utilised both the 
regional interest argument and the national interest argument at various times. 
11.3. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have traversed the arguments surrounding the diversion of water. The 
discussion pivoted around the substantive divide at the heart of the conflict - wether or not to 
divert the headwater flows through the TPD, and if so, then how much water should be diverted. 
The chapter was thus split into two sections, with the first section dealing with both the historical 
political economy of electricity generation, and the specific arguments for the diversion of flows 
that arose out of that context. In that section I observed that the generation and transmission of 
electricity has been an essential infra-structural role that underpinned social and economic 
development In recent decades a state monopoly generator of one form or another has 
undertakeri that role, and the exclusive control of that strategic function has carried with it 
significant institutional influence. However, during the period of the conflict that function went 
from being controlled by a core state agency motivated by the strategic guarantee of supply, to a 
state owned enterprise, at anns length from political control and motivated almost wholly by 
profits. The second half of that section dealt with the role and value of the TPD and Western 
Diversion in turn, within the integrated generation network. This w'as the essential argument 
provided by Electricorp in its advocacy. The main point to note here is that Electricorp's essential 
interests were financial ones as it chased after exchange-value. 
The second section dealt with the countervailing arguments for the retention of either an 
increased portion, or all, of the natural flows within the Wbanganui headwaters. The two main 
120 Ian Fraser (Senior associate, Murray-North Ud), 1989, Evidence on behalf of Electricorp, Planning Tribunal 
hearing. These figures - and the Whanganui minimum flows issue - are discussed in: C. Cocklin, I. Fraser 
and M. Harte, 1994, "The Recreational Value of In-Stream Rows: The Upper Wanganui and Whakapapa 
Rivers'· New Zealand Geographer Vol. 50, No. I, pp. 20-29. 
121 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990. 
Judge Sheppard. W70190, p. 125. 
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strands of argument were on the one hand, the values/interests articulated by the Tangata Whenua 
of the river, and on the other hand, those of wider conservation, recreational and tourist interests. 
The main observation to be made here was that those arguments were primarily non-
commodified. All of this information is crucial to both the presentation of the historical narrative 
of conflict in the following chapter, and to the systematic analysis of the dispute along the lines of 
the analytical framework in Chapter Thirteen. 
12 
The Whanganui River Minimum Flows Conflict 
Processes and Substantive Outcomes 
12. Introduction 
This Chapter is largely a historical narrative of the dispute. It is organised this way because this 
fonn of argument usefully conveys the dynamic pattern and causal relationships of this conflict. 
Discussion is restricted to the period between the setting of an initial minimum flows regime in 
the early 1980s, and the March 1992 High Court decision on flow levels (note that I dealt with 
background features in Chapter Ten). The dispute is easily split into three main phases, with 
each period resulting in a substantive minimum flows regime. I will therefore intersperse the 
historical narrative with brief descriptions and basic analyses of those respective decisions. I 
also highlight the reactions of the various actors towards them. To assist in that process I would 
like to reiterate a couple of basic points. 
At the conclusion of Chapter Ten I noted that the operation of the Western Diversion had 
deleterious effects upon the Wbanganui River system. I also observed that there was a tendential 
connection between the two; the greater the levels of abstraction then the greater the levels of 
environmental harm (I was at pains to stress, however, that the relation was a complex one). 
Furthermore, in Chapter Eleven I made the simple connection between the various interests and 
flows; the interests of the NZED and later, Electricorp, lay with the maximum abstraction of the 
headwater flows, and the interests of all of the in-stream advocates with the retention of in-
stream flows. These basic relationships and tendencies fonn one basis by which to judge the 
progress of the dispute. 
Finally, this chapter completes the largely empirical element of the case study, with 
Chapter Thirteen being devoted to the systematic investigation of the mechanisms of business 
dominance explicated in Chapters Four and Five. These empirical chapters provide a solid 
contextual foundation for that broad interpretive exercise. 
12.1. The 1983 Minimum Flow Regime 
The immediate origins of the WRMF dispute can be traced back to a letter sent by the New 
Zealand Canoeing Association to the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority 
(NWASCA) in 1977. The Association was concerned about the actual and potential effects of 
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development - principally hydro-development - upon the Whanganui, Buller and Motu rivers. 
They sought to prevent or mitigate such effects by petitioning NW ASCA to declare the rivers to 
be of national importance under S. 23 (7) of the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 (the 
'Water Act'). The Authority, however, considered this mechanism to be inappropriate for this 
purpose. But instead of dismissing the canoeists' request outright, they initiated action on the 
Whanganui issue under an alternative provision that allowed for the fixing of a minimum 
acceptable flow. 1 The Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board was subsequently asked to 
prepare a water allocation plan for the catchment, and to investigate and recommend a desirable 
minimum flows regime for the river.2 
There was scant precedent about the procedure of fixing minimum flows, and so 
NW ASCA requested that the Catchment Board follow the process prescribed for Crown water 
rights applications, which included publicly notifying the issue, and the consideration of written 
and oral submissions.3 The Catchment Board promptly commissioned a report on the water 
resources of the ri ver and this was completed by December 1978.4 This report was used as the 
basis of a public discussion paper, and submissions were called for and received by August 
1979. The focus of the paper was broad, however, with the minimum flows issue subsumed 
within the wider context of integrated catchment management, including land use, waste disposal 
and water rights issues, etc. For two years following this initial flurry of activity the minimum 
flows issue was set to one-side by the Catchment Board, its priorities lying elsewhere. When 
they did return to the issue in August 1982, the Chief Engineer, Don Spence, decided to focus 
the process solely upon the minimum flows issue. A further discussion paper was released and 
once again submissions were called for.5 Finally, after a short public hearing, the Board 
recommended to NW ASCA that it establish the following: 
1. A minimum flow atTe Maire (16 km below Taumarunui); 
2. That it be fixed for a five year tenn, after which it would be reviewed; 
3. A minimum flow of 22 cumecs be fixed for the period between 1 December and 14 
February, and for the Easter holiday; 
4. For the remainder of the year the minimum flow to be set at 16 cumecs 
NW ASCA subsequently ratified this recommendation and accepted the Board's request that 
implementation be deferred until the end of 1983 so that the practical aspects of implementing the 
regime could be worked out with the NZED.6 
There was little in this establishment process to herald either the substantive complexity 
or the political intensity of the later conflict In many respects the Canoeing Association request 
detennined the focus and tenns of inquiry. They asserted that the reduced flows had resulted 
1 S. 14(3)(0). A. Gibson (Director of Water and Soil Conservation, Ministry of Works and Development), 1 
November 1977, Memorandum to the Chairman, National Water and Soil Conservation Authority. 
2 A. Gibson (Director of Water and Soil Conserv ation, Ministry of Works and Development), 16 December 1977, 
Letter to the Secretary of the Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board 
31bid 
4 Tonkin and Taylor, Consulting Engineers, 1978, "Water Resources of the Whanganui River" Report 
commissioned by the Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board, Marton. This report was to be referred to 
throughout the dspute. 
5 John Garrett (Resources Manager, Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board), 11 August 1982, Letter to the 
General Manager, New Zealand Electricity Division, Ministry of Energy. 
6 Don Spence (ChiefTechnica1 Officer, Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board), 8 November 1982, Letter to the 
Director of the Water and Soil Conservation Division, Ministry of Works and Development. 
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firstly, in navigational problems, and secondly, contributed to a general decline in the aesthetic 
value of the river - due to decreased dilution of waste water inflows, discolouration, etc. Also, 
their concern was with the middle reaches of the river below Taumarunui. While the later 
submissions broadened the discourse, the majority focused upon the recreational interests of 
canoeists and jet boaters, or upon the scenic values, of those same reaches. Biological issues 
were not treated with any degree of sophistication, and, while the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries raised the effects of flows upon the fisheries, their analysis remained unfocused. 
Moreover, the Board felt that the fisheries in the headwaters were already protected by the 
Kakahi agreement. The concerns of Maori were articulated in a single submission from the 
Whanganui River Reserves Trust. They expressed their fundamental opposition to any changes 
to the river's natural flow, and raised peripheral issues such as the possibility of future hydro-
development on the river and the problem of sewage discharge, but they ultimately supported the 
22 cumec flow suggested by the Board.7 
The NZED argued, not surprisingly, against the establishment of a minimum flow 
regime. At first they asserted the inviolability of their water right and questioned the legality of 
any minimum flow that would constrain that right. 8 Don Spence countered this by noting that S. 
24 (D) of the Water Act provided the power to restrict or suspend a water right to maintain 
minimum flows.9 Failing this the NZED asserted that there was no need to set a minimum flow 
under the Water Act, as the needs and concerns of river users could be well met through 
voluntary undertakings similar to the existing Piriaka and Kakahi agreements. But their 
substantive argument was based on cost, which they consistently calculated and articulated on a 
dry year basis ($1m rather than approximately half that in a normal year). Furthermore, they 
made no effort to deal with the concerns or arguments of other parties. Towards the end of this 
process, while they were maintaining their opposition to the minimum flow in principle, they 
were simultaneously arguing for a lower minimum flow level over the summer months than the 
22 cumec figure preferred by the Board.1o Finally, for the NZED, the amount of water lost to 
the system due to the imposition of the 1983 regime amounted to approximately five percent of 
the total water abstracted in an average year. While this was not an insignificant sum it seems 
that it was judged by the NZED to be bearable or at least politically unavoidable 
At this stage the minimum flows issue was not politicised. What is interesting about this 
period is the extent to which the process was controlled by a single person - Don Spence - who, 
while following the broad process set out by NW ASCA and the Water Act, acted as a gatekeeper 
on the substantive arguments presented. He set out the initial flow options, summarised the 
submissions, and identified the regime (including its five year term) that was ultimately adopted. 
His approach was somewhat paternalistic as he acknowledged the value of expressions of 
opinion within the submissions, but was pedantic on matters of technical detail (especially from 
7 Don Spence (Chief Technical Officer, Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board), October 1982, Summary of 
submissions on the Whanganui River minimum flows, Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board, Marton. 
8 Although their legal advice later confinned that the Catchment Board was acting within .its powers. A. Munro 
(Assistant Office Solicitor, Ministry of Energy), 12 February 1982, Letter to A. Hatrick, New Zealand 
Electricity Division. 
9 Don Spence (Chief Engineer, Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board), 19 December 1979, Letter to the 
General Manager New Zealand Electricity Di vision. 
10 New Zealand Electricity Division, September 1982, "Whanganui River Minimum Flows Submission to the 
Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Boord" pp. 19-21. 
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government agencies) such as, for example, with the MAF submission on the fishery. I I Having 
determined the merits of a minimum flow he was forthright in protecting the process from the 
bureaucratic obstruction and influence of the monolithic NZED. Because of this, this formative 
stage of the dispute was symptomatic of a period when interdepartmental rivalry tended to be 
played out behind the scenes as distinct from the very public process that characterised the later 
stages of the dispute. 
There were a number of further reasons why this process was less politically fraught than 
later episodes: The first of these was that public discontent about the river was unfocused. The 
concern about the upper reaches was by 1983 being channelled towards the alternative 
mechanism of a Local Water Conservation Notice to protect the Whakapapa River.12 Also, 
Maori were otherwise concerned with the longstanding ownership issues that I discussed in the 
previous chapter, and were seeking restitution through the Treaty of Waitangi claims process. 13 
The second, was the question of expectations. The editorial response of the Taumarunui 
Gazette to the setting of the 1983 flow was indicative of this, boldly declaring that the 
"'stranglehold' of New Zealand Electricity on the Whanganui River has been broken", despite 
the essentially small adjustment that had occurred)4 
Lastly, in response to the needs of the analytical framework, it is necessary to deal with 
the issue of resources. The greatest expenditure of time and money was by the Catchment 
Board, mainly in commissioning the Tonkin and Taylor report, but also in managing the decision 
process. This money, however, was provided by central government through a grant from 
NWASCAIS Most of the other parties devoted few resources to the issue. These costs were 
probably kept down due to the fact that none of the parties sought to rebut the arguments of 
others, and hence both research and advocacy costs were limited. 
12.2. The 1988 Catchment Board Review 
By the mid 1980's the issue of water flows in the Whanganui River was again on the 
administrative and political agenda. A de novo review of the minimum flows issue was set for 
mid 1988, prior to the expiry of the 1983 regime. This review was to become the focus, or at 
least the avenue of expression, for a range of historical and emerging grievances. In this section 
I deal with the first stage of the review process which was held under the stewardship of the 
Rangitikei-Whanganui, later the amalgamated Central Districts, Catchment Boards. I begin here 
by tracking the two main strands of political action and conflict tliat preceded and shaped the 
review process. 
11 Don Spence (Chief Technical Officer, Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board), October 1982, "Summary of 
submissions". 
12 Keith Chapple, 9 March 1983, Letter to Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Boord 
13 Don Spence (Chief Technical Officer, Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board), October 1982, "Summary of 
submissions". 
14 The Taumarunui Gazette November 15, 1983, p. 1. 
IS A. Gibson (Director of Water and Soil Conservation, Ministry of Works and Development), 16 December 
IfY77, Letter to the Secretary of the Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board 
-.'.: 
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12.2.(i) The Water Rights Issue 
Since the early stages of the TPD there had been lingering resentment in the Taumarunui region 
about the original planning process, and the subsequent loss of water in the upper reaches. As I 
noted in the previous section, the Friends of the Rivers at Kakahi Society (FORKS) had in 1983 
sought, and subsequently failed to get, a Local Water Conservation Notice for the Whakapapa 
River. Keith Chapple, a resident of Kakahi, had led this effort. In 1987 Chapple was the Chair 
of the King Country Branch of the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society (hereafter Forest 
and Bird). The process of producing a management plan for the newly formed Whanganui 
National Park had recently drawn attention to the flows issue. 16 At the group's AGM in May of 
that year, the Branch identified water flows as an issue of concern and resolved to act on it. 
Chapple quickly set to writing a booklet on the genesis of the TPD and its resultant impacts upon 
the environment and local commu~ty. The Rape of the Whanganui River was published on 10 
October in order to publicise a meeting that the Forest and Bird had called to gain support for the 
issue,l7 Held in Taumarunui the meeting attracted 90 people, and it was there that the 
Whanganui River Flows Coalition (the Coalition) was formed for the purposes of campaigning 
for the restoration of flows. IS In time the membership of the Coalition was to swell to 35 
community groups and many more individuals. Chapple asserted that the membership totalled 
around 60,000, and in a sense it did, given the national membership of groups such as Forest 
and Bird. 19 At the Coalition's first meeting shortly after this, an executive of 11 was established 
and policies decided. Significantly, instead of setting their sights on the minimum flow review to 
be held the following year, they focused upon the question of water rights - a review of the 
water right for the river was seen as the best forum within which to deal with the fundamental 
questions about the management of the river.20 
The corporatisation and possible privatisation of the generation system precipitated this 
focus upon the water right issue. In order to maximise the asset value of the Corporation the 
government intended to include existing water rights in the sale and purchase agreement. 
However: 
[t]he coalition was concerned that the transfer of the water rights would deprive the community of 
any control or input into the management of the river, and could lead to E1ectricorp imposing 
charges on river users. It was also concerned Electricorp would have little incentive to reduce its 
intake from the catchment.21 
16 Indeed the Taumarunui County Council went so far as to suggest that DoC "take steps to have the river 
eventually included the Park". The Daily News 18 May 1987. 
17 K. Chapple, 1987, The Rape of the Whanganui River: One of New Zealand's Most Misguided Engineering 
Projects C and S Publications, Taumarunui. The launch of the booklet was covered in all of .the regional 
papers: The Daily News 12 October, Whanganui Chronicle 10 October, and Taumarunui Gazette 13 
October. 
IS Daily News 22 October 1987. At this stage the following groups planned to join the Coalition: NaturaIly 
Whanganui, Canoe Safaris, Mt Maunganui Tramping Club, Taupo Tramping Club, Taumarunui Tramping 
Club, King Country Forest and Bird, Federated Mountain Clubs of New Zealand, Taumarunui Boating 
Club/NZ Jet Boat Association, Whanganui City Council, OWhango Community Council, River City Canoe 
Club, Taumarunui District Promotion and Development Association, Manu Ariki Marae, and Winston Oliver 
the riverboat operator. 
19 Indeed it was to later include such 'sedate organisations' as the local branch of Federated Farmers and the 
Whanganui Chamber of Commerce. New Zealand Herald 2 January 1988. 
20 The Daily News 2 November 1987. 
21 The Domillion 13 November 1987. 
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The Coalition thus set out first, to delay the proposed sale of water rights to Electricorp, and 
second, to lobby for a review of the water right They embarked on their campaign with great 
vigour. A range of government ministers were petitioned both by letter and in person, with 
Helen Clark, the Minister of Conservation and of Tourism, being identified as the most likely 
ally.22 The Minister acted quickly seeking a stay on the transfer of assets until the water rights 
issue could be worked out.23 Electricorp responded by publicly stating that it expected the water 
right to be transferred to the Corporation - "to assume otherwise is to assume that Electricorp 
can't become a state owned enterprise". They also placed the problem firmly in the 
government's lap: 
Electricorp had no plans to fight to ensure the water right would be transferred Without 
guaranteed water supply the power generating equipment would be useless so it could become the 
Government's concern to ensure this supply.24 
During this period the Coalition received a wide range of media coverage (almost daily reportage 
in all the regional papers, plus extensive national coverage), they held a series of well attended 
public meetings throughout the Wbanganui region, and even announced that they were preparing 
to mount a legal challenge to any transfer. The Forest and Bird national council voted 
unanimously to broaden the dispute to the national level, and urged NW ASCA to "take all 
possible steps to prevent the sale of the nation's water".25 Clearly the campaign was gaining 
momentum. 
However in mid-December a coincident political claim changed the strategic picture. 
Earlier in the year the Court of Appeal had ordered the Crown to institute a mechanism which 
would safeguard existing or foreseeable claims against land and waters transferred to state owned 
enterprises.26 The Crown quickly acted upon this direction and on 9 December introduced the 
Treaty ofWaitangi (State Enterprises) Bill. 27 A consequence of this was that the Crown was 
now unable to transfer to an SOE water rights that had been issued in perpetuity. Yet as the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment pointed out, many water rights were already 
for varied durations, and differed widely in their terms and conditions.28 The Maori Council 
decision and consequent legislation were not a real solution to a problem that was by no means 
restricted to the Whanganui. However, they did up the ante against Electricorp and ultimately the 
government. Furthermore, the Wbanganui National Park Management Plan had been released 
and it advocated not only an increase in minimum flows, but also the restoration of natural flows 
if possible.29 The Coalition adjusted its sights. Instead of a review of the existing water right, 
it now wanted Electricorp to apply for a new water right.3o 
By this stage the new Corporation was on the defensive and had contracted a public 
relations firm to devise a strategy for the issue. They identified the media as a problem: 
22 Keith Chapple (Chairman of the Whanganui River Rows Coalition). 5 November 1987, Letter to the Minister 
of Conservation Helen Clark. 
23 The Daily News 20 November 1987. 
24 Ian Johnstone (North Island Hydro Group Environmental Manager. E1ectricorp) quoted in The Dominion 19 
November 1987. 
25 The Dominion 23 November 1987. 
26 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987]1 NZLR 641. 
27 The Dominion 10 December 1987. 
28 The Dominion Sunday Times 20 December 1987. 
29 Whanganui Chronicle 21 December 1987. 
30 K. Chapple. May 1988. "Whanganui River Flows Coalition: History" Unpublished paper, p. 4. 
:.:.: 
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The media and the 'publics' they address are ever ready to take up the banner for envirorunentaJ 
causes. It has been said that the Tongaririo Power Development (TPD) presents an ideal media 
opportunity, because not only is it seen as an envirorunentaJ issue, but also, since the 
involvement of Electricorp, it has become a case of "big business versus the defenceless wild 
river". It presents a clearly defined conflict situation, easily headlined and over-simplified. 
lending itself to heated debate and misinterpretation. 
The media should, therefore, be the immediate focus of the campaign because of the key role 
they play in informing and influencing publics such as local communities, politicians, pressure 
groups and others} 1 
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As they saw it, the solution was to (i) seek more balanced media coverage, (ii) conduct an 
advertising campaign to improve Electricorp's environmental image, and (iii) to build trust at the 
local level.32 This was a fairly detached and cynical perspective. There had undoubtedly been 
some oversimplification of the issues, and the media were particularly responsive to the 
Coalition's case, but these factors were underpinned by legitimate grievances, and furthermore, 
the Coalition's campaign had been most effective. Electricorp had been caught by surprise and 
their handling of the issue in these early stages verged on the inept (although in all fairness they 
were in the midst of a vast transition process). Most crucially, by seeing the issue as one for the 
government to resolve they had failed to 'own' what was prospectively going to be their 
problem. 
The Coalition campaign gained increasing momentum through the early months of 1988. 
In late January they held a media tour of the headwaters area, at which they launched a national 
petition. This resulted in a large number of articles in the regional and national newspapers.33 
Throughout February there was a vigorous debate in the Dominion Sunday Times prompted by 
a letter from the artist Peter McIntyre who accused Electricorp of manipulation by making a 
special release of water into the Wbakapapa River during the media visit. The Group 
Environmental Manager, Dr Ian Johnstone, denied this and noted that the release was due to the 
1983 regime, which was an "expensive exercise in river management ... a cost that is ultimately 
borne by the electricity consumer of New Zealand" (in another interview he stated that the loss of 
the WD water could result in a doubling of domestic electricity bills34). This in turn was 
rebutted by Tom Wells, retired Headmaster of Wbanganui Collegiate school, and deputy 
chairman of the Coalition.35 Elsewhere, the National MP for Waitotara, Venn Young - a former 
Minister of Lands and Forests, and Environment - threw his weight behind the campaign in a 
lengthy piece in the Whanganui Chronicle. 36 This media exposure, plus the continuous public 
efforts of the Coalition, placed considerable pressure on the Labour Government to accede to the 
demands. The first concession came on 26 February, when the Associate Minister for the 
Environment, Philip Woollaston, announced that the existing water rights agreements may not be 
applicable to the 'business-like' SOEs, and because of this the goverriment would not sell the 
rights but would instead lease them to the Corporation until a new institutional structure was in 
31 R. Hickman, and B. Gillespie (Clarity Communications), "Electricorp and the Whanganui River Hows 
Coalition: An Overview of the Issues and Recommended Communications Strategies" p. 10. 
32 Ibid., pp. 10-15. 
33 K. Chapple, May 1988, "Whanganui River Rows Coalition: History" Unpublished paper, p. 5. 
34 Taumarunui Gazelte 1 March 1988. 
35 The Dominion Sunday Times 7 and 14 February, and 6 March 1988. 
36 Whanganui Chronicle 2 Feb 1988. And in the following days paper he argued that the River should get the 
same sort of protection as Lakes Manapouri and Te Anau - by a set of regulatory controls overseen by a body 
of 'guardians'. 
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place (i.e. until the resource management law reform process was complete).37 Finally, on 27 
March, the Corporation agreed to the Coalition's demands. In its written submission to the 
minimum flows review it indicated that it would apply for a water right to replace the existing 
authorisations for the waters of the Whanganui,38 
While it was not strictly part of the minimum flows process, the water rights issue was a 
crucial episode in the minimum flows conflict. Over nine months a group of people from the 
Taumarunui area had formed an organisation around a clear goal, they had mobilised nation-wide 
support, engaged the help of key government ministers, severely damaged the public image of 
the new SOE, and achieved their immediate objective. They had done this with few financial 
resources, and a core organisation of three .or four people. The discourse had been largely 
symbolic and emotive, with virtually no scientific, technical, and economic argument of any 
substance (and that included the arguments of the Corporation which were equally superficial). 
These successes must, however, be seen in the context of the contemporaneous concerns and 
action of Maori with regard to the transfer of resources to the SOBs, and of nation-wide concern 
about the water rights issue per se. However, in the strategic context of the WRMF issue as a 
whole, the water rights episode had the effect of raising the profile of the issue and 
demonstrating to government the level of concern about the river - a crucial factor in maintaining 
the . resolve and political will of the government agencies and responsible ministers that 
subsequently engaged in the dispute. 
Lastly, in the final months of the campaign it was becoming clear to the Coalition that the 
water rights issue was just the beginning, and that the critical decision-making process about the 
substantive issues would take place within the minimum flow review, and they sought to involve 
themselves in that process. Discussion now turns to that process which had been progressing 
contemporaneous with the water rights campaign. 
12.2.(ii) The Minimum Flows Agenda 
Within a year of the 1983 regime being implemented a local river-boat operator, Winston Oliver, 
began a sustained correspondence with Don Spence (Chief Technical Officer, Rangitikei-
Whanganui Catchment Board) about the problems with navigation on the river. Many of his 
concerns related to issues of channel maintenance and information about flows. However, he 
also persistently questioned the adequacy of the 1983 regime.39 Although his inquiries were not 
the sole motivation, they certainly acted as a catalyst in prompting the Board to informally 
investigate the adequacy of the regime. The central conclusions of this interim review were that 
the flows had achieved their intended function and that the current procedures should continue. 
Spence did note, however, that the Board should "advise any parties interested in seeking 
changes to the existing arrangements, that they should direct their attention to preparing 
submissions, for whatever process is initiated for setting minimum flows beyond the expiry date 
of the present arrangements" .40 It was only months later in early 1987, that the Board 
37 K. Chapple. May 1988. "Whanganui River Rows Coalition: History" Unpublished paper, p. 6. 
38 The Dominion 28 March 1988. 
39 He also engaged the services of a lawyer to put his case to the Catchment Board. For example; 9 May 1986. 
Letter to the Chief Executive Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board 
40 Don Spence. August 1986. "Whanganui River Minimum Rows 1983-1986" Report to the Rangitikei-
Whanganui Catchment Board. 
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announced its intentions to conduct a fonnal review of the flow regime prior to its expiry in 
October 1988.41 This was the beginning of the central phase of the dispute. 
From the outset the newly fonned Department of Conservation took a bold stance on 
river flows. This was partially a function of its statutory management duties, but because the 
river itself (the bed and the water) were not actually managed by the Department, the prime 
motivation or mandate was vis a vis its advocacy function. As I noted above, the draft 
management plan for the Whanganui National Park signalled this position - advocating not only 
an increase in the minimum flow levels, but also the restoration of natural flows in the river - this 
was the broad position taken by the Department for the rest of the dispute. Conscious of 
Spence's injunction to gather evidence, DoC's Whanganui Conservancy was by late 1987 
signalling its intention to conduct an extensive research exercise prior to the minimum flow 
review. The Department put out a request for information about the river system, and began 
collecting data relating to physical, navigational, ecological, aesthetic/amenity and tourism 
impacts.42 During this period the District Conservator, John Ombler, addressed the early 
meetings of the Coalition and made it clear that DoC could not, and would not, participate in the 
water rights campaign, but would instead focus upon the flows review.43 It also moved behind 
the scenes to coordinate its efforts with the local authorities and other interest groups.44 
Throughout 19f!r7 the Taumarunui and Whanganui local bodies were also strident in their 
criticism of the low water levels. While the mayors of both towns pointed to the loss of amenity 
that resulted from low flows (especially the impact upon tourist revenue), they were also seeking 
increased flows in order to mitigate the effects of effluent discharges from their respective 
sewage treatment facilities. Neither council occupied the moral high ground. Furthennore, the 
Taumarunui Borough Council was also seeking to lever both outstanding compensation 
payments, and a higher level of future compensation, from the NZEDlElectricorp (under the 
Piriaka agreement).45 
In December 19f!r7 Don Spence produced a public discussion paper on the minimum flow 
review. Once more he expressed a desire to open up the review process to all matters having a 
bearing on the use and management of the River (although the exigencies and complexities of the 
issue were again to limit the process to a strict consideration of the minimum flows). I include 
here a passage of Spence's report which captures the essence of the Catchment Board process: 
The Water and Soil Conservation Act was intended to ensure that the best is made of the 
Nation's water resources in the interests of the community as a whole, and to allocate its lISe 
between competing interests accordingly. Outside of water conservation orders, where the Courts 
have now accorded some priority to the protection of the natural characteristics of rivers and 
lakes, and this is not the case here, no priority is given to any particular lISe, or the interests of 
any pu1.icular section of the community. Each has to establish what his or its neem are, and 
how their use, or the protection of it, benefits the community. 
Here N.Z. Electricity or now Electricorp, along with the communities of Taumarunui and 
Whanganui, and every jet boater, canoeist, fisherman and others, whether Maori or Pakeha, are 
41 NWASCA resolved that the Catchment Boord carry out a review in which it was to; "(a) report on the 
experience and acceptability over the last five years of the minimum flows set for the Whanganui River and 
whether any change is required, and (b) make use of public participation procedures similar to those used for 
Crown water rights." NW ASCA, 7 April 1987, "Review of Minimum Rows Whanganui River" Minutes 
(submission No. 340.4.87). 
42 Daily News 6 and 10 November 1987. 
43 Taumar/lnui Gazette 28 October 1987. 
44Whang~ui Chronicle 17 December 1987. 
45 Daily News 8 March 1987. 
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all users, and in some cases abusers of the River. None has any privilege, position or priority of 
use .... 
Inevitably, what is involved are decisions on the extent to which active uses of water, 
authorised by way of water rights, should be limited or restricted, now and in the future, to 
minimise or avoid any adverse effects on other users, be they active or passive. That means that 
what is sought must be capable of being achieved through statutory management mechanisms. 
Obviously the Benthamite principle of the greatest good for the greatest number has some 
relevance here, without being the only yardstick to be applied. 46 
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This discussion paper was released in 4 February 1988, with a notice calling for submissions to 
be made before 25 March, and a hearing date scheduled for mid-May. The paper received 
considerable publicity through a series of five feature articles written by Spence in the 
Whanganui Chronicle. 
The limited time frame for submissions caused some consternation amongst both DoC, 
whose scientific investigations were severely constrained by the time frame, and the Coalition, 
which had neglected the minimum flows process until the last moment. The Catchment Board 
rejected the calls for an extension on the deadline. While this forced DoC to curtail elements of 
its research program, the Department chose (on the basis of legal advice) not to present its written 
submissions to the Catchment Board until 9 June, when it made a well publicised delivery by 
canoe of its three volume submission.47 The DoC submission had cost the Department 
approximately $40,000, and had involved 20 staff plus input from outside consultants.48 
The Coalition responded to the time constraints by publicly criticising the Catchment 
Board, and by lobbying central government for an extension. Many of the organisations and 
individuals within the Coalition made their own written statements in addition to the submission 
made by the Coalition itself. Few of these submissions incorporated technical or scientific 
argument of any substance. However, they conveyed a strong message to the Catchment Board 
about the widespread dissatisfaction with the operation of the WD.49 
Electricorp was silent during the early months of 1988. The water rights issue had 
overshadowed the minimum flow review, and the Group Environmental Manager, Dr Ian 
Johnstone, subsequently admitted that in the early stages they didn't feel it was necessary that .the 
Corporation even make a submission. But after attending a Coalition meeting and discussions in 
Tokaanu with DoC staff, Johnstone wrote a brief submission on behalf of Electricorp.50 
However, motivated by the spectre of the DoC research project, this initial submission was soon 
46 Don Spence, December 1987 (Released February 1988), "Public Discussion Paper: Whanganui River 
Minimum How Review" Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board, Marton. The Long Title of the Water and 
Soil Conservation Act 1967 sets out the broad philosophy of balanced use that guided Spence's thinking here: 
An Act to promote a national policy in respect of natural water, and to make better provision for the 
conservation, allocation, use, and quality of natural water, and for promoting soil conservation 
and preventing damage by flood and erosion, and for promoting and controlling multiple uses of 
natural water and the drainage of land, and for ensuring that adequate account is taken of the needs 
of primary and secondary industry, community water supplies, all forms of water-based recreation, 
fisheries and wildlife habitats, and the preservation and protection of the wild scenic and other 
natural characteristics of rivers streams and lakes. 
47 Although the Board did allow DoC to submit additional evidence until mid-April. The Catchment Board 
defeOOed its intransigence by noting that if a decision were not made by the 31 October (the expiry date for the 
regime) then E1ectricorp would be able to take as much water as it wanted Daily News 18 March 1988. 
48 Much of the work on the submission had been carried out by unemployed university graduates, and university 
students during the summer vacation. Also, the $40,000 figure would not have taken into account the labour 
costs of permanent staff. Whanganui Chronicle 19 March 1988, 9 June 1988. 
49 Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board, 1988, "Submissions on Whanganui River Minimum Hows Review" 
Collected submissions in single volume. 
50 Ian Johnstone (Group Environmental rvlanager, E1ectricorp), 9 September 1993, Personal Interview, Hamilton. 
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bolstered by a two volume collection of both in-house analyses of the electricity sector, and 
consultants' reports about issues such as hydrology, fisheries, tourism, etc.51 
One other group was extremely active in the period prior to the closing date for 
submissions. The Taumarunui Development and Promotions Association (TDPDA) had 
distributed standard form submissions requesting the restoration of flows in the river. The 
TDPDA managed to collect 1187 submissions by the deadline which it presented to the Board in 
a battered kayak. 
The Catchment Board received some 1251 submissions in total. The submissions from 
DoC and Electricorp stood out in terms of the quality and breadth of investigation, and in a sense 
the vast majority of the submissions piggy-backed upon their technical arguments. These 
submissions also had the effect of raising the standards of argument for the Catchment Board 
hearing and afterwards. Of the total submissions; 288 advocated no diversion of water, 962 
submitted that only 20-SO percent of flows should be taken (the vast majority of these 
submissions were standard forms from the TDPDA campaign), and Electricorp alone argued for 
the continuance of the 1983 regime. 
12.2.(iii) The Catchment Board Hearing 
The Catchment Board appointed a special Tribunal comprised of four independent members. 
The Tribunal was to acquaint themselves with the written submissions and then entertain oral 
submissions in a hearing beginning 8 July. In the period leading up to the hearing the Catchment 
Board staff undertook the task of collating and summarising the submissions, as well as 
compiling a technical paper on behalf of the Board itself. The resulting precis was then made 
available to the public at a cost of $250 per copy. 
This was a period in which community groups also sought to raise the necessary funds to 
pay for legal counsel (the Board had suggested that such representation would be appropriate52) 
and expert witnesses. In order to share this cost, the Flows Coalition (which had briefly 
disbanded following the water rights decision) joined forces with the TDPDA to form the Flows 
Alliance. The Alliance solicited donations in a public appeal, raised money by such enterprises 
as selling bottles of river water, and received a $5000 grant from the Forest and Bird national 
office towards the projected $12,500 cost of the hearing. Forest and Bird also engaged the 
services of Ian Cowper (a member of the Environmental Defence Society which offered either 
pro bono publico or cut rate legal work to selected environmental causes) who would act on 
behalf of the Society as well as the Flows Alliance.53 
During this period E1ectricorp began to devote more and more resources to the minimum 
flows issue. A group of Corporation engineers, executives, PR staff (Dr Judith Aitken) and 
legal counsel (Roydon Somerville and Hillary Talbot), made a well publicised inspection of the 
area, and stated their intention to have at least 10 people present in Taumarunui for the hearing. 
Yet despite the Corporation issuing more press releases54 they received little coverage in 
51 Ian Johnstone, 23 March 1988, "Whanganui River: Review of Te Maire Minimum Flows, March 1988" 
Submission by Electricity Corporation of New Zealand 
52 Daily News 29 April 1988. 
53 Gerry McSweeney (Conservation Director, Forest and Bird Protection Society), 16 May 1988, Letter to Keith 
Chapple. 
54 Cf. Daily News 18 May 1988; Dominion 10 June 1988. 
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comparison to the daily newspaper reports about the activities and arguments of DoC and the 
Flows Alliance. 
Three of the Tribunal members were chosen because of their expertise and experience 
with the management of water resources, and the fourth member (Harawiri Gardiner) was 
ostensibly chosen to represent 'special interests', but in essence was there to represent Maori.55 
The tenns of inquiry were ultimately those set out in S. 20 J of the Water Act,56 which had 
replaced S.14 (3)(0) following the abolition of NWASCA. The substance of S.20 J was 
effectively the same as the old section. It read: 
The Board may from time to time, after consultation with representatives of all interested bodies, 
and persons known to the Board, fix ... the minimum acceptable flow and minimum standard of 
quality of the natural water of any river or stream, ..... 
One crucial addition made by the 1988 amendments was the establishment of a right of appeal to 
the Planning Tribunal against ajudgement made under S. 20 J. 
The fixing of such a minimum flow, as I have noted previously, was to be made pursuant 
to the principles of the Water Act, which could simply be described as an enjoinder towards 
balanced use. This 'balancing' process had in the past applied to much planning legislation, with 
no decision rule - such as an ecological bottom line - being privileged above any other. The 
procedures set out for the hearing were also flexible; evidence was not required to be given under 
oath, lawyers were permitted but they were not allowed to cross examine witnesses, evidence 
was taken as read and so oral submissions were restricted to synopses and the elucidation of key 
points, and each party was restricted to one spokesperson (other than their expert witnesses).57 
These guidelines enabled the hearing to be conducted over the relatively brief period of seven 
sitting days. The Catchment Board hearing was held in the Taumarunui between 8 and 30 July, 
the Tribunal sat for six days in the District Courthouse and, later, one day on the Ngapuwaiwaha 
Marae, as well as field excursions by helicopter and jet boat to various parts of the river system. 
During this time they heard the evidence of 76 witnesses called by 16 parties.58 Most of this 
period was taken up by the DoC, Electricorp and Whanganui Maori Trust Board submissions. 
In Chapter Eleven I described the main elements of the parties arguments, but it is useful to 
identify some of the central positions taken in the hearing. 
The Department of Conservation was resolute in its advocacy of the return of natural 
flows to the river. This was its baseline approach. The District Conservator, John Om bIer, had 
commented "if the waters are not put back the river remains sick",59 and the foreword of the 
DoC submission described the Wbanganui River as "like an amputee and shadow of its former 
self'.60 In the hearing DoC's senior counsel Jim Guthrie requested 100 percent flows at Te 
55 The tribunal members were: Malcolm Conway, a fonner Director General of the New Zealand Forest Service 
and fonner Chainnan of NWASCA; Peter Simons, retired General Manager of the Hawke's Bay Catchment 
Bowd and former Chief Engineer for the Rangitikei Board; Dr Neil Algar, a medical practitioner, former Mayor 
of Matamata, and member of NW ASCA 1973-88; and Harawiri Gardiner, a former Lt. Colonel and then 
Advisor to the Minister of Maori Affairs. Whanganui Chronicle 18 May 1988. 
56 As inserted by S. 18 of the Water and Soil Conservation Amendment Act 1988. 
57 Daily News 19 May 1988. 
58 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v M anawatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W7019IJ, p. 9. 
59 Whanganui Chronicle 19 June 1988. 
60 Jeff Connell (Regional Conservator, Whanganui Region), In: Department of Conservation, May 1988, 
"Whanganui River Minimum Flows Submission Vol. 1 - Submission to the Rangitikei-Whanganui 
Catchment Board" Whanganui Conservancy. 
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Maire. The Department's stance towards Electricorp's interests was simply that "the Tongariro 
scheme, the capital invested in it and the value of water abstracted by it were all matters of little 
weight".61 The only compromise position of any sort put by DoC was the option of returning all 
flows to the river in the short term, thereby allowing the river to attain some sort of natural 
equilibrium, and then to try diverting as much water as possible without substantially affecting 
that ecological baIance.62 This seemingly intransigent position stimulated considerable criticism. 
First of all the Department came under attack from the parliamentary opposition. National Party 
MP and spokesman for Conservation, Roger McClay, criticised the Department's position as 
"unrealistic" and "ill-conceived" and argued that the Whanganui Conservancy should be "brought 
to heel".63 Secondly, and most pertinently in the context of the analytical framework, DoC's 
position caused rumblings at the heart of government administration - within the Treasury. The 
Treasury had a number of concerns which it expressed in a report to the Finance Minister: 
1. What authority did DoC have to undertake the report?; 
2. Were Ministers aware of the submissions existence prior to media reports?; 
3. Does the submission reflect a Crown position and if not, which agency has the responsibility 
for reporting to Ministers?; and 
4. Should the Crown publicly express a single or potentially multiple view on this issue, and 
conservation issues in general? 
It seems, however, that the motivating factor for the Treasury on this issue was Electricorp's 
assertion that the loss of the Western Diversion flows would reduce national wealth by $300 
million in net present value terms (as it turned out this was a greatly inflated estimate).64 Implicit 
in the Treasury report was the desire to water-down or constrain DoC's advocacy role, as well as 
limit the transparency of public processes such as the Catchment Board hearing (where a number 
of state or peri-state interests were in open conflict). However, irrespective of Treasury's 
discomfiture, the Minister of Conservation Helen Clark supported the Department's stance. 
Finally, the Department's uncompromising position must be seen with hindsight as a strategic 
move. The Chairman of the Tribunal, Malcolm Conway, told DoC's counsel that "practical 
decisions" would be made on the Western Diversion issue.65 But, as I note below, the ultimate 
compromise position did not disappoint the Department - its approach had been to advocate a 
strong case within an overarching balancing process. Both the Flows Alliance and Forest and 
Bird essentially supported DoC's position. 
Prior to the Catchment Board hearing Whanganui Maori had been virtually silent on the 
issue of river flows. This was the first time that Te Atahau-nui-a-Paparangi had presented their 
case under the umbrella of the Whanganui River Maori Trust Board.66 The Trust Board's 
written submission had simply signalled its intention to appear at the hearing. Yet once the 
hearing commenced it was clear that the Trust Board was going to 'play a central role in the 
dispute. Like DoC, the Trust Board called for the natural flows to be restored to the river, but in 
addition to this they saw the hearings as an opportunity to air grievances about the history of the 
61 Evening Post 12 July 1988. 
62 Whanganui Chronicle 19 June 1988. 
63 Daily News 18 June 1988. 
64 D. Andrew (for the Secretary to the Treasury), 20 July 1988, "Water Rights - Whanganui River" Report to the 
Minister of Finance, Treasury, p. 1. 
65 Whanganui Chronicle 13 July 1988. 
66 The Trust Boord was e!otablished by the Whanganui River Maori Trust Board Act 1988 for the purposes of 
administering the resources of the river tribes. 
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TPD and the wider control of the river, and to demand inclusion in future decision-making. A 
large number of people from the river tribes attended the hearing at the Ngapuwaiwaha Marae.67 
Electricorp also took a firm position during the hearing. As I noted above they advocated 
the continuation of the 1983 regime. Where DoC had painted a bleak picture about decreased 
flows, Electricorp exaggerated the costs of increased river levels. Electricorp listed; the cost of 
constructing the TPD ($48 m), the cost of replacing the WD alone ($250-550 m), and an 
estimated the NPV of the loss of all diversion flows as $300 m. They also greatly over-
emphasised consequent price rises. However, these arguments were fairly manipulative, for as I 
argued in the previous chapter, the Corporation itself treated such costs as sunk, the NPV of the 
WD water was more realistically in the region of $225 m (dependent, of course, on the discount 
rate used), and also, the price rise argument could not be sustained. One matter that did arise 
with respect to Electricorp's conduct within the hearing was with regard to a DoC witness. A 
Works Consultancy scientist, Jim Dahm, who had prepared evidence for DoC on the issues of 
hydrology and sedimentation, withdrew his services at the last moment because of Electricorp 
pressure. Electricorp had contracted the services of other Works staff in the preparation of its 
own submission, and claimed that there was a conflict of interest.68 However, DoC's use of Mr 
Dahm would have contravened no legal or administrative principle (there being no property in a 
witness) and could only be construed as blatant exercise of the Corporation's influence.69 
12.2.(iv) Outcome 
Following the hearing the Tribunal embarked on the process of analysing and weighing the 
evidence, and dealing with the technical questions involved in prescribing and implementing a 
flow regime to satisfy their chosen ends.70 The complexity and scale of this task meant that it 
was late September before they reported to the Catchment Board, and 18 October before the 
Board made a decision. In the interim period the Treasury report had been leaked to the media 
(Treasury subsequently turned down an Official Information Act request for the document71) and 
a series of media reports ensued in which Keith Chapple suggested Treasury may seek' to 
influence the Catchment Board,72 There is no evidence to suggest that any such influence was 
exercised, and this is most apparent in the substance of the Boards decision, which was as 
follows: 
That pursuant to Section 20 J of the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967: 
1. The minimum acceptable flow of the Whanganui River immediately downstream of the 
Tongariro Power Development Western Diversion Intake be fixed at 100% of the natural 
flow. 
2. The minimum acceptable flow of the Whakapapa as measured at the footbridge recording site 
be fixed at 8.5 cumecs for the period 1 December to 30 April and 4.2 CunlecS for the balance 
of the year, subject to such flows being naturally available .... 
3. This flow Iegime Iemain in place for five years expiring on 31 October 1993. 
67 Whanganui Chronicle 1 August 1988. 
68 Daily News 12 July 1998; Whanganui Chronicle 12 July 1988. 
69 Indeed, the scientist's summary termination of his contract with DoC was potentially actionable in the law. 
70 Taumarunui Gazette 6 September 1988. 
71 This request was made by Dr Gerry McSweeney, the Conservation Director of Forest and Bird, to the SecIetary 
for the Treasury. Whanganui Chronicle 15 September 1988. 
72 Taumarunui Gazette 6 September 1988; Daily News 15 September 1988; Whanganui Chronicle 15 
September. 
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The decision also made provision for Electricorp to seek lower minimum flows in the event of a 
national power shortage. But the Board's resolution went beyond the specification of minimum 
flows to include two other points. The first was that consideration would be given to the wider 
issues raised by Maori during the hearings. Once it had consulted with Maori and identified their 
concerns, the Board undertook to refer those questions to an appropriate authority. The second 
point was that the Board recommended that the Commissioner for the Environment, under S .16 
(1) and (g) of the Environment Act 1986, promote energy conservation as an important facet of 
resource management 73 The parties had 28 days to appeal the decision to the Planning 
Tribunal. 
Consideration of the flow regime may, in the first instance, focus upon two elements. 
The first is the change in water volumes, and the second relates to which particular headwater 
flows are modified. With regard to the first indicator, the Catchment Board decision reduced the 
annual diversion out-flows by approximately a third. In terms of the second, the Planning 
Tribunal observed that the intent of the Catchment Board's regime was: 
That the intake on the Wbanganui River for the Western Diversion would be closed, so that the 
natural flows there would be restored; that the diversion from the Wbakapapa River would be 
controlled to achieve the minimum flows specified; and that the diversions from the other four 
tributaries of the Whanganui River would continue.74 
In broad terms this focus upon the upper reaches of the river - to a great extent the Whakapapa -
represented a substantial shift in emphasis from the 1983 regime which centred upon the middle 
reaches below Te Maire. I will discuss here the reactions of the main actors to this decision. 
Electricorp's response was initially one of disbelief, before rapidly assuming a more 
bellicose position. The decision was perceived within the Corporation as a disaster, and its 
spokespeople did not hesitate to convey this impression to the media.75 They asserted that: the 
increased minimum flow levels represented a mean loss of 50 percent of the diversion flows76 ; 
this would cut North Island hydro output by a quarter; the cost of the decision alone amounted to 
$17 m a year77; the lost water .would have an NPV of $80 m; this would cost consumers 
hundreds of millions of dollars in the future; and it would add $100 a year to the average power 
bill.78 Furthermore, Electricorp's Chairman, John Fernyhough, was worried that the decision 
would set a precedent, that would subsequently lead to a gradual erosion of the water resources 
available for hydro-generation at a national level: 
At the end of the day it is not the interests of any small group or minority that have got to be 
brought to bear. It is the decision of the community as a whole which has to balance, on the 
one hand, the interests of minorities. [and] on the other hand the cost to the country as a whole. 
And that's the a:cision-making procedure that's got to prevail. Otherwise what'll happen is that 
slowly over a period of time each of these decisions will be made on a local basis where the costs 
will accumulate and one day we'll realise, as New Zealanders, that we've totally shot ourselves in 
the foot.79 
73 M. Holland (Director of Resources, Central Districts Catchment Board), 19 October 1988, Letter to Dr Roger 
Blakeley, Secretary for the Environment. 
74 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, p. 9. 
75 Ian Johnstone (Group Environmental Manager, Eiectricorp), 9 September 1993, Personal Interview, Hamilton. 
76 Evening Post 19 October 1988. 
77 New Zealand Herald 20 October 1988. 
78 John Femyhough (Chairman, Electricorp), 19 October 1988, Interviewed in Television New Zealand 6 pm 
News Bulletin. 
79 John Fernyhough, 20 October 1988, Interview on Radio New Zealand "Morning Report", Newztel Log. 
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The Chief Executive of Electricorp similarly stated "the national interest was not represented".80 
As I noted in the previous chapter, this was a core element of the Corporation's case. However, 
although many of the participants in the hearing had put forward arguments based on local 
interests, the conservation, recreation and Maori arguments could equally be viewed as national 
concerns. 
But while the Catchment Board decision did indeed represent a significant cost to the 
Corporation, their public estimates were substantially exaggerated. A thorough analysis would 
reveal that: the loss of water amounted to 32 percent of mean diversion flows rather than the 
widely quoted 50 percent;81 that would be about 210 Gwh out of the total 7590 Gwh generated 
by North Island hydro in 1988/9 - about 3 percent instead of 25;82 the average annual cost 
would be expected to be $5.9 m and not $17 m; the NPV approximately $72 m (although $80 m 
was not an unreasonable estimate);83 the suggestion that it represented hundreds of millions of 
dollars in future costs had no substance; and, the increase to the average household electricity bill 
would amount to only $5.30 per annum.84 Regardless of these tactical exaggerations, the real 
underlying costs of the decision represented a considerable loss of revenue for Electricorp. The 
Corporation's return on its assets had been a paltry 3.7 percent in 1988,85 and the loss of 
profitable intra-marginal capacity was judged to be unacceptable.86 Electricorp swiftly lodged an 
appeal to the Planning Tribunal. 
The media portrayed the Coalition/Alliance's immediate reaction to the decision as a 
negative one. A front page article in the Dominion quoted Keith Chapple as saying the decision 
was merely "tokenism", and that while the closure of the Whanganui intake was a progressive 
move, the effect on the remainder of the intakes was unacceptable.87 Chapple's comments were 
then quoted elsewhere.88 These negative remarks caused some annoyance amongst the ranks of 
conservationists, many of whom were extremely pleased with the decision. However, it seems 
that his remarks had been taken out of context, much to Chapple's chagrin.89 The grass roots 
activists had indeed wished for a better result, but on reflection they too realised that they had 
achieved a remarkable victory. The Forest and Bird national office portrayed the decision a's a 
huge success.90 Various conservation organisations then went on the offensive in an effort to 
counter Electricorp's response. On one level, Chapple, Gerard Hutching (Forest and Bird's 
national spokesman), and the energy campaigner Molly Melhuish, set out to expose the 
80 Dr Roderick Deane (Chief Executive, Eiectricorp), 17 December 1988, Interview on Radio New Zealand, 
Newztel Log. 
81 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whallganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge 
Sheppard, W70/90, p. 165. 
82 Ibid, pp. 141. 145. 
83 Ibid, pp. 164-5. 
84 Molly Melhuish (Energy Researcher). 21 October 1988, Interview on Radio New Zealand "Morning Report", 
Newztel Log. 
85 After tax and extraordinary expenses. Electricity Corporation of New Zealand, 1992/3, Annual Report p. 28. 
86 Indeed at this time the Corporation had embarked on an aggressive marketing and public relations campaign 
87 Dominion 19 October 1988. 
88 New Zealand Herald 20 October 1988. 
89 Keith Chapple. 14 November 1989, Letter to Gerard Hutching (Forest and Bird). 
90 Gerard Hutching (Spokesman. Forest and Bird), 19 October 1988, Press Release "Whanganui Decision 
Welcomed"; Dr Gerry McSweeney (Conservation Director, Forest and Bird), 20 October 1988, Letter to Keith 
Chapple. 
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inaccuracies in Electricorp's estimates of cost (see above). On another level they sought to 
dissuade Electricorp from its appeal, by selling the decision as a balanced and reasonable one.91 
Direct tactics were also utilised. For example, in the November edition of Conservation News 
(which went out to 50,000 Forest and Bird members), the Society urged its members to write to 
the Chairman of Electricorp at his home address, urging the Corporation to drop the appeal.92 
This action was to later result in allegations of contempt of court against the conservationists. 
The immediate reactions of DoC and its Minister, Helen Clark, were extremely positive. 
In Whanganui the District Conservator John Ombler welcomed the decision, noting that it would 
have positive effects on both the ecology and recreation possibilities.93 Helen Clark issued a 
press statement that listed the various benefits of the decision. She did note that the new regime 
would by no means restore the river to its natural state - for example, the periphyton problem 
would most probably persist in the Whakapapa because the levels of sand fines in the river 
would not increase.94 Nevertheless the Department's approach was a pragmatic one, as they 
saw the decision as a best possible solution in a context of competing uses. 
In their report to the Catchment Board the Catchment Board Tribunal wrote that they were 
concerned that the river tribes had not been properly consulted and their special relationship with 
the river had not been given due consideration. It was for this reason that they recommended the 
restoration of the natural flow to the upper-Whanganui.95 This procedural and substantive 
regard for the values and concerns of Te Atihau-nui-a-Paparangi was warmly received by the 
Whanganui Maori Trust Board. In a press release the Trust Board Chairman, Archie Taiaroa, 
wrote: 
It's the first time the Maori people have been listened to and consideration given to some of their 
grievances as regards to the Whanganui River. Its recommendations is [Sic.) a good start I hope, 
towards continuing consultation, co-operation and partnership... . We want a fair bit of say in it 
all. 
And later: 
The Trust Board spent a lot of money on making its submissions to the Hearing and will 
continue to fight should this matter go to Appeal. We hope that co-operation, continual 
consultation and partnership would not necessitate that. 96 
The Trust Board's resolve was soon to be tested. 
To conclude, in comparison to the 1983 establishment process, the 1988 review (and I 
include here the concomitant water rights issue) was more politicised, focused upon different 
substantive questions which were also more complex and wide-ranging, involved more 
structured 'quasi-juridical' decision-making as well as political discourse, and consisted of a 
matrix of disparate expectations. The impetus of the conflict was a product of the routine 
administrative review (to a degree stimulated by the persistent inquiries of Winston Oliver) 
coinciding with: (i) A period of heightened environmental/ecological consciousness and politics 
91 For example: Molly Melhuish (Energy Researcher), 21 October 1988, Interview on Radio New Zealand 
"Morning Report", Newztel Log; Gerard Hutching (Spokesman, Forest and Bird), 20 October 1988, Interview 
on Radio New Zealand "Morning Report"; Molly Melhuish, October 1988, "Whanganui River Decision: 
Trifling Impact on Power Bills" ECO Newsletter p. 9; Evening Post 21 October 1988. 
92The Editor, November 1988, Conservation News No. 48. 
93 Dominion 19 October 1988. 
94 Helen Clark (Minister of Conservation), 18 October 1988, Press Statement. 
95 Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board and Regional Water Board, September 1988, "Whanganui River 
Minimum Row Review: Report and Recommendations of the Tribunal" Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment 
Boord, Marton. 
96 Archie Taiaroa (Chairman, Whanganui River Maori Trust Board), 18 October 1988, Press Statement. 
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at the nationallevel;97 (ii) Widespread government restructuring. The dis-establishment of the 
NZED and the creation of Electricorp were of crucial contextual significance in the water rights 
issue, which in tum politicised the minimum flows review. The recent creation of the 
Department of Conservation with a clear statutory duty to manage and advocate for conservation 
values meant that the Whanganui Conservancy staff were highly motivated and eager to test their 
mandate.98 Also, the aggressive regionalism of groups such as the TDPDA was in great part 
spurred by economic restructuring - for example, the loss of agricultural subsidies, and in public 
service jobs such as the New Zealand Railways - which had depressed rural service centres such 
as Taumarunui;99 And (iii) the increased cohesion and political strength of Whanganui Maori 
under the umbrella of the newly fonned Wbanganui River Maori Trust Board. I am hesitant to 
describe this as a Maori renaissance, because Maori in the region had never stopped fighting for 
control of the river. However, the Treaty claims process had empowered the tribes and increased 
expectations, and this energy was turned towards the minimum flow review. 
While the dispute proceeded on a far wider scale than previously, and without 
diminishing the efforts of the many people who took part, it was greatly influenced by certain 
key individuals. Don Spence was again pivotal in detennining at an early stage the institutional 
fonn of the decision-making process (insofar as the Water Act did not set out a specific 
process). Keith Chapple'S remarkable energy, tenacity and advocacy skills were vital in driving 
the Coalition, and later the Alliance, campaigns.lOO DoC's District Conservator, John Ombler, 
remained deeply committed to the issue despite public criticism. Electricorp's spokesman, Dr Ian 
Johnstone, was to a degree responsible for the Corporation's uneven and fraught management of 
the issue prior to the hearing. 10 1 While many others played 'important parts in the conflict these 
individuals were pivotal in shaping the character and path of the dispute. 
The substantive content of the dispute also differed greatly. The discourse widened, and 
while the recreational values of the middle reaches still figured prominently, the ecological and 
Maori dimensions were now of fundamental importance. There was also a shift in emphasis 
towards the upper reaches (reflected in the decision). This was partly a function of the ecological 
effects that were present in the areas of greatest hydrological disturbance. But it was also a due 
to the advocacy of Chapple and his cohorts from the Taumarunui region. The values became 
more diverse and extreme thereby raising the stakes, and their articulation, substantiation and 
scrutinisation became more complex, and often technical and scientific. 
Finally, the process of decision-making involved vigorous grass roots politics and 
lobbying activity during the water rights issue, and a more structured mix of democratic input 
and, as I noted above, quasi-juridical, procedure in the flow review. Furthennore, this decision-
97 T. Bilhrs, and R. Bartlett. 1993, Environmental Policy in New Zealand: The Politics of Clean and Green? 
Oxford University Press, Auckland, Ch. 3. 
98 John Ombler (District Conserv ator, Whanganui), 27 July 1998, Personal Interview, Wellington. 
99 Tom Wells, 1988, Submission on behalf of the Rows Alliance, Catchment Board hearing. 
100 Chapple and his wife Brema received Forest and Bird's 'Old Blue' award for their efforts. 
101 Although to be fair, he was previously lUlllware of the legacy of discontent left by the NZED - especially 
regarding Maori. He also pointed out that there was little institutional knowledge within the Corporation as to 
how to go about dealing with processes of environmental conflict. Ian Johnstone (Group Environmental 
Manager, Electricorp), 9 September 1993, Personal Interview, Hamilton. I would like to add here that given 
the NZED's experiences with issues such as the Manapouri and Clyde hydro-disputes, one would expect there 
to have been some institutional knowledge on such matters. 
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making process was located wholly within the region itself (whereas in 1983 NW ASCA had the 
ultimate say). 
12.3. The 1989 Planning Tribunal Appeals 
The second phase of the review process was the Planning Tribunal appeals that followed the 
Catchment Board decision. Once again the ante was raised. However this time it wasn't the 
substantive claims that changed so much as the transaction costs of conflict, which grew 
exponentially with the transition to a wholly juridical decision process. The Planning Tribunal 
was to sit for 84 days in the period between 4 September 1989 and 18 May 1990. The testimony 
of 105 witnesses was heard. Much of this evidence was new, and a great deal of it was highly 
specialised and recondite. The hearing also involved expansive legal argument. It is not 
surprising then that this turned out to be one of the most, if not the most costly resource 
management case in New Zealand's history. 102 
12.3.(i) The Pre-Hearing Period 
Within weeks of the Catchment Board decision, Electricorp lodged an appeal to the Planning 
Tribunal pursuant to S's 20 J and 25 of the Water Act. The essence of its argument was that the 
Catchment Board (the Respondent) had exceeded its jurisdiction. The Corporation ultimately 
sought the continuation of the 1983 regime (and an award of costs). They also noted that while 
the term of the 1983 regime had expired they would voluntarily adhere to the same minimum 
flow levels for the duration of the appeals process. 103 Concomitant with the appeal notice, the 
Corporation sought to justify its actions in the national media 104 
As they had promised, the Trust Board counter-appealed as a strategic response to 
Electricorp's actions. The Trust Board listed five main grounds of appeal, which focused upon 
the affront to their traditional values posed by any diversion of water, and upon the question of 
control over the river. lOS No other parties appealed, but it was inevitable that those sucii as 
DoC, the Coalition, and local bodies, would at least seek to be heard in any subsequent hearing. 
The Coalition's response to the appeals was twofold. First of all they would undertake a 
public campaign similar to the one they had waged on the water rights issue. They would urge 
the Corporation to both withdraw the appeal and to immediately implement Q1e Catchment Board 
regime. Secondly, they would again seek the assistance of legal counsel and begin the process 
of compiling additional evidence in case the appeal proceeded.106 The one action that was 
undertaken over the Christmas period was the letter writing initiative that I mentioned earlier. 
The national President of Forest and Bird, Professor Alan Mark, wrote to John Fernyhough on 
behalf of the Society as a whole (invoking the 'good corporate citizen' clause of the SOE Act), 
and the membership were urged to write individually,l07 I mention this action again because it 
102 I refer here to the procedural costs of conflict rather than the substantive implications. 
103 Ibid. 
104 For example. the Chief Executive was interviewed at length on National Radio. Dr Roderick Deane (Chief 
Executive. Electricorp), 17 December 1988, Interview on Radio New Zealand, Newztel Log. 
lOS The Wbanganui River Maori Trust Board, 18 November 1988, Notice of Appeal. 
106 Keith Chapple (In capacity as Chainnan of the King Country Branch, Forest and Bird), 14 November 1988, 
Letter to Gerard Hutching (National Office, Forest and Bird). 
107 Professor Alan Mark (President, Forest and Bird), 21 December 1988, Letter to John Femyhough. 
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incited a response from Electricorp that changed the character of the conflict environment and 
process. 
In early January 1989 there was a brief public exchange between Forest and Bird and 
Electricorp. The Society issued a press release that, inter alia, described the Catchment Board 
decision as balanced and fair, dismissed Electricorp's costings as scaremongering, and once 
again urged them to withdraw their appeal. 108 This time Electricorp vigorously defended its 
decision - "the Corporation would be failing power users if it didn't appeal".109 Behind the 
scenes Electricorp's lawyers I>rotested to the Principal Planning Judge (David Sheppard), 
arguing that the conservationists' remarks (and lobbying of the Chainnan) were likely to inhibit 
the Corporation from pursuing its appeal. An irate Judge Sheppard warned the Society that by 
pre-empting the due consideration of the Tribunal they were in contempt. Forest and Bird were 
forced to make a public display of contrition, by apologising to the Tribunal directly, and by 
making a public retraction of their remarks. IIO The realisation that the issue was now sub judice 
transfonned the pattern of conflict While the PR battle continued, public statements became 
more obtuse and less direct. Moreover, there was little chance that Electricorp would diverge 
from its course of action, and so the imperative upon all opponents was to be as prepared as 
possible for the Planning Tribunal hearing. 
The Coalition's immediate task was to raise money for the Tribunal case. Once again 
they solicited donations and conducted various fundraising activities in the Whanganui 
region. III They also made a (well publicised) approach to the Minister of State Owned 
Enterprises, Stan Rodger, arguing that if Electricorp were to have access to virtually unlimited 
funds for its legal case, then to ensure some equity in the matter it was fair and reasonable that 
the community groups receive some contribution. The Coalition initially requested $30,000 but 
later reduced the sum to $7,SOO because Forest and Bird said they would cover some of the 
Coalition's expenses.Il2 Stan Rodger turned down the appeal (even if he had wanted to there 
was no applicable mechanism to give such support), and suggested instead that the community 
representatives petition DoC for some money. This was, however, not only inappropriate (as' the 
Department was devoting as many resources as possible to the same case) but also unlikely given 
DoC's perennial funding problems. 1l3 The Coalition did eventually receive a sum of $13,000 
from the Taumarunui Borough Council (ironically the money came from a fund built up from 
NZED and Electricorp compensation payments made under the Piriaka agreement). 1 14 
108 Dr Gerry McSweeney (Conservation Director, Forest and Bird), 10 January 1989, Press Release "Electricorp 
Challenged to Return Headwaters to Wbanganui River"; Whanganui Chronicle 11 January 1988; Evening 
Post 11 January 1988; Dominion 12 January 1989. 
109 National Radio, 11 January 1989, 6 pm News Bulletin, Newztel Log; Dominion 13 January 1989; 
Whanganui Chronicle 13 January 1989; Evening Post 13 January 1989. 
110 Ian Cowper (Counsel for Forest and Bird), 20 January 1989, Letter to the Chief Planning Judge; Ian Cowper, 
14 March 1989, Letter to Dr Gerry McSweeney. . 
111 Daily News 12 May 1989; Ruapehu Press 16 May 1989. 
112 Keith Chapple, 13 January 1989, Letter to the Minister of State Owned Enterprises; Whanganlli Chronicle 
14 March 1989. 
113 Whanganui Chronicle 6 April 1989; Daily News 7 April 1989. 
114 Keith Chapple, 20 September 1993, Personal Interview, Kakahi. The Coalition also mised $10,000 in a 
radio appeal in June, plus donations from Forest and Bird and other organisations and individuals. Daily News 
16 June 1989. 
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The other organisation with funding problems during this period was the Catchment 
Board which as Respondent in the appeal had no choice but to be represented throughout the 
hearing. The Board had already expended considerable resources on the issue and any further 
costs would pose a huge burden on the organisation, forcing it to divert funds from its 
operational budgets. The Board repeatedly applied to the Ministry for the Environment for 
special funding - one of its grounds being that the issue was generally considered to be a matter 
of national importance and such decisions had traditionally been funded by central 
government. llS The request was unsuccessful. 1 16 
On 10 April there was a pre-hearing conference held between Judge Sheppard and the 
parties to the appeal (appellants, respondent, and those other parties who wished to be heard117). 
The purpose of the conference was to ascertain the level of involvement of each party, and to 
make arrangements for a hearing. Through the discussion it transpired that Electricorp would be 
calling over 40 witnesses, while the Minister of Conservation intended to call over 20 witnesses. 
Indeed a total of 80 witnesses were predicted at that stage. Furthermore, it was anticipated that 
the hearing would be of eight to ten weeks duration. 118 
This encounter had a profound effect on the conservationists. The prime impression that 
emerged from the meeting was the sheer scope and scale of the impending hearing. Moreover, 
the vast resources that Electricorp was now devoting to the issue were for the first time readily 
apparent. Following the conference Chapple, Forest and Bird's Counsel, and the DoC 
representatives all retired to the DoC offices. It was at this point that Forest and Bird decided to 
withdraw from the proceedings. The Coalition would continue its involvement, with Chapple 
acting as a lay advocate in the proceedings ("a daunting prospect" 119). A natural division of 
labour emerged, with DoC conducting the bulk of the conservation argument, and the Coalition 
putting forward the regional perspective. 
Forest and Bird withdrew from the hearing for a number of reasons. The first of which 
was the expected cost of participation, estimated to be at the very least $100,000 (even taking 
into account the discounted legal costs). 120 The possibility that it could cost more was indicated 
by an Electricorp official who told Dr McSweeney that the Corporation would pursue the case all 
115 R. Barrett (General Manager. Central Districts Catchment Boards). 21 July 1989. Letter to Dr Roger 
Blakeley. Secretary for the Environment. 
116 J~hn Gallen (Office Solicitor. Ministry for the Environment). 15 August 1989. Letter to Director of 
Resources. Central Districts Catchment Boards. Also; Whanganui Chronicle 16 August 1989. 
117 Parties such as DoC. the Coalition. Winston Oliver and the Councils gained their standing by virtue of 
having appeared at the first instance hearing. Pursuant to S. 25 of the Water Act. 
118 Ian Cowper (Counsel for Forest and Bird). 11 April 1989. Letter to Dr Gerry McSweeney. One of the more 
contentious issues in this meeting was the application made by the Whanganui River Maori Trust Board to be 
h:ard on a marae. Judge Sheppard displayed some concern about the problems of control and process. The 
Planning TribuiJaJ. would be unwilling to divest itself of any control over the proceedings. cross-examination 
would have to remain despite Maori objections. and while the Tribunal had no problems with evidence being 
given in Maori there would still have to be a written document in English that accurately depicted the same 
evidence. Bronwyn Arthur (Counsel for Minister for the Environment). 11 April 1989. Internal Memorandum. 
Ministry for the Environment. 
119 Keith Chapple. 16 April 1989. Letter to Dr Gerry McSweeney. 
120 It had earlier been rumoured that Electricorp had allocated $1 m to conduct its case. This was later to prove to 
be a very conservative estimate. Tom Wells (Deputy Chairman. Whanganui River Minimum Hows 
Coalition). 13 January 1989. Press Release "Electricorp Extravagance Continues". 
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the way using maximum resources. 121 The second was that Forest and Bird's substantive 
concerns were essentially the same as DoC's, and furthermore, DoC was open to the possibility 
of broadening its case to accommodate any specific ecological issues raised by the Society.122 
Thirdly, there had been some unease within the Society about the appropriateness of opposing 
hydro production when the probable alternative was the use of fossil fuels (although not 
necessarily so) - and the Society may have had some difficulty justifying to its membership such 
a relatively large expenditure on an issue that was not (mistakenly perceived to be) unequivocally 
or totally beneficial to the environment. 123 Forest and Bird's decision to withdraw received 
extensive media coverage. The Society's press release listed costs as the foremost consideration, 
and went even further to argue that this was setting a bad precedent.124 The costs issue was 
taken up by the parliamentary opposition - the National Party spokesman for conservation, 
Dennis Marshall, stated: 
Huge taxpayer funded monopolies such as Electricorp have access to unlimited resources. They 
are putting up over 40 witnesses to the tribunal hearing on the Whanganui River and can afford 
to pay for expensive lawyers for unlimited time. It was not surprising the [Society] has to 
withdraw when a proper defence would have cost over $100,000. 125 
Once again Keith Chapple was pulling strings behind the scenes in his PR battle against the 
Corporation. 126 
In the months prior to the commencement of the hearing most of the activity was behind 
the scenes. Legal cases were developed, research undertaken and briefs of evidence written. It 
was a period of great industry. It was also characterised by a succession of turf wars, and 
episodes of personal conflict. I will mention three particular issues/episodes that happened 
during this period. The first was the problem of putting forward the Crown's perspective on 
energy policy. The Minister of Conservation and ElectricoIp both signalled their desire to have 
Ministry of Energy personnel appear as witnesses for their respective cases. However, the 
Minister of Energy (David Butcher) refused this request, which meant that his officials would 
have to be subpoenaed (a process which really signified that the Ministry did not want appear 
either partisan or fractured). From the wider perspective of the Crown this was an unsatisfactory 
121 When, following the Frontline Documentary on the issue (see next section), Judge Sheppard had it brought to 
his attention that Forest and Bird might have withdrawn from proceedings because of intimidation by 
Eectricorp, he made a considemble effort to clarify this point with the SOCiety. However Dr McSweeney made 
it clear to the judge that it bad not been a matter of 'improper influence' but rather 'inequality' of resources, 
and that the Society had "freely withdmwn from the proceedings, albeit with some reluctance". Ian Cowper 
(Forest and Bird Counsel), 20 March 1990, Letter to Registrar Planning Tribunal. Also; Dr Gerry 
McSweeney,2 March 1990, Letter to Ian Cowper. 
122 Ian Cowper (Counsel for Forest and Bird), 11 April 1989, Letter to Dr Gerry M'csweeney. 
123 Although these concerns were dismissed by the Conservation Director, Dr Gerry McSweeney. Bernard 
Chivers (Sec.ffreasurer, Mid-North Branch of Forest and Bird), 15 January 1989, Letter to the National 
Secretary Forest and Bird; Dr Gerry McSweeney (Conservation Director, Forest and Bini), 1 February 1989, 
Letter to Bernard Chivers. 
124 Dr Gerry McSweeney (Conservation Director, Forest and Bird), 27 April 1989, Press Release "Society 
Withdraws from Whanganui River Hearing"; Also Conservation News April 1989. 
125 National Business Review 1 May 1989. 
126 McSweeney's statements had been made at Chapple's behest. Keith Chapple, 16 April 1989, Letter to Dr 
Gerry McSweeney. While the sub judice rule precluded any direct public advocacy during this period, Chapple 
began to encoumge newspapers to run stories on expensive repair work that Electricorp was having to carry out 
on the Western Diversion tunnels. The idea being to portmy the diversion scheme as a bit of a liability .. New 
Zealand Herald 10 May 1989; Whanganui Chronicle 9 May 1989. Chapple's other tactic at this time was 
to make public statements, on behalf of the Society, praising DoC's advocacy for the Whanganui River. Cf. 
Daily News 11 May 1989; Ruapehu Press 16 May 1989. 
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situation for the energy policies of the government would appear to be confusing and conflicting 
(arguably a not inaccurate impression at that time).127 It was therefore determined by the 
Cabinet Policy Committee that as 'a matter of national significance' a more coherent perspective 
could be put by the Ministry for the Environment - who were adopting a non-partisan role in the 
appeal- would lead the Energy witnesses. This example is illustrative of the divergent roles and 
perspectives that were held by state (and peri-state) entities within the conflict 128 
A second issue was the controversy that surrounded the exchange of evidence in the 
weeks directly preceding the hearing. Following the pre-hearing conference in April the Tribunal 
had set a deadline of 21 July for the circulation of Electricorp's evidence to the other parties. 129 
However, on 4 August Electricorp submitted a memorandum to the Tribunal seeking leave to file 
evidence on 24 August - five weeks later than the Tribunal's deadline. The Corporation claimed 
that all of its evidence was reliant upon prior receipt of the Whanganui Maori Trust Board's 
evidence, which had yet to happen.130 This assertion was on the one hand implicitly arrogant on 
the Corporation's part - ie. that Electricorp was the one party that reserved the right to peruse all 
the other parties' evidence - and on the other hand was patently manipulative because the bulk of 
the Corporation's evidence dealt with issues either peripheral or extraneous to the Trust Board's 
case. Nevertheless, the Corporation was given leave to do so, and on the 22, 23, and (mostly) 
Friday 24 August - the week before the hearing commenced - they delivered to the other parties 
the briefs of 41 witnesses which filled seven large ring-binders and ran to 3500 pages. Much of 
the evidence was "fresh and reported on unpublished investigations undertaken ... on contract to 
the Electricity Corporation since the Respondent's Tribunal heard the matter". Furthermore, the 
Corporation indicated that further information was forthcoming (some of this was fieldwork that 
was ongoing through August).131 The effect on the other parties was overwhelming. DoC was 
undoubtedly the only organisation able to fully analyse the new information. Electricorp had 
made i.tquite clear that it was going to pursue its case aggressively, and would utilise all of the 
vast resources at its disposal in doing so. 132 
Thirdly, counsel representing the Minister of Conservation raised the issue of Electrirorp 
pressure upon potential DoC witnesses: 
A number of your [the Minister] witnesses, (or persons who had earlier indicated that they would 
be available as witnesses but are now not available), have reported to us that they have been 
subjected to subtle pressures by Eiectricorp intended to have the result that the witness is 
unavailable to give evidence in support of the Conservation argument. This pressure has most 
commonly been applied by suggesting that conflicts of interest will arise for that witness. The 
result would be that work would cease to be available to them from Eiectricorp while this case 
and any appeals arising from it are considered. This period has been intimated as being 3 years or 
more. This has proved to be a very successful ploy for Eiectricorp. With abolition of the 
Ministry of Works and Development many individuals having special skills, or controlling 
information that was fonnedy thought of as public now work for private organisations 
127 John Gallen (Office Solicitor, Ministry for the Environment), 16 June 1989, "Whanganui River How 
Appeals" Report to the Minister for the Environment, Ministry for the Environment. 
128 John Gallen (Office Solicitor, Ministry for the Environment), 11 July 1989, Memorandum on behalf of the 
Secretary for the Environment to the Minister for the Environment, Ministry for the Environment. 
129 D. Sheppard (Principal Planning Judge), 24 April 1989, Minutes of Judicial Conference (10 April). 
130 K. Chapple, 9 August 1989. Letter to Judge Sheppard 
131 Jim Guthrie and Andrew Cameron (Counsel for the Minister of Conservation), 26 August 1989. 
"Memorandum for his Honour Judge Sheppard". 
132 All of the participants that I interviewed (apart from Eiectricorp staJl) without prompting singled out this 
episode as a low-point of the conflict. Stories of piles of unread evidence being relegated to the 'back office' 
abounded. 
Chapter Twelve: The Whanganui River Minimum Flows Conflict 
(including SOE's and the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research). Your Department is 
having considerable difficulty in gaining access to infonnation which was fonnerly controlled by 
the Crown and which private interests now claim to be private for reasons of commercial 
sensitivity or because of proprietorial rights. 133 
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Electricorp's size and monopoly position thus enabled it to subtly imply potential sanctions, and 
to control infonnation. 
12.3.(ii) The Hearing 
Three weeks prior to the commencement of the hearing Judge Sheppard circulated a 
memorandum that directed the parties to make no public comment on the appeals until the 
Tribunal had made its decision. However, on the eve of the hearing an Electricorp official and 
Coalition representative each made comments about the proceedings on National Radio. Also, 
on the morning of the hearing conservationists with placards surrounded the entrance to the 
Tribunal. Thus on beginning the hearing Judge Sheppard directly called the assembled counsel 
to his chambers to make it clear that such actions would not be tolerated (19 lawyers were present 
in court that morning 134). He also noted that the official's comments could be "seen as 
intimidating other parties from taking their full part in the proceedings in some way or 
another".135 From the outset, the Judge was making it clear that the conflict was now a wholly 
juridical one, and that he was in control of the proceedings. 
The Tribunal, consisting of the Judge and two lay members, sat for a total of 84 days 
between 4 September 1989 and 18 May 1990, and the testimony of 105 witnesses was heard 
over that time. The first two weeks of the hearing were held in Whanganui, with two of those 
days spent at Putiki Marne hearing .evidence of Maori cultural and spiritual matters. The 
remainder of the hearing was held in Wellington, supposedly for the convenience of counsel and 
witnesses,136 However, for the local representatives such as Chapple (who attended for the 
duration at the Tribunal) it meant a great deal of travelling and time away from home. Such 
difficulties were further compounded by the fact that the local parties were those who possessed 
the least resources. 137 The Tribunal also travelled extensively in the Whanganui catchmenf, to 
view the river throughout its length in different seasons. They also inspected the TPD and the 
Waikato power stations. 138 
Given the scale and complexity of the hearing, it is only possible to discuss this period in 
the most general tenns: I will first touch upon the substantive positions of the parties (note: the 
preferred regimes are set out in Table 12.1 below). The core arguments presented by the 
participants in the dispute were considered in the previous chapters (albeit in skeletal fonn 
compared to the dispute itself), so what 1 am doing here is providing· a sense of the types and 
breadth of evidence that was presented by the different actors at this crucial stage; Secondly, I 
133 Jim Guthrie (Counsel for Minister of Conservation), 27 July 1989, Memorandum to Minister of 
Conservation and Department of Conservation. 
134 Keith Chapple, 20 September 1993, Personal Interview, Kakahi. 
135 Whanganui Chronicle 5 September 1989. In my interview with Keith Chapple he noted that he privately 
encouraged such public actions, media commentaries, documentaries etc. during this period, whilst maintaining 
an air qf innocence in the Tribunal. Keith Chapple, 20 September 1993, Personal Interview, Kakahi. 
136 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v ManawalU-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, 
Judge Sheppard, W70190, p. 10. 
137 Keith Chapple, 20 September 1993, Personal Interview, Kakahi. 
138 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990. 
Judge Sheppard. W70/90. p. 10. 
Chapter Twelve: The Whanganui River Minimum Flows Conflict 269 
will discuss the legal arguments which, to a significant degree, differentiated this phase of the 
dispute from the previous stages; And thirdly, I will deal with the Planning Tribunal decision. 
Table 12.1. The Planning Tribunal Appeal - Parties and Proposed Flow Regimes139 
_ P_a!:t!eli ________________________ _ 
Electricorp 
Whanganui River Maori Trust Board 
Central Districts Catchment BoardlManawatu-
Whanganui Regional Council140 
}1i,!1lster .!o..r }!!~~l!.v!r_o!!l!14ln_t __________ _ 
Minister or Conservation 
Whanganui River Flows Coalition 
Whanganul City Council 
Taumarunui Borough Councll/Ruapehu 
District Council 
139 Ibid, pp. 10-15. 
~r_op~s!!! .fLo~ )!.egLlI!.e __________ _ 
Regulate the operation of the WD at the 
Whakapapa intake structure, and if necessary at 
any other intake structure, to meet a flow of: 
(a) 0.6 curnecs at the Whakapapa footbridge 
gauging station; 
(b) 7.1 curnecs at the Piriaka gauging station; 
(c) 23.1 curnecs at the Te Maire gauging station 
from 1 December to 14 February and over the 
Easter period; and 
(d) Sufficient water to remain in the Whakapapa 
River when the temperature at Kakahi reaches 
~:~. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Minimum flow to be fixed at 100% of natural 
qo~ ______________________ _ 
To uphold the CB decision, which was: 
(a) A minimwn acceptable flow at the 
Whanganui intake of 100% of the natural flow; 
(b) 8.5 curnecs at the Whakapapa Bridge, for the 
period 1 December to 30 April, and 4.2 cwnecs 
for the balance of the year, subject to such flows 
being naturally available. (On the basis of the 
evidence presented at the Pf hearing, the Board 
increased the 8.3 cumec figure to a prescribed 9.3 
SIl!!1~~ .. ____________________ _ 
1:~Is.l!.n~ll-earti§l!!l.§l!DSe..oJl.flQy!'s ______ _ 
(a) Diversion from all the intakes would cease 
when flows less than or equal to the average 
annual seven-day low flow; 
(b) At least 50% of the flow above the average 
annual seven-day low flow would remain in the 
river; 
(c) Control parameters would be set at the 
intakes; 
(d) Diversion intakes would be modified so that 
the amount of sediment remaining in the river 
was in proportion to the natural transporting 
capacity of the modified flow; 
(e) That there would be no diversion in the 
Whanganui main stream; and 
(f) That the regime would remain unaltered 
~hr~~!tq"utt!!ey~. ______________ _ 
Focus should be upon restoring the natural 
rhythms of the Whanganui River system. 
Supported the proportional flow that was 
proposed on behalf of the Minister of 
C;;;o..D!e[V!!ti.og. _________________ _ 
Supported any increase on the 1988 Catchment 
~<!ll'E geSi~iQll. _________________ _ 
If the diversion was to continue then the 
Corporation should pay compensation to the 
C;;;oJ1!!Cil. ____________________ _ 
140 During the hearing period the Central-Districts Catchment Boord was dis-established and its catchment 
management functions were transferred to the new Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council based in 
Palmerston North. 
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I The Rotoaira Forest Trustees, the Lake Sought no reduction in the diversion flows into _~o!o_atr.!' J'.!'l.!s!e_e~,_a!}~ §IS JJ:..ept 1,e_,!e_u}!,e.!l_ _ !:a!e)~.o~o:p~a _________________ _ 
Winston Oliver (river-boat operator) Minimum Row of 30 cumecs at Te Maire when 
available 
Electricorp essentially sought the continuance of the 1983 regime (although it did not do 
so consistently - counsel sometimes expressed a preference for even lower minimum flow 
levels). In its pursuit of this goal, the Corporation's strategy was (i) to provide an expansive 
legal argument seeking to undermine the legality of the Catchment Board decision and to limit the 
discretion of the Planning Tribunal, (ii) to present evidence on all matters which had been raised 
that touched on flows, and (iii) to systematically contest every point raised (which was of course 
enabled by (ii». 1 will only focus upon broad evidentiary matters here. 
I have already recorded that Electricorp circulated 3500 pages of evidence prior to the 
hearing. This evidence was authored and presented in the hearing by 42 witnesses, the majority 
of whom were qualified as scientists or engineers. Judged Sheppard described this corpus thus: 
Their evidence described the Whanganui River and catchment in terms of their respective 
disciplines, and also the effects of the Western Diversion and of various minimum flow regimes 
in terms of their fields of knowledge, including geology, vulcanology, earth. sciences, climate, 
hydrology, hydraulics, sediment transport, water quality and temperature and limnology, 
microbiology and public health, freshwater biology (including fisheries) and ecology, fish 
pathology, wildlife habitats (including those of the blue duck and black shag), the socio-
economic environment, scenic, wild and natural landscape assessment, tourism, navigation, 
catchment management planning, effects on the Waikato River system, atmospheric effects of 
substitute electricity generation by burning fossil fuels, economic effects and cost benefit 
analysis, the structures and operation of the Tongariro Power Development, the history of the 
Western Diversion, hydraulic design and operation of the Western Diversion, comparison with 
smaIl hydro-stations, integration of the electricity system, and the contribution of Western 
Diversion water to the electricity generation system. 141 .' 
Many of the Electricorp witnesses were leaders in their fields, some were from overseas, and a 
large number were contracted from the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR). 
Indeed it has been observed that Electricorp had whole divisions of the DSIR working on its case 
at times leading up to the hearing. 142 These witnesses were utilised not only to author evidence 
in chief and supplementary evidence, 'but also to rebut the arguments of opponents' witnesses. 
Some of the experts, such as the hydrologists were retained for extended periods of the hearing 
to advise the counsel about technical matters (eg. for the purposes of cross-examination). The 
few matters that Electricorp did not seek to give evidence on were those "relevant to 
apprehensions and fear based on emotion rather than any probative concem".143 This somewhat 
disparaging reference was essentially directed towards many (or some) of the arguments of Iwi 
and the regional advocates. 
The trust Board's case differed markedly from Electricorp's. As I noted in Chapter Ten, 
the dispute involved some starkly contrasting epistemoligies, methodologies and most generally, 
world-views. None were further removed from Electricorp's 'technocentric' perspective than 
those presented in the Trust Board's case (as was evident in the previous chapter). The Trust 
Board argued for the full restoration of flows to the river: 
141 Eleclricily Corporalion of New Zealand Lid v Manawalu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, 
Judge Sheppard, W70/90, pp. 11- 13. 
142 For example, eight scientists from the Water Sciences Division gave evidence. Evening Standard 11 
September 1990. 
143 Eleclricity Corporalion of New Zealand Ud v Manawalu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, 
Judge Sheppard, W70/90, p. 11. 
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It was submitted that this is a case where the Treaty of Waitangi obligation should be enforced 
rather than compromised, because compromise (it was said) is not really possible while the mana 
of the people was acknowledged Countervailing interests could only prevail if they are of 
greater importance than a breach of the Treaty. 144 
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It called 24 witnesses, the majority of whom were long time residents of the river, but it also 
incorporated, inter alia, the evidence of academics with expertise in areas such as oral history, 
traditional fisheries, and cultural relationships with and valuation of water. 145 To illustrate its 
case the Trust Board arranged for the Tribunal to travel on the river by waka and jet boat, to visit 
a number of marae, and to view films of life on the river in the 1920s,146 Legal counsel 
represented the Board throughout the appeal. Many of the tribal members attended the hearings 
in both Whanganui and Wellington. 
The Catchment Board (later Regional Council) was named as Respondent in the appeal. 
Its counsel argued that the Tribunal should uphold the Catchment Board decision, and if there 
were to be any alteration to the regime then it should be to increase the minimum flow in the 
Whakapapa to 9.3 cumecs. In its defence of the decision the Board argued that (i) it was 
empowered to make a decision and had subsequently applied the correct decision-rules, (ii) the 
process was fair and reasonable, and (iii) on the evidence presented the decision was correct 
Four witnesses were called to give evidence on the history of the issue, the Board's approach to 
minimum flow regimes, to explain the decision, to describe the hydrological effects of that 
decision upon the Whanganui River system, and to describe the effects of the TPD diversion 
flows upon the Waikato River system. The Board was represented throughout the appeal.147 
The Minister for the Environment took a non-partisan role in the proceedings, "and did 
not advocate any particular course or result".148 The Ministry was, however, represented by 
counsel throughout the hearing, who were charged with keeping a watching brief.149 MfE's 
participation was ultimately restricted to making submissions of law to assist the Tribunal, and to 
facilitating and leading the witnesses on energy conservation and management, and on global 
climate change and the greenhouse effect (see discussion above). 150 
The Minister of Conservation was (along with the Whanganui River Maori Trust Board) 
the main counterbalance to Electricorp. The Minister's argument was that the Catchment Board 
regime was insufficient to provide for the in-steam values of the river. The Department of 
Conservation had moderated its position since the previous hearing (restoration of natural flows) 
and they now sought a regime which allowed substantial minimum flows in all of the headwater 
streams, enabled sediments to pass downstream in proportion to flows, and gave effect to the 
natural variation in flows. The DoC case was extensive, building on the research programs 
instigated prior to the previous hearing. 23 witnesses were called on behalf of the Minister: 
Their evidence covered the Department of Conservation's interests; changes observed in the river; 
hydrology and changes in sediment transport resulting from the Western Diversion; erosion of 
144 Ibid, p. 12. 
145 Dame Joan Metge. Dr George Habib, and Professor James Ritchie respectively. 
146 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, 
Judge Sheppard. W70/90, p. 12. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. p. 13. The Ministry was responsible for the overall administration of the Water Act after the abolition 
ofNWASCA. 
149 Bronwyn Arthur (Solicitor, Ministry for the Environment), 11 April 1994, Personal Interview, Wellington. 
150 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whangallui Regiollal Council October 1990, 
Judge Sheppard, W70/90, p. 13. 
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papa ledges; wildlife, including the blue duck; aquatic fauna; trout habitat and river flows; 
angling; water clarity and turbidity; navigation; rafting; recreation and tourism; survey analysis; 
travel-cost valuation; the Whanganui National Park; intake structures; the Whangamarino 
Wetland; the economics of the New Zealand electricity system; and energy conservation and 
planning. IS 1 
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The Minister was well represented throughout the hearing by two legal counsel and various DoC 
staff who remained on hand to provide technical assistance. 
The Coalition lS2 was represented throughout the proceedings by Keith Chapple who 
acted as a lay advocate (he was almost universally praised in his performance of this role lS3). 
Chapple was briefly assisted during the arguments on law, by Peter Horsley a geography lecturer 
at Massey University and qualified lawyer. The Coalition advocated the restoration of the natural 
rhythms of the river system, and towards this end they supported the flow regime proposed by 
DoC. In strategic terms the Coalition were free to articulate the conservation case in a manner 
which was politically (and juridically) unavailable to the state conservation agency.lS4 The 
Coalition called eight witnesses who were mostly locals - residents, anglers, and tourist 
operators. 
A number of other parties were represented at times during the proceedings: The 
Whanganui City Council supported any move that would improve that natural flow of the river 
beyond the 1988 decision because of the interests of the City as a base for Tourism and the 
National Park. They gave evidence on siltation, and on regional and local planning instruments; 
The Taumarunui Borough Council argued that if the diversion was to continue greater 
compensation should be paid to the Council under the Piriaka Agreement. Its successor, the 
Ruapehu District Council, expressed a desire to see the river restored to something approaching 
its pre-TPD status; The Rotoaira Forest Trustees, the Lake Rotoaira Trustees, and Sir Hepi Te 
Heu Heu, called for no reduction in the diversion of water. The Ngati Tuwharetoa parties did 
not call evidence; Finally, the river-boat operator Winston Oliver also played a significant part in 
the hearing. He sought a greater minimum flow level at Te Maire, so as to provide for better 
lSI Ibid, p. 13. 
lS2 Which by this time represented 13 groups: Taumarunui Boating Club; Taumarunui and District Promotion 
and Development Association; Friends of the Shoreline, Whanganui; Whanganui Chamber of Conunerce; 
Central North Island Wildlife Conservancy (Waimarino Ward); Hospitality Whanganui; Mr and Mrs P. 
McIntyre; Mr B Haggitt; Mr L. Rogers; NZ Freshwater Angling Society; NZ Jetboat Association; Maruia 
Society; Friends of Rivers at Kakahi Society; Taumarunui Museum Trust. Electricity Corporation of New 
Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge Sheppard, W70/90, Appendix 2. 
The Coalition had originally represented 35 groups prior to the appeal but the spectre of costs caused many to 
withdraw. GerardHutching, November 1990, "Keith Chapple: Speaking for the rivers" Forest and Bird p. 41. 
lS3 He also received considerable advice from other counsel (especially DoC). J. Garrett (then Resources 
Technical Manager, Central Districts Catchment Boards), 16 September 1993, Personal interview, Palmerston 
North. Chapple had to take two-thirds of the eight month appeal period off work. He commuted between 
Wellington and Kakahi, and often worked in his job at the Taumarunui hospital through the weekends between 
sittings. His wife Brenda was equally devoted to the campaign. and was pivotal in the processing and 
preparation of evidence, in addition to giving birth to a son at the time of the hearing. Other key members of 
the Coalition were: 
Tom Wells, Larry Rogers, the Parker brothers [Owners of Plateau Guides Ltd], Manu Lata and Jim 
Gosman [local Anglers]. Expert advice came from Massey University geography lecturer Peter 
Horsley and former Auckland University environmental studies lecturer Dr Bob Mann. Graeme 
Dingle and Grant Davidson [of the local Outdoor Pursuits Centre of NZ] gave invaluable advice 
on recreation; David Pate [energy consultant] on the electricity system, energy conservation and 
management; Brian Carran on regional development and tourism opportunities. 
On the Coalition experience of the Planning Tribunal process, see: Gerard Hutching, November 1990, "Keith 
Chapple: Speaking for the rivers" Forest and Bird pp. 40-3. 
IS4 Keith Chapple, 20 September 1993, Personal Interview, Kakahi. 
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navigation in the middle reaches. He gave evidence on navigation, channel works, and 
tourism. 155 
Media coverage of the dispute was extensive. The bulk of this was straightforward 
reportage of the arguments being presented in the Tribunal, for after the Judge's initial outburst 
there was virtually no media advocacy, or indeed a great deal of editorial comment There were, 
however, some exceptions. For example, a highly publicised hour long documentary entitled 
"Electricorp and the Whanganui River: A Clash of Values" which was screened on national 
tel evision. I 56 The documentary clearly adopted a pro-conservation stance - an impression that 
was exacerbated by the reluctance of E1ectricorp officials to be interviewed. 157 The issue of 
Forest and Bird's withdrawal was focused upon (which as I noted earlier prompted the Judge to 
investigate the matter). But the most significant effect of the program was that it seriously 
damaged the public profile of E1ectricorp.158 This would have been especially irritating given 
the Corporation's concerted public relations campaign aimed at selling electricity as the 
environmentally sound energy form.l 59 
12.3.(iii) The Law: Powers, Judicial Discretion and Decision-Rules 
Of the 200 dense pages of the Planning Tribunal decision, 80 or so pages were devoted to 
summarising the legal arguments. These arguments spanned the gamut of legal forms, for 
example; statutory interpretation, principles of administrative law, case law and international 
mechanisms. The Tribunal was at once backward looking, examining the legitimacy and veracity 
of the 1988 decision, and forward looking, seeking to ascertain the powers, discretion and 
decision-rules that would enable it to make its own judgement That the legal discourse was so 
wide-ranging was, in great part, due to the absence of direct precedent. It was also due to the 
absence of statutory guidance about the purpose, process and criteria for the setting of flows. 
Before I set out the Tribunal's overall conclusion on the law it is useful (once more, for the 
purposes of the analytical framework) to distil the essential legal approach taken by each of the 
main advocates; Electricorp, Maori and the Conservationists. 
To a considerable extent the expansive nature of the legal discourse resulted from the 
unfocused 'shot-gun' approach taken by Electricorp in all facets of its appeal. But despite the 
Corporation's dilatory and'diffuse strategy, an underlying theme persisted throughout most of 
their case - the inviolability and primacy of the prior use right. The Corporation's water rights, 
which ultimately derived from the 1958 Order in Council and were later validated by the Water 
and Soil Conservation Amendment Act 1973, constituted the fons et origo of Electricorp's 
argument. For example, Electricorp's counsel sought to undermine or diminish the 'minimum 
acceptable flow mechanism by submitting that: 
ISS Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, 
Judge Sheppard, W70/90, pp. 14-15. 
156 Television New Zealand, 6:00pm, 11 February 1990, "Electricorp and the Whanganui River: A Clash of 
Values" Frontline Channel One. 
157 RULlpehu Press 13 February 1990; Whanganui Chronicle 9 February 1990. 
158 This program catmd much consternation within E1ectricorp. David Frow (General Manager, Electricorp 
Production), 14 February 1990, Letter to Dr Gerry McSweeney. 
159 In conjunction with its television and print advertising campaign Electricorp produced a corporate video that 
was clearly designed to promote the use of the Western Diversion aOO to portray hydro-production as having 
the least impact upon the environment. Pater Hayden and Tom Scott, 1990, "Our Future Generation: The 
Story of Electricorp Production" Valhalla Productions for Electricorp Production. 
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It is acceptable to allow for continuation of existing lawful uses except in emergencies, and not 
acceptable if a minimum acceptable flow detrimentally afTects those rights so that a party who 
normally has the security of the right would be succwnbing to a procedure varying the conditions 
on the right. 160 
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They similarly argued that S. 24 D (the section designed to give effect to minimum flow regimes) 
could not be used to vary conditions on water rights. 161 A further line of argumentation related 
to the factors to be taken account of when setting a minimum acceptable flow: 
Counsel for Electricorp submitted that it is necessary to give recognised existing conswnptive 
uses priority over contingent optional, recreational or passive uses which have not been subjected 
to a notified application, objection and consent process. They contended that to be acceptable the 
flows fixed must first recognise those with legal authority under the Act, rather than those who 
might like to use water at higher flows, but have not established any prior right to do that 
pursuant to the Act. 162 
The other main rights based argument pursued by the Corporation was in the realm of 
administrative law, namely the principle of 'legitimate expectation': 
!'vir Somerville submitted that a water right is a private legal right and entitlement to do certain 
things for the specified period. He contended that there is a legitimate expectation by existing 
users who are relying on a particular flow regime that the regime will not be chan"oed unless 
identifiable impacts have occwred which lead to an adjustment to the regime; and that an 
adjustment will not be made unless those impacts are such that they outweigh the expectation 
that existing activities will not be restricted through a management procedure. 163 
Lastly, in addition to these rights based arguments, and also directly relevant to the analytical 
framework, Electricorp asserted that (i) the WD water is used for the benefit of the nation, and 
(ii) that the 'national interest' must be given priority over regional matters.164 
The Whanganui River Maori Trust Board submitted, inter alia, that: 
On the proper construction of the Water Act, priority is to be given to recognising Maori values 
and interests, to Maori rights under the Treaty of Waitangi, and a heavy weighting to the 
relationship of Maori people to the Whanganui River. 165 
The Trust Board argument was essentially founded upon the developing body of case law that 
had recently explicated the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, and had provided some guidance 
on the Crown's obligations to give effect to those principles in the administration of government. 
Unsurprisingly the conservation advocates (the Coalition, Trust Board and DoC) arg';1ed 
first of all for no priority to be given to existing uses,166 and second, for greater weight to be 
given to in-stream values. 167 Indeed, the counsel for the Minister of Conservation submitted 
that the very purpose offixing a minimum flow was: 
The conservation of water resources to ensure that in-stream values are offered a degree of 
protection from man's use of water consistent with the benefits being obtained from that use; to 
more adequately ensure the environment against harm. 168 
Likewise, they opined that the purpose was also to maintain the river's natural character. 169 
What I want to convey here, is that each major strand of argument appealed to some 
foundation - be it a property right, Treaty right, or ecological bottom-line - as a reason for 
160 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, 
Judge Sheppard, W70/90, p. 44. 
161 Ibid, p. 54. Which if this was the case would essentially render the minimum flows mechanism useless. 
162 Ibid, p. 80. 
163 Ibid, p. 85. 
164 Ibid. p. 81. 
165 Ibid, p. 69. 
166 Ibid, p. 80. 
167 Ibid, p. 74. 
168 Ibid, p. 37. 
169 Ibid 
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privileging those values within the decision-making process. The construction of the arguments 
and their articulation were drawn out, repetitive and often tangential, but in essence they were 
simple. While each of these arguments is interesting in terms of the questions at the heart of this 
thesis (eg. the role of private property or the nature of value-form), within the dispute they were 
ultimately judged to be either invalid arguments or ultra vires. The juridical logic of the Tribunal 
decision was a cumulative process of many individual decisions on points of law, slowly finding 
a basis and space for their discretion, and ascertaining which considerations were relevant and to 
what extent; a complex process of clearing. But at the end of this scrutiny there still stood S. 20 
J of the Water Act with its balancing equation that privileged no particular concern prior to the 
consideration of the substantive arguments: 
A balancing process requires the decision-maker to identify the relevant considerations, to 
evaluate each of them in the particular circumstances of the case, and then to strike a balance 
among them in the course of reaching the ultimate judgement. Continuing the metaphor, the 
evaluation involves imputing weight to be given to each consideration in the balancing process. 
Some may be quantifiable in a relatively straightforward way, such as by cost benefit analysis. 
Others may be metaphysical and unquantifiable, such as the spiritual and cultural values of the 
tangata whenua. The decision-maker has to weigh each in a way that enables fair comparison in 
the balancing. 
It is our experience that the weight to be imputed to a class of consideration varies according to 
the circumstances of the case. . .. Because many of the factors are unquantifiable, it is impOrtant 
that the various considerations are ascribed weights, which are related to the same scale, so they 
can be fairly placed in the same balancing. The only assurance of that can be that weights are 
ascribed to each of the factors, and the balancing made, by the same decision-maker. 170 
The judge goes on to note that while Parliament can direct decision-makers to give weighting to a 
class or classes offactors this was not the case under S. 20 J.I71 Judge Sheppard was dealing 
with the most perplexing and intractable problem in resource management - the conflict between 
"multiple languages of value",172 His conclusion that the particular considerations could 
somehow be related to the same scale (a meta- or mediating 'language') is, however, a difficult 
one to sustain. 
In effect the Tribunal had returned full circle to the simple exposition on the intent and 
workings of the Water Act set out by Don Spence two years previously. Granted, the Planrung 
Tribunal's comprehension of the Act was far more thorough, consisting of a core notion of the 
balancing process surrounded by a myriad of qualifications and justificatory arguments. But the 
prescribed balancing calculus remained, and it was the substantive evidence placed before the 
decision-makers that would (in theory) determine the weighting given to the respective 
concems. 173 
As an addendum here, there were two legal issues that pre-occupied Judge Sheppard at 
times during the dispute, each of which could have affected the status of the Tribunal hearing and 
final decision. The first, was with respect to the Trust Board's pending claim to the Waitangi 
Tribunal, and the second, was the future status of any decision given the complete overhaul of 
resource legislation that was contemporaneous with the appeal, and would in all likelihood 
supersede the Water Act. Given the vast amount of resources that had already been devoted to the 
170 Ibid, pp. 68-9. 
171 Ibid, pp. 69-80. 
172 D. Harvey, 1996, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference Blackwell Pub!., Cambridge Ma, p. 172. 
173 This may be seen either as the ludicrous preswnption of complete juridical objectivity and lack of pre-
disposition, or as a pragmatic attempt at • common-sense , problem solving in the face of multiple discourses of 
value. 
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minimum flows issue, the Judge's intense concern about these matters was not without reason. 
It eventually required the appearance of the Solicitor General before the Tribunal to allay these 
concerns, and to urge the Tribunal to continue with the hearing. 174 
12.3.(iv) The Planning Tribunal Decision 
The Planning Tribunal released its decision on the appeals on 29 October 1990, just over five 
months after the completion of the hearings. The Tribunal made the following determinations: 
1. That the decision of the Rangitikei-Whanganui Catchment Board and Regional Water Board 
made on 18 October 1988 fixing minimum acceptable flows for the Whanganui River is 
cancelled; 
2. That pursuant to section 20J of the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1%7 the minimum 
acceptable flow of the Whakapapa River at the footbridge flow gauging station ... from 1 
June 1991 is fixed at 3 cubic metres per second, or the natural flow of the river, whichever is 
the less; 
3. That pursuant to section 20J of that Act the minimum acceptable flow of the Whanganui 
River at the Te Maire flow gauging station ... from 1 June 1991 is fixed for the period from 
1 December in each year to 31 May in each following year at 29 cubic metres per second, or 
the natural flow of the river, whichever is the less ... . 175 
The Tribunal had given a great deal of consideration to determining where the flows should be 
controlled as well as the appropriate flow levels that would give effect to its ultimate balancing of 
the evidence. The Catchment Board had set its control points at the Whanganui and Whakapapa 
intakes, with the complete cessation of diversion flows in the Upper Whanganui in deference to 
Maori concerns. However, the evidence presented to the Planning Tribunal on Maori cultural 
and spiritual values noted that all of the headwater streams had mana, and the Upper Whanganui 
was no special case. As a consequence, the Planning Tribunal did not single out the Upper 
Whanganui for special or symbolic treatment The Planning Tribunal set its control points at the 
Whakapapa footbridge, and additionally at Te Maire. Setting minimum flows on the Whakapapa 
would be "effective for eliminating or reducing the gravest hann to the biota, and consequent 
h!mIl to the cultural, tourism and recreational values, in the Whakapapa downstream of the 
intake".i76 But the Tribunal also wanted to acknowledge the range of in-stream values f~her 
downstream (both upstream and downstream of the Te Maire gauge), and it therefore set 
minimum flows atTe Maire (as the 1983 regime had). Interestingly, given his role in initiating 
the review process, the Tribunal singled out Winston Oliver's desired flow of 30 cumecs at Te 
Maire in its analysis, and its determination of 29 cumecs was not far off that figure - a neat 
conclusion. 177 
I compare the flow levels in the final section. However, as a rough guide, the Planning 
Tribunal regime would allow Eiectricorp to abstract approximately 82 percent (6469 cumec days 
per year (cmd/yr» of mean annual flows (7889 cmdlyr), as opposed to 95 percent under the 
1983 regime, and 71 percent under the 1988 regime. 
174 Judge Sheppard had been extremely concerned and there ensued a period of some tension between the Tribunal 
and the Ministry for the Environment On the Treaty claim, Electricorp was the only party that wanted to 
delay proceedings until the eventual Waitangi Tribunal decision. This was not surprising given the possibility 
that it could be many years before the completion of that process. Electricity Corporation of New Zealand 
Ltd v Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge Sheppard, W70/9fJ, pp. 96-8. 
175 Ibid, p. 209. The decision was to be implemented and monitored by both the Regional Council aOO 
Eiectricorp. 
176 Ibid. p. 188. 
177 Ibid, pp. 184-93. 
Chapter Twelve: The Whanganui River Minimum Flows Conflict 277 
This time Electricorp's public response was far more measured. Where previously the 
Environmental Manager of the North Island Hydro Group had fronted for the Corporation, its 
spokesperson was now its Public Relations Manager, Juliet Hensley. Hensley acknowledged 
that there had been a "full and fair hearing", but pointed out that there would be "costs both in 
terms of replacing the lost electricity with more expensive thermal power generation and in terms 
of the impact of the fossil fuels" .178 But over the following month the financial, legal, and ("for 
the first time") public relations, implications were considered by Electricorp's senior 
management 179 A decision was made to appeal the decision in the High Court. 180 In an 
attempt to mitigate the inevitable public criticism from the environmental movement etc., the 
Corporation argued that it was appealing not only because of the "still substantial" financial cost 
(which they put at $3.6m per annum or a NPV of $4Om 181), but also in order to prevent a 
, 
100,000 tonne increase in CO2 emissions, and to "clarify the legal rules underlying minimum 
flow water hearings",182 Yet upon further examination the force of these arguments is 
somewhat diminished: First of all, the $3.6m figure, while undoubtedly significant, must be seen 
in the context of a record profit for Electricorp of $373m for 1989 (after tax and extraordinary 
expenses183);184 Secondly, the greenhouse gas argument was hugely over-exaggerated and 
blatantly manipulative (remember Judge Sheppard had identified the problem as real but 
negligible in terms of New Zealand's total emissions), and moreover, the Corporation was 
simultaneously pursuing a yearly target of 2 percent growth in net electricity 
production/consumption; And thirdly, the incoming resource legislation was going to transform 
the specific rules for the setting of minimum flows. 
DoC's immediate response to the decision was reasonably positive. The Director 
General, Bill Mansfield, stated that; "although the precise flow regime sought on behalf of the 
Minister of Conservation at the hearing had not been granted, many of the factual concerns 
identified by the Minister's witnesses had been recognised and taken account of by the tribunal," 
and, "that the new flow was a considerable improvement". 185 Given the divergence between the 
Planning Tribunal decision and elements of the regime proposed by DoC as part of its case: the 
Department's response can be categorised as pragmatic. However, just when DoC had decided 
that it could live with the decision, Electricorp appealed. In a press statement the Minister of 
Conservation, Denis MarshalIl86, strongly condemned Electricorp's chosen path and signalled 
his intention to oppose Electricorp in any appeal proceedings; "I have instructed the Department 
of Conservation to actively oppose the Electricity Corporation's appeal. The Department is 
178 New Zealand Herald 31 October 1990; Whanganui Chronicle 31 October 1990. 
179 Ian Johnstone (Group Environmental Manager. Electricorp), 9 September 1993, Personal Interview, 
Hamilton. 
180 Hilary Talbot (Senior Legal Advisor, Electricorp), 29 November 1990. Letter to Duncan Laing (Counsel for 
Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council). 
181 Once again, and contrary to the findings of the Tribunal. they asserted that this cost would have to be borne 
by electricity consumers. Whanganui Chronicle 30 November 1990. 
182 Whanganui Chronicle 30 November 1990. 
183 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand. 1993, Annual Report 1992/3. 
184 New Zealand Herald 12 December 1990. 
185 Whanganui Chronicle October 21. 
186 Of the newly elected National Government. 
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representing many individuals and organisations who cannot afford the high legal costs 
involved". The Department lodged a cross-appeal 187 
Keith Chapple and the Coalition responded in a similar manner to DoC. On the one hand 
they saw the decision as a vindication of their case to increase the flows in the river, but on the 
other hand they expressed disappointment over the continued de-watering of the Upper 
Whanganui and other tributary streams (other than the Whakapapa).188 Yet overall they hailed 
the decision as a "sensible compromise" that would "restore, in some measure, the health of the 
river, improve fishing and angling values, and increase the habitat of the blue duck".189 Over 
the following weeks the Coalition was widely lauded for its efforts, and a number of feature 
articles were written about Keith and Brenda Chapple and their three year battle for the river 
against the vast resources of Electricorp.190 The Coalition's response to Electricorp's decision 
to appeal was one of outrage. In the national press Chapple pointed out that the ruling had 
merely decreased Electricorp's share of the headwater flows from 97 percent to 78 percent. He 
labelled Electricorp "the biggest corporate bull y this country has ever seen", and exclaimed 
"Electricorp has money to bum - it is soaking up public dollars in its resource allocation by 
litigation, which other people simply do not have". Electricorp's exclamations on greenhouse 
emissions were seen as quite bizarre given the Corporation's expansionary business strategy. 191 
The Coalition's reaction was mirrored by the national office of Forest and Bird, and the 
Conservation Director of the Society subsequently wrote to the Minister of State Owned 
Enterprises, stating that "Electricorp's financial resources can wear down any opponent through 
litigation" and that "the playing field is finnly tilted in favour of Electricorp".I92 The 
Government's position was that as a shareholder it had no role in operational matters and so the 
Minister passed on these letters of protest to the Corporation itself. 193 
The Trust Board reserved its comment on the decision. 194 As a consequence it is 
difficult to detennine whether they would have opted to appeal if Electricorp had not done so. 
But, following the Corporation's appeal, the Trust Board lodged a cross-appeal. At this time the 
Chainnan, Archie Taiaroa, made a rare media statement on the issue, where he described·the 
battle for the Whanganui River "as an extremely costly and drawn out affair... but it is very 
important to our people". He noted that the Trust Board had already spent a "couple of hundred 
thousand dollars since 1988", and that "we are losers all the way in the Pakeha system".195 
187 Denis Marshall (Minister of Conservation), 30 November 1990, Press Release: "Wbanganui River Appeal 
Opposed". 
188 Daily News 31 October 1990. 
189 Dominion 31 October 1990; Whanganui Chronicle 31 October 1990. 
190 Dominion Sunday Times 4 November 1990; Taumarunui Gazette 6 November 1990; Whanganui 
Chronicle 14 November 1990; Gerard Hutching. November 1990, "Keith Chapple: Speaking for the rivers" 
Forest and Bird pp. 40-3. . . 
191 Dominion 30 November 1990; New Zealand Herald 30 November 1990; Whanganui Chronicle 30 
November 1990. 
192 Kevin Smith (Conservation Director, Forest and Bird), 29 November 1990, Letter to Doug Kidd (Minister of 
State Owned Enterprises); New Zealand Herald 3 December 1990. 
193 Geraldine Baumann (Company Secretmy, Electricorp), 3 April 1991. Letter to Don Gannon (Taurnnga). 
194 Whanganui Chronicle 31 October 1990. 
195 Whanganui Chronicle 1 December 1990, 5 December 1990. 
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The general response in the Whanganui region was that the decision was a "sensible 
compromise"196 and a "fair deal".I97 The Regional Council's response was more complex. 
The General Manager, Reg Barrett initially reacted with caution; "There are certainly no clear 
winners and losers in the Tribunal decision".198 After further analysis they were even less 
enthusiastic; "In general, the minimum flows decisions were accepted [at the Council meeting] 
unenthusiastically", however there was "no good reason to appeal against the Tribunal's 
decisions on any points of law". The Council's rough analysis of the decision is interesting as 
they thought that the new decision favoured the headwater streams slightly less, and the middle 
reaches slightly more, than the 1988 decision. 199 Nonetheless, they were disappointed that the 
case was going to appeal. The big issue for the Council at this stage was the old one of cost for 
the ratepayers of the region - this prompted the Chairman to write once more to the Prime 
Minister to seek funding, but again they were turned down.200 
The matter in turn progressed to the High Court, and I deal with that episode very briefly 
in the next section (for the appeals were ultimately unsuccessful and the Tribunal decision 
upheld). Before I do so, I will first make some general comments about the Planning Tribunal 
phase of the dispute. 
In the Planning Tribunal process the Minimum Flows Conflict reached its denouement. 
But this phase of the dispute differed greatly from what had gone before. The framework for the 
dispute narrowed within the juridical context and as a result evolved into a more formalised and 
less overtly political (certainly less democratic and inclusive) process. Yet at the same time the 
dispute grew in public stature, and in another sense became more politicised - that is, the issues 
of strategic capacities, of resources and institutional power, and the simple ability to participate in 
resource management decision-making, were a constant sub-text. Previously, opponents of 
water abstraction could adopt various relatively low-cost political strategies with considerable 
success. But from the inception of the Tribunal phase these avenues disappeared, and the 
continued participation of local, regional, or indeed any independent, voices in the dispute 
became an issue of sheer personal sacrifice and gumption (issues which shall be traversed in the 
following analytical chapter). 
The juridical setting also had a profound effect upon the substantive discourse. In the 
Catchment Board hearing the balancing process proceeded roughly as follows; The parties tended 
to promote bold schemes, these positions were underpinned by evidence that varied immensely 
in its nature and quality (certainly there was greater tolerance of different epistemologies), this 
evidence essentially stood untested within the hearing process and hence divergent perspectives 
on particular issues were reconciled later on within the balancing process, and the balancing 
calculus involved a compromise between a matrix of diverse positions. Also of note was that 
the decision-making process was located solely within the Whanganui region and, moreover, that 
concerns about past processes and future uses were more readily entertained (these were judged 
beyond the scope of the Planning Tribunal decision). 
196 Daily News 31 October 1990. 
197 Whanganui Chronicle 31 October 1990, editorial. 
198 Daily News 1 November 1990. 
199 Whanganui Chronicle 21 November 1990. 
200 Daily News 21 November 1990; Jim Bolger (Prime Minister), 5 March 1991. Letter to Reg Barrett 
(Chairman. Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council). 
Chapter Twelve: The Whanganui River Minimum Flows Conflict 280 
In contrast the Planning Tribunal phase was far more structured and contested. With 
regard to evidentiary matters, while the Planning Tribunal did not expressly discourage direct 
statements of value, the very nature of the process tended to encourage probative discourse of 
some sort or another.201 The flow regimes or arguments presented by the parties tended to be 
more constrained as a result of this, and where exaggerated statements were made, such practices 
as the provision of supplementary and rebuttal evidence, and cross examination, served to 
moderate those claims. The result of this was that the Tribunal's balancing calculus operated on 
the basis of more highly scrutinised infonnation (and without reference to some of the more 
spontaneous arguments that had persisted previously), and a narrower spectrum of positions (the 
non-reducible Maori' arguments excepted). Some mention should be made of the overall logic of 
the decision. As I noted earlier the Tribunal's extensive legal analysis detennined the powers, 
discretions and decision rules, and the substantive arguments were subsequently placed within 
that framework. The Tribunal's analysis of the substantive argument (tens of thousands of pages 
of evidence and 2,500 pages of transcript) can only be described as a phenomenally 
accomplished effort at integrative resource decision-making. It was, essentially, a series of 
hundreds of micro-decisions on a myriad of matters (Le. whose, if anyone's, arguments were 
considered to be correct and what weight to give to them?). These building blocks of reasoned 
argument were amalgamated within subject areas, and then finally weighed together. Yet despite 
the overall rigour of that process it finally came down to (and I use this tenn guardedly) a 
common sense and distinctly personal judgement It was ultimately an example of the absolute 
epistemic limits (boundedness), contingency and subjectivity of any decision-making process. 
Lastly here, it is once again necessary to touch upon the issue of resources. The types of 
resources relied upon by the participants varied greatly, and many remain unknown either 
because of an absence of records or because of a reluctance to divulge expenditures.202 
Nevertheless it is possible to provide an approximate survey: First of all, Electricorp's 
expenditure was the subject of much speculation. The Corporation itself disseminated various 
estimates from $500,000203 to $2.4m204• However, both of these figures are patently 
understated given the scale and nature of Electricorp's research and advocacy processes 
compared to those of other parties (for many of which official figures exist). The most likely 
estimates fall in a range between $7-$15m2os. Which is not unreasonable when a single 
overseas expert witness was reputedly paid $750,000 for their research and testimony, another 
paid $250,000, and the DSIR $5m; Secondly, DoC released a figure of $625,000, without 
201 Judge Sheppard stated: ..... in these proceedings no party carries any legal burden of proof. However each 
party has the evidential burden of establishing those matters which are advanced by it, to the standard of proof 
required. Any party must produce some evidential basis to support the contentions and submissions that it 
makes". In effect, he was providing an hortatory ex.clamation that parties should strive to prove their 
assertions within and against the standards of their respective discourses. Electricity Corporation of New 
Zealand LId v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council October 1990. Judge Sheppard. W70/90. pp. 93-4. 
202 Electricorp (and the government agencies that it employed. such as the DSIR) was extremely sensitive about 
this issue, and managed to evade official infonnation requests and appeals to the Office of the Ombudsman. 
Evening Stando.rd 11 September 1990. 
203 Evening Post 6 November 1990. 
204 Evening Stando.rd 11 September 1990. 
205 Whanganui Chronicle 14 November 1990; P. Horsley. 1991. "Whanganui Row-ons" Terra Nova Vol. 2. 
February. pp. 25-7. 
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taking into account many of its internal costs206 ; Thirdly, the Coalition estimated that it spent 
$43,000, which did not take into account the large quantities of unpaid labour and free advice207 ; 
Fourthly, the Trust Board roughly estimated its costs as a "couple of hundred thousand 
dollars"208; And finally the Regional Council placed its costs in the region of $650-700,000 
(including the $250,000 for its previous decision process). The costs of other parties such as 
Mffi and the local bodies were not assessed. These figures can only be taken as indicative of 
both the scale and the disparate resources employed within the conflict, which at the end of the 
Planning Tribunal process was described by the Justice Department as "probably" the lengthiest 
and most costly Planning Tribunal case in New Zealand's history.209 
12.4. The 1992 High Court Appeals 
The three appeals to the High Court were not to be heard until March 1992. So in early 1991, 
with the hearing a distant prospect, the campaigners set out to keep the minimum flows issue 
alive and on the public agenda. They swiftly latched onto the subject of the $3.8m modifications 
and repair work that was ongoing in the Western Diversion tunnels. The abrasive action of sand 
and gravel fines upon the walls of the tunnels had caused substantial damage, and the Coalition 
mischievously questioned the integrity of the structures, and claimed that the work would have 
deleterious effects upon the blue duck populations.2lo This issue was continually raised over the 
following months.211 Another issue pursued was electricity efficiency. A research paper from 
within Electricorp was leaked to Forest and Bird. The society singled out (completely out of 
context) a speculative comment that energy efficiency measures could in theory decrease 
electricity consumption by up to 57 percent, and they proceeded to manipulate this information in 
the media.212 Following this the Society and Chapple criticised the role of world-renowned 
conservationist Dr David Bellamy, who had been employed by Electricorp Marketing to 
participate in a series of advertisements aimed at branding the Corporation as environmentally-
friendly.213 Also at this time the Minister of Maori Affairs, Winston Peters, joined the Minister 
of Conservation in condemning Electricorp's pursuit of their appeal.214 Despite Electricorp's 
efforts to justify its actions, its corporate image continued to be badly damaged by the 
Whanganui issue.2ls 
The High Court appeals were eventually heard in Wellington on 16-20, and 23-24 March 
1992. In addition to the three appellants; the strategic Crown perspective on the process was 
206 Evening Standard 11 September 1990. 
207 Evening Post 6 November 1990. 
208 Whanganui Chronicle 1 December 1990 
209 Gerard Hutching, November 1990, "Keith Chapple: Speaking forthe rivers" Forest and Bird p. 41. 
210 Whanganui Chronicle 5 January 1991; Daily News 9 January 1991; Dominion 21 January 1991; 
Whanganui Chronicle 22 January 1991. 
211 Keith Chapple, 20 September 1993, Personal Interview, Kakahi. 
212 New Zealand Herald 19 January 1991. 
213 Dominion 1 February 1991; New Zealand Herald 1 February 1991. 
214 New Zealand Herald 26 January 1991; Daily News 28 January 1991. 
215 For example; Russell Howie (Senior Environmental Advisor, E1ectricorp Production), 1991, "Electricorp 
Reveals Why Low Row Means High Court" Terra Nova Vol. 2, February, pp. 26-7; Also Chapple's 
rejoinder article. Keith Chapple, 1991, "Bandits on the Whanganui" Terra Nova Vol. 7, July, pp. 42-4. 
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represented by the Solicitor General and the Crown Law Office, the Regional Council remained 
as respondent, the Minister for the Environment was represented, and Keith Chapple216 
continued to represent the Coalition. Electricorp's appeal was heard first. Once again its counsel, 
Roy Somerville, deployed a wide and unfocused approach (and Justice Jeffries made much of 
that diffuseness). But the underlying theme throughout was the old one - that the Tribunal had 
failed to give special weighting to existing water rights. The argument was primarily about 
matters of legal interpretation. However, the substantive issues were touched upon in respect to 
the questions of whether the analysis was reasonable and fair. The High Court's investigation 
was directed towards and based upon the Planning Tribunal's argumentation rather than the 
primary evidence. The Electricorp appeal was unsuccessful on all grounds.217 
The Minister of Conservation's appeal was based on a single cause of action; that the 
Tribunal failed to give special weighting to in-stream values. Justice Jeffries felt that the essence 
of S. 20J of the Water Act had a greater affinity with conservation and in-stream values than the 
protection of use-rights that Electricorp asserted, but he ultimately held this did not amount to a 
special weighting or primacy. He therefore dismissed the Conservation appeal also.218 
At the completion of the Eiectricorp appeal and Conservation cross-appeal, the counsel 
for the Maori Trust Board, Sian Elias QC, sought, and was granted, an adjournment until the 
Court had made its determination on those appeals. In the event of both appeals failing the Trust 
Board would then abandon its appeal. This was indeed the case, and the High Court appeals 
effectively ended at that point.219 
The two appeals dealt with by the Court were so comprehensibly dismissed that there 
was little point in further challenges in the Court of Appeal.220 EJectricorp's strategic position 
was by this time completely 'lose-lose'. The adversarial character of the Whanganui minimum 
flows process did not sit well with the Corporation's otherwise consultative approach to resource 
management (indeed it could be seen as the catalyst for that change in approach).221 Most 
importantly, the Corporation was embarking on its water rights applications under the Resource 
Management Act 1991 (RMA) and those processes would be universally reliant upon public 
trust and goodwill. While the Corporation still perceived the loss of WD flows as unacceptable, 
they "simply had to live with it".222 Electricorp's acquiescence also meant that there was no 
reason for DoC to continue to litigate their case. The WRMF conflict was over almost five years 
216 Chapple made a brief submission in support of the Minister of Conservation's appeal. He subsequently 
acknowledged that by this stage he was well out of his depth, and essentially an observer. Keith Chapple, 20 
September 1993, Personal Interview, Kakahi. . 
217 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd and Others v Manawatu- Whanganui Regional Council High 
Court, Wellington. 3 June 1992, AP 302/90, Jeffries J. 
218 Ibid. Of some interest here is that counsel for the Minister for the Environment openly opposed the 
arguments on behalf of the Minister of Conservation. p. 46. 
219 Justice Jeffries provided an oral judgement on 24 March 1992. His written judgement was issued 3 June 
1992. 
220 New Zealand Herald 25 June 1992. 
221 Ian Johnstone (Group Environmental Manager, Electricorp), 9 September 1993, Personal Interview, 
Hamilton. Johnstone noted that by the late 1980's the Corporation was actively consulting with local 
communities over water resource issues with much success. He also noted that while the WRMF conflict had 
been a big lesson for the Corporation in how not to deal with such questions, that the Corporation's mistakes 
had been evident at an early stage. However, Electricorp was "locked into" an unsatisfactory formal ani 
adversarial process from the time the Catchment Boord decided on the process. 
222 Ibid 
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after the initiation of the flow review, and almost fifteen years since the Canoe Association's 
letter. 
Once again, it is necessary to touch upon the issue of resources. For most parties the 
costs incurred during this phase were predominantly legal fees. The Regional Council spent 
$67,000 on its two lawyers,223 and while figures are not available for other parties, similar sums 
would be likely as all parties, except for the Coalition, were represented by at least two legal 
counsels for the duration of the hearing. Electricorp's costs would, once again, have been far 
higher due to the greater preparation involved in their case. 
Finally, the Planning Tribunal decision carne into force on 1 September 1992, four years 
after the expiry of the previous regime.224 During the interim period the Corporation had 
voluntarily complied with the 1983 minimum flow guidelines. However, by delaying the 
imposition of a new flow regime Electricorp had been able to abstract 13 percent225 more than it 
would have otherwise been able to if the Planning Tribunal regime had replaced the 1983 regime 
on 31 October 1988 (24 percent had the Catchment Board decision been upheld). The value of 
that water to Electricorp was at least $2.34m per year or an approximate total of $9.36m (in 1989 
terms).226 The delaying tactics thus offset either all, or the bulk of, the transaction costs of the 
minimum flows conflict to Electricorp. In stark contrast, those pursuing greater in-stream flows 
received no such reduction in costs, indeed their costs were heightened by the delays, with four 
years of benefits to in-stream values being lost. There was no legal requirement to compensate 
for such substantive losses. 
12.5. The Whanganui River Minimum Flows Conflict 
The purpose of this final section is to tidy-up some loose ends, and to draw the threads of the 
largely empirical elements of the study together before I apply the analytical framework in the 
following chapter. In particular, I examine two aspects of the study that, while touched upon 
here and there within previous discussion, merit a composite analysis. The first aspect is the 
need to address the question of whether or not the Corporation prevailed in substantive terms 
(although I would like to stress that the issue of how it exercised its power is the focus of the 
following analytical chapter). The second is the issue of media coverage of the dispute - and on 
that subject I survey the newspaper coverage of the dispute. Lastly, I broadly summarise the 
conflict. 
12.5.(i) The Substantive Outcomes 
In the Black Head study the analysis of the substantive outcome was a pivotal and extensive 
element of my argument. In contrast, 1 will discuss the substantive outcome of the Whanganui 
223 Duncan Laing (Senior Counsel for Manawatu-Whanganui Regional COWlcil), 1 April 1992, Letter am 
attached invoice to Regional COWlcil. 
224 It was to be jointly managed by the Regional Council and Electricorp, and monitored remotely. There had 
been no subsequent compliance problems by September 1993. J. Garrett (then Resources Technical Manager, 
Centra! Districts Catchment Boards), 16 September 1993, Personal Interview, Palmerston Nortlt 
225 Of mean annual flows. 
226 I base these calculations on the figure of $18m for the total loss of the diversion flows. Electricity 
Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council October 1990, Judge Sheppard.. 
W70/90, on Whanganui River Minimum Rows Appeals 1990 Wellington. p. 165. 
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dispute only in the most general terms. I do so because: (i) The outcome of the WRMF dispute 
is most usefully viewed as a series of outcomes (I have already discussed each decision and the 
parties' responses to those regimes); (ii) The overwhelming substantive complexity of the 
conflict means that a systematic analysis WOUld, perforce, approximate and duplicate the 
comprehensive decision processes of the dispute itself; And (iii), unlike the Black Head conflict 
the juridical process served to filter and test the parties' claims - as a consequence there was no 
comparable disjuncture or 'false consciousness' between the parties' perceptions and the reality 
of the settlement (see 13.4.(iv». 
Table 12.2. The Minimum Flow Regimes 
Flow Measurement Point Flow Levels (cumecs) Duration 
1972 _~~Q3J~.!>tid~ _______ 0.6 y~r2U!l'!. ______ 
-------- --------------
1983 Whakapapa footbridge227 0.6 Year round 
TeMaire 22 1 December to 14 Feb. 
plus Easter 
-------- -------------------
!.6 _____________ B.~toll::~ ______ • 
1988 Whakapapa footbridge 8.5. 1 December to 30 April 
4 .2 1 May to 31 November 
_V{~P-Jl~1~~ _________ Natural Rows Y~tr2U!l'!. ______ 
-------- 1---------------1990 Whakapapa footbridge 3 Year round 
Te Maire 29 1 December to 31 Mav 
Figure 12.2. The Minimum Flow Regimes Compared on the Basis of Mean Annual 
Flows228 
% or Mean Annual flo ... 
TheRegtmes 
m % of headwater flows 
available for abstraction 
• % of headwater flows to be 
retained in-stream 
It is helpful to first plot and compare the respective flow regimes in broad terms, bearing 
in mind that each regime was the product of, and judged within, a contingent bundle of 
information, expectations, practices and structural conditions. Figure 12.1. is a blunt resume of 
227 The Whakapapa minimum flow was not part of the NW ASCA regime - it was the continuation of the 
existing arrangement between the NZED and the NZ Wildlife Service. 
228 The figures used here are those set out in Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd and Others v 
Manawatu-Whanganui Regional Council High Court, Wellington, 3 June 1992, AP 302/90, Jeffries J. p. 6. 
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the three main decisions, however it usefully illustrates the general movement within the decision 
making process. Prior to the commencement of the NW ASCA regime the NZED had been able 
to abstract virtually all of the headwater flows (subject to the limited constraints of the Piriaka and 
Kakahi arrangements). The 1983 regime had little substantive effect upon this - the loss of a 
further 2% of mean annual flows. It was the 1988 decision that signalled a substantial shift in 
the management of the water resource. But the Planning Tribunal's review soon moderated that 
movement. Viewing the successive decisions in this way, the Planning Tribunal judgement 
appears as a distinct compromise position equidistant from the 1983 and 1988 levels. The 
impression given is that despite the rigour of the Tribunal process - the comprehensive reasoning 
process and justificatory arguments - the ultimate decision rested squarely between the polarities 
of the NW ASCA and Catchment Board regimes. 
The final outcome was also a compromise between the parties' substantive positions. Yet 
while it is true that none of the participants achieved all they had set out to, it was also the case 
that some achieved more, or conceded less, than others. The distinctions here are relative rather 
than absolute. 
A simple argument can be made in support of the proposition that, on balance, Electricorp 
did prevail in the dispute. At the beginning of the conflict the NZED was effectively entitled to 
exclusive use of the headwater flows - they were in the position of having nothing to gain and 
everything to lose. This meant that the strategic goal of both the NZED and Electricorp was, at 
best, to mitigate their losses. These losses were respectively 5 percent, 29 percent and 18 
percent of the mean headwater flows, for the 1983, 1988 and 1990 regimes. The final figure of 
18 percent is the important one here. Against the vigorous and protracted campaign to restore 
most, if not all, of the natura! flows, the Corporation had succeeded in retaining over four-fifths 
of that water. Indeed, if that outcome is set against the 1972 regime, then the losses to 
Electricorp were in the region of only one-eighth of headwater flows. This is not to deny the 
undoubtedly significant costs to the Corporation of the settlement - $3.6 m per year or an NPV 
of approximately $40 m, in addition to the functional constraints it placed upon the operation of 
the generation system - rather, it is simply to recognise that most of the headwater resource 
remained available to Electricorp (see 12.3.(iv». 
Because of the zero-sum character of the diversion/retention equation, a complementary 
argument can be made about those who advocated increased in-stream flows. Those parties 
started the dispute with nothing to lose and everything to gain, and they ended with roughly a 
fifth of mean annual headwater-flows retained in-stream. It is possible to construe this result as a 
success solely because it was a gain per se. But such an interpretation is set against the 1972 
flows regime, and it is equally possible to proffer an alternative analysis based upon the pre-
diversion distribution. On this alternative account 18 percent of natural headwater-flow appears 
as small consolation for the in-stream advocates. 
The final settlement can be analysed in a myriad of ways; it can be measured against the 
substantive arguments and value-narratives articulated within the dispute, against different 
historical baselines, against the strategic positions of the various actors, or on the basis of their 
responses (which I have recorded throughout this chapter), etc. But ultimately, and as 
recognised by the decision-makers in the dispute, there is no objective calculus by which to 
analyse the decision. What I offer in summary, is the observation that as a result of the dispute 
the Corporation retained the use of most of the headwater flows and the in-stream advocates far 
:'--' 
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less. Obviously aspects other than the quantitative assessment of flows would be integral to a 
more comprehensive assessment of the substantive outcome (of relevance, for example, would 
be the matter of the distribution of compensation flows throughout the year or across the 
headwater streams, or indeed, the fact that water retained in-stream would be more valuable for 
in-stream needs at the lower margins and there would be some element of diminishing returns as 
greater compensation flows were awarded). Nevertheless, the quantitative summary does 
provide a useful working impression of the distribution of benefits and costs. I will set my 
analysis of the generative mechanisms of business influence against that aggregate picture. 
12.S.(ii) The Media Coverage 
The way the substantive arguments were represented in the public discourse is an important 
element of the 'power to define reality' mechanism that was originally explicated in Chapter Five, 
and that will be applied to this conflict in 13.4.(iv). Throughout this chapter I have referred to 
the various strategies used by actors to influence the presentation of their interests in the news 
media - towards the goal of shaping public discourse and opinion. In terms of historical analysis 
the media coverage is interesting on a number of levels. On one level it provides a useful record 
of the conflict - hence my reliance on that resource here and there within this case study. But it 
is another level that specifically concerns me here, that is the level of how the dispute was 
generally reported in the media. This is particularly important because it concerns the issues of 
power and discourse that are highlighted in the analytical framework. In Figure 12.2. I set out 
the results of a survey of 452 newspaper articles that appeared in four regional papers and three 
national papers over the full course of the dispute.229 I have restricted my focus to newspaper 
coverage because it was by far the most common form of media reporting on this issue, and this 
allows a greater sample to be used, and thus provides a sounder basis for inference. I would like 
to stress that this is not to diminish the importance of other modes of communication such as 
radio and television coverage (I have already referred to prominent examples throughout the 
study), it is rather, that from a historical perspective it is impossible/impracticable to survey those 
forms. Furthermore, all those forms are referred to in the analysis in 13.4.(iv). 
229 Those papers are: Regional Whanganui Chronicle. Taumarunui Gazette. Daily News (New Plymouth). 
Ruapehu Press; National Dominion (Wellington). Dominion Sunday Times. New Zealand Herald (Auckland). 
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Figure 12.2. Newspaper Coverage of the WRMF Conflict230 
Number of Articles 
Case for [n-stream Case Both/Neutral Other 
Diversion 
Arpments Reported 
Each article has been classified as falling within one of four general categories. In the 
first two categories the articles dealt exclusively with either the arguments for diversion, or 
alternatively for the retention of greater in-stream flows. The third category embraces instances 
that either included both of the first two sets of arguments, or that reported the substantive issues 
in the dispute in broadly neutral terms (an example of this would be a description of the power 
scheme). The fourth category is a residual one where the dispute was discussed in any other 
way - most of the articles categorised as such were about matters of process (eg. agendas for 
hearings).231 
A basic tendency is apparent from the data presented in Figure 12.2: The in-stream 
arguments were far more widely reported than the arguments for diversion. Not surprisingly, 
this tendency was more marked in the regional newspaper coverage. This asymmetry was most 
likely explained by, on the one hand, an element of editorial bias or greater receptivity towards 
the regional, conservation, recreation and Maori arguments, and on the other hand, the in-stream 
advocates greater reliance upon public opinion and the media as means of exercising influence in 
the conflict 
12.S.(iii) Conclusion 
In Chapters Ten, Eleven and Twelve I have endeavoured to construct a comprehensive and 
balanced account of the WRMF dispute. My primary goal has been to serve the needs of the 
analytical framework - to provide a factual basis for the assessment of business dominance in 
this dispute. I have sought to provide enough breadth of detail to set my concerns within the 
wider historical and substantive contexts. By doing so I hope to assist and allow for the 
composition of ancillary and complementary (and possibly competing) causal explanations of this 
very important episode of resource conflict 
230 See Appendix I for the data sets. 
231 I have made no distinction between the size of the articles presented. 
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The WRMF dispute is a compelling study for many reasons; the scope of the conflict, the 
complexity of the issues that subsequently surrounded a seemingly straightforward choice, 
the numerous discourses of value and fonns of reason, etc. But my interest lies with the 
mechanisms of business power posited in Chapters Four and Five. As a consequence, the 
following chapter is solely devoted to the task of operationalising the theoretical framework 
in the context of the WRMF dispute. The starting point for that investigation must be the 
endpoint of discussion in this chapter - viz. the general conclusion that while Electricorp did 
indeed prevail in the WRMF conflict the outcome was by no means unequivocal, and that 
Electricorp was certainly forced to make substantial concessions to the needs of competing 
values. 
13 
A Critical Analysis of the Whanganui Conflict 
13.1. Introduction 
As with Chapter Nine of the Black Head study, the task here is to use the analytical framework in 
the investigation of the WRMF conflict This is a two-way operation involving, on the one hand, 
the use of theoretical precepts to explain, in some meaningful part, the processes and outcomes of 
theWhanganui conflict, and on the other hand, to let the historical evidence reflect back upon the 
framework itself - to scrutinise the posited mechanisms of business dominance. In doing this the 
greatest difficulty is to detect or infer the exercise (or non-exercise) of these transfactuaI 
mechanisms within the 'noise' of the complex conjuncture.! 
The general approach taken is the same as before. I begin with a brief section on value-
form. As I noted at the beginning of Chapter Four, the distinction between use-value and 
exchange-value, and in applied terms, commodified and non-commodified values, performs a dual 
function. First of all, it acts analytically as a broad ordering principle for the discussion of 
environmental politics. Secondly, it allows for a systematic connection to be made between social 
class (functionally defined) and type of substantive value-connection with the natural world. Yet 
like Chapter Nine, the bulk of the chapter is devoted to investigating the model of politics and 
mechanisms of power originally set out in Chapter Five. Following the progression of the 
analytical framework, discussion moves from the strategic level of politics - the general causal 
imperatives that are the subject of Offe's schema - to the more specific generative mechanisms 
such as the matter of property rights or the dilemma of collective action. 
13.2. Value-Form 
As with my critical analysis of the Black Head conflict, the discussion of value-form is only a 
preface to the central questions of the political schema - the framework of business dominance. 
The application of the value argument to the case studies is largely a matter of a simple assessment 
of whether or not there was a general fit between the types of actors in the dispute and the types of 
value-holdings that motivated their political action. But I will also ascertain whether there was a 
noticeable prima facie connection between value-form and environmental harm - namely, were 
! Remembering that the posited structural relationships, and specific mechanisms of business dominance, must be 
conceived as trans/actual entities (Chapter Two). 
",' 
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the commodified interests also the interests that potentially or actually resulted 10 the greatest 
environmental harm? 
13.2.(i) Commodified and Non-Commodified Value Arguments 
As with the Black Head dispute, commodified values featured in the discourse in at least two 
ways; first in tenns of the articulation or expression of the substantive arguments, and secondly 
there was the matter of essential motivations. With regard to the fonner, a range of actors on both 
sides of the substantive argument over flows expressed their interests in money terms. But this 
does not itself subvert the basic connection between value-type and social grouping. As I noted in 
Chapter Four, the money-form is the dominant expression of value in capitalist society. Hence 
some of the in-stream advocates were at times translating their arguments into the dominant 
language of value (ie. surrogate prices). For others, money-valuations were an appropriate 
expression of their interests (ie. markets existed). Although for all of those in-stream advocates 
the commodity valuations were only one of a range of value types that they used in their 
arguments. The main point to be made at this level is that Electricorp was the only actor that 
utilised commodity valuations as its primary expression of value. 
But it was in terms of motivations or interests that there was the most marked 
correspondence with the value schema. Once again, there was some crossover with in-stream 
advocates being motivated to various degrees by the pursuit of exchange-value. Nevertheless, 
non-commodified types of value essentially motivated even those in-stream actors who did stress 
the economic implications of flows. Examples of this would be the tourist operators who were 
concerned not so much with the matter of profitable accumulation per se, but rather making a living 
in a particular place and in a close relationship with the river. Electricorp was the only central 
actor whose driving force was the "passionate chase after exchange-value". For the Corporation 
the dispute was about the availability of low cost and highly profitable generating capacity. Marx 
argued that "it is only in so far as the appropriation of ever more and more wealth in the abstract 
becomes the sole motive of his operations, that he functions as a capitalist".2 On such an acCount 
Electricorp was the only agent that can be clearly classified as having acted as a capitalist in the 
Whanganuiconflict 
This assessment can be confirmed by focusing, conversely, on the non-commodified value 
arguments. Again there were the two dimensions. In terms of the articulation or expression of 
value, non-commodified arguments were drawn upon by all of the parties involved. Electricorp's 
argument was peppered with references to various use-values of the water. For example the value 
of the Tokaanu station for frequency control. Notwithstanding 'this, Electricorp's primary 
expression of value was, as noted above, in terms of its financial interests. By contrast, the in-
stream campaigners articulated their interests by reference to a wide array of non-commodified 
value-forms. The Tangata Whenua referred to the river as a taonga, mahinga kai resource, 
recreational resource, and as of value as a pathway. None of those arguments were expressed as 
money-values. The conservation case spanned a spectrum of values: The ecological arguments 
referred to the inherent or 'intrinsic' natural values of ecosystems (ie. the integrity of the system, 
connections, natural processes), life-support arguments, scarcity values, etc.; The landscape 
2 K. Marx, 1958 (1867), Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production Vol. I, Foreign Language 
Publishing House, Moscow, pp. 152-3. 
Chapter Thirteen: A Critical Analysis of the Whanganui Conflict 291 
values referred to aesthetics, scientific/naturalistic value, historical values, spiritual connections; 
And the recreational arguments referred to various uses such as boating and fishing. There were 
many languages of value expressed within the dispute. 
But the crucial issue here, as above, was that while Electricorp utilised non-commodified 
value arguments they did not pertain to its essential motivations. Arguments such as the 
'frequency control' issue were well founded, but for Electricorp, like any other capi talist, they 
were only important in so far as they affected the overall profitability of the enterprise, and not for 
their own sake. The in-stream advocates, by contrast, were essentially motivated by a diverse 
collection of non-commodified value-fonns. There was a strong fit between the type of actor in 
the dispute and their type of value-holdings. On the one hand, there was Electricorp which 
expressed its interests through a range of instrumental use and exchange-value arguments, but 
was essentially motivated by exchange-value. On the other hand, there were the in-stream 
advocates who in great part both articulated their interests in tenns of, and were essentially 
motivated by, non-commodified values. It is thus legitimate to say, for the purposes of the 
following political analysis, that Electricorp can be classified and treated essentially as a capitalist 
enterprise, and that the in-stream advocates, where they were not acting as capitalists (which was 
almost exclusively apart from the tourist operators), can be classified in a residual sense as 
environmentalists/non-capitalists. 
13.2.(ii) Value-Form and Environmental Harm in the WRMF conflict 
The task here is to ascertain whether there was a prima facie connection between value-fonn and 
environmental hann - namely, were the commodified interests also the interests that potentially or 
actually resulted in the greatest environmental hann? 
In Chapter Ten I argued that the operation of the Western Diversion had deleterious 
biophysical effects upon the Wbanganui River system. I also observed that there was a tendential 
relationship between the two, with greater levels of water abstraction leading to greater levels of 
environmental hann. I did, however, provide the caveat that the relationship was complex, for 
example, there were undoubtedly threshold effects and the effects of the diversion were greatest at 
the higher increments of water abstraction (conversely, that there would probably be diminishing 
marginal environmental returns from increasing minimum flow levels beyond some point). Yet 
overall it was possible to say that the operation of the Diversion caused significant environmental 
hann, and that the more water used the greater the harm.3 
Over the course of Chapters Eleven and Twelve I discussed the parties and their 
arguments/interests vis-a-vis flows. I noted that the interests of both the NZED and its successor 
Electricorp lay with the maximum utilisation of the headwater flows. This raises a crucial issue, 
because while the NZED built and operated the scheme in order to exploit the resource fully, they 
were not directly motivated by profitable accumulation and, hence, exchange-value. Electricorp, 
on the other hand, was so motivated. Common to both was the fact that they advocated a use of 
the resource that led to significant environmental hann - they were both large scale and exploitative 
developmental organisations - but they were not both capitalists. Yet this does not negate or even 
diminish the core argument for three reasons: First, I noted at the start that the realist understanding 
of complex open systems allows for the exercise of other mechanisms of environmental 
3 There was. of course. the argument that the use of the water for hydro-generation avoided greater greenhouse gas 
emissions. So the relationship was not absolute. 
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exploitation (thus allowing for explanations of environmental harm in other than advanced 
capitalist societies); Secondly, while the NZED was not itself motivated by the passionate chase 
after exchange-value, it was, as I shall argue in 13.3.(iii), ultimately motivated by the need to 
sustain the requisite conditions for system wide accumulation; And thirdly, for the crux period of 
the dispute Electricorp was the primary developmental actor, and hence, for that period commodity 
production was the primary source of environmental harm. 
In Chapter Four I argued that the commodity form poses a number of ecological 
difficulties. AIl of those difficulties are somehow applicable to the production and exchange of 
electricity using the diversion flows. But two of those difficulties are of particular relevance. First 
and foremost is the observation that the use-value/exchange-value split involves an inherent 
disconnection. I argued that the consequence of the blindness of exchange-value to the rich and 
manifold qualities of things, and to the peculiarities of the production process, is that many 
environmental and other costs are subsequently extemalised - they are not accounted for within the 
exchange-value. This was most certainly the case with Electricorp's use of the water. Indeed, 
there was no recognition of the various costs associated with the loss of in-stream flows, even in a 
most superficial sense - for example they did not pay any resource rental for the water rights. The 
only recognition of those costs came in the form of the minimum-flows process and outcomes. 
The second factor is that emphasised by Harvey: "Money prices attach to particular things and 
presuppose exchangeable entities with respect to which private property rights can be established 
or inferred. This means that we conceive of entities as if they can be taken out of any ecosystem 
of which they are a part."4 Certainly, the water of the headwater streams was treated as separate 
from all of its natural functions and connections within the downstream river system. I make these 
points to emphasise that not only was Electricorp the primary cause of environmental harm, but 
some of the mechanisms of value posited in Chapter Four were, indeed, efficacious in causing that 
harm. 
A last point. The money form is the dominant value discourse in advanced capitalist 
society. Money values are generated within and in response to markets, which are an ubiquitous 
form of social choice me·chanism. But the WRMF dispute was arbitrated within a broadly juridical 
social choice mechanism. Both the Catchment Board tribunal and the Planning Tribunal were not 
only open to, but also actively encouraged the articulation and inclusion of other value forms 
within the decision-making process (they were empowered to do so by the Water Act). The 
existence of those bodies and frameworks can be seen, to some degree, as a necessary response to 
market failures, such as those that derive from the ecological failings of the commodity form. It is 
important to acknowledge the success of those frameworks in including varied value types, 
compared to the very exclusive and narrow boundaries of the negotiation framework in the Black 
Head conflict. 
4 D. Harvey. 1996. Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference Blackwell Publ., Cambridge Ma, p. 153. 
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13.3. Business, State and Environment: Offe's Model 
13.3.(i) Exclusion 
On the surface the exclusion principle functioned far less obviously in the WRt\1F conflict than in 
the Black Head dispute. At times there was no apparent division, with the state acting, for all 
intents and purposes, as a capitalist However, the situation was both complex and dynamic -
indeed, it is absolutely crucial to perceive the operation of the exclusion imperative as an ongoing 
process. Because of this I will focus upon two distinct chronological periods. 
Prior to 1986 the planning/design, construction and operation of the TPD had been the sole 
preserve of the state - variously, the State Hydro-electricity Department, New Zealand Electricity 
Department and Ministry of Works and Development, and later the Electricity Division of the 
Ministry of Energy. As I noted in both 10.3.(i) and 11.1.(ii), these were leviathan development 
agencies charged with the provision of key infrastructure during a period of sustained economic 
growth. At the beginning of the dispute (late 1970s) the raison d'etre of the NZED was the 
strategic guarantee of electricity supply, and not, at least in the first instance, to function as a 
capitalist enterprise motivated by profitable accumulation. For these development agencies 
electricity was not so much a tradeable commodity, than a social or public good (see maintenance 
function). This, however, changed towards the mid-I980s in the lead up to corporatisation.5 
Contrasting interpretations may be drawn here. One analysis is that if electricity was not 
ultimately treated as a commodity then the state's role in its supply does not necessarily contravene 
the exclusion principle. For if the state was not producing commodities then it was not acting as a 
capitalist But I would tend to hold that while the exigencies of electricity production and supply 
were not wholly consistent with private commodity production (ie. the passionate chase after 
exchange-value), the state was accumulating capital in the process (albeit with limited returns on its 
investment), and perhaps of most importance it was potentially supplanting private production. 
On this account the state was involved in accumulation, and as a consequence it was violating, or 
in conflict with, the exclusion imperative. The veracity of this interpretation is further bolstered 
when the pressure for institutional change is taken into account. Much of the nec-liberal reform 
program can be seen as a functional response to the state's contravention of the exclusion 
principle. The state had been increasingly active in organising many facets of commodity 
production, as well as 'socialising' many goods that had been, or could be, treated as 
commodities. The nec-liberal structural adjustment program sought to reverse that process. 
This leads into the second institutional phase following the establishment of the Electricity 
Corporation in 1986. The SOE form raises a host of questions about the littoral zone between state 
and business. Most crucially here, as to whether Electricorp is to be classified for analytical 
purposes, as either state or business? Building on the value-form analysis, my answer to this must 
be that as a participant in the Whanganui conflict the Corporation acted almost wholly as a 
commercial enterprise. Their primary motivation was to be a profitable business, and this drove all 
aspects of Electricorp's strategy. The Crown did retain ownership and some measure of control 
over the Corporation, but its relationship was determinedly hands-off. This functional separation 
was clearly evident in the dispute process, where the strategic interaction between Electricorp and 
various central government agencies was almost entirely played out within the public arena. The 
5 This is not to imply that electricity ceased to be of essential social use-value after that time. 
::1 
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Cabinet or officials committee, is testament to the desire to allow the SOE to function 
autonomously and transparently, even though in the short run this could involve significant 
procedural costs. Finally, while it is possible, and appropriate, to treat Electricorp in functional 
terms as a business enterprise, it is important to recognise that for the nea-liberal reformers the 
SOE model was only an interim phase before privatisation. Only by divesting itself of ownership 
would the state fully realise the underlying exclusion imperative. 
The consequence of this analysis is that the genesis and first stage of the dispute must be 
understood as being between the state and environmentaiistsiMaori/regional interests, although, as 
I will argue in the 'Maintenance' category, the state was ultimately driven by the wider needs of 
accumulation. In the second phase of the dispute, the conflict was between both capital and the 
state, and between capital and environmentalistslMaori/regionai interests. 
13.3.(ii) Dependency 
To recap, the strength of the capitalist state largely depends upon the strength of the economy as a 
whole. In Chapter Five I asserted that this fiscal dependence incorporates two interconnected 
elements. First, that the material capacity of the state to make decisions, and act upon them, is 
predicated upon the resources that it extracts from private accumulation (and that the ability of the 
state to extract such material concessions will be dependent upon the performance of the economy 
itself). Secondly, that the state's legitimacy is, in great part, dependent upon the economy, and 
this in tum is a powerful motivation for the state to serve the interests of capital. 
As with Black Head, the dependency relationship functioned in the Whanganui conflict on 
both national and regional levels. On the one hand, there were the agencies of central government 
that relied upon general taxation revenues for their existence, and on the other hand, there were 
local bodies largely dependent upon rates and levies upon local communities. Each level of state 
activity was fundamentally bound by this constraint. But the extent to which this in tum motivated 
or affected their strategic behaviour is difficult to ascertain. Certainly, the action element is more 
directly explained by the concomitant maintenance and legitimation imperatives. One of the few 
occasions when the dependency relation was exposed was the episode when Treasury officials 
voiced their concerns about the potential loss of asset value and income stream that could accrue 
from further limits upon diversion flows (for Electricorp was a significant source of government 
revenue). At the local level the dependency mechanism was probably partly responsible for the 
various local councils' advocacy of regional economic interests. 
The dependency relation is taken here to underpin other elements of the framework - a 
secondary or 'deep' structural mechanism - and as a consequence is of use in explaining the 
existence of those elements (such as the maintenance function or the state's pre-disposition to the 
needs of business), but it tends not to cast direct light upon historical events. 
13.3.(iii) Maintenance 
The dependency principle motivates the state in the performance of a this crucial third element of 
Offe's schema - the maintenance function - whereby the state seeks to create, sustain and modify 
the conditions in which capitalists engage in production for profit. As I observed in the analytical 
framework, this role is carried out both in the broad context of the system-wide needs of capital, 
and the narrower contexts pertaining to fractions and/or moments of accumulation. I also asserted 
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that particular patterns of accumulation establish crucial and specific impulses for state action (and, 
for that matter, in-action). 
At the very beginning of the analytical framework I referred to a widespread transition in 
advanced capitalist societies, from the late 1970s onwards, from a pattern of accumulation 
characterised by Fordist production and Keynsian state managerialism to a more flexible and fluid 
pattern of accumulation. 6 One crucial political-ideological manifestation (and driver) of this 
movement was the neo-liberal reform program referred to throughout this case study, and most 
recently in the discussion of the exclusion principle. The WRMF conflict straddled this transition, 
and as a result there existed two distinct patterns of state action, and most significantly here, two 
distinct patterns of maintenance. I will thus split my discussion of the maintenance function into 
the periods before and after the corporatisation of electricity production. 
The maintenance dynamic is pivotal in explaining the state's involvement in electricity 
generation prior to 1986. In II.I.(ii) I noted that during this period electricity was treated, by the 
state at least, as being of instrumental value at the scale of society as a whole - social use-value. 
Electricity was necessary for social development and economic growth. It was on this basis that 
the state dominated in the construction, ownership and operation of an integrated electricity 
generation and transmission system. This is consistent with the system-wide imperative upon the 
state to provide the general material conditions for profitable accumulation. Another causal element 
also became of increasing importance. This was the need for the state to counter threats to 
accumulation. In this case it was the actual effects of the energy crises of the 1970s, and the 
perceived risk of further disruptions to the New Zealand economy.7 The state's response to this 
was to continue with the expansion of the generation system, focusing upon indigenous energy 
resources, and also to regulate use. There also developed a greater emphasis upon integrated 
energy planning and management at the centre. As will be revealed in the discussion of 
'legitimation' next, this powerful articulation of the maintenance function overrode all other 
concerns such as environmental and other community considerations. 
The historical exercise of this imperative accounts, in great part, for the genesis df the 
WRMF conflict: It clearly motivated the construction of the TPD and the Western Diversion; It 
explains the centralised and opaque nature of the original decision-making process; And it explains 
the way the power planners were either oblivious to, paid lip-service towards, or simply overrode, 
various community concerns - concerns that subsequently evolved into the arguments presented in 
the dispute. 
But the second phase - re-configured pattern of maintenance - is equally important in 
explaining the development of the dispute. The structural adjustment 'program of the mid-I980s 
onwards radically transformed the state's economic function in general, and role in electricity 
supply in particular. The transition process is particularly revealing. As I noted in Chapter 
Eleven, the dissolution of the large developmental agencies was motivated by at least two strands 
of criticism. The foremost arguments were about the economic in-efficiency of those agencies8 -
that they delivered a poor return on public investment (when viewed as businesses). This was an 
6 See D. Harvey, 1989. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 147-50. 
7 Also here, there was the initial choice to construct the TPD. This was made largely because its modular structure 
placed relatively few demands - or at least staggered those demands - upon New Zealand's overseas reserves 
during a period when the economy had slowed (see 1O.3.(i». 
8 That is, in-efficiency judged on the basis of the ne<H:lassical notion of market efficiency. 
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"anti-statist" and "anti-corporatist" position that involved a strong ideological commitment to the 
'capitalisation' of state activities (see also 5.3.(iv».9 A second strand of criticism was founded 
upon a succession of environmental grievances, stimulated largely by the deleterious and highly 
unpopular ecological and social effects of major projects such as the TPD. This was a useful 
political justification for the core reformers, but for them it was really a collateral one, with the 
economic arguments always central. 
In brief, the assertion made by the proponents of structural reform was that the state was 
increasingly failing in its performance of the system-wide maintenance function - it was no longer 
providing the requisite conditions for profitable accumulation. Also, as I noted above, the 
wholesale intervention of the state in areas such as electricity supply was clearly in conflict with the 
exclusion principle. The new approach was detailed in Chapter Eleven, namely: 
• A commitment to the market in preference to the state as a means for allocating resources; 
• Emphasis on individual and corporate freedom as a key to economic progress and social well-being; and 
• A redoced role for the state in the economy.! 0 
Electricity was to be treated singularly as a commodity. Its supply and transmission was to be 
operated as a business, despite ownership being retained almost wholly by the Crown for the time 
being - as an interim position before privatisation. The withdrawal of the state from direct 
involvement in the production and transmission of electricity was itself an articulation of the 
maintenance role. Only by this time the optimal conditions for aggregate accumulation were 
judged to be best provided by a less interventionist state. 
This framework had a two-fold effect upon Electricorp's strategic position within the 
WRMF conflict. On the one hand, the Corporation was free to pursue its interests relatively 
unencumbered by political control and tactical compromises. For example, it had the sole 
discretion to expend vast resources on legal and other transaction costs of conflict (although it also 
had to bear fully the public disapprobation for this). It could also be strident in advocating its 
position in a way that would, in all likelihood, not have been politically tenable within the old 
development agencies. But on the other hand, the state's withdrawal meant that there was little 
chance that there would be political intervention in support of the Corporation's interests -
interventions to counter a threat to sectoral interests or a specific capital (regardless of Electricorp's 
relative ability to pursue its own interests). It also meant that Electricorp had to pursue its case in 
public, and there was no possibility of the type of corporatist accommodation that may have 
ensued previously. 
It is also useful here to review some specific manifestations of the maintenance functions as 
they related to various participants during the post-1986 period: First of all, a very important 
element of the Whanganui conflict was the role of the courts. This was consistent with the state's 
functional responsibility for providing the institutional framework for the regulation of conflict. It 
is doubtful, however, that the courts served the substantive interests of capital in this instance;ll 
Secondly, the involvement of Treasury noted above is interesting in so far as that control agency 
had been a major proponent of the corporatisation process which saw electricity supply distanced 
9 G. Bertram, 1993, "Keynesianism, Neoclassicism, and the State" In B. Roper, and C. Rudd, (005), 1993, State 
and Economy in New Zealand Oxford University Press, Auckland, p. 37. 
10 R. Mascarenhas, 1991, "State-Owned Enterprises" in: J. Boston, J. Martin, J. Pallot, and P. Walsh, (005),1991, 
Reshaping the State: New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution Oxford University Press, Auckland. 
11 This is not to say that the courts do not function that way. See: H. Collins, 1982, Marxism and Law Clarendon 
Press, Oxford. A seminal text on the ideological or political role of the Courts is: J. Griffith, 1985, The 
Politics of the Judiciary (third edition) Fontana Press, Great Britain. 
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from political control. Yet at the same time its officials were advocating the kind of corporatist 
inter-departmental accommodation that had been a central object of their critique of past 
administration (the desire for transparency and accountability) - there was a strong element of 
'wanting to have their cake and eat it'; And thirdly, the Ministry of Energy did articulate a sectoral 
perspective, and in doing so were closest to the historical maintenance role. But even so, they 
were fairly ineffectual in their stance and, indeed, capacity to influence events. 
The divergence between the national interest and the regional interest provides a good 
example of the tensions inherent within the overall maintenance role. The various local bodies 
engaged in the dispute were motivated to some extent by their own dependence upon local 
economies, but also by their general mandate to represent the local interest, and they advocated the 
commercial benefits that would accrue to the region if flow levels were increased. This brought 
them into conflict with Electricorp, which equated its own commercial interests with the national 
economic interest. 
The maintenance function explains a lot about the WRMF conflict at a general level. It was 
articulated in two quite distinct fashions over the course of the dispute. Prior to 1986 it was 
manifest primarily in the form of direct state provision of strategic infrastructure. Post 1986 it was 
manifest as a withdrawal of the state from direct involvement in electricity supply. Because of 
this, the mechanism helps explain in a broadly 'positive sense' the genesis of the dispute, and in a 
broadly 'negative sense' the middle and end of the conflict (by which I mean that the state did not 
intervene in support of EIectricorp). 
13.3.{iv) Legitimation 
..... the generally observable need of any power, or even of any advantage of life, to justify itself."l2 
It is imperative upon the state (in a liberal democracy) that it be seen to "pursue the common and 
general interests of society as a whole, allows equal access to power and is responsive to justified 
demands".l3 This is the legitimatory function. Following Williams and Reuten, it is understood 
here that the legitimation of the state involves both the "specification of the content of negative 
right through the framework of the law", and "a further positive specification of these rights -
grounded in welfare policy [which must include environmental welfare] and the institutions of civil 
society" .14 The question here is just how did this dual process of legitimation manifest itself in the 
Whanganui dispute? 
As with the maintenance function, over the course of the dispute there were a series of 
distinguishable patterns of legitimation. I will deal with each of these in tum. The first period 
predates the minimum flow process, spanning the planning and construction phases of the TPD. 
As I recorded in Chapter Ten, the power development progressed with remarkably few regulatory 
or procedural constraints. The scheme was deemed lawful not by virtue of a new act of 
Parliament, statutory planning procedure or, indeed, any meaningful consultative or even vaguely 
democratic process. Instead, the whole project was enabled by the far less transparent instrument 
of an Order in Council under the Public Works Act 1928. It was essentially legitimated by 
12 M. Weber, 1968, EcolWmy and Society J/I Bedminster Press, New York, p. 953. 
13 C. Offe, In L. Lindberg, (ed.), 1975, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism D C Heath and Co., 
London, p. 127. 
14 M. Williams, and G. Reuten. 1993, "The Political-Economic Transfommtions in Central and Eastern Europe: A 
Tragic Neglect of Civil Society" Working Paper Series 2/93 Graduate School of Business and Government 
Management, Victoria University of Wellington, p. 16. 
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executive fiat and justified on the basis of the exigencies of national economic interest (maintenance 
function). Of utmost importance in the current context was the failure of this process when 
measured against the expectations of modern liberal democracy (let alone the fuller conception set 
out in Chapter One).15 The developers failed to (i) divulge adequate information about the 
scheme, (ii) to examine social and environmental impacts (even cursorily), (iii) to consult with the 
public, and (iv) to accommodate community concerns (which of course were stifled by (i), (ii), 
and (iii». The consequences of this failure to predict or survey, wider interests were compounded 
by the general absence, or inaction, of state agencies that could have advocated such concerns on 
their behalf. For example, there was no government agency actively articulating the environmental 
concerns (at that stage framed as 'scenery preservation' or 'trout fishery'). When the Wildlife 
Service did eventually become involved it was after the design stage, and any consequent changes 
were necessarily restricted to limited structural modifications (eg. ladders for trout to make their 
way past obstructions) or minor operating restrictions such as those embodied in the Kakahi 
temperature agreement 16 In retrospect, the consequence of the emphasis upon economic 
legitimacy (see 5.3.(ii», the stealthy but categorical legal foundation (negative right), and general 
failure to accommodate potential and actual community concerns (positive right), can be seen to 
constitute something of a legitimation deficit - one that would in all probability have to be 
subsequently reconciled in some way.17 
The second period covers the opening stage of the dispute following the Canoe 
Association's 1977 request. Many of the dormant regional concerns did not surface at this. time. 
Indeed, even when prompted, some such as the Whanganui River Reserves Trust, did not express 
a great deal of dissatisfaction with the status quo. There were at least four reasons for this. First, 
some of the groups and individuals that were to play a central role in later proceedings did not 
consider the minimum flows mechanism to be either the most appropriate or viable, avenue for the 
expression of their grievances or achievement of their goals. For example, Te-Atihau-nui-a-
Paparangi were focusing upon the Treaty of Waitangi claims process, and FORKS (Chapple, etc.) 
were pursuing a Local Water Conservation Notice for the Wbakapapa River. Secondly, there was 
still a general lack of awareness about the issue in the region. Thirdly, there was the issue of 
expectations. Even those who did involve themselves in this process couched their claims in very 
conservative terms compared to later in the process. This may have been a strategic response to 
the complete 'stranglehold' over the river held by the NZED, and its perceived political power. 
Finally, while much of the dissatisfaction with the diversion could be seen to derive in some way 
from the inadequacies of the original development process, the responses were also formed by 
contemporary values, activities,18 political aspirations, etc. (themselves a product of the historical 
15 Such as, for example, that planning processes will be fairly transparent, that potentially affected communities 
will be provided with avenues for meaningful participation in decision-making process, and that their interests 
will be taken into accOlmt. 
16 The one other example of the state accommodating the concerns of those in the Whanganui region was with 
regard to the Piriaka power station, which constituted the type of economic use of the water that was 'valued' at 
the time. 
17 This legitimation deficit must be seen in the context of a succession of state development projects that similarly 
involved deleterious ecological and social consequences. It was this cumulative deficit that, in some significant 
part, led to the dissolution of the monolithic development agencies and the creation of the new environmental 
administration in the mid-l980s. 
18 For example, canoeing was to become more and more popular over the following few years. 
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context19). In brief, some concerns remained donnant and others had yet to develop, and the 
upshot of this was that while there was some pressure upon the state to make compromises that 
influence was fairly limited. 
In this early phase of the dispute the state was beginning to take notice of wider community 
demands. In enacting the Water Act, the state recognised that water was valued in a multiplicity of 
ways - not all commodified. In fact, the balancing process at the heart of the Act was a clear 
example of a framework where the legitimation function and the maintenance function come 
together and are in some way reconciled. But while that framework was in place, the balancing 
process meant that any substantive accommodation would only occur on a case by case basis. The 
1983 adjustment of the flow regime was minimal, and hence amounted to only a small legitimatory 
acknowledgment. 
Although the Water Act provided the framework for this accommodation, it was the 
Catchment Board and ultimately NW ASCA that controlled this process and detennined its 
outcome. With regard to the legitimation role, those organisations can be understood, on the one 
hand, as facilitating and supporting participation and the expression of community concerns20 
(albeit prompted by the canoeists), and on the other hand, as in some way controlling or shaping 
those very concerns. For example, Don Spence functioned in a gatekeeper role, filtering out 
claims that he perceived as too ambitious or beyond the ambit of the exercise. One other 
characteristic of this early process, was that it remained relatively hidden from the public (see 
12.1.(i». 
It was with the emergence of the water rights campaign and the parallel minimum flow 
review that the legitimation role came to the fore. The pattern of legitimation that materialised 
during this phase must be understood on two levels. First of all there was the system-wide 
context. As noted above, by dissolving the NZED and creating Electricorp the state moved the 
electricity generation and transmission functions to arms length. One effect of this movement was 
~at the state was no longer directly responsible for legitimating the electricity production process 
and its impacts upon 'the social and natural environments. As I have also repeatedly stated, the 
Corporation functioned as a business. Moreover, its political power derived not so much from its 
residual relationship with the state, but rather, from its position as a monopoly generator. A 
consequence of this within the conflict was that the state ceased to be the direct or primary focus of 
criticism for those opposing the diversion of flows. The one exception was with regard to the 
water rights question where the government was lobbied hard, and ultimately made significant 
concessions - indeed those concessions can be viewed as a move by the state to bring about a 
more publicly acceptable (hence more legitimate) water use regime. Of greatest note was that in 
transferring the rights the state had passed on the historical legitimation deficit to Eiectricorp.21 
19 Indeed, one bas to be careful about concentrating on subjective preferences because they are themselves (as I made 
clear in Part I of the thesis) products of existing power structures. 
20 Of note here was the way that Don Spence actively protected the process from the NZED's stand-over tactics. 
21 It is appropriate that I make some supplementary reference to the issue of corporate power and legitimation here. 
In an excellent article in the Western Political Quarterly, Neil Mitchell argues along Weberian lines that the 
firm seeks power in order to make and maintain a profit, hence: "The actions of corporations have public 
influence and effect The obverse of the exercise of power, for the business firm as for the state, is the problem 
of legitimising that power". He later describes how business goes about legitimising its activity: 
Traditionally businessmen have sought legitimacy in an ideology based on classical economic 
theory, the pivotal assumption of which is competition. The central tenet of traditional business 
ideology is the claim of powerlessness on the part of the individual firm. The firm's activity, in 
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Concomitant with this transition, was the establishment of the Department of Conservation 
which, was to not only manage the Crown lands under its direct stewardship, but was also to act 
as a wider conservation advocate. The environmental struggle that, in some considerable part, 
precipitated this transition can be seen as a response to a widespread failure of the state to 
legitimise its own developmental activity and to control the environmental effects of other 
economic activity. This was a wider version of the legitimation deficit attached to the TPD. 
Although this was not the sole reason, as increasing environmental awareness and expectations 
also drove these changes. The existence of DoC and its mandate is wholly in line with the notion 
of positive right explicated in the analytical framework - the state is forced to open itself to non-
capitalist interests, and it is obliged to make material concessions which may be immediately or 
partially subversive of capitalist accumulation. 
The position taken and acted upon by DoC within the conflict was itself immediately and 
partially subversive of accumulation. From the very beginning of their involvement the 
Department constituted a significant threat to the profitability of the Corporation. Throughout the 
1988 Catchment Board process the Department advocated the full restoration of natural flows. 
Even if one takes this to be a rhetorical or tactical position, it was still the most absolute position 
that could be taken on this issue. Moreover, DoC actually pursued that goal with considerable 
zeal, and at very considerable cost given the Department's limited budget and vast range of 
obligations (and the later Planning Tribunal phase involved costs of an even greater order of 
magnitude - see below). They also had to weather opposition such as that of Treasury, and also 
the parliamentary opposition. The question that arises here is how the Department was able to 
adopt and justify this approach given the concomitant maintenance role. 
A number offactors explain this. First, there was the contemporaneous water rights issue 
and regional campaign. As I noted in 12.2.(ii) DoC did not participate in that campaign - which 
was beyond its direct mandate and also highly politicised. However, the water rights campaign 
did set the political agenda, by raising public awareness, mobilising support, and raising 
expectations about the restoration of flows. Indeed, the campaign built upon the hitherto dormant 
grievances that had stemmed from the genesis of the TPD. But while this process involved the 
Minister of Conservation, thus raising the profile of the flows issue at the national political level, 
the Department had for some time focused its activities on the minimum flow review process. 
DoC's preliminary involvement was not driven or even prompted22 by the Coalition's activities, 
but they did help create the political will to support the Department's actions once they were under-
way. This was most certainly the case once the water rights question had been settled and the 
Coalition turned to the minimum flows process. 
The second reason was, as noted above, the distancing of the electricity supply function 
from the state, and the re-configuration of the maintenance role to one of non-intervention. This 
effectively created a window of opportunity for DoC with regard to the WD issue. The 
the competitive market is in hannony with the public good. and under traditional ideology is self-
legitimising. 
But in situations like the one here. where Electricorp was in a monopoly position. this competitive argwnent falls 
down (even despite the arguments that the threat of new participants acts as a sufficient discipline). aIXl 
legitimation problems arise. Thus. instead of denying its power. the monopoly player will seek to justify its 
position - most significantly. by the inculcation of an ideology of social (and in this case 'environmental') 
responsibility. See; N. Mitchell. 1986, "Corporate Power, Legitimacy, and Social Policy" Western Political 
Quarterly Vol. 39, No.2. pp. 199-205. 
22 DoC had responded autonomously to Spence's agenda for the review process. 
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Department had no obligations towards Electricorp and its production role, and their relationship 
was not necessarily close - i.e. an interdepartmental one as may have been the case previously. 
A third factor was DoC's clear mandate, which had invested its new employees with a missionary-
like sense of purpose. I noted in my analysis of the Black Head dispute that the conservation 
mandate acted to buffer the Department from the maintenance role of the state. The result was that 
the staff of the Wbanganui conservancy (although with the support of head office and the Minister) 
were able to pursue their goals on the Whanganui question in a manner that would in all likelihood 
not have been possible in later years.23 Finally, the 'entrepreneurial' role of key individuals 
within the organisation was not confined to the private actors, and the indomitable commitment of 
John Om bIer and his conservancy staff was pivotal in DoC's participation. 
The Catchment Board's statutory role did not alter in the 1988 review - i.e. to administer 
and adjudicate the flow setting process - other than that it had the final say instead of NW ASCA 
which had by that stage been disbanded. However the way it gave effect to its powers did change. 
In response to the greater public interest and importance placed in the flows issue, the Board went 
to great lengths to conduct an open, thorough, and impartial process. In doing this the Board and 
its special Tribunal were acting entirely consistently with the requirement that the state allow equal 
access to power and be responsive to justified demands. There is no evide~ce to suggest that this 
was an ideological sop (i.e. the ideological mechanisms mentioned in 5.3(iv» - indeed, that the 
Catchment Board's approach was genuine was borne out in their decision, which represented a 
significant material accommodation towards the demands of environmentallMaori/regional interests 
(compared to what had existed prior to the decision). 
The final phase is that of the legal appeals. The Planning Tribunal, and later High Court, 
replaced the Catchment Board in controlling the process and in adjudicating the outcome. The 
judicial articulation of the legitimation role differed somewhat from the Catchment Board. While 
all those who had previously made a submission on the matter retained the right to be heard in the 
Planning Tribunal hearing, the juridical context - for example, its formality, emphasis upon expert 
evidence, and the actual and potential matter of costs - acted to deter participation.24 Hence the 
withdrawal of Forest and Bird from proceedings. Thus, as I noted in the last chapter, the process 
was far less inclusive and democratic, although not necessarily less legitimate because of this. 
Legal legitimation is strongly dependent upon the operation of negative right. 
The legal appeals increased DoC's role in the legitimation process. In late 1990, Denis 
Marshall, Minister of Conservation in the newly elected National Government, openly criticised 
Electricorp's decision to go to the High Court. The Department would actively oppose Electricorp 
in any appeal proceedings. He then went on to state that the "Department is representing many 
individuals and organisations that cannot afford the high legal costs involved".2s As the 
framework for accommodation tended towards the operation of negative right, then DoC's 
articulation of positive right became even more critical. 
The Planning Tribunal decision moderated the concessions made by the Catchment Board 
in 1988. It would be overly simplistic to attribute that movement solely, or even greatly, to the 
courts' emphasis upon negative right. But it was undoubtedly the case that the Catchment Board 
23 John Ombler (District Conservator, Whanganui), 27 July 1998, Personal Interview, Wellington. 
24 Although standing in the High Court appeals was dependent upon participation in the Planning Tribunal hearing. 
2S Denis Marshall (Minister of Conservation), 30 November 1990, Press Release: "Whanganui River Appeal 
Opposed". 
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Tribunal (which undertook all of its considerations within the Whanganui region, and drew upon 
the volumes of written submissions as well as the oral presentations) placed far more emphasis 
upon regional demands, and hence upon positive Right, and that resulted in the retention of greater 
flows for in-stream needs. 
Finally, in summarising the operation of the legitimation function it is useful to make some 
limited comparisons with the Black Head dispute. In the Black Head controversy the participation 
of DoC was crucial to the putative success of the conservation case. Prior to the Department's 
intervention, and their tactical threat of legal sanctions, there had been little chance of any 
meaningful negotiated settlement. This was mostly due to the expansive bundle of property and 
other use rights held by the quarry company. Other than moral suasion and public pressure -
hitherto ineffective - the legislation administered by the Department offered the only real leverage. 
So, it was also a case of the state opening itself to, and accommodating, non-capitalist interests. 
Indeed, the Black Head issue was a clearer case of the state actually responding directly to 
struggle than the Wbanganui conflict, for in the WRMF dispute DoC's involvement seemed to 
stem more from its own institutional agenda - an indirect response to wider historical struggle. 
But the role of DoC in the two disputes diverged in their subsequent handling of their cases. In the 
Black Head dispute DoC proceeded cautiously, and ultimately strove to portray itself as a moderate 
and reasonable bargaining agent compared to the independent environmentalists.26 Also, there 
was a strong sense of its legitimacy deriving from the fact that it represented the broader public 
interest. But there was also a sense that the DoC decision-makers did not want to engage in an 
open conflict with an important local company (completely private as opposed to an SOE). In the 
WRMF dispute DoC pursued its case as vigorously as possible. While the Department was unable 
to adopt the kind of maverick strategies adopted by Chapple and others, they remained 
uncompromising in the pursuit of their goals. 
The concept of a legitimation function does usefully explain some of the overall dynamic or 
pattern of the dispute. Most notably through the failure of the state to legitimise the project in its 
early stages, the subsequent surfacing and development of dormant concerns, and lastly, the whole 
thrust and importance of the Department of Conservation within the conflict. 
13.3.(v) The Strategic Picture 
Without doubt, the four relational principles of Offe's political schema did operate at various levels 
throughout the Wbanganui dispute. The exclusion principle does help explain the pressure upon 
the state to divest itself of control (and ultimately ownership) of electricity generation and 
transmission. It is also valuable because it emphasises how the dispute pivoted around the wider 
structural reform process - a theme that resonated throughout the rest of the analysis. The 
dependency relationship was more difficult, in that the principle describes a simple but critical 
relationship between the state and capital. That simple relation certainly operated throughout the 
dispute process, but in terms of explanation it is of greatest significance because it logically 
underpins the maintenance, and to some extent the legitimation, functions. It is also underpins 
some of the more specific mechanisms of business dominance discussed next. It is because of this 
that I depicted it as a secondary or 'deep' structural mechanism. Two patterns of maintenance 
were described - a highly interventionist period characterised by corporatist decision-making and 
26 Although in the Black Head dispute this cautionary approach was partially explained by the limited legal options. 
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accommodation, and a subsequent withdrawal of the state from organising production. I then 
argued that this transition was of fundamental importance in explaining the genesis, processes and 
outcomes of the dispute. Finally, the legitimation dynamic did stand in the posited synergetic-yet-
antagonistic relation with the maintenance function. This was most obvious in the way the 
maintenance role drove the construction of the scheme creating a crisis or 'deficit' of legitimacy. 
That deficit subsequently led, in great part, to the dispute. But also, it was the transformed 
articulation of the maintenance role from the mid-1980s that opened up a space for that legitimation 
to occur. In summary, these four principles are of significant value in explaining the overall 
pattern of the conflict, but they are also assumed to underpin the mechanisms of dominance 
discussed next. 
13.4. Mechanisms of Business Dominance 
I tum now to the more specific mechanisms of business dominance. In doing this I focus only 
upon Electricorp, for as I concluded in 13.3.(i) the NZED cannot be considered as a business 
enterprise in the context of this framework. 
13.4.(i) The Business Sanction 
The business sanction is the strategic leverage that fractions of capital derive from the potential 
cessation, translocation, reduction, or even withholding of future, investment and production, 
within a given geo-historical context. It is a mechanism that operates on a continuum from overt 
and deliberate action to subconscious structures of in-action or constraint. Also, it is premised 
upon businesses willingness and capacity to act when their interests are threatened. 
This mechanism worked on two levels in the Whanganui conflict The first level was the 
general and underlying one whereby the scope of any environmental initiative may be severely 
limited if the program is considered to pose a general threat to the conditions of accumulation. On 
this account, most if not all, of the arguments/advocacy against diversion, constituted threats to 
Electricorp's profitability. Electricorp's argument throughout was that any decrease in the water 
available for generation would result in economic costs that would be borne by the nation as a 
whole. The greater the loss - the greater the economic cost to the nation. It was this simple 
argument that underpinned Electricorp's case within the balancing process, and indeed, it can be 
said to have largely underpinned the substantive outcome where Electricorp managed to retain the 
use of the greatest portion of headwater flows. 
The second level is the more strategic or pro-active question of Electricorp's willingness 
and capacity to act when threatened. This is really the essence of the business sanction as depicted 
in the analytical framework. Possibly the earliest example was during the water rights campaign, 
when Corporation staff argued that they "expected the water right to be transferred - to assume 
otherwise is to assume Electricorp can't become a state owned enterprise".27 On the face of it this 
statement was true (it needed water rights to generate power) the real issue was always about the 
nature of the bundle of use rights and the concomitant obligations that would apply. To the extent 
that the Corporation staff were overstating and oversimplifying the cause, there was an implied 
sanction. But given that the government subsequently required Electricorp to apply for new water 
27 Ian Johnstone (North Island Hydro Group Envirorunental Manager, Eiectricorp) qooted in The Dominion 19 
November 1987. 
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rights across its entire generation system, the Corporation cannot be seen to have succeeded in this 
instance. 
There was also an element of this type of sanction in the way the Corporation consistently 
exaggerated its arguments throughout the conflict First of all, they overstated the economic 
implications of any reduction in flow levels. By constantly warning of large electricity price 
increases they suggested a sanction against power consumers. Another realm of argument was 
with regard to environmental costs. According to Electricorp, the loss of hydro-production would 
lead to greatly increased thennal generation and associated green-house gas emissions (indeed 
there was even scaremongering about nuclear generation) - an environmental sanction (note the 
environmental sanction in the Black Head case (9.4.(i)). Once again, this did not clearly benefit 
the Corporation because such claims were systematically tested, and in most cases rejected or 
attenuated, in the adjudication process (see 13.4.(iv». But the point here is that while all parties to 
the conflict overstated their arguments in some way or another, Electricorp was the only actor that 
retained the apparent capacity to carry out those threats. They could, for example, potentially 
decide what fonns of generation would be used, or what prices charged. 
One final example was the disturbing matter of Electricorp's influence upon DoC 
witnesses. This happened twice, and on both occasions it operated through the Corporation 
inferring a conflict of interest, or alternatively, by simply relying on the consultants' (scientists and 
engineers) fear of losing the Corporation's business. This exercise of power was broadly 
analogous to the job blackmail/capital strike mechanisms - it was predicated upon Electricorp's 
overwhelming market power. 
So while Electricorp's economic interests established apparent 'limits to the possible' 
within the wider decision-making process, the Corporation was constrained in its ability to actively 
impose sanctions upon society. At least two strands of argument can be gathered to explain this. 
The first strand relates to the basic proposition that the business sanction operates through the 
spatial transfer of capital, and is especially reliant upon the relative mobility of capital compared to 
ecosystems or human communities. In this case, there was no credible threat that could be made. 
The TPD was already constructed, and moreover, it was operating as part of an integrated 
generation system. Even if the Corporation had lost all of the WD flows, that would not 
necessarily have meant that the TPD would cease to function. Moreover, any subsequent 
reduction in generation capacity or output would have to be replaced by the Corporation itself as 
monopoly generator. So there was no question of losses in jobs or investment, or of capital flight 
out of New Zealand. Indeed, the construction of new generation capacity or the utilisation of the 
more labour intensive thennal capacity may have required greater investment or employment 
opportunities. A second strand of argument is that any consequent increase in generation costs 
would have been spread across all electricity consumers - and as I observed in Chapter Eleven 
while the immediate cost to Electricorp amounted to millions of dollars, the costs to the individual 
consumer were nominal. This second argument can also be applied to the underlying level noted 
above - thus vitiating that argument also. One other factor that could be made here is that as a state 
owned enterprise, and as a monopoly (that could not legitimise its actions by reference to wider 
market forces), the Corporation was also politically constrained in the types of threats or 
suggestions that it could make. 
In summary, the dependency and maintenance dynamics operated at a deep level to make 
decision-makers wary of the economic impacts of any decisions and this probably shaped the 
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substantive outcome. However, in this conflict the strategic exercise of the sanctioning 
mechanism was particularly limited in scope and effect. 
13.4.(ii) The Double Privilege of Private Property Ownership 
In the WRMF dispute the property rights structure was of far less causal significance than was the 
case in the Black Head conflict, where it was pivotal. To understand why this was so it is useful 
to return to the original argument. In Chapter Five I asserted that a private property regime confers 
a double privilege upon its owners. On the one hand, there is the internal logic of the private right 
- a privileged relation of power over the resource and over the rest of society - and on the other 
hand, there is an external structural political-economic bias that creates, sustains and legitimates 
this type of property rule. I shall relate each of these elements to the Whanganui case. 
The first task here is to ascertain the status of the Corporation's water rights - did those use 
rights constitute the privilegedfonn private property? An appropriate starting point is the historical 
treatment of water resources. Traditionally, at common law, flowing water was "said to be publici 
juris ('of public right') in the sense that it was public or common to all who had a right of access 
to it".28 This meant that water was not property as such until it had been appropriated.29 While 
that basic principle endured throughout the period covered here, its effect had been gradually 
eroded by specific interventions authorised by statute, and overarching legislative regimes for 
managing water resources - in this case, the 1958 Order in Council and Water Act respectively. 
Those statutory mechanisms allowed the Crown to vest use rights in particular actors for particular 
purposes - in this case the open-ended right for Electricorp to take as much water as it wanted 
from the headwaters of the Whanganui River, subject only to natural flows and to existing 
agreements. In functional terms this was an expansive use right that is consistent with the above 
depiction of the private right (it allowed the Corporation to monopolise the resource and, ipso 
facto, exclude the rest of society from its use). But on closer inspection there are important 
differences between those water rights and the general form of private property. 
The first and foremost distinction was that they conferred a right to use the water for a 
specified purpose, whereas one of the basic tenets of ownership (as described in 5.4.(ii» is the 
right of the owner to "determine how that object shall be used and by whom".30 Granted, there 
will nearly always be some regulatory constraint upon a resource owner's discretion, but that is 
not the same as prescription. The difference lay in the degree of agency involved - Electricorp 
held a valuable but narrow right A second distinguishing factor was that Electricorp's water right 
was held as part of the package of authorisations originally granted by the Order in Council. This 
meant that the water rights were not alienable from the larger bundle of rights that enabled the 
operation of the TPD. Moreover, any decision on the divestment of those rights would in all 
likelihood be a political one and not one for the Corporation itself. Thirdly, following the water 
rights campaign Electricorp was bound to apply for new water rights within five years. This 
imbued the water rights with a provisional character. Finally, one other aspect - not of itself 
subversive of the notion of the private right but when placed alongside the other qualifications does 
help explain the special character of the Corporation's entitlements - was that the Corporation 
28 F. Brookfield, 1997, The lAws of New Zealand: Water Butterworths. Wellington, p. 45. In that context the 
key issue was who, in fact, had access to the water in the first place. 
29 Ibid., pp. 45-53. 
301. Waldron, 1988, The Righi to Private Property Clarendon Press, Oxford. p. 39. 
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inherited the water rights at nominal, if any cost. The water was a factor of production but was not 
itself commodified. All of these factors together help describe the particular nature of the 
Corporation's water right. I believe that while this was a very valuable right for Electricorp it was 
definitely not as strong an entitlement as those rights over land that underpinned the Black Head 
conflict. While it granted certain privileges of use to the Corporation, it was not as strong when it 
came to the matter of the power to exclude the rest of society from the control of that resource. 
There was still a sense of the principle of publico juris that penetrated the whole matter of water 
rights - the recognition that water is of interest to many parties, if not society as a whole. This 
was borne out of the second level of privilege - the political-economic articulation of the right. 
The issue of water rights was dealt with in two realms. The first was in regard to the 
transfer of rights to the new Corporation. I have already mentioned this, and will only reiterate 
here that in this transition, and in response to the public campaign and wider question of Treaty 
obligations, the state acted to constrain the (hitherto perpetual) right by requiring that the 
Corporation apply for new entitlements. There was no such opportunity for the state to constrain 
the legal rights of the developers in the Black Head conflict But the most significant treatment of 
the issue of use rights in the Wbanganui conflict was within the legal discourse; viz. the dispute 
over the status of the Corporation's water right in the setting of a minimum flow. under S. 20 J of 
the Water Act. It was in that process that the dispute accorded with Koetsch's portrayal of 
resource conflict as "the extent to which a right is protected or accorded preference over another 
entitlement".31 
Electricorp presented two main rights-based arguments throughout the conflict. In the first 
instance it asserted that its use rights were inviolate32, and that because of this decision-makers 
could not establish any minimum flow regime that constrained their water right (the NZED had 
argued this, unsuccessfully, in 1982). In the second instance they set out a fall-back position, 
where they argued that in establishing a minimum flow regime, Electricorp's prior use rights must 
be accorded primacy within the balancing process. As I recorded in Chapter Twelve, the 
Catchment Board Tribunal, Planning Tribunal and High Court all subsequently dismissed 'those 
arguments, thus enabling the establishment of an acceptable minimum flow under S. 20 J, and in 
doing so acting to substantially constrain Electricorp's use right. No comparable legal mechanism 
was available to accommodate wider countervailing interests in the Black Head dispute. 
In a sense, the original right of Electricorp to abstract virtually all available water from the 
river was analogous to Black Head Quarries' unfettered right to flatten the headland if it should so 
choose. But the historical treatment of water resources as of common interest (in response to 
wider statutory recognition of competing needs) resulted in a legal framework that could be used to 
curb those rights. Finally, it is crucial to recognise that while Judge Sheppard made it clear that the 
existing use right would not be accorded primacy in the balancing process, this does not mean that 
it wasn't of great importance within that calculus. There is no way of distilling the extent of that 
influence, but it still remained that Electricorp retained access to by far the greatest portion of 
flows. 
31 J. Knetsch. 1983. Property Rights and Compensation: Compulsory Acquisition and Other Losses Butterworths. 
Canada, p.2. 
32 Specifically. that S. 24 0 (the section designed to give effect to minimum flow regimes) could not be used to 
vary conditions on water rights. 
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13.4.(iii) The Unequal Distribution of Resources 
Charles Lindblom observed that business advocates enjoy a triple advantage over other civil actors 
in polyarchal politics; "extraordinary sources of funds, organisations at the ready, and special 
access to government".33 The task here is on the one hand, to broadly identify the distribution of 
resources in each of Lindblom's categories as they applied to the Whanganui conflict, and on the 
other hand, to ascertain where possible, just how those distributions affected the strategic course 
of the dispute. While my focus is upon the nature and use of the resources possessed by 
Electricorp, to speak of unequal resources is, perforce, to speak in relative terms, and hence my 
review covers the other main advocates. 
First, some general statistics. At the height of the dispute in 1989 Electricorp owned assets 
worth $7,311 m. Using those assets it sold $1,434 m of electricity, making a profit (after tax and 
extraordinary expenses) of $373 m, which amounted to an approximate return of 12 percent on the 
funds employed.34 It had a total staff of 3876.35 A number of those staff were employed both in 
Wellington and in its group offices (such as the North Island hydro-group in Hamilton) for the 
specific purposes of dealing with both environmental and legal matters. In terms of the 
Corporation's political connections, while it was given a fairly long rein on operational matters, its 
management was in constant communication with its shareholding ministers, with a wide range of 
government agencies, and with other corporate business actors and organisations. I turn next to 
the issue of how Electricorp mobilised its resources in the dispute. 
As I described in the previous chapter, Electricorp was slow to realise either the immediate 
or long-term significance of the nascent review process. Its officials had been roused by the 
parallel water rights campaign and their initial response was primarily at the political level in 
Wellington. Few organisational resources were needed through 1987, with the environmental 
manager of the North Island hydro group handling the issue. The only notable expenditure was 
incurred through the commissioning of a public relations strategy - which itself came to nothing. 
It was only in the early months of 1988 that Corporation personnel realised that they needed to . 
engage in the review process, that DoC et al were a long way down the track in their preparations, 
and that to combat that threat they would have to mobilise the most effective resources at their 
disposal. This mostly meant money. 
Electricorp's pattern of expenditure was greatly influenced by the type of process already 
under way. The Water Act was not specific about this question, and so it was largely up to the 
Catchment Board to establish the decision-making format. That the dispute was, from this point 
onwards, largely confined to quasi-juridical and juridical contexts, is of absolute relevance vis-a-
vis the resource question. Put simply, litigation is expensive in most substantive arenas, but is 
especially so with regard to environmental matters. Their interdisciplinary character, with multiple 
languages of value, wide technical discourses, problems of verification in the context of risk and 
uncertainty, and the need for recondite knowledge on substantive and procedural matters, all 
comes at considerable cost. This instantly gave the wealthy Corporation a considerable advantage 
over the other partic.ipants. For the Corporation the transaction costs of litigation paled in 
comparison to their substantive (financial) interest in the flow levels. The most striking 
33 C. Lindblom, 1977, Politics and Markets Basic Books, New York, pp. 193-4. 
34 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand, 1993, Annual Report 199213 pp. 26·9. This was a solid return; neither 
a poor nor remarkable result. 
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manifestation of this was that it was cheaper for the Corporation to engage in perpetual litigation as 
long as it delayed the implementation of either the Catchment Board or Planning Tribunal regimes. 
No other actor in the conflict was in a similar position. Most of the in-stream advocates were not 
essentially motivated by commodified values, and where they were partially or wholly motivated 
by financial questions the sums involved were insignificant in comparison to the perceived and real 
costs of litigation. 
Electricorp was quick to exploit this financial advantage. Its strategy from the written 
submissions stage of the 1988 review onwards, was to throw money at the problem. Like any 
other party it set out to present the strongest case it could, but in doing so Electricorp also strove to 
control the process as much as possible. The estimated $7-15 m that the Corporation spent on the 
process went on exorbitant legal fees, a host of scientists and other expert witnesses (including 
research, analysis, collation of material, and appearances before the Tribunals), and various 
background/administrative tasks. The Corporation's strategy was to overwhelm the opposition 
and neutralise the countervailing arguments with masses of highly specialised material - for 
example, the last minute submission of 3500 pages of evidence in the week prior to the 
commencement of the Planning Tribunal hearing. It also endeavoured to draw the proceedings out 
over a far longer period than had previously been envisaged. Such tactics were enabled by the 
resources possessed by the Corporation (and its aggressive approach to the question), and they 
also acted to further compound the disparities that existed - as the length of time stretched out the 
more difficult it was for those such as Chapple or the Trust Board to continue with their cases, 
further exaggerating Electricorp's relative advantage. 
While the Corporation used its money to hire a team of specialists to construct and advocate 
their case, its existing organisational resources were also mobilised to great effect: First, through 
the coordination and administration of the case by simply drawing upon the established 
institutional structure; Secondly, by providing a good deal of the institutional and specialist 
knowledge integral to their argument (a significant number of EIectricorp engineers, economists 
and various senior managers provided and presented evidence in the various fora); And thirdly, the 
juridical pathway channelled the conflict and limited the use of broader political strategies. The 
Corporation did conduct a public relations campaign through advertising and the distribution of 
'educational' materials, but while they included images of the TPD diversions, the sub judice rule 
meant they had to restrict themselves to a general branding exercise - 'clean and green hydro-
electricity' - rather than direct advocacy on the flows issue. Another tactic that proved less 
effective in these circumstances was political lobbying. This was partially because of the 
reconfigured maintenance role discussed earlier, where the state deliberately stood at arms length 
from the operations of the SOE (the flows issue was defined as an operational matter).36 But it 
was mostly because from an early stage the process was locked into a formal and ultimately 
juridical decision-making framework. This meant there was little scope for political intervention 
despite the strong linkages between the Corporation executives, government officials and 
politicians. 
35 Ibid. p. 32. 
36 This is not to suggest that there wasn't an ongoing dialogue between the senior E1ectricorp officials am 
directors. and various senior public servants and politicians - there certainly was. But the inertia of the litigation 
process, the unstinting commitment of the Minister of Conservation and the Department to the issue, and public 
sympathy for environmental issues, all served to limit the scope of political intervention or conciliation. 
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For the purposes of comparison three questions arise; what resources were possessed by 
the in-stream advocates, how did Electricorp's mobilisation of its vast resources affect those 
actors, and how did they, in turn, utilise their own resources to pursue their goals? Once again, I 
will restrict my observations to the three main in-stream advocates. The Trust Board, first of all, 
devoted most of its financial expenditure37 to the retention of quality legal representation 
throughout the three phases of the review. Their witness (and wider evidentiary) costs were 
minimised because they maintained a focus upon their core arguments - their historical relationship 
with the river - which meant that they were primarily dependent upon knowledge possessed by 
kaumatua and other tribal members. A handful of their witnesses were from beyond the region, 
but their costs were relatively small. A significant factor here was that their arguments were not 
(on the whole) framed in scientific terms, and hence avoided the costs inherent in such discourse. 
Nevertheless, participation in the dispute was an extraordinary financial burden upon the river 
tribes' resources. In terms of institutional capacity, the Trust Board did benefit from a small 
permanent organisation that was able to provide some administrative services, and great strength 
was derived from the tribal support network with many members attending the lengthy hearings, 
but most of the coordination was done by the legal team itself. The tribes' political resources 
were minimal in this context. Indeed, the Catchment Board hearings were the first time the Board 
members had felt included in a decision about the management of the river38 - this was testament 
to the fact that Whanganui Maori had long been politically marginalised. 
The Corporation's use of its vast resources made the Board's participation in the 
proceedings more difficult by, on the one hand, increasing the costs of participation (by drawing 
out the hearings), and on the other hand by widening and complicating the discourse (through the 
production of expansive technical evidence). The Board's basic response was to focus upon the 
advocacy of its own arguments rather than the scrutiny of Electricorp' s, and as a consequence their 
respective arguments did not meet head on. As to the issue of costs, this simply made the tribes' 
sacrifice even greater. As I discussed in Chapter Eleven, Maori participation in the conflict was 
predicated upon a profound connection between their people and the river. This resulted'in a 
commitment to participation at almost any price. 
The Flows CoalitionlFlows Alliance was even more constrained by its lack of resources. It 
was an issue specific coalition and thus possessed no resources - financial, organisational or 
political- prior to the commencement of the controversy. In terms of finance, the Coalition carried 
out direct fundraising efforts, but most of the total expenditure of $43,000 came from the 
contributions of member organisations (for the most part Forest and Bird which effectively 
underwrote the campaign) and grants such as the $13,000 received from the Taumarunui Borough 
Council. Some of the money was used to pay for a consultants report in the Catchment Board 
hearing, but the balance went on Chapple's basic costs of attending the hearings throughout 
(travel, accommodation, photocopying/general administration - but not for his services or 
recompense for lost earnings), and to pay the expenses of their handful of witnesses. In the initial 
stages of the review process the Coalition could pursue relatively low cost strategies such as 
through media campaigns (facilitated by a receptive media) and direct political lobbying, but when 
the process started to focus upon 'probative discourses', and became formalised, the potential and 
37 The $200,000+. See 12.3.(iv). 
38 See 12.2.(iv). 
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actual costs of participation escalated dramatically. The Coalition was only able to present its legal 
case on a shoestring budget due to: Chapple acting as a lay-advocate; The unstinting commitment 
and sacrifice of Chapple, his wife Brenda and a small number of core members. And the 
generosity of unpaid witnesses and those who gave free advice on legal, scientific and other 
aspects of their case. 
I will concentrate upon the Coalition's organisation in the later discussion on collective 
action. For the moment it will suffice to note that the core members of the Coalition had to work 
hard to enlist and maintain the support of a wide range of parties and individuals. Much of that 
support was either moral or symbolic, and the brunt of the work fell upon the core group of 
volunteers. The notable exception was the close connection between Chapple and the Forest and 
Bird national organisation. 
The Coalition's political resources were probably better on paper than its financial or 
organisational capacities. There was its solid regional support base which was buttressed at 
various points in its campaign by all of the local bodies within the region, and by national 
politicians whose electorates fell within or were contiguous with the Whanganui region. There 
were also its crucial links with the national environmental movement. In addition, it benefited 
from a strong groundswell of public opinion in its favour - or at least opposition to the perceived 
environmental excesses of a monopoly actor. All of this contributed to the victory on the issue of 
water rights, however in the same way that it affected the political manoeuvres of the Corporation, 
the transition to a juridical process limited the options for political solutions and influence. But 
probably the most effective articulation of the Coalition's political support was that it helped create 
and maintain the political will of the Minister of Conservation to vigorously pursue the matter. 
As with the Trust Board, Electricorp's deployment of its resources made the Coalition's 
continued participation increasingly difficult over time. The most obvious example here is the 
crucial withdrawal of Forest and Bird from the Planning Tribunal appeal, largely on the basis of 
actual and potential costs. The Coalition constantly sought to compensate for its lack of 
comparative 'resources by adopting low cost/high profile strategies. The legal format mad~ that 
approach more difficult, and in the final analysis it came down to the same type of community 
commitment and sacrifice that underpinned the Maori case. Lastly, to counter their lack of 
resources in the face of overwhelming opposition, the Coalition concentrated its case almost 
wholly on the task of providing a regional voice, leaving it up to DoC to present the conservation 
case and to counter the analyses of Electricorp experts. As time went on the participation of DoC 
was more and more essential for the general in-stream case. 
It was DoC - a state and not a civil actor - that possessed more resources than any other in-
stream advocate. As a state agency DoC sits outside Lindblom's business/civil actor divide, 
however because the Department functioned in a distinct advocacy role that brought it into direct 
conflict with the Corporation (business), its resource holdings are relevant here. In 1989 DoC had 
a national staff of around 1600, and a total expenditure of $119.7 m.39 With these resources it had 
to manage a conservation estate of 5 million hectares or nearly 19 percent of New Zealand's 
39 Of that total $2.2 m and $3 m. were spent on legal protection and statutory advocacy respectively. Report of the 
Department of Conservation (fe Papa Atawhai) for the year ended 30 June 1990. Appendices to the Journals of 
the House of Representatives C. 13. p. 45. 
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landmass in addition to 13,000 km of coastline and many offshore islands.4o Furthennore, its 
advocacy role applied not only to the whole of New Zealand but also to the Sub-antarctic Islands, 
Ross Dependency, and to various international initiatives.4l Its obligations were virtually 
unlimited, and the pool of funds it could draw upon for issues such as the Whanganui dispute was 
not only relatively small (compared to Electricorp), but consumed resources that could be used to 
great benefit elsewhere. Nevertheless, having decided to pursue the minimum flows case, the 
Department did devote significant financial, organisational (coordination and vast technical 
expertise), and political resources to the issue. 
As I noted in the previous chapter, by the end of the Planning Tribunal hearing the 
Department had spent $625,000 (excluding many internal costs), and if one adds the cost of 
representation in the High Court, it is reasonable to conclude that the final sum was in the region of 
$700,000.42 A large portion of that expenditure was in legal fees, with the remainder largely 
spent on witness costs and the research process. The fact that the Catchment Board process only 
cost the Department $40,000 illustrates the added costs of litigation. But in comparison with 
Electricorp's outlay, even the Department's budget seemed small. This did not prevent DoC from 
mounting a very effective case across the spectrum of substantive issues - its ability to do so was 
largely due to its own institutional resources. 
The organisational resources were crucial on a number of levels. First, the Whanganui 
Conservancy staff were pivotal in providing the issue with the type of critical mass necessary to 
justify the devotion of substantial resources to the issue.43 They managed the process and 
maintained the momentum throughout the dispute, and they did so with great conviction. 
Secondly, the national organisation was essential for its wide range of expertise in areas such as 
ecology/conservation science and management, recreational management, and landscape 
assessment. A number of its in-house specialists presented not only their own evidence, but were 
scrutinised by and in tum scrutinised and rebutted the evidence of a range of highly specialised 
Electricorp witnesses - some of whom were engaged from overseas at great expense. 
Finally, the Department was of course vertically integrated at all level of government, and 
hence was able to put its case behind the scenes. However, as with the other actors, the juridical 
form of the dispute limited the scope for political intervention or accommodation (although its very 
involvement in the dispute was an example of political intervention). 
Electricorp's aggressive approach and deployment of resources affected DoC in the same 
way as it did the other parties, by increasing the costs of participation and making the process more 
complicated. But unlike the other actors DoC was sufficiently well resourced to meet the 
Corporation on a relatively equal footing. The Department was the only actor (other than 
Electricorp) capable of presenting rigorous evidence across the whole spectrum of substantive 
questions and most crucially, it was the only actor that systematically tested the COrpOration's 
argument. The Department's participation was absolutely essential in gaining the increased 
40 Department of Statistics, 1989, New Zealand Official Yearbook Government Printer, Wellington. 
41 S. 6 of the Conservation Act 1987. 
42 Assuming that DoC's bill for the High Court hearing was comparable with the Regional Council's - which was 
$67.000 for the services of its two counsel. 
43 In an interview John Ombler (then District ConserVator, Whanganui) observed that the Department tends to "pick 
its fights", and having done so, will find the resources necessary to competently advocate its case. 27 July 1998, 
Personal Interview, Wellington. 
Chapter Thirteen: A Critical Analysis of the Whanganui Conflict 312 
minimum flows. As a caveat here I would like to reiterate that while state actors do not fit 
comfortably within Lindblom's schema, it is legitimate to include DoC here because it took a 
strongly partisan line in opposing Electricorp. 
Overall, Electricorp as an actor, and in its role in the dispute, conformed to Lindblom's 
portrayal of corporate capital as possessing superior financial, organisational and political 
resources compared to other actors in civil society. Without a doubt the possession of those 
resources (mostly its financial advantage) greatly benefited the Corporation in its advocacy 
(especially in the juridical context), and hence in is success in retaining the greatest portion of 
flows for hydro-production. The only other actor with comparable resources (and even then there 
was a distinct asymmetry in the Corporation's favour) was DoC - a state rather than civil actor. It 
is difficult to see how the Flows Coalition and the Trust Board could have mounted a full defence 
of the river if DoC had not participated. To conclude, business was greatly privileged in terms of 
its possession of superior resources. 
13.4.{iv) The Power to Define Reality and the Distortion of Communicative 
Processes 
In Chapter five I noted that the empirical investigation of the issue of power and discourse must 
proceed on two fronts: First of all the systematic distortion of communication must be examined by 
means of dialectical explanations (for example, by identifying where possible, the disjuncture 
between commonly perceived and 'real' explanations); Secondly, by examining the specific 
communicative strategies used by business in a particular context. I will deal with each of these 
questions in turn. 
In the Black Head conflict the quarry company was clearly able to systematically 'define 
reality'. This was mainly by controlling the economic valuations that underlay the decision-
making - in that case bargaining - process. This conclusion was reached through a dialectical 
analysis whereby the accepted valuations were compared to the 'real' discounted costs. The 
disjuncture between the two sets of figures was taken to be the product of business power. In the 
Whanganui conflict there was no immediately apparent equivalent disjuncture. It is useful to 
comprehend why this was the case - especially given that the Corporation, like Black Head 
Quarries Ltd, also utilised distorted valuations. 
In the final pages of Chapter Twelve I observed that the overall substantive outcome of the 
dispute, while a compromise position, still chiefly favoured the existing commercial use of the 
water. Moreover, the parties involved in the dispute perceived the outcome to be just so, and their 
subsequent responses while not incompatible with this were made on the basis of prior flow 
levels, assessments of the distribution of power and subsequent expectations. Thus the Flows 
Coalition did not achieve anywhere near what they had been advocating, but in the face of 
overwhelming opposition they saw it as a victory. To frame this in terms of the present question; 
business wielded considerable influence to its ultimate benefit but this did not result in any 
apparent false consciousness. This was not the case in the Black Head dispute. Two 
interconnected factors explain the difference between the two disputes. The first is the nature of 
the decision process. In the Black Head dispute an informal bargaining process prevailed. In such 
a process there is no requirement for the systematic scrutiny of the parties' arguments, indeed, 
certain dissenting arguments may not even be presented if some parties are excluded from the 
process. By contrast, in the Whanganui dispute the inflated claims (of all parties) that appeared in 
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the early media exchanges were subsequently tempered within the juridical process. The 
Catchment Board hearing, and to a much greater degree, the Planning Tribunal hearing, involved 
the structured presentation and testing of arguments. Under those conditions 'false' or 
manipulative arguments would only tend to endure if no other party could assemble an argument 
against them. This is not to rule out the possibility for systematic distortion in that context. If, 
say, a conservationist does not possess the resources to research and mount an argument against a 
false assertion by a wealthy actor then that would certainly be the case. But in the Whanganui 
dispute (as I observed in the previous subsection) the participation of DoC was an essential buffer 
against those types of inequity. The second explanatory factor was that in the Black Head conflict 
the Company was - mainly due to the structure of rights - in a very powerful position, and could 
as a consequence choose to either accept or disregard any argument. It set out a grossly inflated 
price and dismissed dissenting analyses outright (viz. Dr Cullen's discounted figures). It was thus 
totally able to define reality in that context. Once again, Electricorp was in no such position. 
especially in so far as the tribunals and courts functioned as arbiters on matters of fact. 
In my original discussion of power and discourse I referred to Sharon Beder's analysis of 
the 'new corporate activism', and in particular her list of broad communicative strategies utilised 
by big business in their confrontations with environmentalism. Four of the eight mechanisms 
listed by Beder were of some importance in the WR1v1F dispute, and I will make some brief 
comments about each. 
The first tactic is that of the punitive lawsuit to deter environmental advocacy. Now while 
Electricorp's appeals to the Planning Tribunal and High Court were primarily responses to an 
unsatisfactory decision, its aggressive conduct in those hearings can be understood as a deliberate 
move to overwhelm and inflict costs upon the opposition. The Forest and Bird's withdrawal from 
proceedings is evidence that the Corporation's strategy was partially successful. The second tactic 
used in this dispute was the use of environmental PRo As I have already noted the initial PR 
strategy commissioned by the Corporation was of little value to the Corporation (see 12.2.(i)).44 
But as the dispute progressed towards the Planning Tribunal hearing and beyond, EJectricorp's 
media relations became increasingly managed and strategic, and the Corporation deliberately set 
out to mitigate the damage that the Whanganui issue was doing to its wider corporate image.45 
This leads on to the third device which was to run advertising that branded electricity as a clean and 
green energy source, and the Corporation as a good corporate citizen. The last element that is 
worth mentioning here is with regard to the reporting of the issue in the media - which in this case 
was at odds with Beder's commentary on trends in environmental reportage. My limited survey of 
the newspaper coverage revealed a marked preference (particularly' in the Whanganui region) 
towards the in-stream arguments. The high profile Frontline documentary on the issue was also 
very biased against the Corporation. Some likely reasons for this being the regional element, the 
astute media campaign run by the conservationists, and an apparent editorial responsiveness to 
'green' issues. It also seems reasonable to suggest that much of the general attitude towards the 
Corporation was a symptom of public distrust and antipathy towards the aggressive approach of a 
44 Although the consultant's recommendations were wholly consistent with the types of strategies observed by 
Beder. See: S. Seder, 1997, Global Spin: The Corporate Assault 011 the Environment Scribe Publications. 
Melbourne. Ch. 8. 
45 They utilised tactics mentioned by Seder such as media releases. the distribution of educational resources to 
schools and othe institutions, and the production of promotional videos. 
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powerful monopoly (and significantly state owned) actor against local interests - the David and 
Goliath aspect. 
Electricorp was not able to systematically distort reality in the Whanganui dispute. All of 
the actors utilised manipulative arguments, but the juridical process limited the success of those 
attempts. This was due to the interrogatory procedure and the fact that the Tribunals and Judges 
got to decide on the facts rather than a dominant actor as was the case in the Black Head conflict. 
But the Corporation certainly did control the discourse in other ways. Mainly through its use of 
resources to expand and complicate the substantive arguments, and through its ability to make it 
more difficult for other actors to advocate their cases. The worst effects of such influence were 
curtailed by DoC's ongoing participation in the conflict. But finally to reiterate a point made 
earlier, the very fact that the in-stream advocates perceived the outcome as a success - when over 
80 percent of headwater flows continued to be abstracted - was itself a product of Electricorp's 
fundamental dominance within the discourse. It was at that basic contextual level that business 
was able to define reality and the limits of the possible. 
13.4.(v) The Dilemma of Collective Action 
Uke the Black Head analysis in Chapter Nine, the starting point for my investigation of collective 
action must (following Olson's schema) lie with the basic distinction between the private 
good/interest and the public or collective good/interest. Once again, a general connection can be 
made between certain groups and the type of goods or interests that they seek. On the one hand, 
Electricorp's primary concern was with the production of commodities. Thus in its collective 
efforts it was, at least in the first instance, motivated by private interests. On the other hand, the 
main in-stream advocates were essentially concerned, again in the first instance, with collective or 
public interests (there were exceptions such as the tourist operators). This is consistent with the 
original assertion that the locus of environmental conflict can be commonly seen as a conflict 
between interests in these two types of goods. The next step is to ascertain whether the 
incentive/disincentive structures that attend each type of good (in theory) actually worked to 
privilege business in its collective pursuit of its interests. 
Before I do so it is useful to recall that Olson's model works from the basic assumption 
that collective action involves some costs, whether in time, money or labour (see 5.3.(v». He 
argues that no 'rational' individual will assume these costs unless two conditions are met; (i) that 
the likely benefits from participation exceed the benefits that would accrue without participation, 
and (ii) that the benefits exceed the costs of membership and participation.46 
Theform of business actor in the dispute was the individual firm rather than the business 
association. But the capitalist finn acts both as an individual actor (the corporate fonn) and as a 
collective actor. For example, it is as an artificial person that the corporation is able to own 
private property. But as a social enterprise it can be viewed as a group of people working 
towards a collective goal - viz. the profitable accumulation of capital. The participation of 
Electricorp in the minimum flows conflict must be viewed on both those levels. First of all, the 
Corporation participated as a 'rational individual' (self-maximising). It is on this level that the 
'private' benefits/costs of any substantive outcome would accrue to the Corporation; the Planning 
46 M. Olson. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups Harvard University 
Press. Cambridge Ma. pp. 1-52. 
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Tribunal decision directly affected the corporate entity first, and only affected the individual 
employee in the most indirect terms. As I have repeated throughout the study, the financial 
rewards to E1ectricorp of participating, and indeed, the costs of not participating, were very great. 
Secondly, there were the permanent and temporary employees who participated in some part in 
furthering the Corporation's collective goals in the conflict (at the broadest level this involved all 
Electricorp staff). The contributions of all of these individuals involved varying levels of sacrifice 
- time and labour, but not money. Some Corporation staff, legal counsel, and consultants devoted 
great amounts of time to the issue. However, the financial benefits of participation were 
considerable (for some very large indeed), and certainly outweighed any financial costs. So the 
participation of the individual representatives of Electricorp was premised upon the organisation's 
ability to dispense significant selective benefits. Those benefits, however, derived from the 
Corporation's general resources and interests and not just those streams of private benefits 
deriving from the flows issue. Olson's model largely, if not wholly, explains the logic of 
E1ectricorp's collective action within the conflict 
The main civil collective actors were the Maori Trust Board and the Flows Coalition and I 
will discuss each of these in turn. I have already described the types of resources that the Maori 
Trust Board devoted to the issue (13.4.(iii». The Trust Board benefited from an existing 
organisational structure - with a large support network - and the capacity to fund (even if at great 
sacrifice) its legal campaign. These resources derived from the Board's role in the day to day 
management of the river tribes' affairs. Those responsibilities involved the management of 
government and other revenues, tribal assets, and the prosecution of Treaty claims', all of which 
actually or potentially involved the ability to distribute benefits to tribal members, whether 
collectively or individually. Olson's model would explain in some part the existence of the 
permanent structure that enabled it to act collectively on a specific issue.47 It would also explain 
the participation of its legal counsel (in the same way as E1ectricorp's counsel). But it cannot 
explain the ongoing commitment and sacrifice expended by the Board and tribal membership on 
the flows issue. Whanganui Maori were essentially motivated by collective goals founded' upon 
their close relationship with the river. The rational actor model does not extend to such complex 
motivations. 
Likewise, the rational actor model can only partially explain participation within the Flows 
Coalition (because unlike the Trust Board it had no collective existence outside of the issue). But 
as with the Friends of Black Head Coalition, Olson's model is of some utility in explaining why 
people may not have participated. On paper the Coalition could count numerous organisations and 
individuals as supporters. But even though that support represented a significant and real 
opposition to the continued abstraction of water, the active membership was limited, indeed its 
collective action was driven by a handful of highly motivated personalities. This is consistent 
with the experience of the Friends of Black Head. That few people acted on the issue even though 
large numbers supported the cause could be explained by the fact that (i) selective benefits were not 
offered, (ii) membership was not compulsory, and (iii) that the costs of participation outweighed 
47 The Trust Board was not a traditional body. but rather, one set up by Parliament. It owed its most recent 
manifestation to the Whanganui River Maori Trust Board Act 1988. That Act set up the Whanganui Board for 
the purposes of the Maori Trust Boards Act 1955. which were essentially to manage its assets for the purposes 
of promoting the health. economic and social welfare, educational and vocational training. and other 
miscellaneous purposes. The 1988 Act also authorised the Board to negotiate claims on the tribes' behalf. 
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the immediate benefits (it is interesting to note that the core members of the Coalition mostly lived 
in the vicinity the river and could be expected to derive considerable direct - even if non-
commodified - benefits from the restoration of natural flows).48 
But it is also useful to consider some of the pluralist explanations that I mentioned in 
5.3.(v): There was indeed a differentiation of roles and hierarchies within the Coalition. The 
participation and membership of the many 'nominal' groups and individuals gave the organisation 
political power, but the restriction of decision-making to a core group enabled a dynamic and 
focused approach, and avoided coordination problems and the dilution or dissipation of energies 
on organisational matters; The core group functioned as entrepreneurs and risk-takers; The 
dedication of the core group to their goal, and their willingness to make sacrifices, were of 
paramount importance; They were able to call upon the voluntary contributions of professional 
agents, and moreover, Chapple proved particularly adept in the advocacy role - those skills were 
essential; The main form of patronage was in terms of the Coalition's relationship with the 
Department of Conservation; And they were by definition a 'coalition'. So while they had a large 
'individual' membership by association they did not have to maintain such an organisation. 
Finally, I will make a few brief comments on the Department of Conservation. As a 
collective actor the Department pursued a collective good. Like Electricorp and the Trust Board, 
DoC benefited from an existing organisation devoted to wider collective goals, and it was able to 
draw upon wider resources within the flows contlict Given its considerable resources, and the 
relative weakness of the other in-stream advocates, DoC/s participation was crucial to the pursuit 
of the collective environmental goals. The benefits of its involvement were potentially high - and 
those benefits would in all likelihood not have accrued if DoC had not joined in. As for the 
involvement of the individual staff and consultants," like Electricorp, DoC was well able to 
dispense selective benefits - i.e. salaries, wages, fees, and non-monetary rewards. But as with 
the Trust Board and Flows Coalition the dedication of key individuals can only be explained by 
broader factors beyond the 'rational actor' model. 
Olson's model explains in large part the collective behaviour of the business actors: For 
the other actors it can offer no more than a partial explanation - although, conversely, it potentially 
explains why people do not actively participate in such endeavours. Other explanations, such as 
those suggested by pluralist writers, must be utilised to explain why people do participate, and 
how they are able to make substantial gains in the face of business power. But overall, by utilising 
Olson's model in the context of the WRMF contlict it is possible to discern a very powerful 
structural mechanism at work. One that certainly privileged the Corporation in its ability to gain 
and exercise power through association. 
13.5. Conclusion: Business Power and the WRMF Conflict 
Because of the breadth of this chapter, I begin this conclusion by reviewing how each mechanism 
applied to the Whanganui contlict. I then move on to make some general observations about the 
explanatory power of the analytical framework in explaining the processes and outcomes of the 
Whanganui dispute. 
48 I am, here, reversing Olson's prescriptions for mobilising collective action. See 5.3.(v). 
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Value-form. In Chapter Four I noted that value-form offers one means by which we can 
organise class analysis; viz., the study of business power in environmental conflict. As with the 
Black Head study, the value-form distinction between exchange/use-values, and more inclusively 
commodified/non-commodified values, was almost wholly in line with the division over the 
substantive question at the heart of the thesis. On the one hand, Electricorp can be classified and 
treated within the power analysis as a capitalist enterprise, and on the other hand, the in-stream 
advocates, where they were not acting as capitalists (which was almost exclusively apart from the 
tourist operators), can be classified in a residual sense as environmentalists/non-capitalists. This 
was the organising element that underpinned the power analysis. In the second element of the 
value discussion I observed that there was a prima Jacie connection between value-fonn and 
environmental harm. Namely, that Electricorp, motivated by the pursuit of exchange-value, was 
the primary cause of environmental harm. Moreover, I noted that elements of commodity 
valuation, such as the disconnection/abstraction mechanism, the way Electricorp externalised its 
environmental costs yet internalised the benefi ts, and the treatment of the natural resource as 
separate from its ecological context, were components of that destructive relationship. I did 
emphasise, however, that there were other socio-economic mechanisms at work in causing the 
environmental damage. 
Offe's schema The strategic imperatives theorised by Offe were of considerable value in 
explaining this conflict: First, the exclusion principle helps to explain the pressure upon the state to 
divest itself of the control (and ultimately ownership) of the electricity generation and transmission 
system. Moreover, it emphasises how the dispute pivoted within the wider neo-Iiberal structural 
reform process; Secondly, the dependency relation describes a simple but fundamental relation 
between the state and capital. It is of most significance because it logically underpins the 
maintenance, and to some extent, legitimation, principles. But it is of less use in directly 
explaining the pattern of the conflict, and as with the Black Head conflict, I depicted it as a 
secondary or 'deep' structural mechanism; The third principle of maintenance explained much 
about the dispute at a general level. It largely explained the state's involvement in electricity 
production prior to 1986, and can be seen to have motivated the construction of the TPD, and in 
turn to explain the centralised and opaque nature of the original decision-making process. It can 
thus be seen as one fundamental cause of the dispute. I also pointed out that the maintenance role 
was articulated in a different fashion after 1986. Significantly, the withdrawal of the state from 
direct involvement in electricity supply decreased both the state's willingness and ability to 
actively intervene in defence of EIectricorp despite their fiscal interest in the SOE; Finally, the 
legitimation function also operated in that broad contextual way, and does complement the 
maintenance imperative in explaining the overall pattern of conflict This was most apparent in the 
failure of the state to legitimise the project in the early years, the subsequent surfacing and 
development of dormant concerns, and lastly, the whole thrust and importance of DoC as an 
advocate for the in-stream case. In summary, Offe's strategic model of politics in advanced 
capitalist society is a broad contextual theory. Because the Whanganui dispute was indeed played 
out across a wide canvass, such a broad schema is of great value in understanding this particular 
co¢lict. 
Mechanisms of business dominance. The five specific mechanisms of business 
dominance were of varied explanatory value: First, the business sanction operated on a most 
general level. That is, the dependency and maintenance dynamics probably operated at a basic 
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level to make decision-makers wary of the economic impacts of any decision on flow levels, and 
this may have shaped the substantive outcome. However, given its vast resources the Corporation 
was remarkably limited in its ability to inflict strategic sanctions even though it tried to do so at 
certain times. This was partly because it was constrained in its ability to transfer its investments 
away from either the region or the nation, and it was also because any economic costs that the 
Corporation passed on to society would have a nominal impact on the individual electricity 
consumer. There were, however, small-scale examples of this mechanism that were still serious, 
such as, for example, the implied pressure upon DoC witnesses. But overall, the mechanism was 
limited in scope and effect; Secondly, the privilege of private property was of less causal 
significance in the Wbanganui dispute than it was in the Black Head conflict. There were two 
basic reasons for this - (i) the water right, while extremely valuable to the Corporation, was not as 
strong an entitlement as the quarry's use-rights, and (ii) in the Wbanganui case there existed a 
countervailing legal mechanism in the form of the Water Act. But once again, the Company did 
retain over 80 percent of the headwater flows so it would be wrong to rule out the efficacy of the 
prior right within the Planning Tribunal's balancing process; Thirdly, there was the unequal 
distribution of resources. Overall, Eiectricorp conformed to Lindblom's portrayal of corporate 
capital as possessing superior financial, organisational and political resources compared to other 
actors in civil society. Without doubt the possession of these resources (mostly financial) greatly 
privileged the corporation in its advocacy (especially in the inherently expensive context of 
litigation), and hence in its success in retaining the greatest portion of flows for its use. The only 
other actor with comparable resources, and even then there was a marked asymmetry - was DoC -
a state and not a civil actor. This underlined the importance of the Department's advocacy function 
for the protection of environmental values. The resource mechanism was probably the primary 
source of strategic power for Electricorp in the dispute; Fourthly, Eiectricorp was not able to 
systematically define reality in the fundamental way that Black Head Quarries did in the previous 
dispute. But the Corporation was able to shape the discourse in some important way~, for 
example, by making it more difficult for the other parties to articulate their cases. DoC's 
participation was again crucial in countering Eiectricorp's efforts to dominate. I would like to 
reiterate, however, that the very fact the in-stream advocates viewed the outcome as a success 
when Eiectricorp retained over 80 percent of flows, was itself a product of Electricorp's ability to 
shape the 'limits of the possible'; Finally, Olson's model of collective action explained, in large 
part, the collective behaviour of the Corporation. For the other actors it offered no more than a 
partial explanation (although it can explain why people did not aC,tively participate). Yet by 
utilising Olson's model in the context of the WRMF conflict, it is possible to discern a very 
powerful mechanism at work. One that certainly privileged capital in its ability to gain and exercise 
power through association. 
Before I draw together the threads of this case study I will touch upon the issue of the role 
of the courts. It is clear that the courts played an essential role in shaping the process and outcome 
of the WRMF dispute. The role of those institutions is of academic interest for many reasons; for 
example, the limits to comprehensive decision-making, or as a possible argument for ADR 
solutions. However, my interest is with the mechanisms of business power and dominance, and 
the role of the courts as a state actor raises a challenge in this context. Within the analysis in this 
chapter I have mentioned the courts in my discussion on the maintenance function (institutional 
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frameworks for regulating conflict), and it is clear that the functioning of the courts is integral to 
other aspects of maintenance such as enforcing contracts and upholding property rights. In the 
legitimacy discussion I touched upon the importance of negative right (by the framework of the 
law) as a source of legitimacy, and then in 13.4.(ii) there was the discussion of property rights. It 
is clear that the function of the courts vis-a.-vis business power will require further investigation 
and would complement or supplement the collection of mechanisms that have been investigated in 
this thesis. 
At the close of the previous Chapter I observed that E1ectricorp's substantive victory was 
relative rather than absolute. The in-stream/environmental interests did gain a great deal, but in 
aggregate the Corporation did far better. But the fact that Electricorp did lose the use of some 
flows at a significant financial cost, makes the Wbanganui dispute intriguing in terms of the 
application of this framework. The private conservationists, Maori, and the Department of 
Conservation were together able to mount an effective challenge, albeit at great cost to those 
groups and individuals. This demonstrates that environmental actors can and do elicit substantial 
concessions in their collective efforts. However, very few examples of conservation advocacy 
involve the kind of deployment of resources that happened in the Wbanganui issue. The 
involvement of the state as an advocate was crucial to the achievement of an' increased minimum 
flow regime for the river. While it was noted in discussion that the Department picks its fights and 
then pursues them vigorously, DoC will only be able to do so. in a limited number of cases because 
of resource and political constraints (ie.the maintenance role of the state will in many cases act to 
constrain the Department's advocacy). The reason why the in-stream advocates were able to 
extract this concession is further clarified when one considers the situation of the Corporation. On 
the face of it Electricorp was a fonnidable business actor. However, Electricorp's power in the 
dispute was reduced by their inheritance of the legitimation deficit, the reconfigured maintenance 
role that meant the state was reluctant to actively intervene in support of the commercial interests, 
their position as a monopoly with attendant legitimation problems, the weak form of private 
property present in the water right and the countervailing constraint of the Water Act, their inability 
to sanction, and the scrutiny of their arguments within the formalised decision-making process. 
All of these factors served to constrain the powers of the Corporation, yet it still remained 
dominant. Some of these issues I will enlarge upon in the general conclusion that follows. 
General Conclusion 
Business Dominance in Environmental Conflict 
The purpose of this thesis is to better understand the phenomenon of business dominance in 
environmental conflict in advanced capitalist society. To investigate how, on the one hand, 
business values the world, and on the other hand, the way that power is derived from the 
ownership and control of commodity production. And, to investigate how these two 
elements together systematically subvert both the possibility of sustainable relationships 
with the natural world, and the ability of people to participate in decision-making in respect 
of their environments. The focus of the project is clear - it is wholly concerned with the 
ability of business to dominate within environmental conflict, the exercise of this capacity, 
and the consequences of such dominance. 
I begin discussion here by reviewing the development of the argument over the 
course of the study. Following that I will turn to the essential question, and set out what I 
consider to be the key insights into business power that arise out of this project. In the third 
part I make some preliminary observations about the possible emancipatory consequences of 
this project. Finally, I draw these threads together in the final passage. 
The Argument 
I opened the thesis with the same statement of intent that I used to open this general 
conclusion. My methodological response to that question was to split the thesis into three 
broad parts; a preparatory section, the development of an analytical framework, and the 
empirical scrutiny of two in-depth historical case studies including the systematic 
application of the theory to that investigation. I will deal with each of these parts in turn. 
The preparatory section performed a number of crucial functions; to explain and 
defend the purpose of the study and the approach taken, to provide a methodological 
foundation for the thesis, and to ground the project in the literature on business power and 
environmental conflict. These threads wound through the first three chapters. In Chapter 
One I began from the global perspective of the environmental problematique or crisis. I 
argued that the environmental disputes that form the empirical core of this thesis must be 
understood as both symptomatic and constitutive of wider destructive tendencies that 
ultimately give rise to that environmental crisis. I proceeded to examine the broad 
characteristics of that problematique and asserted that there arises a fundamental assertoric 
imperative - an immanent and universal need to reduce environmental harm - and 
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concluded that the purest normative expression of this imperative is the notion of 
'environmental sustainability'. This was the first of the two normic foundations that 
underpin my thesis. The second foundation that I introduced was that of the ability of all 
people to participate meaningfully and relatively equally in decision-making about their 
environments.! 
From that point I moved on to construct a prima facie case for the study of business 
dominance in environmental conflict in advanced capitalist society. I also noted that I 
would focus upon New Zealand examples. My assumption that business dominance 
potentially exists in the realm of environmental conflict, and that it is a probable source of 
various significant forms of harm, stemmed from three predicates; the crudely empirical 
. (viz. common sense observation and description of contemporary society), the existing body 
of research into this phenomenon, and through an analogical/retroductive movement from 
research into other realms of business power and dominance. In doing this I also reviewed 
the literature and looked at some of the ways that people have examined this phenomenon. 
My assessment was that business power has been explored in diverse and often fruitful 
ways, but they tend to be either system-wide analyses that are largely theoretical and are not 
thoroughly or deeply grounded in empirical work, or they are relatively weak on the theory, 
and focus narrowly upon specific mechanisms of business dominance. So, at the close of 
Chapter One I asserted two things: First, that business power in the context of environmental 
conflict is a very worthy subject of inquiry; And secondly, that the goal of this project was 
to try and reconcile the strands of political analysis within a broad framework, and to apply 
that framework to the empirical investigation of the phenomenon. 
This integrative goal raises a host of difficulties on meta-theoretical, theoretical and 
empirical grounds. Hence the broad progression of the thesis. In Chapter Two I began with 
the meta-theoretical foundations. The purpose of that chapter was to clarify some basic 
questions about first, the structure of the natural and social worlds that are the object of the 
study, and secondly the practices (possibilities and limitations upon) of scientific and social 
scientific investigation. I framed my discussion around a basic question of what a realist 
philosophy of science could do for resource management in general (this is of course a thesis 
in resource management), and my study in particular. Bhaskar's critical realism is a difficult 
area and I strove to draw in the most relevant elements that are scattered across his wide 
corpus of work, and the work of other realists and non-realist commentators. The insights 
and uses of critical realism for this project are manifold and profound, and I touch upon 
those of rrwst direct relevance here. 
I began with the broad insights of transcendental realism. The split between the 
transitive and intransitive dimensions allows for scientific discontinuity and change while 
holding on to the notion of a real world (indeed, some form of realism is necessary if 
environmental problems are to be addressed). The depiction of the world as stratified 
underpins my treatment of the mechanisms of business power as transfactual tendencies that 
may be "possessed without being exercised, exercised without being actualised, and 
! My purpose in doing so was not to set out the basis of a political treatise but rather to make explicit an 
imperative that runs through most, if not all. of the literature on business power - whether it be liberal or 
Marxist in origin. 
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actualised without being empirically identified".2 The differentiation of the world means 
that individual mechanisms can be held to exist, and the picture of the world as dynamic 
means that all mechanisms - and especially social mechanisms - must be treated as 
temporally contingent. Next there was the notion of depth explanation and the four-phase 
pattern of scientific investigation; the development within this thesis was held to conform 
with the first three phases of description (Chapter One), retroduction (Chapters Four and 
Five), and empirical investigation. The fourth phase of corrective work is a natural 
progression beyond this project. The other main point to come out of that discussion was 
the emphasis upon explanation rather than prediction. I then moved on to the social 
ontology - critical naturalism. The transformational model of the society-person connection 
is also of great importance in the thesis for it provides a sophisticated understanding of the 
way that people act within structures yet work back upon those structures and constantly 
transform them. It thus allows for the investigation of causally efficacious social structures 
while retaining a meaningful role for the historical agent. The later social cube is a more 
complex development of that model and takes in the connection between people and the 
physical world. Thus, the two-part framework of this thesis can be conceived along the lines 
of the social-cube, with the value-form relationship making the systematic connection 
between business and environmental harm. 
The distinction between the natural and social sciences (limits to naturalism) was 
held to rest upon a succession of factors, such as activity-dependence, concept-dependence, 
greater geo-historical specificity, greater openness and complexity (their 'mish-mash' 
nature), and the causal interdependence between social science and its subject matter. At 
least three consequences of this should be mentioned here: First of all, that the messiness 
and fluidity of the social world means that social science is necessarily tentative; Secondly, 
that meanings must be taken into account - the hermeneutical moment. In this thesis there is 
not only a hermeneutical starting point of common-sense description, but constant reference 
to the perceptions of the agents involved in the dispute, and a strong reliance upon 
contextual interpretation. I also made use of the dialectical form of investigation, for 
example, in contrasting the responses of actors in the Black Head dispute with Cullen's 
analysis of the settlement; And thirdly, that social science has an emancipatory element. 
This element has two basis forms. Dalziel describes one, when he writes, "successful 
explanation of underlying structures is an essential prerequisite for effective policy 
making"} The other is the immanent critique argument (for example, the revelation of a 
mistaken understanding may undermine that belief), where there is a forceful link between 
social science and emancipation. I have reviewed the critical realist arguments in some 
detail to reveal how they permeate and enable all aspects of this investigation. I concluded 
Chapter Two by noting that what is constructed here is an exploratory, explanatory, and 
hopefully emancipatory critique of business power in environmental conflict. 
Chapter Three was the third and final element of the preparatory argument, and it 
dealt with two fairly disjoint elements. In the first half of the chapter I reviewed four broad 
bodies of research and writing on environmental conflict: (i) the conflict resolution 
2 R. Bhaskar, 1994, Plato Etc. The Problems of Philosophy and their Resolution Verso, London, p. 23. 
3 P. Dalziel, 1994, "Critical Realism and the Methodology of Economics" A paper presented to the Social 
Science Group seminar, Lincoln University, canterbury, p. 5. 
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literature, (ii) analysis of competing forms of reason, (iii) the partisan review, and (iv) 
academic case studies. The first two groupings are comprehensive analytical approaches to 
the subject and they were discussed because they provide some useful theoretical insights, 
but also to point out some serious deficiencies in much of the literature in those areas. The 
second two were featured because diverse narratives of past conflicts provided a fertile 
reference source for problem definition, theoretical development and, most of all, the 
execution of the empirical studies themselves. But the other element here is that the form 
and insights of this investigation have critical implications for those wider discourses. In the 
second half of that chapter I described and justified the research method used in the study, 
how I was going to choose and construct the two case studies, and apply the analytical 
framework to those studies. One point of note here is that I made it clear that the first three 
chapters of each study were intended to be largely empirical so as to enable the uncluttered, 
global/contextual, transparent, and consistent application of the framework, and to enable 
the studies to exist as a resource for other investigations into environmental conflict. Only 
after the full contextual development was complete could the operation/non-operation of the 
eleven mechanisms be explored. 
In Part Two I constructed a theoretical framework for the study of business power. 
This was the hub of the thesis. The first part of that framework - the value component -
was developed in Chapter Four. I began discussion with the dilemma of theorising about 
class in the context of environmental politics/conflict; of differentiating and theorising about 
relatively enduring sectors of society. This question needed to be resolved before it was 
possible to categorise actors within my framework. The difficulty is that environmental 
activism seems to transcend or be dissonant with traditional socioeconomic class 
alignments. My solution to the problem was as follows. While 'environmentalists' cannot 
be easily treated as a monolithic grouping in terms of socioeconomic class, there is the 
possibility that they can be theorised; (a) in opposition to capitalists (who can be treated as 
sufficiently homogenous on the basis of their overriding interest - vis-a-vis ownership and 
control - in profitable capital accumulation), and (b) on the basis of value-form. This is a 
functional conception of class and is thus not dependent upon solidary associations or 
consciousness. I proceeded to integrate both approaches into the framework, but it is the 
latter foundation that is central. 
The adoption of the classical distinction between use-value and exchange-value 
performs a dual function: First, it allows a political distinction to be made. The interests of 
capitalists are held, in the first instance, to be with the production of exchange-values, and 
the interests of environmentalists, in the first instance, with use-values (and, more broadly, 
non-commodified forms of value). It thus acts analytically as a broad ordering principle for 
the discussion of environmental politics; Secondly, the commodity form - and especially its 
most abstract manifestations - is seen to be intrinsically problematic in ecological terms, 
constituting a serious threat to the attainment of sustainable ecological relations. These 
elements together enable a systematic connection to be made between socioeconomic 
function and environmental harm. It is a sophisticated conception of value that enabled 
subsequent discussion of interests, attitudes, perceptions and subjective valuations to be 
grounded in an understanding of the social relations underlying environmental conflict, and 
vice versa. The remainder of that chapter was devoted to investigating the implications of 
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the commodity form for socio-ecological being. The identification of the commodity form 
as problematic in that realm is not new. However, the use of this connection as an ordering 
principle for the study of environmental conflict/politics is new. Furthermore, I provided a 
fuller investigation of value-form and socio-ecological being than I have found elsewhere. 
One final point is that this approach, and the political analysis that follows, hinges on the 
realist notion of transfactual tendencies. 
Chapter Five contained the more extensive component of the framework that 
encompassed the power and politics element - namely, the mechanisms of business 
dominance. The political element operated on two levels (for it is an attempt to reconcile 
some of the theories of business power in environmental politics). The first works at the 
level of broad structural relations that persist between business, the state and other social 
agents (in this case environmental actors) in advanced capitalist societies. It is based upon 
'state theory' - in this case the work of the post-Marxistlneo-Weberian Claus Offe (although 
I developed his arguments considerably by drawing on other broadly Marxist and neo-
pluralist work) - and it is, in great part, state centred. Four principles were explicated; 
Exclusion, Dependency, Maintenance and Legitimation. Offe and other post-Marxists have 
theorised that inevitable disjuncture between the principles leads to crises of legitimation. 
However, I rejected the deterministic and totalising elements on the basis of the realist 
understanding of complex open systems, and once again conceived of these mechanisms in 
transfactual and tendential terms. In the second part I drew together a series of five 
narrower mechanisms of business power that have been studied by both liberal and Marxist 
scholars alike (especially within neo-pluralist analyses of particular disputes); the business 
sanction, unequal resources, the privileged role of private property rights (where I described 
a double privilege), distortion of communicative processes and the dilemma of collective 
action. I brought the two levels together within the framework in order to understand how 
they are functionally connected. In doing this I sought to reconcile the disjoint theorising on 
the subject that was described in Chapter One. 
Part Three contained the two case studies. The Black Head study was conducted 
over Chapters Six to Nine, and was the more straightforward of the two. In Chapter Six I 
described the natural character of the area, its historical use, and the arguments surrounding 
quarrying. Chapter Seven provided an historical narrative of conflict, and in Chapter Eight I 
analysed the conservation settlement The Black Head conflict was relatively 
uncomplicated in substantive terms. Similarly, the process of conflict played out within a 
very limited negotiating framework, and as a consequence the pattern of conflict was both 
fluid and informal. But there are a number of very interesting characteristics of the dispute 
that are worthy of mention. Of great note was the disjuncture revealed by Cullen's 
discounting analysis. While the outcome of the dispute was generally portrayed as a 
significant commercial sacrifice on the part of the Company, Cullen revealed it to have been 
quite the contrary - BHQ would in all likelihood profit from the conservation agreement. 
The Black Head dispute was a clear case of business dominance both in procedural terms 
where the Company had largely determined the pattern of discourse, and in terms of the 
substantive outcome. 
In Chapter Nine I used the analytical framework to explain how the Company had 
been able to prevail. First of all there was a clear correspondence between the study and the 
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value-form arguments. Both the political split between business and conservation, and the 
substantive divide at the heart of the dispute, were described by the value-form distinction. I 
distinguished two levels on which value-form operated. One level was as an expression of 
value (means argument). At that level there was some crossover; BHQ did utilise use-value 
arguments, and the conservationists' alluded (albeit in the most abstract manner) to the 
possible commercial benefits of protection. But in terms of distinguishing between social 
actors it is the level of the parties' motivations (ends) that is crucial. On that level it was 
only the company that was apparently motivated by the chase after exchange, and 
conversely, the conservationists that were apparently motivated by various non-
commodified interests. In addition to this I also examined the connection between 
commodity valuation and environmental harm and noted that the way the Company valued 
the resource at Black Head was in some part causative of the destruction. Most 
significantly, the way that BHQ internalised its benefits and externalised its costs. 
I then proceeded to examine the power element. Because the Black Head conflict 
played out largely at the level of local politics, Offe's principles were somewhat limited in 
their explanatory power. However, it was also probable that those principles were shaping 
the behaviour of the local government actors. I concluded that the exclusion and 
dependency mechanisms operated in indirect and secondary (or deep) ways. That is, the 
exclusion principle accounted for the broad division of labour that tended to operate between 
the state and capital, and the pressure upon the state not to become directly involved in 
organising commodity production. The dependency principle described an undoubted 
relationship between the state and business across both state and local government actors. I 
concluded that strategic implications of that relationship were probably strongest at the local 
government level with the close relationship between the council's and BHQ and its parent 
companies. By contrast, DoC was relatively buffered from that pre-disposition. Of most 
use in explanation were the maintenance and legitimation principles. The maintenance role 
clearly accounted for the actions of the Mines Division, probably explained the nOD-
participation of the Dunedin City Council, and in some part DoC's hesitant approach to the 
issue. The legitimation role was articulated in two ways, firstly to motivate both the 
Silverpeaks County Council and DoC to act as mediators or intermediaries seeking the 
resolution of conflict, and most significantly, in mobilising DoC's actions as an advocate 
(response to political struggle . 
. The five specific mechanisms of business dominance were of more concrete 
explanatory power (although they were all connected in some meaningful way with the 
wider mechanisms). The business sanction did play some part, both as a general constraint 
upon the actors, and more concretely, in limiting which options for protection were feasible, 
the subtle exercise of job-blackmail, and the possibility of the environmental sanction. The 
role of private property was singularly the most important source of business dominance in 
the Black Head conflict. The Company held an anomalous and anachronistic bundle of use 
rights that in considerable part caused the conflict, and subsequently enabled BHQ to control 
the dispute process, and ultimately the options for preservation. There was a strong 
asymmetry of resources between the actors, although that was partly mitigated by DoC's 
advocacy on behalf of the conservation interests. One interesting point in respect of 
resources was that the power that the Company derived from its property right meant that it 
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did not have to mobilise any significant resources in defence of its interests. As Cullen's 
analysis revealed the Company displayed a remarkable ability to define reality within the 
dispute. This happened throughout the conflict as BHQ constantly distorted the valuation of 
the headland and determined what options were technically and commercially feasible. But 
it is the disjuncture between the general perceptions of the settlement and Cullen's 
discounted figures that provides the most invaluable insight into the way business power can 
distort the terms of discourse. Finally, the dilemma of collective action was useful in 
explaining why the business acted collectively within the conflict, and why people may not 
have played active roles. It cannot explain the commitment and sacrifice of the core 
conservation and Maori campaigners. 
I then moved on to the WRMF conflict, which was one of the most significant 
environmental disputes in New Zealand in recent times. In Chapter Ten I described the 
Whanganui River system, the genesis and operation of the TPD, and the effects of the 
scheme upon the river system. In Chapter Eleven I dealt first of all with the political 
economy of electricity generation, before focusing more specifically upon the arguments 
surrounding the diversion of water. In Chapter Twelve I provided a narrative of the dispute 
and provided a general assessment of the three successive substantive decisions on flow 
levels. In terms of the general form and content of the dispute, the Whanganui conflict was 
very different from the Black Head dispute: The substantive discourses were broader and 
technically complex; There was greater and more reasoned scrutiny of arguments; The 
process was played out in a wider and more politicised context; Decision-making was 
largely formal; The financial costs of participation were very high; And the substantive 
outcome of the dispute was indeed a compromise position (albeit one that largely favoured 
business). 
In Chapter Thirteen I followed the same procedure as Chapter Nine. At the end of 
that chapter I provided a detailed summary of my findings. However, because that was just 
prior to this general conclusion, I will avoid unnecessary repetition by focusing here upon 
those findings that either diverged from the Black Head dispute, or were of particular 
interest. 
The value-form conclusions were essentially the same as with Black Head; both in 
terms of the substantive/political split and in terms of the mechanisms of harm. However, 
one particular issue is worth highlighting. When considered in institutional terms, the SOE 
form occupies a grey area between the state and business. However, on the basis of the 
value-form argument the ultimate interests of Electricorp were held to be the chase after 
exchange value. From that point onwards I treated the Corporation as essentially a capitalist 
actor, albeit one that stood in a special relationship with government 
The strategic relationships of Offe's schema were extremely valuable in the 
explication of the WRMF dispute. There were a number of reasons for this. In constructing 
the case study I provided a significant amount of historical and contextual detail. The case 
study took in the genesis of the power scheme, the historical origins of conflict, and the 
wider neo-liberal structural reform program including the transformation of both the 
electricity sector and the environmental administration. The ambit of my investigation thus 
took in an extended time frame, including a period of great change, and the actors within the 
dispute were themselves caught up in those transformations. It was therefore possible to 
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plot the changing dynamics of the dispute against those wider transformations of the role of 
the state. Some examples: The exclusion principle explained the pressure upon the state to 
deregulate and corporatise electricity generation and transmission; Over the course of the 
dispute the articulation of the maintenance role was redefined from one of direct 
intervention, to a conscious distancing of the state from operational control. This helped 
explain both the genesis of the TPD and the later reluctance of government to seek some sort 
of corporatist accommodation; Finally, it was possible to observe first, an historical 
legitimation deficit arising from the state's zealous performance of its maintenance role, and 
later, the subsequent compensation for that in terms of DoC's persistent advocacy (positive 
right). 
The five mechanisms of business dominance operated quite differently within the 
Whanganui conflict. In the Black Head conflict the Company's power was largely 
derivative of the property rights structure, whereas in the Whanganui dispute Electricorp's 
influence essentially derived from its overwhelming resource advantage. Consistent with 
Lindblom's portrayal of corporate capital. Electricorp possessed superior financial, 
organisational and political resources compared to other actors in civil society. Without 
doubt the possession of those resources (mostly financial) greatly privileged the corporation 
in its advocacy (especially in the inherently expensive context of litigation). and hence in its 
success in retaining the greatest portion of flows for its use. But one of the most interesting 
things about the Whanganui dispute was that despite Electricorp being a large Corporation 
with vast resources, it failed to derive a great deal of strategic power from some of the 
remaining mechanisms. For example, the Corporation's ability to sanction was greatly 
constrained by on the one hand. its inability to transfer its investments, and on the other 
hand, that the impacts of any commercial sanction would be diffuse. It was thus possible to 
elicit a greater understanding of the pre-conditions necessary for the operation of each 
mechanism. Probably the greatest inSight to come out of the comparative study, was that in 
both disputes business displayed a significant yet relative ability to dominate. However, the 
sources of dominance - the 'mix' of generative mechanisms - differed substantially between 
the two conflicts. I will enlarge on this point later in discussion. 
In concluding the Whanganui study I observed that Electricorp's substantive victory 
was relative rather than absolute. The in-stream/environmental interests did gain a great 
deal, but in aggregate the Corporation did far better. The challenge for the framework was 
to explain (in some meaningful part) how Electricorp - a very powerful business actor - did 
lose the use of some flows at a significant financial cost. I offered two broad reasons for 
this. The first was in terms of the particular effectiveness of the in-stream challenge (albeit 
at a huge cost to those groups and individuals). This demonstrated that environmental actors 
can and do extract substantial concessions in their collective efforts. However. very few 
examples of conservation advocacy involve the kind of deployment of resources that 
happened in the Whanganui issue. The other reason was with respect to the Corporation 
itself, and the efficacy of the mechanisms posited in my framework. Electricorp's power in 
the dispute was reduced by, inter alia, their inheritance of the legitimation deficit, the 
reconfigured maintenance role that meant the state was reluctant to actively intervene in 
support of the commercial interests, their position as a monopoly with attendant legitimation 
problems, the weak form of private property present in the water right and the countervailing 
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constraint of the Water Act, their inability to sanction, and the scrutiny of their arguments 
within the formalised decision-making process. All of these factors served to constrain the 
powers of the Corporation, yet it still remained dominant. 
Explanation 
I will return now to the essential focus of the project; the ability of business to dominate 
within environmental conflict, the exercise of this capacity, and the consequences of such 
dominance. What has this project revealed about these phenomena? I will begin with the 
exercise of this capacity because in this thesis I have chosen to study observable episodes of 
environmental conflict in order to gain entree to the mechanisms of power. 
On a general level the realist understanding of society is an invaluable foundation for 
comprehending the exercise of mechanisms of business power. I will highlight two useful 
insights (of many). The first is that such mechanisms operate within open systems and will 
therefore act complexly with other causal factors to produce events. It is thus possible to say 
that mechanisms of business power operated in a dispute yet environmental interests 
extracted concessions. For example, in the Whanganui dispute the Water Act served to 
constrain the power of Electricorp's water right, whereas in the Black Head dispute there 
was no resource legislation that could directly limit the environmental impacts of quarrying. 
One of the most significant implications of this is that it avoids the errors of determinism or 
dogmatism, and allows for a plurality of explanations. The other point is that mechanisms 
of dominance must be understood in transfactual terms. This may mean that a mechanism 
of influence, say a property right, is exercised but produces no observable event, or an event 
that is not observed. This also has important implications because it suggests that the 
mechanisms posited in this thesis will operate beyond the realm of observable 
environmental conflict. For example, the possibility that business will exercise sanctions 
may work to suppress the emergence of environmental conflict, or of wider environmental 
initiatives. 
The next observation of note is that the various mechanisms operate both jointly and 
separately, both vertically and horizontally. At the end of Chapter One I noted that I wanted 
to vertically integrate the levels of analysis to see how the mechanisms studied empirically 
by neo-pluralists are connected to wider structural observations. Take, for example, the 
issue of property rights. Pluralists such as Schrecker have observed in their empirical 
studies of environmental conflict (see 1.4.) that private property rights serve to privilege 
business. These are useful observations, and I have made similar ones within this thesis. 
However, to understand why this is so one needs to examine the critical function of private 
property for commodity production and exchange. And to further comprehend how the 
privilege is maintained one needs to understand factors such as the state's role in the 
enforcement of those rights. In terms of horizontal connection between the mechanisms, an 
example would be the link between BHQ's private property right and its consequent ability 
to define reality. So by bringing these mechanisms together within my framework it has 
been possible to study their joint exercise. This is one of the most significant developments 
in this work, and is aimed at filling the gap in the literature that I noted in Chapter One. 
The third set of insights is in respect to the conditions necessary for the exercise of 
each mechanism. The business sanction is a good example here. In 5.4.(i) I argued that this 
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form of business power is derived from the potential cessation, translocation, reduction or 
even withholding of future investment or production. It was thus interesting to observe the 
limited efficacy of this mechanism for Electricorp because there was little potential for such 
movements, and, moreover, any consequences would be diffuse. In other cases the 
sanctioning mechanism will be very effective (take for example, the 'fast ferries' conflict 
outlined in Chapter One where the local businesses were pitted against the environmentalists 
because of the possibility that Tranz Rail would move its operations elsewhere). Each of the 
posited mechanisms requires a particular set of conditions to be exercised. One of the 
strengths of the comparative case study method for this project is that it reveals how those 
operative conditions mayor may not be present. However, because there are a broad array 
of mechanisms available to business (I am not implying the necessity for conscious use) it is 
likely that some of the mechanisms will be available to reasonable sized enterprises in most 
instances of conflict. This empirical observation is further bolstered by the logical 
derivation of most of these mechanisms from general characteristics of commodity 
production in advanced capitalist society - as is contained within the analytical framework. 
Still on the topic of operative conditions, Offe's model deserves specific attention. 
In the Black Head conflict it was possible to point to obvious examples of those 
relationships - the Mines Division's performance of the maintenance role, or DoC's 
articulation of the legitimation role. However, while these were crucial relationships they 
were fairly limited in their ability to explain specific patterns of behaviour or influence. It 
was in the Whanganui study that I was able to more fully exploit the explanatory insights of 
Offe's principles. This is because Offe's schema requires supplementary historical work at 
the system-wide level (which partly accounts for the size of the Whanganui study). Having 
provided that background, Offe's schema was crucial to the comprehensive understanding of 
business power in that conflict. I tum now to the issue of the ability of business to dominate 
in environmental conflict. 
Two broad approaches can be taken here in concluding what this thesis says about 
the ability of business to dominate in environmental conflict. The first approach is to 
generalise from the empirical observations; namely in both disputes business was able to 
prevail. In the Black Head conflict the Company displayed a remarkable ability to control 
the course and outcome of events, and in the Minimum Flows conflict Electricorp's vast 
resources enabled it to shape much of the pattern of conflict and to successfully mitigate 
what were probably inevitable losses (and could easily have been far greater). These two 
studies add to the body of evidence that suggests that business occupies a privileged 
position. The second, and more forceful argument, is founded on the causal explanations 
contained here. While I have focused upon the manifest exercise of these mechanisms of 
influence, by understanding the causes of business dominance as arising out of the 
ownership and control of commodity production, and the wider structural (albeit historically 
contingent) dynamics of advanced capitalist society, it is possible to make general 
statements. As I noted in the above paragraphs, in both of the disputes a series of 
mechanisms operated to enable business to dominate. Those mechanisms are likely to be 
broadly available (in different mixes) to business. However the ability of business to 
dominate in any particular setting will be historically contingent. So on the basis of 
empirical observation and the causal understanding of these mechanisms, I would assert that 
:~-: 
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business derives substantial political power out of the ownership and control of commodity 
production, power that it can readily use to dominate in environmental conflict (note this is a 
tendential assumption). It is also useful to bear in mind the realist understanding that power 
(ability) may be possessed without being exercised in any given context 
The consequences of dominance also brings discussion back to the opening 
paragraph of the thesis: to investigate how these two elements together systematically 
subvert both the possibility of sustainable relationships with the natural world, and the 
ability of people to participate in decision-making in respect to their environments. I will 
first deal with the issue of business dominance and sustainability. 
In each of the disputes studied here considerable environmental harm was caused by 
business activity. This is in itself significant. Both Black Head and the Whanganui River 
system were held to be of great value for reasons other than commercial use, and some of 
those values would be lost in perpetuity and others would be lost as long as the business 
activity persisted. However, as I observed above, those examples of environmental harm are 
both symptomatic and constitutive of wider environmental problems. Hence, my argument 
about the relationship between business dominance and environmental harm has broader 
implications. In this thesis I have identified a fundamental connection between business and 
environmental harm in the value-form relation. I observed that the preoccupation with 
exchange-value played a causal role in both disputes (most notably through the 
intemalisation of commercial benefits and the externalisation of environmental costs). The 
argument about the dangers of treating the natural world in commodified terms has been 
made by ecologists (eg. Leopold), systems theorists (such as Wilden), and Marxists, among 
others. While it can only be a partial explanation of environmental harm in advanced 
capitalist society it is a crucial one, and it is one that is systematically connected to business 
actors. 4 I must also emphasise that because it is understood in realist terms this theory can 
readily accommodate instances where business is acting to reduce environmental harm (eg. 
waste management companies). I have already concluded that business derives substantial 
political power out of the ownership and control of commodity production, power that it can 
use to dominate in environmental conflict. The value-form argument adds another 
dimension to this where through dominating within environmental conflict business will 
tend to contribute to the causation of environmental harm and thus subvert the development 
of sustainable relations. 
The argument that mechanisms of business power will hamper the achievement of 
sustainable environmental relationships is bolstered by the second matter; the unequal 
ability of people to participate in decision-making in respect to their environments. On the 
basis of the observations in these studies, the reverse side of business dominance is that: 
First, some real environmental problems that affect people may be systematically hidden 
from them (businesses ability to define reality is especially important here); Secondly, many 
environmental concerns held by people will not be raised in the first place; Thirdly, (and 
crucially in the context of environmental conflict) environmental advocates (where they are 
4 Although very valuable as an organising principle and in understanding the ways the actors in the disputes 
related to the natural world, I think the strength of the value-fonn argument will only be fully realised at a 
wider system-wide level. For example, it will only be when the basalt from Black Head, or the electricity 
from the Western Diversion flows, is consumed at a distance, mediated by markets, that the most damaging 
and cumulative consequence of abstraction/disconnection will be felt. 
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not acting as capitalists) will be structurally disadvantaged in their political efforts relative to 
business actors; Fourthly, the state will be limited in the extent to which it can protect non-
commodified environmental interests in broad historical terms (ie. it may be particularly 
effective in certain contexts); And fifthly, that these disadvantages will result in 
environmental harm and the perpetuation of unsustainable relations with the natural world. 
In the context of this thesis even if one does not subscribe to the value-form argument, this 
basic political observation still provides a sound environmental argument against business 
dominance. But as I also noted in the first chapter, the types of inequalities demonstrated in 
environmental conflict (take for example the types of sacrifices that had to be made by Sue 
Maturin or Keith Chapple) subvert the notion of anything more than nominal democracy in 
environmental decision-making. So there is a very powerful social justice argument that 
stands alongside the environmental one. 
So in answer to the essential question that I stated in the opening paragraph of this 
thesis, I have contributed to a fuller understanding of the exercise of mechanisms of business 
power, provided added confirmation of this ability, and revealed some ways that this 
phenomenon subverts both the possibility of sustainable relationships with the natural world, 
and the ability of people to participate in decision-making in respect of their environments. 
Before I proceed to make some broad comments on the emancipatory consequences 
of this project I will make some observations about the limits to my approach within this 
project and point to where further development will be useful. The first point I will stress is 
that in constructing my framework I sought to collect together mechanisms already 
identified in the literature as relevant to the domain of environmental conflict or politics. 
However, over the course of the study there arose additional issues such as the role of the 
courts that will need to be more fully worked out (either in terms of existing mechanisms, 
such as Offe' s principles, or in their own right). This is by no means problematic because 
the open realist framework can accommodate such developments. The second point is that 
by taking a comprehensive approach to this subject one necessarily sacrifices the insights e:f 
focusing upon a few mechanisms. An alternative approach that would build on the findings 
of this study would be to take, for example, an issue such as private property rights and 
construct a vertical study that considers the basis of their priVilege, their articulation and 
their support by the state. Such a study could cover a series of conflicts for greater 
comparative value. Thirdly, there were eleven broad categories dealt with in the context of 
each case study. My methodological response (see 3.3.(ii» was to apply the framework on 
the completion of a full contextual study. It would have been unworkable to wind the 
principles through the studies or discuss the mechanisms sequentially, without a full 
contextual picture of the conflicts. The downside of this is was that the case studies were 
bulky. Nevertheless it was unavoidable given the integrative nature of this project. None 
of these issues undermine this project but they do point to possible developments in the 
future. 
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Emancipation 
In Chapter Two I set out the critical realist argument that social science has a potential, and 
sometimes inevitable, role to play in processes of human emancipation.S Most particularly, 
that "successful explanation of underlying structure is an essential prerequisite for effective 
policy~making".6 Although I would add that it is an essential pre~requisite for all types of 
decision~making. The explanation of structures of business power contained within this 
thesis will have manifold implications. Their development is beyond the boundaries of this 
project, so I will provide only three brief examples of the types or levels of application that 
may follow. 
A first level could be labelled advocacy strategies. The understanding of the array of 
mechanisms of dominance could stand as a resource for deciding upon optimal strategies for 
opposing environmentally harmful business activity,7 They could thus assist in identifying 
what forms of advantage are available to a business in a given geo-historical context, and 
conversely where weaknesses lie. For example, the necessity of combating information 
deficits in situations where business acts to control communications, or the absolute 
importance of recruiting state actors such as DoC to a particular cause, or to counter 
attempts to sanction by assessing the limitations upon a company's ability to move or 
withhold its capital. Of course, environmentalists have always looked for such weaknesses, 
but a comprehensive analysis may be useful. 
A second level could be in motivating institutional reform (or indeed deterring 
certain types of reform). An example of the need to deter reform is in respect to businesses 
efforts to see DoC's advocacy function extinguished or watered down. Indeed, the two 
conflicts studied here provide a strong argument for the enhancement of the advocacy 
function (of course this would bring it into greater conflict with the maintenance dynamic). 
The Black Head conflict confirms the necessity for planning laws and their extension to 
existing uses to restrain the excesses of landowners. The inherent difficulties with the 
commodity form prompt other solutions, for example; Leopold's advocacy of ethical 
remedies, market frameworks or regulations that force business to intemalise costs, the need 
to provide information on commodities denoting that they were manufactured in a 
sustainable way, etc. 
The trouble with these types of reform is that they do not get at the fundamental 
structural mechanisms at work, and so there is a possible third level; radical social 
transformation. Where Leopold sought the extension of ethics as a response to the 
alienating and exploitative consequences of the commodity, Marx sought the wholesale 
subversion of the commodity relations. In this thesis I have observed that the ability of 
business to dominate in environmental conflict and to inflict environmental harm flows out 
of the ownership and control of commodity production. Given the global environmental 
imperatives identified at the outset of this thesis, there are strong arguments for change at 
this level. 
S Where emancipation is understood to be "the transition from an unwanted, unnecessary and oppressive 
situation to a wanted and/or needed and empowering or more flourishing situation" R Bhaskar, 1994, Plato 
Etc. p. 253. 
6 P. Dalziel, 1994. "Critical Realism and the Methodology of Economics" p. 5. 
7 They may equally assist a business to identify its own structural advantages within a conflict. 
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These are just three broad examples of the political implications of this type of work. 
The transformational model of the society/person connection - with its recognition of the 
fundamental role of social structure balanced with a meaningful role for the historical agent 
- allows for the possibility of enlightened action at all of these levels. 
Conclusion 
In approaching the problem of business dominance in environmental conflict I have brought 
together three strands of argument; the broadly meta-theoretical or philosophical, the 
broadly theoretical, and the broadly empirical. By doing so I have been able to draw 
together, develop and successfully investigate a range of mechanisms that have been 
variously described elsewhere. By undertaking this kind of integrative project I have sought 
to - at least in some meaningful part - fill a distinct gap in the literature. The theoretical 
insights of political economy, empirical insights of liberal scholars, and the socio-ecological 
insights of those such as Leopold or systems-theorists, can all be brought together to provide 
a more comprehensive understanding of the ability, exercise and consequences of this form 
of social power. The ability of business to dominate is real and pervasive, the exercise of 
those powers is historically contingent yet business is able to draw on a range of 
mechanisms and thus adapt to diverse circumstances. Such dominance poses a serious 
impediment to the achievement of sustainable relationships with the natural world, and the 
ability of people to participate in decision-making in respect to their environments. But the 
realist understanding of social science suggests the possibility of structural transformation 
through the enhanced understanding of the world, and through the meaningful role of the 
historical agent in the face of structures of dominance. 
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Appendix A 
The Black Head Covenant 
Covenant for Conservation Purposes 
(Section 27 Conservation Act 1987) 
361 
Whereas Black Head Quarries Limited a company incorporated under the Companies Act 
1933 and having its registered office at Fairfield ("The Landholder") and the Minister of 
Conservation ("The Minister") 
Whereas 
A Section 27 of the Conservation Act 1987 provides that: 
(i) There may be granted or reserved over any land any covenant for conservation 
purposes in favour of the Minister. 
(ii) Every such covenant shall run with and bind the land that is subject to the burden 
of the covenant, and shall be deemed to be an interest in land for the purposes of the 
Land Transfer Act 1952. 
B The Landholder is registered as proprietor of an estate in fee simple of the land described 
in the Schedule ("the land") being the seaward edges of a basaltic headland comprising 
more or less regular five-seven sided columns in various formations. 
C The Landholder and the Minister have agreed that the land be managed with the 
following conservation objectives: 
(i)That the basalt column formations on the land be preserved and protected from 
further quarrying effects. 
(ii)That when it is safe and appropriate to do so public access across the land to the 
formations will be permitted and improved. 
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(iii)That the formations on the land affected by earlier quarrying operations will be 
cleared of spoil and other wise rehabili tated. 
(iv)That the native flora and fauna on the land be protected and restored where 
practicable. 
Now Therefore This Deed Witness that in accordance with Section 27 of the Conservation 
Act 1987 the Landholder and the Minister Mutually Covenant that the land shall be 
managed for the purposes and objectives listed in recital C above and in particular on the 
following conditions: 
1 (a) No act or thing shall be done or placed or permitted to remain upon the land that 
in the opinion of the Minister materially alters the actual appearance or condition of 
the land and which in the opinion of the Minister is prejudicial to the aim and purpose 
of within written conservation covenant Provided However that the spillage of some 
material onto the land in terms of subclause (b) of this clause is envisaged during the 
continuation of quarrying operations above the land. 
(b) The Land Holder will take all reasonable measures to ensure there is minimal 
spillage of material on to the land particularly on to those parts of the land known as 
the Roman Baths and the Dock. The amount or extent of spillage shall not be greater 
than that permitted in terms of the consent given by the Minister of Conservation 
pursuant to section 244(3) of the Harbours Act 1950 a copy of which is annexed to 
this Deed. 
(c)The Landholder will notify the Regional Conservator Departinent of Conservation 
Dunedin (the "Regional Conservator") at least two days before any blasting or back. 
actor work is carried out which could result in debris falling into the Roman Baths or 
the Dock and will permit the Regional Conservator and any other person or persons 
authorised by him and who are working for the Department to observe the effects of 
such blasting work if it is safe to do so. 
(d)The Landholder will take all reasonable means to avoid causing the collapse of the 
pinnacle at the highest point of the land or the breaking of any portion from that 
pinnacle. 
2 The Landholder will discuss from time to time with the Regional Conservator the 
matter of public access to the land with a view to permitting public access across the 
land when it is reasonably safe and appropriate to do so. It is preferred that access 
when available is to be generally to and across that part of the land above the western 
foreshore. The parties agree that access to the land is at any individual's own risk and 
it is each individual's responsibility to take appropriate precautions whilst on the land. 
The Landholder will permit the Regional Conservator to erect signs and notices on the 
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land relating to the existence of the covenant warning of risk and interpreting the 
features. 
3 The Landholder shall not permit any change in the character of the topography of the 
except as may be authorised in writing by the Minister. 
4 The Landholder shall not build any hoardings on the land or erect any buildings or 
other structures thereon Provided However that with the approval of the Minister the 
Landholder may erect structures to facilitate public access. 
5 The Landholder shall not mine the land and shall notify the Minister of any intention 
by any person or company to mine the land for minerals petroleum or any other 
substance or deposit and shall not signify any concurrence in relation to mining 
without the written consent of the Minister. 
6 The Landholder shall notify the Minister of any intention to erect utility transmission 
lines on the land and shall not signify any concurrence in relation to the proposed 
work without the written permission of the Minister. 
7 No native vegetation will be removed or damaged. No exotic colonising vegetation 
will be removed or damaged without the approval of the Minister. No vegetation will 
be planted on the land without the approval of the Minister. 
8 (a)The Minister will so far as is practical;>le keep the land free from gorse broom sweet 
briar nodding thistle and all noxious plants and in particular comply with the 
provisions of any notices given under the Noxious Plants Act 1978. 
(b)The Landholder will so far as is practicable keep the land free from exotic tree· 
species. 
9 The Landholder shall not permit the accumulation of any rubbish or material which is 
unsightly or offensive on the land Subject However to the proviso to clause l(a). 
10 The Landholder shall not subdivide the land except for such conservation purposes as 
may be authorised in writing by the Minister. 
11 Any officer of the Department of Conservation or any other person working n behalf 
of that Department may after first advising the Landholder of his or her intention so to 
do and receiving the consent of the Landholder (which consent shall not be 
unreasonably withheld but may be subject to reasonable conditions) enter upon the 
land for the purposes of viewing the state and condition thereof or for the purposes of 
carrying out such work as may be necessary for the protection or maintenance of the 
land consistent with the aims and purposes expressed herein or for the purpose of 
research provided that no such work shall be carried out which material interferes with 
the existing use of the land. The Landholder shall allow any such officer or other 
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person as aforesaid to enter upon the land for any of the purposes aforesaid the full 
free uninterrupted and unrestricted right liberty and privilege from time to time and at 
all times by day and by night to go pass and repass on foot and with or without 
machinery and implements of any kind over and along any part of the land comprised 
and described in the Certificate of title which the land comprises part. 
12 The Landholder shall not directly or indirectly damage alter or impede access to any 
facilities (including information notices or boards) that may be placed on or affixed to 
the land in pursuance of objective (ii) in C above. 
13 The Minister may provide to the Landholder from time to time and at any time upon 
request by the Landholder such technical advice or assistance as may be necessary or 
desirable to assist in meeting the objectives set out in this Deed. 
14 For the avoidance of doubt: 
(a) The covenants contained in this Deed shall bind the Landholder and the 
Landholder's heirs executors administrators successors and assigns in perpetuity. 
(b) The Landholder shall not be personally liable in damages for any breach of 
covenant committed after it has parted with all interest in the land in respect of which 
such a reach occurs. 
(c) Where there is more than one registered proprietor of the land the covenants 
contained in this Deed shall bind each proprietor jointly and severally. 
(d) Where the Landholder is a company the covenants contained in this Deed shall 
bind a receiver liquidator statutory manager of statutory receiver. Where the 
Landholder is a natural person in this Deed shaH bind the Official Assignee. In either 
case this Deed binds a mortgagee in possession. 
(e) The reference to any Act in this Deed extends to and includes any amendment or 
re-enactment of that Act. 
(f) Any notice required to be given in terms of this Deed shaH be sufficiently given if 
made in writing and served as provided in Section 152 of the Property Law Act 1952 
and shall be sufficiently given if actually received by the party to whom it is addressed 
or that party's solicitor. 
(g) Any notice required to be given by the Minister shall be sufficiently given if it is 
signed by the Regional Conservator, Department of Conservation, Dunedin. Any 
notice required to be served upon the Minister shall be sufficiently served if delivered 
to the office or the time being of the Regional Conservator, Department of 
Conservation, Dunedin. 
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(h) Any dispute which arises between the Landholder and the Minister in any way 
relating to this Deed may be resol ved by referring the dispute to an agreed third party 
for decision or by arbitration under the Arbitration Act 1908. 
Dated 14th day of May 1991 
Schedule 
All those parcels of land situated in the Otago Land District containing together 3.5 hectares 
more or less being parts of Section 3, Block XIV, Dunedin and East Taieri Survey District 
and being part of the land comprised and described in Certificate of Title Register Volume 
, 
255 folio 278 Limited as to Parcels (Otago Registry) as the same is more particularly shown 
marked with the letters "A" and "B" and outlined with bold red lines on the attached 
elemental plan. 
Signed by Denis Marshall, Minister of Conservation & Jim Hunter Managing Director 
Black Head Quarries Limited. 
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Appendix B 
Harbours Act Consent 
The Minister of Conservation hereby consents, pursuant to section 244(3) of the Harbours 
Act 1950, to the removal by 
Black Head Quarries Ltd. 
Green Island 
Dunedin 
of material from the headland known as Black Head (Certificate of Title 255/278), subject 
to the following conditions: 
a That where removal is to take place more or less above the foreshore or the sea, 
blasting holes be drilled vertically, that they be not greater than 90mm width, and 
that explosives not be placed within four meters of the outside edge of the headland. 
b For blasting more or less above the foreshore or the sea, inward burden to be not 
greater than 2.5 m per hole. 
c That material loosened by blasting be pulled inwards (ie. away from the foreshore or 
the sea below) with all possible care being taken to avoid spillage outwards. 
d That in the event that any variation in (a), (b) or (c) appears desirable in order to 
reduce spillage or the size of spilled material (this could arise in areas where whole 
blocks larger than 2.5 m3 might detach and roll into the sea), a variation can be 
approved by the regional conservator. 
e Notwithstanding compliance with conditions (a) to (d) the amount or dimensions of 
any material spilled on to the foreshore or into the sea shall be such that it does not 
alter the shape of the shoreline depicted in the photographs in the company's 1990 
management plan. (This condition means that the amount of spillage or the size of 
rocks spilled will have to be small enough for the sea to pick up or remove them, 
leaving the shape of the shoreline as so depicted after allowing for a reasonable period 
of wave action.) 
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f The regional conservator shall be notified prior to any drilling, blasting or pulling 
inwards of material at the outside edge of the headland more or less above the 
foreshore or the sea. 
Signed by Phillip Woollaston, Minister of Conservation. 
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Appendix C 
Section 244(3) of the Harbours Act 1950 
Not withstanding anything to the contrary in this or any other Act or in any rule of law, 
where the removal of any material from any part of any land is likely to produce, either 
directly or indirectly, any detrimental effect on the foreshore or on any beach or reserve 
adjoining the foreshore, or to lead, either directly or indirectly, to any inroad by the sea or 
by any tidal water, it shall be unlawful for the owner of the land or any person to remove 
that material from that part of the land without the prior consent in writing of the appropriate 
authority, which shall be the Minister where the foreshore, at or adjoining the place at 
which the removal is likely to produce any such effect or to lead to any such inroad as 
aforesaid, is vested in the Crown, and the Harbour Board or local authority where the 
foreshore, at or adjoining that place, is vested in a Harbour Board or local authority. 
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Appendix D 
The Discounting Methodology 
The present value, P, of a series of annuities is given by: 
P= 
i (1+ i)n 
Where: 
• A is the series of annual returns accruing at the end of each year for n years. 
• i is the discount rate 
• n is the notation for the year 1,2,3, ... , n. 
In calculating; the net present costs of protecting the covenanted area of Black Head, the 
hypothetical net present costs of further protecting the eastern bluffs, and the potential cost 
reduction due to the Harbours Act consent, it was necessary to consider discrete periods of 
time occurring at a future date. To do this I used two time series for each calculation -
subtracting the shorter series from the longer. 
P= 
i(l+i)n i(l +i)n 
Where: 
• A is the series of annual returns accruing at the end of each year for period 1 
• B is the series of annual returns accruing at the end of each year for period 2 
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Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd. 
Table E.1. Company Purchases Since 1970 
Date 
1970 
1972 
1973 
977 
1982 
983 
1984 
1985 
986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Company 
. A. McLennan Ltd 
ueenstown Concrete Ltd 
c Gregor Bros Ltd 
ack Mowat Hymac 
ore gravel Ltd 
lexandra Transport Ltd 
lexandra Concrete Ltd 
tago Bitumen Ltd 
Stevenson Ltd 
ritish Asphalte (S.I) Ltd 
adford transport Ltd 
curr's Quarry Assets 
vroc Holdings Ltd 
owe AsphaIte Pty Ltd 
aveys Concrete Ltd 
avey's Concrete Ltd 
aieri Carrying Co Ltd 
arrier Waimak Ltd 
avroc Holdings Ltd 
tainless Castings Ltd 
. C. Mowat & Sons Ltd 
. F. Howey Ltd 
L Construction Ltd 
outhland Construction Co Ltd 
lackhead Quarries Ltd 
arrier Waimak Quarries 
nit Concrete Ltd 
umett Construction Ltd 
aveys Concrete Ltd 
asman Howey Ltd 
eliable Group Holdings Ltd 
oad materials Ltd 
larlborough District Council 
NL 
whiro Bay Quarries 
Purchase Method 
% with Transport Holdings Nelson Ltd 
% with Northern Transport Ltd 
chase by Queenstown Concrete Ltd. 
chase 
hare purchase within Group 
hare exchange within Group 
hare exchange within Group 
chase 
chase 
hare exchange within Group 
chase 
hase 
chase contracting division 
chase minority interest 
chase 50% - closed down 1986 
chase 
chase 58% 
chase 
chase 21% - 50% 
chase 
chase - Daveys Concrete Ltd. 
chase 
chase SO% from Allied Concrete Ltd. 
chase second 50% 
chase emulsion marketing rights 
chase crushing and sealing operation 
chase crushing operations - Renwick 
Motueka 
chase Allied FH Ltd - 1/3 interest 
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Table E.2. Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd - Regionalisatlon 
Region Company Title 
Otago Coastal Fulton Hogan Ltd 
Otago Central Fulton Hogan Central Ltd 
Southland Fulton Hogan 
Cantebury Fulton Hogan Cantebury Ltd 
NelsonIMarlborough Fulton Hogan Construction Ltd 
Auckland Fulton Hogan Contracting Ltd 
Australia: Brisbane Fulton Hogan Pavements Pty Ltd 
Incorporating 
Fulton Hogan Ltd - Fairfield 
Fairfield Asphalte Co Ltd - Fairfield 
Maxwell Bros Ltd 
Bitumen Sales Ltd 
British Asphalte (S.l.) Ltd 
Fulton Hogan Engineering Ltd 
Fulton Hogan Forestry Ltd 
Industrial Floors and Pavements Ltd 
Walton Park Sand Co. Ltd 
Daveys concrete Ltd 
Fulton Hogan Ltd - Otago Central 
Fairfield Asphalte Co Ltd - Otago Central 
Alexandra transport Ltd 
Alexandra Concrete Ltd 
Radford Transport Ltd 
Southland Construction Co Ltd 
Fairfield Asphalte Co Ltd 
Invercargill Gore Gravel Ltd 
Pavroc Contracting Ltd, including Farrier 
Waimak and Burnetts contracting and 
crushing equipment 
Tasman Howey Ltd (Tasman Asphalte Ltd, 
Bulk Bitumen Ltd) 
Reliable Group Holdings Ltd 
includes Northland, Auckland, Waikato, 
Tauranga 
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Source: A. Tyrell, 1992, The Fulton Hogan Story 1933-1993 Fulton Hogan Holdings Ltd, Fairfielct, 
Dunedin. pp.l11-15. 
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Appendix F 
Classification of Rapids 
Table F.l: Classification of Ra . lpuis 
Class Label Description 
I Practice Only minor waves and ripples, 
easy to find course, very minor 
obstacles 
II Novice Minimal manoeuvring required, 
waves three feet or less, no 
dangerous hazards 
III Intennediate Some manoeuvring required 
around rocks and/or holes, 
waves under five feet, course 
not always recognisable, 
consider scouting 
IV Advanced Multiple hazards - rocks, large 
holes, strong cross currents, 
sharp turns etc., waves over five 
feet, should be scouted 
V Expert Extremely difficult and 
complicated series of hazards, 
usually including large drops, 
very dangerous, must scout. 
VI Unrunnable Virtually impossible to float 
safely in ordinary river craft, 
high likelihood of injury or 
death 
Source: Tony Parker (Partner, Plateau Guides), 1989, 1989, Evidence on behalf of the Whanganui River 
Rows Coalition, Planning Tribunal Hearing, p.5. 
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Appendix G 
1958 Order In Council 
Authorising the Minister of Electricity to Construct and Use Works in Connection With 
the Utilisation of Water Power From the Wanganui, Tokaanu, Tongariro, Rangitikei, and 
Wangaehu Rivers for the Generation of Electrical Energy 
Cobham, Governor-General 
ORDER IN COUNCIL 
At the Government House at Wellington this 29th Day of October 1958 
Present: His Excellency the Governor-General in Council 
Pursuant to section 311 of the Public Works Act 1928, His Excellency the Governor-
General, acting by and with the advice and consent of the Executive Council, hereby 
authorises the Minist~r of Electricity to erect, construct, provide, and use such works, 
appliances, and conveniences as maybe necessary in connection with the utilisation of water 
power from the Wanganui, Tokaanu, Tongariro, Rangitikei, and Wangaehu Rivers and aU 
their tributary lakes, rivers and streams, in the Land Districts of South Auckland, Taranaki 
and Wellington, for the generation and storage of electrical energy, and with the 
transmission, use, supply, and sale of electrical energy when so generated; also to use 
electrical energy when so generated in the construction, working, or maintenance of any 
public work, or for the smelting, reduction, manufacture, or development of ores, metals, 
or other substances; also to raise or lower the level of all or any of the said rivers and their 
tributary lakes, rivers, and streams, and impound or divert the waters thereof; also to 
construct tunnels under private land, or aqueducts and flumes over the same, erect pylons, 
towers or poles thereon, and carry wires over or along any such land, without being bound 
to acquire the same, and with right of way to or along all such works and erections; and 
also to supply and sell electrical energy and recover moneys due for the same. 
T. J. Sherrard, Clerk of the Executive Council 
{N.Z.E.D. 21/75/1)1 
1 New Zealand Gazelle 30 October 1958, No. 66, p.I463. 
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Appendix H 
Electricity Statistics 1942 - 1990 
Year Total Consumers Kilometre Real Retail Gwh Percentage 
Ending Capacity (thousands) S of Line Price Generated Annual 
March (MW) (cents/unit) Increase in 
GWh 
1942 340.8 455.0 46721 18.03 1928.6 5.4 
1943 364.2 460.8 47383 16.85 2036.4 5.6 Average 
1944 414.3 465.3 47618 16.97 2170.2 6.6 annual 
1945 395.4 473.8 48539 16.45 2273.8 4.8 increase 
1946 433.9 486.2 49520 15.86 2365.0 4.0 1942-
1947 455.9 493.1 50533 15.72 2528.2 6.9 1948: 
1948 509.2 511.7 54777 14.93 2599.4 2.8 5.2% 
1949 586.7 533.4 61647 14.07 2844.4 9.4 
1950 590.0 554.6 65195 14.30 3035.8 6.7 
1951 589.9 576.3 67843 13.52 3096.7 2.0 
1952 616.1 599.5 70180 12.17 3462.3 11.8 
1953 702.0 622.4 73642 11.74 3579.0 3.4 
1954 764.9 643.8 77721 14.04 4029.5 12.6 
1955 864.6 671.3 81551 13.64 4383.2 8.8 
1956 940.2 699.6 85671 13.38 4748.3 8.3 Average 
1957 1205.2 725.9 90101 12.89 4967.4 4.6 increase 
1958 1201.0 75l.4 94041 12.43 5644.1 13.6 1949-67: 
1959 1360.0 777.5 97423 14.83 5677.4 0.6 8.1% 
1960 1509.4 802.9 100294 14.20 6360.7 12.0 
1961 1565.8 831.9 104220 13.76 6834.5 7.4 
1962 1814.6 859.7 106612 13.60 7399.3 8.3 
1963 1944.6 884.2 110146 13.19 7951.3 7.5 
1964 2006.3 912.7 112635 12.85 8963.4 12.7 
1965 2335.8 940.2 115526 12.25 9718.2 8.4 
1966 2522.1 967.1 118704 11.83 10577.6 8.8 
1967 2649.8 992.4 120699 1l.70 11316.5 7.0 
1968 2975.5 1014.5 124311 12.03 11604.6 2.5 
1969 3137.5 1080.7· 126966 12.31 12185.1 5.0 
1970 3682.7 1086.7 129891 11.71 12925.6 6.1 
1971 3908.6 1109.6 132231 10.72 13705.7 6.0 
1972 4208.6 1129.4 135898 9.97 15193.7 10.9 Average 
1973 4209.2 1154.0 128605 9.36 17253.5 13.6 annual 
1974 4543.7 1182.5 130685 8.73 18114.4 5.0 increase 
1975 4784.5 1214.9 134121 7.91 18351.7 1.3 1968-77: 
1976 5037.7 1248.9 138146 7.06 20071.2 9.4 6.4% 
1977 5365.7 1280.2 139958 8.50 20914.2 4.2 
1978 5633.7 1310.0 141899 10.24 21268.5 1.7 
1979 5623.3 1327.5 143986 9.80 21692.8 2.0 
1980 5860.4 1345.3 144632 11.88 21607.2 -0.4 
1981 6018.2 1363.2 147446 11.14 22110.6 2.3 Average 
1982 5826.6 1377.7 148853 10.56 22962.7 3.9 annual 
1983 5819.8 1396.8 150528 10.45 24301.3 5.8 increase 
1984 6382.3 1417.6 152290 9.94 25854.9 6.4 1978-90: 
1985 6987.9 1436.7 154496 9.40 26764.6 3.5 2.9% 
1986 7435.1 1462.7 156102 9.93 27017.1 0.9 
1987 7388.7 1488.3 157487 9.68 28160.4 4.2 
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1988 7398.5 1509.2 159473 9.39 28686.4 1.9 
1989 7373.0 1528.6 161309 9.40 29457.8 2.7 
1990 718 L.9 1547.6 161068 8.85 30157.3 2.4 
.. Source: 1. Marttn (ed.), 1991, People, PollIICS and Power StatIons: Electric Power GeneratIOn In New Zealand 
1880·1990 Bridget Williams Books and ECNZ, p. 294 
Note 1: The apparent reduction in length of line between 1972 and 1973 is the result of the changed basis of 
measurement from route miles to circuit kilometres. 
Note 2: Real retail electricity prices. Nominal retail prices of electricity are derived from revenue from sales 
divided by units sold. Using the Consumer Price Index of base December 1989=1000, nominal prices are 
converted to real prices in March 1990 terms. 
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